


19-8848
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

ORIGINAL

Curtis Clay Phillips Junior,
(Lower Case Figures)




Plaintiff,

v.

DELEK F. OBERLANDER, ET AL,
(CAPITAL CASE FIGURES)

DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI



Curtis Clay Phillips Junior At
(Lower Case Figures)

CURTIS PHILLIPS - LL9924
(CAPITAL CASE FIGURES)

PA. DOC. S. CT. - FOREST

286 WOODLAND DRIVE, PA 19030

MARIETTA, PENNSYLVANIA 16239

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IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Curtis Clay Phillips Junior (P)
(Capital Case Filings)

v.

DOL. #

DEREK F. OVERLANDER ET AL (P)
(Capital Case Filings)

PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

- DECISIONS BELOW -

THE DECISION OF 'THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT' (CAPITAL CASE FILINGS) APPEARS TO BE UNREPORTED. IT IS APPENDED TO THIS PETITION AS EXHIBIT A. THE ORDER OF 'THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA' (CAPITAL CASE FILINGS) ALSO DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE REPORTED. A COPY THEREOF IS ALSO APPENDED TO THIS PETITION AS EXHIBIT B.

- JURISDICTION -

THE JUDGMENT OF 'THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT' (CAPITAL CASE FILINGS) WAS ENTERED ON FEBRUARY 19TH, 2020. AN ORDER DENYING A PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS ENTERED ON APRIL 8TH, 2020, AND A COPY OF THAT ORDER IS ALSO APPENDED TO THIS PETITION AS EXHIBIT C. JURISDICTION WAS CONCURRENTLY CONFERRED ON THIS COURT IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE JUDICIAL ACT OF 1789, §§ 11;

25, 1 STAT. 78 AND 'ARTICLE III, § 2' OF 'THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) - EACH GRANTING JURISDICTION TO THE DISTRICT COURTS OF 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FILES).

- THE QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED -

THIS CASE INVOLVES FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS REGARDING THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FILES)'S JURISDICTION IN A PRIVATE BILL IN EQUITY INVOLVING THE COURT'S EXCLUSIVE EQUITY JURISDICTION UNDER THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, §§ 11, 25, 1 STAT. 78 IN CONJUNCTION WITH 'ARTICLE III, § 2' OF 'THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) AND THE NATURAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW GRANTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 'THE FIFTH AMENDMENT' TO 'THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION' (CAPITAL CASE FILES), AS WELL AS THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT TO CERTAIN MATERIAL FACTS.

- STATEMENT OF THE CASE -

THE PETITIONER FILED AN INITIATING DOCUMENT IN THE NATURE OF A PRIVATE BILL IN EQUITY INDICATING TO BE BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE EQUITY JURISDICTION GRANTED VIA THE JUDICIARY ACT, SUPRA AND ARTICLE III, SUPRA, IN WHICH HE TENDERED A RESTRICTED, SPECIAL AND PRIVATE SIGNATURE, ALLEGING THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, OFFERED SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS AS WELL AS TENDERED AGREEMENTS HAVING THE QUALITIES OF INSTRUMENTS PURSUANT TO THE OPERATION OF, AND IN THE NATURE AND SPIRIT OF, LAW AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SATISFY ALL OR ANY PORTION OF THE DEBT INCURRED UNDER

EACH INSTRUMENTALITY, AS WELL AS THAT EACH DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE TO HIM FOR THE VALUE THEREOF TENDERED AS RECOVERABLE UNDER THE LAW. PLAINTIFF ALLEGED TO BE A PRIVATE AND SOVEREIGN AMERICAN INMATE BEING HELD IN A 'PENNSYLVANIA' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) PRISON DESPITE A VACATED SENTENCE OF CONFINEMENT, DRAWN ON COLLATERAL, AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND CONSENT. HE ALLEGED THAT, IN RESPONSE TO COURT ACTIONS SOUGHT TO BE FILED AND NOTICES TO CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, HE WAS RETALIATED AGAINST BY BEING PLACED INTO SEGREGATED CONFINEMENT AND DEPRIVED OF HIS LEGAL WORK AND MATERIALS, WAS BEING DEPRIVED OF ACCESS TO THE INSTITUTION'S LAW LIBRARY, HAD HIS PROPERTY TAKEN BY OFFICERS AND HAD HIS FOOD ITEMS PURCHASED FROM PRISON COMMISSARY ORDERS DISTRIBUTED TO INMATES IN RETALIATION, AMONGST OTHER THINGS. HE ALLEGED THAT SEVERAL SURELLOR OFFICERS AND/OR STAFF MEMBERS ASSIGNED TO REVIEW HIS INTERNAL EFFORTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TENDERED VARIOUS CONCESSIONS AND/OR ACTIONS HAVING THE EFFECT OF CONCESSIONS AND DID SO ULTIMATELY. HE ALSO ALLEGED THAT THE ^{MATTER} ~~MATTER~~ WAS NOT GOVERNED BY PUBLIC POLICY OR PUBLIC LAW AND SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE LAW STRICTLY.

THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ~~EX~~ SPONTE WITHOUT EFFECTING SERVICE ON THE DEFENDANTS BASED ON PUBLIC POLICY VIA THE 'PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) VACILITATING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A 'PRISONER' IN THE MEANING OF THE SAME, AND THE PROVISIONS THEREOF APPLIED TO THE MATTER AS A RESULT. THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO DENIED A PETITION TO DETERMINE THE NECESSITY OF FILING FEES IN THE MATTER, IN SO DOING, APPLYING

A BLANKET-TYPE OPINION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT SUPPORTING INAPPLICABILITY OF FILING FEES IN THIS SPECIFIC MATTER AND DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MATERIAL FACTS.

- THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION -

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION CONCURRENTLY WITH THIS COURT IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, §§ 11, 25, SUPRA AND INHERENT IN ARTICLE III, § 2, SUPRA THAT GRANTS THE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION OF ANY MATTER FILED IN EQUITY OR IN LAW.

- REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION -

A. CONFLICTS WITH DIRECTLY BINDING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

"LOWER COURT JUDGES ARE COMMONLY FREE TO NOTE THEIR DISAGREEMENT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT. BUT THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE FORBIDS [LOWER] COURTS TO DISSECTATE THEMSELVES FROM [SUPREME] LAW BECAUSE OF A DISAGREEMENT WITH ITS CONTENT OR A REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE SUPERIOR AUTHORITY OF ITS SOURCE." HOLYETT V. ROSE, 496 U.S. 356, 371, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990); CF. KIRWAN V. STATE OIL CO., 43 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (CA7, 1996), VARADERO, 572 U.S. 3, 118 S.Ct. 215, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DONE PRECISELY SO IN ITS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 'PETITION' FOR A DETERMINATION ON APPLICABILITY OF FILING FEES IN THIS SPECIFIC MATTER. IN SO DOING, IT APPLIED A BLANKET-TYPE OPINION BASED ON POLICY OF THE 'GENERAL PUBLIC' WITHOUT LEGAL SUPPORT TO IMPOSE UPON A PURELY PRIVATE LITIGANT. IT ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE 'PETITION' AS A 'MOTION' SEEMINGLY IN AN EFFORT TO HELP THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS TO LEGITIMIZE THE ABOVE DESCRIBED APPLICATION UNDER GENERAL JURISDICTION GROUND. THE

COURT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT PUBLIC POLICY MAY NOT INFRINGE UPON PRIVATE RIGHTS OF RECOUPMENT.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT AND APPEALS COURTS WAS THEREIN LIMITED SPECIALLY TO THE EXCLUSIVE AND PRIVATE EQUITY JURISDICTION INHERENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS AS DISCUSSED ABOVE. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF PAPER AND PENS PLAINTIFF HAS AVAILABLE TO HIM, PLAINTIFF REFERS TO THE PETITION TO DETERMINE NECESSARY DATED 1/27/20 DOCKETED AT CA3-20-1141 FOR LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT. IN GRUPO MAXIMIANO DE SANCHEZ, S.A. V. ALLIANCE BOND FUND, INC., 527 U.S. 308, 119 S.Ct. 1961, 144 L.Ed2d 319 (1999), THE COURT STATED:

"THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 CONFERRED ON THE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION OVER 'ALL SUITS IN LAW AND IN EQUITY.' ... [T]HE 'JURISDICTION' THIS CONFERRED ... IS AN AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER IN EQUITY SUITS THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED AND WAS BEING ADMINISTERED BY THE ENGLISH COURTS OF CHANCERY AT THE TIME OF THE SEPARATION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. SUBSTANTIALLY, THEN, THE EQUITY JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IS THE JURISDICTION IN EQUITY EXERCISED BY THE ALTA COURTS OF CHANCERY IN ENGLAND AT THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORIGINAL JUDICIARY ACT... [T]HE SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES FOR OBTAINING AN EQUITABLE REMEDY AS WELL AS THE EXTENT AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ARE NOT DETERMINED BY [PUBLIC POLICY] AND DEPEND ON TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY JURISDICTION." 10. AT 326, P. 326 (INT. CIT. & QUOT. OMITTED).

AND THE SAME POSITION WAS RESTATE AS RECENTLY AS 2016. SEE, TRUSTEES OF CONNORRY LAKE PARK V. PARK RESTORATION, LLC, 554 BR. 100, 2016 BANKR. LEXIS 27777; 63 BANKRUPTCY CASES NOS. 14-1277-140, CH. 11 ADV. PROC. NOS. 16-01029 (2016). ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL OPINION APPEARS TO RELATE TO THE FACT THAT THE DEBTR COMPANY IN QUESTION WAS PARTIALLY PUBLICLY OWNED AND OPERATED, A WELL VERRED JUSTICE OF THIS COURT ALSO EXTENDED AN INTERESTFUL DISCUSSION IN THE CASE OF B&B HARDWARE, INC. V. HANCOCK INDUS., 135 S. CT. 1317, 191 L. ED. 2D 251 (2014), STATING:

"[T]HE RIGHT TO ADAPT AND TO EXCLUSIVELY USE A TRADEMARK APPEARS TO BE A PRIVATE RIGHT THAT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE COMMON LAW AND THE CHANCERY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND OF THIS COUNTRY. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE A TRADEMARK WAS NOT CREATED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS, AND DOES NOT NOW DEPEND ON IT FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT. THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF TRADEMARK PROPERTY AND THE CIVIL REMEDIES FOR ITS PROTECTION EXISTED LONG ANTERIOR TO THAT ACT, AND HAVE REMAINED IN FULL FORCE SINCE ITS PASSAGE. THIS, IT APPEARS THAT THE TRADEMARK VIOLATION BUT MIGHT BE OF A TYPE THAT MUST BE DECIDED BY 'ARTICLES IN JUDGES IN ARTICLES IN COURTS'" (GUTHRIE, STERN V. MARSHALL, 564 U.S. —, 131 S. CT. 2594, 180 L. ED. 2D 415, 445 (2011)) (INT. Q. & OCT. OMITTED). 10. AT 1312-14, P. 247-53.

AND IN THE MATTER OF SVEN V. MEIN, 138 S. CT. —, 201 L. ED. 2D 193 (2018), ALSO APPEARING TO BE RELATED TO CERTAIN FACTS, THE LEARNED JUSTICE STATED:

EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY "DOES NOT HOLD TRUE [FOR] COURTS²

THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY EXISTING LAWS TO DISCRETE CASES AND CONTROVERSIES INDEPENDENTLY AND WITHOUT CONSULTING, SHIRING, POLITICAL WINDS." 10. 201 LED 20 AT 197 (EMPHASIS ADDED).

AND IN "B&B HARDWARE, INC., CIVIL" (2015 LEXIS 2119; 113 VS. P.Q. 20 (3NA) 2015), IT IS STATED THAT:

"[S]INCE THE 17TH CENTURY IN ENGLAND, COURTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH THE ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE RIGHT, AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES WITH THE EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY." 10.

AGAIN, CERTAIN PRECEDENT CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION IS EVIDENTLY RELATIVE TO THE NATURE OF THE RIGHTS TO THE MATTER; HOWEVER, ALL OF THE SAME APPLIES CONSEQUENTLY TO THE MATERIAL FACTS & ISSUE IN THIS MATTER, AND TO THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AS IS THE RULE OF LAW AND AS DISCUSSED IN THE NEXT POINT.

B. DEPRIVATION OF THE NATURAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW

THE JUDICIAL ACT OF 1789 ENCOMPASSES ALL WARRANTIES OF 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) WHETHER PUBLIC, PRIVATE FOREIGN OR OTHERWISE. GILVESTON, H. & S.A.P. CO. V. BONZALOS, 151 VS. 496, 500-01, 38 LEX 248. IN ACCORD WITH THE NATURAL LAW OF MEN AND OF NATIONS, EACH AND EVERY INHABITANT THEREOF HAS THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE COURTS FOR REDRESS AND TO OBTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR A HARM SUFFERED AT THE HAND OF ANOTHER BASED ON THE MATERIAL FACTS OF HIS OR HER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS IS THE NATURAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE NATURAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS INHERENT IN 'THE FIFTH AMENDMENT' TO 'THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) AND ENTRUSTED TO THE PERSONS OF 'THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) THEREAFTER.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS BEEN DEFINED AS THE RIGHT TO BE
HEARD "AT A MEANINGFUL TIME AND IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER"; OTHERWISE
"THE PROCESS THAT IS DUE" AS SELF EXPLANATORY. LOBBAN V. ZIMMERMAN BRUSH
CO., 455 U.S. 412, 437, 102 S. CT. 1140 (1992); PROSS V. LOPEZ, ⁴¹⁹ 919 U.S. ⁵⁶⁵ 565,
⁵⁷⁹ 579, 92 S. CT. 729 (1995) & CASES CITED. THE DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A
DETERMINATION BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIAL OFFICER THAT IS BASED
ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE MATTER AND APPLYING LAW
SPECIFICALLY TO A PETITIONER'S GIVEN SITUATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THE
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE V. THE WARREN BRIDGE, ET AL, 11 PETERS. 420,
634, 9 LEO 773, 859 ("THE RULE OF LAW IS CLEAR. THE APPLICATION OF IT
MUST DEPEND ON THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE."); FED.
CR. # FB-20-90003 & ED. RA. # 2:14-CN-DSDB6 AT LETTER DATED
10/31/19 (CITING INCOME TAX CASES, PRL 787-88) (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MAKES
AS APPLIED TO THE NATURE OF THE PARTIES AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH
CASE)¹; WOLFF V. MCDONNELL, 418 U.S. 539, 565, 94 S. CT. 2463 (1974)
(DUE PROCESS REQUIRES IMPARTIAL THIRD PARTY, OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
AND PRODUCTION OF A "WRITTEN STATEMENT BY THE FACTFINDERS AS TO THE
EVIDENCE RELIED ON AND THE REASONS" FOR THE DETERMINATION); HAMDI V.
RAMMFIELD, 542 U.S. 507, 533, 538, ~~524~~ (S. CT.) 2133 (2004) ("DUE PROCESS
REQUIRES A 'NEUTRAL AND DETACHED JUDGE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE'");
SILVA V. MORTON, 380 F. 3D. 57, 74 (2ND CIR. 2004) (THE "DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO KNOW THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A [COMMIT] RULING IS BASED IS NOW
ESTABLISHED") (EMPHASIS ADDED); EDWARDS V. BALLOCH, 320 U.S. 641, 641,
117 S. CT. 1584 (1997) (DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS "ARE NOT SO LAX AS TO
LET STAND THE DECISION OF A BIASSED HEARING OFFICER" WHO TENDS

MATERIAL EVIDENCE).

AS THIS MATTER INVOLVES THE DEPRIVATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED AND PROTECTED PROPERTY THAT THE COURTS HAVE HISTORICALLY EXTENDED THE UTMOST REGARD, IT IS A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS DEPRIVATION. ZINERMAN V. BUDGET, 494 U.S. 113, 115, 110 S. CT. 925 (1990) (SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS "BARS CERTAIN ARBITRARY, WHOLLY GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 'REGARDLESS OF THE PROCEDURES USED TO IMPLEMENT THEM'" (CITATION OMITTED)); HAMM V. MUMFORD, SUPRA AT 528-31 ("[E]THER PUBLIC INTOLERANCE OR ANIMOSITY CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFY ^{THE DEPRIVATION} OF A PERSON'S PHYSICAL LIBERTY [OR PROPERTY].") (EMPHASIS ADDED). PRIVATE RIGHTS ARE DISTINCT FROM THOSE OF THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, AND, WHILE THEY CANNOT HINDER PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC RIGHTS AS COMMONLY VEST RIGHTS IN PRIVATE PEOPLE. CHARLES LIND BUDGET, SUPRA, 11 PETER 420, 563-64, 629-30, 9 LEO. 773, 830, 856⁴. THE OPINION IN CHARLES LIND BUDGET IS RELATIVE, EVIDENTLY, TO THE NATURE OF THE COMPANIES AT ISSUE THEREIN - BEING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS; HOWEVER, A LEARNED JUDGE THEREIN ALSO PROVIDED MUCH INSIGHT INTO THE NATURE OF STATUTORY LAW. ALSO NOTEWORTHY IS THE FACT THAT PETITIONER IS BEING HELD IN THE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE STATE WITH VERY LIMITED ACCESS TO MATERIALS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH OF A PUBLIC NATURE ONLY OR BASED ON SIMILAR PUBLIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AS WELL AS BEING REGULATED AGAINST FOR THE NATURE OF HIS LEGAL WORK, AND CAN PRODUCE ONLY THOSE PRECEDENTS AND/OR PUBLICATIONS ADDRESSABLE UNDER THE LOC'S CONTRACT WITH 'LEXIS NEXIS' LEGAL RESEARCH DATABASE.

THE MATTER AT ISSUE HERE INVOLVES THE 'PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT' (CAPITAL CASE FORMER) AND RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED THEREUNDER THAT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE SPECIFIC FACTS OF THIS MATTER.

PETITIONER IS NOT A 'PRISONER' WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 'PLA' (CAPITAL CASE FRAMES) AS THE SENTENCE OF CONFINEMENT DELIVERED TO HIS COLLATERAL HAS BEEN VACATED SINCE THE DATE OF JULY 15TH, 2016. ADDITIONALLY, PETITIONER HAS NOT GIVEN VALID RECEIPTABLE JURIDITION TO 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FRAMES) IN ANY GENERAL FASHION OR ANY IN PERSONAM FASHION REGARDING THE MASTER INSTRUMENT OFFERED HIM BY THE SAME OR ON ANY ENFORCEMENT THEREOF, AND IS NOT A PARTY TO THAT INSTRUMENT AS A RESULT. ~~RECEIVED~~ BROOKLYN & NEWTOWN NL CO. N. NAT. BANK, ¹⁰² ~~100~~ US, 19, 21-22 & HD. NTS. (AS CITED WITHIN 14-85086, SUPRA & FC-20-90003, SUPRA). SINCE BECOMING CAPABLE OF FINANCIAL LAW LIBRARY ACCESS AND LEARNING THE LEGAL AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS MATTER, PETITIONER HAS MOVED TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO SECURE HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY IN REGARDS THE COLLATERAL OFFERED HIM - ADMITTING SOME MINOR ERRORS WERE MADE IN THE PROCESSES STEMMING FROM THE BLOCKAGE OF LAW LIBRARY ACCESS AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF RELATED DOCUMENTATION - AND, AS MENTIONED BEFORE, HAS PERFECTED AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE COLLATERAL AND HIS ESTATE.

'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FRAMES) IS A CORPORATION. AS EVIDENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT, 1429 U.S.C. § 3002, IT IS ^{a-c} ~~(a-c)~~. AS A NATURAL MAN BEING NO INNATE LIABILITY TO A CORPORATION, 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FRAMES) PRODUCES AND DISTRIBUTES TO ITS INHABITANTS A STOCK CERTIFICATE TO A SUBSIDIARY THEREOF PURSUANT TO THE LENDING OF THE NATURAL MAN'S NAME OF CONCEPTION CHOSEN BY HIS NATURAL PARENTS THAT HE MAY OR MAY NOT ENDORSE IN A GENERAL FASHION AND THEREBY BECOME A PARTY TO THAT INSTRUMENT BEARING 'THE UNITED

OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER ALL
'PERSON' AND ESSENCE. THIS INSTRUMENT IS KNOWN AS A 'CORPORATE
PERSON' AT LAW. THE LOUISVILLE, CINCINNATI & CHARLESTON R.R. CO. V.
LEWIS, 2 HOWARD. 491, 511, 533, 558, 11 LED 353, 378 (CORPORATION
CREATED BY THE UNITED STATES IS SUFFICIENT TO GIVE DISTRICT COURT
JURISDICTION; DISCUSSING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATURAL MAN AND CORPORATE
'PERSONS'); UNITED STATES V. KARANA, 118 U.S. 378, 379-81, 30 LED.
228 (ALL OF STATES POWER DERIVED FROM STATUTES OF U.S.; 'SUBJECTS' OF U.S.
AND DEFINED AS 'WARDS' OF U.S.; U.S. RECOGNIZE NO INTEREST IN PRIVATE
PEOPLE; CONSTITUTION IS DEFINED AS AN 'INSTRUMENT' OF U.S.). UNLIKE WITH
A LAND GRANT OR AN INCORPORATED COMPANY, 'THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) HAS NO NATURAL INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT
NAME OF THE NATURAL MAN AND IS THEREFORE BOUND BY THE TERMS THAT
HE MAY SET FORTH IN THE GRANT OF THE SAME. TO WH, IT MAY HAVE A LEGAL
INTEREST THEREIN IF CERTAIN FACTS ARE PRESENT; HOWEVER, DOES NOT RETAIN
ANY EQUITABLE INTEREST.⁵

AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FACTS AND AUTHORITIES
HEREIN, THERE WAS NO INTENT IN 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL
CASE FIGURES) TO CHANGE THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 'PEOPLE' THAT IS THE
NATURAL LAW. DALSON V. REEBORN, (U.S.) 2 DAL. 419, 1 LED 440 (1797) ('THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE'); LEWIS, SUPRA (1839); CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE,
SUPRA AT 378 ("THE PARTIES MAKING A CONTRACT MAY EMBRACE ANY CONDITIONS
THEY PLEASE, IF THE CONDITIONS DO NOT CONTRAVENE LAW, OR ITS ESTABLISHED
POLICY"). PEOPLE MAY FORFEIT THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IF THEY CHOOSE TO DO SO, OR
IF THEY FAIL TO EDUCATE THEMSELVES TO THE NATURE OF THEIR TRANSACTIONS
WITH 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) - GIVING THE

EFFECT OF A CHOICE TO FORFEIT. ALL ACTS, STATUTES, CODES, RULES AND/OR MEASURES, THEREFORE, ASSUME THE NATURE OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) AND THE 'WORLD' OR SUB-COMPLETE ENTITY CREATED THEREBY, PURSUANT TO THE OPERATION OF LAW. MALLOTTING LAW DIST., 3rd ED. ('CONTRACT') (INCLUDES ALL ^{"INSTRUMENTS,"} ~~ORDINANCES~~ AND MEASURES" HAVING LIKE EFFECT) (CITING 16 AM. JUR., 2nd, §§ 43B, ET SEQ, CONST. L.); VABAMA, SUPRA AT 10 (DEFINING CONSTITUTION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE US.); ED. RA-2:14-CN-05086 & FED. CIR-FC-20-90003, SUPRA (CITING INCOME TAX CASES - ALSO DEFINING CONSTITUTION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE US.).

LIKewise, ALL ENGAGEMENTS WITH 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) ARE SUBJECT TO SAME PRINCIPLES, SO THAT A GENERAL APPEARANCE IN A COURT OF THE SAME WILL HAVE THE TECHNICAL EFFECT OF GRANTING A GENERAL JURISDICTION TO THAT SPECIFIC MATTER OR TO THE RULES OR PUBLIC LAW OF THE SAME. WHEN VIEWED IN TOTALITY IT IS FOOLPROOF TO SEE THAT THE ACTS, CODES, RULES AND STATUTES MADE IN PURSUANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY CONSTITUTE BY THE OPERATION OF LAW TERMS, OBLIGES AND/OR OBLIGATIONS OF THE 'GENERAL PUBLIC' - THOSE 'PERSONS' WHO HAVE GRANTED GENERAL JURISDICTION AND THEREBY HAVE CONVERTED THEIR GIFTS INTO CONTRACTS. SEE, ED. RA, SUPRA & FED. CIR, SUPRA (CITING THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND V. THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS AT 719 - GENERAL APPEARANCE IN DISTRICT COURT WAIVES JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS).⁷ ADHERENCE TO THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF A GIVEN MATTER THEREFORE STANDS AS A DUTY AND OBLIGATION OF THE COURTS, AS IS THE RULE OF LAW. AS IS DISCUSSED BELOW, THIS MATTER IS NOT ONE INVOLVING A CONVERSION AND THE NATURAL QUALITY OF THE PAPER PRODUCED

TO THE PORTION HAS BEEN PRESERVED AND RETAINED THROUGH THE VARIOUS ENGAGEMENTS OF THE SAME.

WHEN 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FIGURES) ENGAGES IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS ITS DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS THEREIN ARE GOVERNED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS, AND IT FORFEITS ITS SOVEREIGN STATUS AND ALL CHARACTERISTICS FLOWING THEREFROM SO FAR AS IT CONCERNS THE TRANSACTIONS OF THAT ENGAGEMENT. THE LOUUVILLE, CINCINNATI & CHARLESTON R.R. CO. V. LUTSEN, 2 HOWARD 497, 511, 533, 551, 558, 11 LED 353, 315 (1839) (GOVERNMENT WHICHS ARE POWERS OF SOVEREIGNTY WHEN IT ENGAGES IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS); CLEVELAND TRUST CO. V. UNITED STATES, 308 US 363-71, SUP. CT. ANN., 87 LED 838, 842 (1934) (SAME) (CHUNG UNITED STATES, V. NAT. EXCH. BANK, 270 US 521, 534, 20 LED 717, 718, 46 S.Ct. 388 ("THE UNITED STATES DOES BUSINESS ON BUSINESS TERMS."); POLY V. UNITED STATES, 294 US 330, 351-52, 79 LED 912 (SAME); UNITED STATES V. WINSTON CORP., 318 US 839, 845, 135 LED 20 964, 116 S.Ct. 2432 (1996) (CITED IN MORRIS E. & PSE. V. UNITED STATES, 530 US 604, 147 LED 20, 528 (2006) ("WHEN THE UNITED STATES ENTERS INTO CONTRACT RELATIONSHIP, ITS RIGHTS AND DUTIES THEREIN ARE GOVERNED GENERALLY BY THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRIVATE PEOPLE."); CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUPRA AT 595 ("ALL INCIDENTS OF A CORPORATION ARE "TIGHTLY ANNEXED" THOUGH NOT NAMED IN ITS CHARTER OF INCORPORATION) AND AT 602-05 ("THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZING THESE RIGHTS TO BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENTLY FROM THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS IN REGARDS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER.") AND AT 597 ("THE GRANT IS EXPOUNDED EXACTLY AS IT WOULD BE IN THE CASE OF A PRIVATE GRANT, FAVORABLE TO THE GRANTEE").⁶

CONSIDERATION IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. BALLETIN'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3RD ED. ('CONSIDERATION'); BROOKLYN & NEWTON M.L. CO. V. NAT. BANK, 103 U.S. 14, 21-22, 24 (ALL CONTRACTS "REST UPON A VALID CONSIDERATION."). THERE IS A REASONED ADVICE THAT GOES TO THE EFFECT OF SAYING THAT A MAN'S SIGNATURE IS THE RULER OF ALL THINGS OR OF HIS FUTURE. THIS ADVICE IS BASED IN LAW. THE STOCK CERTIFICATE OFFERED TO PETITIONER IN THIS MATTER HAS THE NATURAL QUALITY OF AN ABSOLUTE GIFT PLEDGED FOR THE SECURITY OF THE DEBT INCURRED UNDER THE LENDING OF THE NATURAL MAN'S NAME, AS ALL COMMERCIAL PAPER OFFERED DOES. BALLETIN'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3RD ED. ('STOCK CERTIFICATE') ('EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP'); MURRAY V. LAROWER, 20 WALL. 40, 120-22, 17 LED. 851 ("THERE [IS] NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN BANK NOTES AND ANY OTHER COMMERCIAL PAPER."); MARTINOVICH V. STEPHENSON LEATHER HUTTON, INC., 514 U.S. 52, 62, 115 S.Ct. 1121, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) ("COURTS SHOULD CAST AN AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE [WITHIN A CONTRACT] AGAINST THE INTEREST OF THE PARTY THAT DRAFTED IT."). SO TO THE ADVICE; THE NATURE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE DETERMINES THE NATURE OF THE PAPER - A GENERAL ENDORSEMENT WILL CONVERT IT TO A CONTRACT AND THE HOLDER TO A PARTY TO IT, WHILE A SPECIAL AND RESTRICTED SIGNATURE OR ACCEPTANCE WILL RETAIN ITS NATURAL QUALITIES. BALLETIN'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3RD ED. ('GENERAL ENDORSEMENT'), ('GENERAL'), ('RESTRICTED ENDORSEMENT'), ('RESTRICTED'), ('SPECIAL ENDORSEMENT'), ('SPECIAL'); ROBINSON V. NOBLE'S ADMINISTRATORS, 8 PETER. 161, 8 LED. 910 ('SPECIAL CHANGE IN COMMERCIAL PAPER'); ED. RA. 2:14-CV-05086 & FED. CIR. FC-20-90003, SUPRA (CITING ALBERTS V. BORDEN - IT PROVES A POWER IN THE STATE TO REGULATE COMMERCE ALSO PROVES THE SAME POWER IN PEOPLE).

AS 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CANNOT USE FORCE) SOUGHT TO

COMMON THE PETITIONER'S NAME OF NATURAL CONCEPTION VIA THE REQUEST FROM HIS MOTHER THAT SHE FILE FOR THE CERTIFICATE PRODUCED AND THEREAFTER GRANTED, CONVEYED, ASSIGNED, APPOINTED, TRANSFERRED AND DELIVERED TO HIM, ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER, A STOCK CERTIFICATE BEARING THE FICTITIOUS NAME AND LEGAL TITLE 'CIVIL CLAY PHILLIPS JR' (CAPITAL CASE FICTITIOUS) TOGETHER WITH A COMMON MEND TO HIS ATTACHED ACCOUNT, PETITIONER HAS AN EQUITABLE LIEN OVER THE TITLE AND HIS ESTATE BY THE OPERATION OF LAW KNOWN AS AN 'EQUITABLE LIEN BY ADJECTION'. VS. ALWAYS, INC. V. MCCORMICK, 569 U.S. 88, 95-96, 133 S.Ct. 1545, 185 L.Ed.2d 663 (2012) ("THE FAMILIAR RULE OF EQUITY IS THAT A CONTRACT TO CONVEY A CERTAIN OBJECT NOT YET ACQUIRED CREAT[ES] A LIEN ON THAT ^{OBJECT} AS SOON AS THE CONTRACTED ... GIVES THE TITLE TO THE THING.") (INT. Q. & A. OFFERED). THIS LIEN IS OF PRIORITY IN NATURE. MORILL V. NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE, 173 U.S. 131, 140-42, 43 L.Ed. 640; UNITED STATES V. NEW BATHIN, 347 U.S. 81, 85-88, 98 L.Ed. 590 (PRIORITY OF STATUTORY LIENS GOVERNED) BY PRINCIPLE THAT "THE FIRST IN TIME IS THE FIRST IN RIGHT").

THE RETURN FOR VALUE OF THE INSTRUMENT PERFECTS THE LIEN OVER THE CERTIFICATE AND HIS ESTATE, AS IN THIS CONTEXT THE HOLDER SERVES AS THE TRUSTEE IN THE TRANSACTION AND ENSURING NATURAL TRUST BY OPERATION OF LAW. SERENOFF V. MID ATLANTIC MEDICAL SERVS., 547 U.S. 356, 363-64, 126 S.Ct. 1986, 164 L.Ed.2d 612 (2006) ("THE FAMILIAR RULE OF EQUITY [IS] THAT A CONTRACT TO CONVEY A SPECIFIC OBJECT EVEN BEFORE IT IS ACQUIRED WILL MAKE THE CONTRACTOR A TRUSTEE AS SOON AS HE GIVES THE TITLE TO THE THING."); GALLENTHINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3RD ED. ('RETURN FOR VALUE'); BAS HANDMADE, INC. V. HANLEY-INDUS., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1312-13, 191 L.Ed.2d 246-53 (2014) ("THUS THE TITLE [HAS] PASSED FROM THE

GOVERNMENT A MORE COMPLETE FORM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BECOMES AVAILABLE BECAUSE THE QUESTION BECOMES ONE OF PRIVATE RIGHT."); UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA, 148 U.S. 375, 379-81, 30 LED. 28 (U.S. RECOGNIZING AND INTEREST IN PRIVATE PERSONS). THE RESTRICTED, SPECIAL AND PRIVATE ENDORSEMENT RETAINS THE NATURAL PRIVATE OWNERSHIP QUALITY INHERENT IN THE TRANSFER OF THE INSTRUMENT AND SPECIES OF THE SAME; AS IN THE CASE OF ANY STOCK CERTIFICATE THE HOLDER OWNS THE RELATIVE SHARES OF STOCK - IN THIS INSTANCE THE ENTIRE CORPORATION, EXCEPT THAT THE PURCHASE THEREOF IS DONE WITH THE NAME OF NATURAL CONCEPTION AND BEING OF THE NATURAL MAN.

ALTHOUGH SOME MINUTE ERRORS WERE MADE IN RELATIVE PROCESSES DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE OF ANY AND/OR ADEQUATE LAW LIBRARY USAGE AND ADDRESS AT THE TIMES OF FILING CERTAIN DOCUMENTATION STEMMING FROM NOTIFICATION AT THE HANDS OF PRISON STAFF RESULTING FROM A LAWSUIT AT A PREVIOUS INSTITUTION AND A NOTARIAL TRANSFER TO A WORKER INSTITUTION FARTHER AWAY FROM HOME, TROUBLED WITH UNDUE DUTIES OCCASIONED THEREUNDER, PETITIONER HAS BEEN TAKING THE STEPS NECESSARY TO CORRECT THE PREVIOUS ERRORS REGARDING THE TITLE THAT WERE MADE AS A RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE TO THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION. PETITIONER HAS RETURNED THE CERTIFICATE FOR VALUE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION IN HIS PROPER LEGAL CAPACITY AS THE AGENT THEREOF, WITH A RESTRICTED, SPECIAL & PRIVATE DESIGNATION, TO THE THE 'PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF VITAL RECORDS' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) - THE CERTIFICATE, AND TO THE 'PENNSYLVANIA SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) - THE BOND TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT, SEE, ED. RA. - 5:18-CV-00451 (A FUGITIVE KILL IN COUNTRY FILED W/ ESSENTIALLY

NO LAW LIBRARY ACCESS LESS THAT REQUIRED TO TYPE THE DOCUMENT),
& EXHIBITS (NOTICE, DEC. OF STATUS & AMENDMENT). IN ADDITION TO THIS,
PETITIONER HAS CREATED AN EXPRESS TRUST WITH THE CEO. OF 'THE
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) AS THE HOLDER
OF THE CERTIFICATE'S ESTATE, SEE CAS: 18-2410 & 18-1472, AS PER. TO
LAW FIRM, EXHIBITS, AND AS OF FEBRUARY 21ST, 2020 AFTER ACQUIRING
ADDITIONAL LAW LIBRARY ACCESS FOR A PERIOD OF TWO (2) MONTHS
APPROXIMATELY FOR A TOTAL OF ROUGHLY (GENEROUSLY) TWENTY-FOUR (24)
HOURS, ~~THE~~ HAS ALSO APPOINTED THE SECRETARY OF 'THE UNITED STATES
TREASURY DEPARTMENT' (CAPITAL CASE FILES) AS CO-FIDUCIARY IN REGARDS
THE LEGAL TITLE AND HIS ESTATE, AS EVIDENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT, ~~GRANT~~
OF THE PERSONS U.S. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FILES).
SEE, 28 USC § 3002, IT IS(C) (INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNITED STATES U.S. THE
UNITED STATES). LIKEWISE, ON FEBRUARY 21ST, 2020 PETITIONER AMENDED THE
SIGNATURES ON THE TRUST DOCUMENT TO THE CEO OF THE BANK TO A
RESTRICTED, SPECIAL & PRIVATE DESIGNATION IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE AGENT
(AT THE TIME OF FILING THE INITIAL PETITIONER HAD BEEN PLACED INTO SEQUESTERED
CONFINEMENT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE NOTICES TO THE STATE, AND RETURN,
OCCURRED ABOVE AS WELL AS HAD ESSENTIALLY NO LIBRARY ACCESS AT THE
TIME LESS THAT REQUIRED TO TYPE THE DOCUMENT HIMSELF; THE NATURAL
TRUST SHOULD PROVEN AS THE IDENTITUDE PORTION WAS NOT EXECUTED). HIS
ACCESS TO LAW LIBRARY MATERIALS, WHEN IT HAS BEEN AVAILABLE, IS AT A
MAXIMUM OF TWO (2) DAYS PER WEEK FOR A PERIOD OF ONE AND ONE-HALF
(1 1/2) HOURS PER MEETING. SEE, ATTACHED DECLARATION, EXHIBIT D.

AS A RESULT OF ALL OF THE FOREGOING, PETITIONER RECOGNIZES PURELY
BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN ALL TRANSACTIONS REGARDING THE TITLE AND HIS

ESTATE AND ENLARGEMENTS. HE HAS TENDERED SOME ERRONEOUS ENDORSEMENTS ON SOME INSTRUMENTS OFFERED BY THE STATES, SUCH AS DRIVER'S LICENSES; HOWEVER, HAS NOT GIVEN KNOWING AND WILLFUL SIGNATURES, RATHER HAS LANDSLANTLY ENDORSED THE NAME ON THE SPECIFIC INSTRUMENT IN HIS UNLEARNED STATE VOIDING SUCH ENDORSEMENTS AS THEY WERE NOT MADE IN THE ONLY LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CAPACITY THAT HE HAS AVAILABLE TO GIVE SUCH ENDORSEMENTS - BEING THE PROPER AND NATURAL NAME OF CONCEPTION; HAVING NO CAPACITY TO ENDORSE A CHOSE IN ACTION ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER THAN HIS NATURAL SELF. TO WIT, HE IS INCAPABLE OF SIGNING FOR ANY NAME OTHER THAN HIS OWN FOR PRINCIPLES OF FRAUDULENT ENDORSEMENTS, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD. ^{EST & CONST} ~~EST & CONST~~ BLAIR & CONST V. HOCHSTETTER, 425 U.S. 185, 194, 11.12, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 41 LEd2D 669 (1976) (DEFINING CRITERIA FOR RECOGNIZABLE LAW PURPOSES AS "A MENTAL STATE EMBRACING INTENT TO DECEIVE, MANIPULATE OR DEFRAUD"). SEE ALSO, 27 AM. JUR. 2d, § 24, EQUITY ("IN GENERAL, IT MAY BE SAID THAT WHEREVER ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN TAKEN OF A PARTY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MULLIED, CONFUSE, OR MISLED THE JUST RESULT OF HIS JUDGMENT, AND THIS EXPOSES HIM TO BE THE VICTIM OF THE ARTFUL, THE IMPOTUNATE, AND THE CUNNING, WHERE PROPER TIME IS NOT ALLOWED TO THE PARTY AND HE ACTS IMPROVIDENTLY, OR IF HE IS IMPROVIDENTLY PRESSED, IF THOSE IN WHOM HE PLACES CONFIDENCE MAKE USE OF STRONG PERSUASION, IF HE IS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES, BUT IS SUDDENLY DRAWN IN TO ACT, IF HE IS NOT PERMITTED TO CONSULT DISINTERESTED FRIENDS OR COUNSEL BEFORE HE IS CALLED ON TO ACT IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUDDEN EMERGENCY OR UNEXPECTED LIGHT OR ALARMATION ... ~~IF~~ IF THERE HAS BEEN INEQUITY IN THE MANEUVER, COURTS OF EQUITY WILL ASSIST THE PARTY ON THE GROUNDS OF FRAUD, IMPERSONATION, OR

UNCONSCIONABLE ADVANTAGE."); HARLOW v. HARLOW, 1 WHEAT. (13.) 103, 6
LEO. 429 (IMPOSITION OR UNWISDOM INFLUENCE RESULTING FROM ADVANCED AGE
AND MEDICAL USES); HUNGERFORD v. SIBERSON, 20 HOW. (13.) 186, 15 L. ED.
869 (PREVENTED FROM DEFENSE BY FRAUD OR OTHER UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT).
EACH OF PETITIONER'S LEGAL MATTERS CONTAINS MULTIPLE REQUESTS FOR CONTINUANCES
RESULTING FROM DEPRIVATION OF LAW LIBRARY ACCESS, HE HAS A THOROUGH
HISTORY OF GUARANTIES FILED REGARDING THE ONGOING DEPRIVATION (THROUGH
HE IS WITHOUT ACCESS TO CURRENTLY DUE TO VARIOUS TRIPS TO SEGERSTON AND
NEED TO SEND EXCESS PASSPORT OUT TO BE STORED COUPLED WITH GENERAL
RESTRICTIONS ON SEGERSTON PROPERTY) AND IN THE MATTER RESULTING IN
HIS INITIAL 'INCARCERATION', WHICH THE CURRENT UNDERLYING 'INCARCERATION'
IS A DIRECT BY-PRODUCT OF, HE WAS OBLIGED INTO A NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA
W/ INCOMPETENT REPRESENTATION COUPLED WITH A LACK OF ACCESS TO THE
COUNTY JAIL'S LAW LIBRARY PRIOR TO CONVICTION (AS INFORMED BY GUARD 4 THE
UN-OFFICIAL CUSTOM OF THE FACILITY) IMMEDIATELY AFTER SUFFERING A FAIRLY
SUBSTANTIAL HEAD INJURY THAT DISTURBED HIS COMPREHENSION OF THE NATURE
OF THE PROCEEDING, AND DURING THE FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS WAS
NOT BEING PROVIDED WITH ANY ACCESS AT ALL (THE 'INCARCERATION' IS A
MATERIAL IMPEDIMENT OTHER THAN FOR THE EFFECT ON HIS ABILITY TO DEFEND).
SEE, ED. PA - 10-0007 & CAS: 16-3872; ED. PA - ED. PA - 14-05090 & APPL.;
ED. PA - 18-00251 & CASES CITED WITHIN EACH MATTER + THEIR NOTICES. SEE
ALSO, ED. PA - 14-05086 AT PET. FOR SUMM. JURY. & DECLARATION. SEE ALSO,
NORTHERN ASSURANCE CO. v. GRANOWEN BROS. ALSO, 183 VS. 300, 326,
46 LEO, 213, 215 ("EQUITABLE REMEDY EXISTS "ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD,
ACCIDENT, OR MISTAKE, IGNORANCE, IMPOSSIBILITY, OR NECESSITY.").

ONE TO THE FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS AN EQUITABLE TITLE AND HAS

NEVER HAD A RECOGNIZABLE LEGAL INTEREST IN THE TITLE, HE IS ENTITLED TO A COURT OF EXCLUSIVE EQUITY TO SETTLE THE MATTER THAT IS IN DISPUTE AS DISCUSSED IN THE NEXT POINT.

C. PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO A COURT OF EXCLUSIVE EQUITY

AN EQUITABLE LIEN IS NOT RECOGNIZED AT LAW. MALLON'S LAW DIST. 3rd ED ('EQUITABLE LIEN'). JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO GRANT RELIEF BECOMES A JUDICIAL DUTY TO GRANT IT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE BALANCE WHICH EQUITY SHOULD WEIGH THEN BECOMES A MATTER OF RIGHT. 27 AM. JUR. 2^d, § 102, EQUITY AT P. 673 (^{QUOTATION} ~~QUOTATION~~ OMITTED); MORGAN V. BELLO, 7 WALL. 613, 19 LED. 203 (PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY TO ENFORCE AND PROTECT RIGHT THAT LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE). AS PETITIONER HAS AN EQUITABLE TITLE EACH CLAIM INVOLVES THE ENFORCEMENT OF AN EQUITABLE LIEN AS EACH INSTRUMENT AND OFFICIAL ACTION CONSTITUTES A 'CONTRACT' BY THE OPERATION OF LAW SUBJECT TO THE SAME PRINCIPLES. MILLER, CURRIE, 173 US. 131, 145, 43 LED. 640 (ALL LIENS, EQUITABLE OR LEGAL, WHATEVER INCURRED BY EXPRESS AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, BY IMPLICATION IN THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION OR BY OPERATION OF LAW, ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME PRINCIPLES). AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, 'THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION' ('CAPITAL CASE PRINCIPLES') SERVES AS THE 'CONTRACT' - THE CHARTER - OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAVE CHOSEN TO FORFEIT THEIR NATURAL SOVEREIGNTY AND NATURAL RIGHTS IN PLACE OF PUBLIC POLICY BY CONVERTING THEIR CERTIFICATES INTO CONTRACTS; HENCE, THE EXISTENCE OF DISTINCT LAW FOR EACH - PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC LAW - AS IT IS THE RIGHT OF A CHARTER TO PROPOSE THE TERMS OF HIS OWN CONTRACTS AND OF PEOPLE TO ENTER INTO THOSE CONTRACTS AT THEIR OWN FREE WILL. PERRY V. UNITED STATES, 294

VS. 330, 353-54, 79 LED. 912 & 110, NT. 5 (1938) ("[S]overeignty resides
IN THE PEOPLE WHO ARE THROUGH THE ORGANS ESTABLISHED BY THE
CONSTITUTION."); ED. PA - 2:14-W-05006 AT LETTER DATED 10/31/19,
SUNA & FED. CH. - FC-20-90003, SUNA (CITING SPOKEO, INC. - AN
DISCUSSION ON DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS);
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUNA, 11 PETERS. 410, 563-64, 629-30, 9 LED. 713,
880, 886 (PRIVATE RIGHTS ARE DISTINCT FROM PUBLIC RIGHTS).

THE JUDICIAL ACT OF 1789, SUNA GRANTS THE RIGHT TO A COURT OF
EXCLUSIVE EQUITY THAT CANNOT BE PRECLUDED OR REPELLED, OR OTHERWISE
HINDERED. GREEN, ET AL V. BIDDLE, 8 WHEAT. 1, 107, 5 LED. 547 (1802);
VATTEL V. HINDS, ET AL, 7 PETERS. 252, 274, 8 LED. 675 ("THE FORM AND
MODES OF PROCEEDINGS" IN EQUITY CASES "SHALL BE ACCORDING TO THE
PRINCIPLES, RULES AND USAGES WHICH BELONG TO COURTS OF EQUITY.");
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUNA AT 453, 544, 569, 574, 575, 592-93, 603-
04, 609-10, 611, 616-18, 630 ("IT IS A PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT THE KING IS
BOUND BY HIS OWN AND HIS ANCESTORS' GRANTS, AND CANNOT, THEREFORE,
BY HIS MERE PEROGATIVE, TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS, IMMUNITIES, OR
PRIVILEGES." ... "THE CHARTER ... IS A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT WHICH MUST
SPEAK FOR ITSELF, AND BE INTERPRETED BY ITS OWN TERMS." ... "ACTS OF
INCORPORATION ... ASSUME THE NATURE OF CONTRACTS; AND VESTED RIGHTS
UNDER THEM ARE NO MORE SUBJECT TO THE LEGISLATIVE POWER THAN ANY
OTHER VESTED RIGHTS." ... "THE THING TO BE DONE, AND THE TIME OF PERFORMANCE,
REMAIN ON THE FACE OF THE CONTRACT IN ALL BINDING FORCE UPON THE
PARTIES; AND THESE ARE SHIELDED BY THE CONSTITUTION FROM LEGISLATIVE
INTERFERENCE." ... "THE PRINCIPLE ASSUMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO
NOTHING THAT SHALL DESTROY HIS DEED, AND THIS RULE APPLIES TO THE

STATE AS TO AN INDIVIDUAL." ... "IT IS A PRINCIPLE OF COMMON SENSE, AS WELL AS OF LAW, THAT WHEN A THING IS GRANTED, WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ENJOY IT IS GRANTED ALSO ... [I]F IT ADMITS TWO CONSTRUCTIONS, THAT SHALL BE FOLLOWED WHICH WILL SECURE ITS VALIDITY AND OPERATION ... SO, IF THE KING GRANT TO ME A FARM, I SHALL HAVE A COURT OF PEPOWDER, AS WE DON'T THERE TO." ... "WE ARE CONSIDERING A GRANT OF LEGISLATURE, WHICH, THOUGH IN THE FORM OF A STATUTE, IS STILL NOT A SOLEMN CONTRACT. IN SUCH A CASE, THE TRUE COURSE IS TO ASCERTAIN THE SENSE OF THE PARTIES FROM THE TERMS OF THE INSTRUMENT; AND THAT ONCE ASCERTAINED, TO GIVE IT FULL EFFECT." ... "THE LEGISLATURE COULD NOT RECALL ITS GRANT OR DESTROY IT. IT IS A CONTRACT, WHOSE OBLIGATION CANNOT BE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIRED." ... "THE GRANT IS A CONTRACT FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, AND A FULL AND ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION." ... "THE PRESENT GRANT IS CONFESSEDLY A CONTRACT, AND [CITATION OMITTED] THEY COULD SAY: THIS IS A CONTRACT, AND ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS A PARTY, IT OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED ACCORDING TO THOSE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES WHICH REGULATE CONTRACTS GENERALLY[.]" ... VESTED RIGHTS CANNOT BE IMPAIRED IN ABSENCE OF A PRESERVED RIGHT IN CORPORATE CHARTER (606-18) ... "WHEN THE USE IS GRANTED, EVERYTHING IS GRANTED BY WHICH THE GRANTEE MAY ENJOY AND USE"; ELIOT & FRANTZ, INC. V. INGERSOLL-MANN CO., 457 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1970) (EVERY CONTRACT IMPOSES THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS).

DUE TO THE FACT THAT LAW IS COMMERCIAL FOLLOWING THE CORPORATE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT THERE IS NO AUTHORITY FOR A COURT TO IMPOSE UPON A PRIVATE PARTY WITH STATUTORY LAW IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED ABOVE. TWIST V. PRANGE OIL & GAS CO., 274

U.S. 684, 684-90, 71 LER 1247 (1921) ("THE STATUTORY RULE ... WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT HAND. THIS IS NOT AN ACTION AT LAW... AT NO PT. II, "IT IS ERROR FOR [THE COURT OF APPEALS] TO DECLARE THAT AN ACTION SEEKING DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS [IN THE NATURE & FORM OF A BILL IN EQUITY] SHOULD BE DEEMED AN ACTION AT LAW."); UNITED STATES V. HOWLAND, 4 WHEAT. (U.S.) 103, 4 LER 426 (STATUTORY LAW DOES NOT NECESSARILY APPLY IN EQUITY); ED. PA. - 14-CV-05086 & FC-20-90003, SUPRA (CITING SCOTT V. NOBLE AT III-114 - PARTY WITH EQUITABLE TITLE MUST PROCEED IN EQUITY; PARTY WITH LEGAL TITLE MUST PROCEED AT LAW); BRONSON V. ROODS, 7 WALL. 229, 245, 14 LER. 141 ("IT IS THE APPROPRIATE FUNCTION OF COURTS OF JUSTICE TO ENFORCE CONTRACTS ACCORDING TO THE LAWFUL INTENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARTIES."); PERRY V. UNITED STATES, 294 U.S. 330, 351-52, 79 LER. 912 (1938) ("WHEN THE UNITED STATES ... MAKES CONTRACTS, IT HAS RIGHTS AND INCURR RESPONSIBILITIES SIMILAR TO THOSE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE PARTIES TO SUCH INSTRUMENTS").

IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE NATURAL SOVEREIGNTY OF PEOPLE, LIABILITY IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF ALL TRANSACTIONS WITH 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' (CAPITAL CASE FRAMES) - AND THIS ASPECT IS WRITTEN INTO NEARLY EVERY LAW, STATUTE, CODE AND THE LIKE, SINCE A PARTY MAY AGREE TO ANY TERM THAT HE OR SHE MAY CHOOSE. AS EVIDENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT, SEE, 'U.S. CONST. XIV AMEN.' (CAPITAL CASE FRAMES) ("SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF" CLAUSE); UNITED STATES V. SECURITY TRUST & SAV. 340 U.S. 47, 50, 95 LER 53 ("IF ANY 'PERSON' LIABLE TO PAY ANY TAX NEGLECTS OR REFUSES TO PAY THE SAME [THE AMOUNT SHALL BE A LIEN IN FAVOR OF LIENOR ON ALL PROPERTY]."); FC-20-90003, SUPRA (CITING STATE OF LAOUE ISLAND V. STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS - VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE WAIVES JURISDICTION).

THE COMMERCE, CINCINNATI & CHARLESTON R.R. CO. V. LITSON, SUPRA (A JUDGMENT DOES NOT EXTEND TO PEOPLE NOT VOLUNTARILY APPEARING TO ANSWER)³. ALTHOUGH LITSON IS BASED UPON AN ACT OF CONGRESS THIS HAS NO BEARING ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT THE SPECIFIC ACT IS DEPENDENT UPON, AND DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION, SPIRIT OR NATURE, OF LAW THEREOF. CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUPRA AT 540, Pgs. 824 ("[A] CORPORATION IS STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE EXERCISE OF THOSE POWERS WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY CONFERRED ON IT ... THE EXERCISE OF THE CORPORATE FRANCHISE BEING RESTRICTIVE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CANNOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE ACT OF INCORPORATION."). A RIGHT CANNOT BE CLAIMED BY A CORPORATION UNDER AMBIGUOUS TERMS, AS SUCH ARE TO BE CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS OWN INTERESTS AS CITED EARLIER. ID. AT 559, Pgs. 828-29; 589, Pgs. 840.

NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO HINDER THE GOVTABLE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS MATTER. CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUPRA, AT 624, 604, 582, 575, 484 ("[I]T IS EQUALLY CLEAR, UPON ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES, THAT THE KING CANNOT, BY A NEW GRANT PRODUCE HIS FORMER GRANT; FOR THE LAW DEPRIVES HIM OF ANY SUCH PREROGATIVE.", ETC.). SEE ALSO, GREEN, ET AL V. SHIPLE, SUPRA, @ WHIST. 1, AT 107 (WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO MEND AND CONFOUND LAW AND EQUITY). WHILE SOME AUTHORITIES STATE THAT THE COURT MAY ALTER CONTRACTS, UNDER THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF ITS CONSTITUTION, THIS IS A CONTRASTING INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. CHARTER ITSELF THAT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF A FULLY PRIVATE LITIGANT. CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUPRA, AT 638 ("IF NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT IS, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF A FREE GOVERNMENT, A VIOLATION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS, WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT COMPENSATION.")

... AT 580, 577, 534, 458, STATES POWER TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY MUST BE ABOVE CONTRACT, IF IT EXISTS... POWER OF STATE TO APPROPRIATE PRIVATE PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE IS AN "INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY" ... "AND THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON ITS EXERCISE, EXCEPT AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY THE SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF." ... "EMINENT DOMAIN IS AN INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY" ... IT IS ADMITTED THAT EMINENT DOMAIN IS AN INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY").
SEE ALSO, ORDEN V. SAUNDERS, 12 WHEAT. 243, 236-37, 245-49, 6 LED. 606 (OVERSIGHT CONTRACTS UNDER CONTRACTS CLAUSES IN DEPTH).

IN THIS INSTANCE, ALL INCIDENTS AND POWERS OF SOVEREIGNTY HAVE BEEN WAIVED IN THE TRANSACTION AS EVIDENCED BY THE FOLLOWING AUTHORITIES. THE LOUISVILLE, CINCINNATI & CHARLESTON RR. CO. V. LUTON, SUPRA AT 551, 553, PP. 375. HERE, THIS MATTER IS DISTINCT IN THAT IT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE AND EXCLUSIVE EQUITY. CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE, SUPRA AT 452-53. AS EVIDENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT, SEE, 24B USC § 1333 (PROCEEDINGS SAME TO OBTAIN HIS EQUITABLE REMEDY). PETITIONER IS NOT A 'PUBLIC PERSON' LIABLE TO THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACTS AT ISSUE HERE; THIS, THERE IS NO GROUND UPON WHICH TO HOLD HIS LIABILITY TO THE OBLIGATION OF THE 'GENERAL PUBLIC'. THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE TERMS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC'S CONTRACT FOR 'PUBLIC CITIZENSHIP' IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS AT ISSUE HEREIN AS INCIDENT TO THE TWO CONSTRUCTIVE - PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE LAW, OR LAW AND EQUITY, IT IS AN INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY. AS EVIDENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT, IN A COMPARABLE PROCEEDING, SEE, 53 USC § 4309 (9) (c); KINGDOMWARE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES, 579 US _____, 136 S. CT. 1969, 1977, 198 LED. 20, 334, 344 & HD. NR. 11 (2016) (MANDATORILY BINDING). IF AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IS ESTABLISHED THE HEARING OFFICER 'SHALL' ENTER THE EQUITABLE RELIEF SOUGHT. THE

APPLICATION OF PUBLIC POLICY "DOES NOT HOLD TRUE FOR COURTS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY EXISTING LAW TO DISCRETE CASES AND CONTROVERSIES INDEPENDENTLY AND WITHOUT CONSIDERING SHIFTING POLITICAL WINDS." SVEN V. MEIN, SUPRA, 201 LED 20, AT 197 (2018). STATES ARE SUPERORDINATES, AS ARE PUBLIC PERSONS; PRIVATE LAW EXISTS FOR PRIVATE LITIGANTS, PRIVATE PEOPLE.

ALTHOUGH PETITIONER HAD MADE SOME ERRORS WHILE OPERATING IN HIS PREVIOUS STATE, THESE ERRORS HAVE BEEN CORRECTED (ALTHOUGH THE PROCESSES HAVE BEEN SLOW AND TENUOUS DUE TO STATE CREATED INTERFERENCE) AS PROMPTLY AS HE HAS BEEN PROVIDED WITH THE RESOURCES NECESSARY IN ORDER TO EDUCATE HIMSELF, AND THE PREVIOUS ERRORS OF HIS MOTHER, AS WELL AS OF ALBERTA, ARE IMMATERIAL AS PRODUCTS OF MISTAKE AND IGNORANCE TO THE NATURE AND CAPACITY OF THE TRANSACTIONS.² "A PRO SE PRISONER NEED NOT MAKE A PROCEDURALLY PERFECT ASCERTAINMENT OF THE RIGHT IN QUESTION" AS "COURTS ARE ESPECIALLY FLEXIBLE WHEN DEALING WITH IMPRISONED LITIGANTS [WHO] OFTEN LACK THE RESOURCES AND FREEDOM NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE TECHNICAL RULES OF MODERN LITIGATION". HAZOREM V. BAYER, 990 F.2D 760, 763-64 (3RD CIR. 1992); MALA V. CROWN RAY MARINA, INC., 704 F.3D 229, 244-45, 8B I.V. 691 (3RD CIR. 2015).⁸ THE DOCUMENTS FILED REGARDING THE CERTIFICATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY (OFFICIAL CASE NUMBER) BOND ARE EFFECTUAL AS OF THE DATE PLACED INTO THE MAIL FOR FILING (PETITIONER ~~IS~~ IS WITHOUT THE ACCESS TO THE PRECEDENTIAL SUPPORT AT THAT TIME DUE TO SEGREGATION); HOWEVER, IT APPLIES TO "ALL" LOCAL FILINGS" WHETHER THEY INTENDED REQUIRING PROCEEDINGS THEN APPROPRIATELY OR NOT). BRANSON V. RODES, 7 WALL. 229, 245, 19 LED 141, SUPRA ("IT IS THE APPROPRIATE FUNCTION OF COURTS OF JUSTICE TO ENFORCE CONTRACTS ACCORDING TO THE LAWFUL INTENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARTIES."); CHASLER RIVER BOUGLES

AT 603, PPS. 846; 609-10, PPS. 848-49 ("IN SUCH A CASE, THE TRUE
COURSE IS TO ASCERTAIN THE SENSE OF THE PARTIES FROM THE TERMS
OF THE INSTRUMENT; AND THAT ONCE ASCERTAINED, TO GIVE IT FULL EFFECT.
...[T]HE GRANT IS A CONTRACT FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, AND A
FULL AND ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.").

AS PETITIONER HAS SOLICITED AN EQUITABLE ORDER OF HABEAS
CORPUS, COUPLED WITH THE DUALITY OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
OF HIS CIRCUMSTANCES, IN THIS MATTER AND THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES THAT
WILL ARISE FOR HIM IN PURSUING THE MATTER IN THE LOWER COURTS AS
A RESULT THEREOF, AS WELL AS THAT THIS MATTER INVOLVES APPLICATION
OF A CONGRESSIONAL STATUTE TO COMPLEX MATERIAL FACTS AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AS APPLIED TO THOSE
FACTS, IT WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND
ECONOMY FOR THIS COURT, AS THE ONLY TRULY COMPETENT COURT AT
HAND, TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OF THIS MATTER AS IF IT WERE BROUGHT
PURSUANT TO THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789,
1 STAT. 78, §§ 11, 25, SUPRA, AS THIS COURT COULD THEN CONSOLIDATE
ALL OF THE MATTERS PETITIONER HAS BEEN SEEKING TO BRING IN A
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION FOR SETTLEMENT OF HIS TITLE.

ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI IN ORDER FOR A
DETERMINATION ON THE APPLICABILITY OF FILING FEES IN THIS MATTER
AS THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT EQUIVALENT FEES AND/OR
RULES HAVE NO BEARING ON THE ABILITY OF A PARTY TO PROCEED IN
EQUITY, AS WELL AS THAT, AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS MATTER, IT
IS A VIOLATION OF THE NATURAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR
THE LOWER COURT TO BLOCK THE INDIGENT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SEEK

MEANS FOR AN OBLIGATION TO PAY AN UNREASONABLE FEE FOR
THE FILING OF DOCUMENTATION WITH THE COURT.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY PLAYS THE COURT AHEAD
CERTIORARI IN THIS MATTER AND/OR ASSUME JURISDICTION OF THE
ENTIRE MATTER FILED IN THE LOWER COURT.

DATE: 4/15/20

BY: [Signature] AGENT
REGISTERED, SPECIAL & PRIVATE
CURETIS Clay Phillips Junior
AT CURETIS PHILLIPS - LL5924
RA. DOR., 36th - FOREST
286 WOODLAND DR., PO BOX 307
MARIETTA, GA 30067

FOOT NOTES:

1.) THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRETY OF HIS BEING WITHIN A STUDY OF THE
STATE PETITIONER HAS BEEN PLACED INTO SEPARATIONAL CONFINEMENT
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING INSTITUTION OF LOCAL ACTIONS AND HAS HIS ACCESS
TO RESEARCH MATERIALS BROCKED COMPLETELY OR NEAR TO COMPLETELY
SUCH THAT THE ALLEGED HAS BEEN GROSSLY UNDERMINED AND
INCAPABLE TO PROSECUTE THE MATTER MEANINGFULLY. SEE, EX. D. AT
PP 1-7B.

2.) THE CUMULATIVE TOLLING AND CUMULATIVE DISCOVERY DOCTRINES PERMIT
TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS FOR FILING. GILBERTSON LEARNING CO. V. BASSMAN,
2003 RA. DOR. 9 CIV. DOR. LEXNEX 152, 61 RA. D. & C. 449 (APRIL 29,
2003) ("IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT [PETITIONER] LEARNED OF THE

initially in 1988 when it received the deed ... as non-attorneys, the individuals just constitute [plaintiff] had no reason to know [of the legal issue underlying the complaint]. Therefore, it is proper to invoke and apply the [equitable] discovery rule in this matter.").

3.) A party becomes joined with an instrument by way of his endorsement and acceptance thereof in the manner of it, and a document binds only parties to instruments and their privies. Brooklyn City and Newtown Rd. Co. v. Nat. Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 21, 27, 26 LEd 61, 66 ("personal documents bind only parties and their privies ... [all commercial engagements are] to rest upon a valid consideration.").

4.) Burke v. Ware, et al, 15 Peters. 93, 98, 100, 112-14 ("A public grant is not only an appropriation of the [property], but is itself a perfect title. ... (Grant cannot be impeached in a court of law) ... [i]nvestigation shall put a prudent man on inquiry is sufficient ... the law requires reasonable diligence in a purchaser to ascertain any defect of title."), respectively, 10 LEd 672.

5.) Fitzsimons & others v. O'Brien & others, 7 Cranch. 2, 10, 3 LEd. 249 ("[i]n all the equity will always be in the cestui que trust and not in the trustee"); Landale v. Daniels, 100 U.S. 113, 117-18, 25 LEd 587 (survivor equity must prevail); Hanson, et al v. The Lessor of Eustache, 2 Howard. 653, 678-79, 4 LEd. 416 (priority of equity).

6.) Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 524, 524, 25 LEd.

699, 703 (at 529, "[W]hen municipal corporations engage in commercial relations"] they are, to that extent, to be deemed private corporations, and their obligations are secured by all the guarantees which protect the engagements of private individuals.")
(Citation omitted).

7.) ANDREWS v. DAN, 201 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2000) (PARRY is not in private with his individual capacity when sued in official capacity);
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (actions at law same to sustain his equitable remedy).

8.) LOCKHART v. LODGE, 195 U.S. 429, 436-37, 49 LEd 263, 269 (1904) (ALLEGATIONS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN RELIEF).