

No. 19-8602

ORIGINAL

To Be Assigned

IN THE

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

MAY 21 2020

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Eugene Washington — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

Santa Rita County Jail — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

United States Courts Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Eugene Washington
(Your Name)

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(Address)

Oakland , CA 94603
(City, State, Zip Code)

(Phone Number)

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

- 1) Was the District Court following proper Supreme Court procedures and case law when they issued their final order on August 7th, 2019 in violation of Petitioner's Constitutional rights?
- 2) On January 30th, 2019, the District Court issued an order stating that the hearing and motion to dismiss were vacated, however, on August 7th, 2019, the District Court [granted] the very motion they vacated in violation of Petitioner's V. Amendment.

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the _____ court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was January 9th, 2020

No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. A .

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was _____.
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _____.

A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. A .

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

**United States Constitution Amendment V.
Due Process Clause.
18 U.S.C. section 1983 . . . Civil Rights Violation**

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The case herein spawned from facts based on the actions of the [Respondent] Santa Rita County Jail. For on September 16th, 2015, the Petitioner was released from the Shu from Terminal Island Federal Prison and flew to San Francisco and registered at the Geo Halfway-House there.

However in retrospect, while the Petitioner was in the Shu prior to his release, the District Court in Chicago granted the petition's 18 U.S.C section 3582 motion correcting his sentence, see Appendix E. The date this occurred was April 21, 2015. Petitioner never returned to the open compound and spent the remainder of his prison time from April 21, 2015 to September 16, 2015 in the Shu.

Therefore, while in the Shu, once the District Court in Chicago granted Petitioner's 18 U.S.C. sec. 3582, Petitioner sought assistance from a person in the Shu who studied law sometimes. This person stated to the Petitioner that his new "possible" release date was November 1st, 2015. He said that the date was tentative and based on BOP official records. He said if you had gotten ie shots or write ups that may have taken away good time, so your official outdate would be extended.

The Petitioner was unsure about his administrative record with the BOP and was therefore unsure about his "official release date" since the Petitioner had received various shots during the course of this 21 year incarceration.

So on September 16th, 2015 the Petitioner was released from Terminal Island Federal Prison in San Pedro, California. Petitioner's sentence was modified from 360 months to 292 months under 3582. Petitioner then flew from Los Angeles to San Francisco, California. The petitioner was assigned to the GEO Halfway-House in San Francisco to complete the remainder of his sentence.

While at the GEO Halfway-House, the Petitioner was assigned to a room with an inmate who constantly harassed him “daily” to move to another room. Staff was aware of the inmate’s actions toward the Petitioner but did nothing to deter them.

On the morning of September 20, 2015, the Petitioner “feared” for his life and left the halfway-house on foot seeking to protect himself. For this was a Sunday and the facility was clearly under staff. After wondering through the streets of San Francisco for over 2 hours, the Petitioner’s sister, Lucille Cunningham picked him up and took him back to the halfway-house. Staff then directed Lucille to take the Petitioner to a hospital. Lucille then took the Petitioner to Highland Hospital in Oakland, California, where he stayed for 3 days because of the altercation.

On the 3rd day, Highland Hospital recommended that Lucille take the Petitioner to John George Psychiatric Hospital in San Leandro, California. For Highland Hospital stated to Lucille that the records indicate that the Petitioner had a very serious “Mental Health” problem. For during the Petitioner’s 21 year incarceration, in 2003, Petitioner suffered a life-threatening brain accident that eventually led to his “civil-commitment” in 2005 under 18 U.S.C section 4245. See Appendix E order from the court.

Petitioner remained at John George Psychiatric Hospital until October 3rd, approximately 2 weeks. For on October 3rd, 2015, the U. S. Marshalls transported the Petitioner to the Santa Rita County Jail in Dublin, California. While there, the Petitioner called Lucille to find out if GEO Halfway-House had wrote him an incident report about the altercation on September 20th Lucille stated she contacted the director and she stated “No”.

Accordingly, around October 20th, the Petitioner called Lucille regarding his release. Lucille stated she contacted the Santa Rita County Jail (SRCJ) and persons unknown on several occasions stated

"no release date had been set." And finally that if she wanted to know the release date to check the website called "find an inmate." See Appendix G.

Lucille stated she checked the website from October 23rd to October 30th and no release date had been posted. Lucille said she then became concerned and at this point contacted Terminal Island Prison. A woman in R & D stated that normal procedure was for the contract facility to post it on their website. And that if the day of release was soon approaching to contact the BOP administrative in Sacramento, California. On November 3rd, Lucille spoke to a Mr. Dan Painter at the administrative office in Sacramento.

Lucille asked Mr. Painter why the BOP could not give her the exact day of release. Mr. Painter stated that the Santa Rita County Jail will eventually post it on the website.

Lucille stated she had been checking the website periodically leading up to November 1st because that was the date the Petitioner had given her as a possible release date. When November 1st came, no release date was posted on the website. So, when that date posted, Lucille stated to the Petitioner that evidently whoever told you that was your new release date was mistaken. Petitioner "accepted" what his sister stated. Lucille went on to say that she would continue to check the website until Santa Rita posted a release date of November 12th as Petitioner's "Official" release date. See Appendix G, find an inmate.

Furthermore, once the Petitioner was released and returned to the free world, the Petitioner never discussed the issue again until Social Security "denied" his disability claim in late 2017. So in early 2018, the Petitioner took a plethora of documents to the Monterey College of Law to review. Pursuant to the Petitioner's mental health status, the Monterey College of Law reviewed the many documents Social Security used to determine disability, for Social Security "denied" the Petitioner's initial disability

claim pursuant to discrepancies as to is “official release date;” in addition, the date the Petitioner was determined to be disabled by the BOP and the date the Petitioner was committed under 18 U.S.C. section 4245 for mental health and other factors effecting mental health.

Petitioner gave all documentation to a concerned legal mind that studied them for about 2 ½ months. In March of 2018, the concerned legal mind informed the Petitioner that his “official release date” was November 1st and not November 12th the day the Santa Rita Jail released him. Therefore, it is clear from the facts here in of how the Petitioner found out of his release date.

1. Therefore, in May of 2018 the concerned legal mind assisted the Petitioner with putting together a civil action against the Santa Rita County Jail and the BOP. The initial claim was filed in June in the Oakland Division of the Northern District of California. The action was then transferred to the San Jose division, the Honorable Lucy Koh presiding.
2. The initial assessment was on August 27, 2018, see Appendix D, where her Honor struck the initial claim filed in June and requested the Petitioner to amend the complaint. Petitioner sent the court the “Amended Compliant” and the District Court ordered the Santa Rita County Jail to “respond”. Therefore, on December 18th , 2018 the Santa Rita County Jail filed their response.
3. The Petitioner was well aware that his “Reply” to their Response was due on February 12th. However, while the time to file the Reply was pending on January 30th of 2019, the Clerk sent a “Notice” under Appendix C, to the Petitioner.
4. Pursuant to the “Notice” under Appendix C, the Petitioner interpreted the “Notice” to mean that the Honorable Court was vacating “both” the “Hearing” set for April 11th and the actual “Motion to Dismiss” filed by the Respondent. Accordingly, the Petitioner never sent a “Reply” in.
5. Therefore, on August 7th, 2019, the District Court issued a final order under Appendix B. The final order states that the District Court granted the Respondent’s RJN & Motion to Dismiss.

6. The Petitioner then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. The District Court then sent the Ninth Circuit an order stating that the appeal is frivolous and thus "revoking" the Petitioner's forma pauperis status. On October 9th, 2019, the Ninth Circuit requested the Petitioner to explain in writing why the appeal should not be dismissed as frivolous. A timely response was sent to the October 9th order.
7. On January 9th, 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued an order under Appendix A. The order clearly states that the appeal is frivolous and thus denied the Petitioner the right to "exhaust" the judicial process. The Petitioner is now compelled to request the United States Supreme Court for redress pursuant to Appendix A.
8. The Petitioner therefore brings this Writ of Certiorari in good-faith pursuant to the failure of the lower courts to see their errors of law and fact.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The [facts] herein are *prima facie* evidence that the Petitioner was held [11] days past his "official release date" of November 1st, 2015. For once the Petitioner left John George Psychiatric Hospital in San Leandro on October 3, 2015, the Federal Marshalls transported him to the Santa Rita County Jail (hereafter – SRCJ). Due to the Petitioner's Mental Health condition, see Appendix E, SRCJ was aware of the Petitioner's mental health problem and provided him medicine while confined there.

Therefore, from October 3rd to November 1st was the time period the petitioner had fixed in his head that he would be released from prison. And this release date was based on what an individual in the SHU @ Terminal Island stated to him about a 'possible' release date. Petitioner's sister, Lucille, who was assisting him with his release transition checked the web-site periodically up until November 3rd, 2015 @ which time Lucille called the BOP administrative office in Sacramento, California. In addition, Lucille had spoke to Terminal Island Prison about the same afore-mentioned release date. However, in each case, the person[s] Lucille spoke to about a release date stated that the SRCJ would "post" the date on their web-site.

Therefore, as a matter of contractual obligation, the "contract" facility was the one "carrying the ball" and [not] the BOP. For the court stated in their order under Appendix B, pg. 2 & 3 in part:

The court dismissed Plaintiff's compliant with leave to amend and explained that Plaintiff could not pursue claims against SRC Jail unless he identified some policy of the jail that led to his injury. See Dkt. No. 10.

The Court found that, liberally construed, plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim that his constitutional rights were violated see Dkt. No 17 @2.

Defendant moved to dismiss and sought judicial notice of three documents in support of that motion. See Mot., RJN.

Continuing @ pg. 4, Appendix B in part:

Here, as Justification for holding SRC Jail liable Plaintiff stated " It is presumed that the BOP provided [SRC Jail] with a copy of the Plaintiff's "official" release date. And the [SRC] Jail applied their policy used to verify the Plaintiff's official release date"

In Conclusion @ pg. 5, Appendix B in part

Defendant argued that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because the BOP documents reveal Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. In the alternative, defendant argued that Plaintiff's claim is time-barred. The court will address each argument in turn.

It is clear here in Her Honor's order under Appendix B that the District Court "accepted" the three document[s] provided by the SRCJ as prima-facie evidence of "official notice of release" by the BOP.

Case Law Her Honor quote's is Foronda v. Wells Fargo Home Morg Inc no. 14-CV-03513-LHK, 2014 WL67086815, @ 3 (N.D. Cal Nov.26, 2014) (take judicial notice of, inter alia, a letter from the Office of Thrift Supervision because "[t]hese documents are true and correct copies of Government records and public document not subject to reasonable dispute")...

Petitioner wants the Honorable Court to recognize that the document[s] the SRCJ asked the District Court to take Judicial Notice of by Law "are subject to reasonable dispute." For it is presumed that the SRCJ has a [contract] with the BOP to hold federal prisoners from time to time. It is also presumed that the contract is set up so that the SRCJ can [verify] that the document [or] document[s] sent as "official documents of release" by the BOP are the official and final document[s] and not just document[s] the BOP sent stating information about the inmate's release.

The aforementioned statements are extremely important. Why? For the SRCJ knows that the [most] serious [act] performed by a penal institution is the release of an inmate from custody. Penal institution[s], whether federal or state, take this [act] of release a main priority. Proof! When an inmate

is released from a BOP institution, the BOP has an "official form" the inmate must take to specific department[s] in the institution and have the supervisor of each department sign it. The signature[s] on the form are "verified" by R&D. At this point the release process can continue. R&D then contacts Grand Prairie, Texas and obtain an "official release document" with the actual sentence computation attached, showing the actual day of release. The process of releasing an inmate from "prison" confinement is a very tedious and scrupulous process.

The process of release takes several hours and an inmate must patiently wait on the various "checks & balances" to ensure that any mistakes[s] are caught. See Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 741 F.2d 336, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18863 (Sept. 6th, 1984). Therefore, the SRCJ, like the BOP, has a back-up-plan in place in order to ensure that an inmate is not released [arbitrarily]. In the instant case, SRCJ's back-up-plan [or] administrative procedure was not working on the day the Petitioner was released. See Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 741 F. 2d 336, @ 339-340 (11th Cir. 1984) in part:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently dealt with a similar legal issue in Garris v. Rowland, 678 F. 2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1982), a warrant was issued and Mar. Garris' was arrested even though a follow-up investigation prior to Mr. Garris' arrest had revealed that the charges against Mr. Garris were without substance. The court found that while the City of Fort Worth Police Department had a policy that required follow-up investigations by a second police officer, there was no policy to coordinate the follow-up investigation with the original investigation so as to prevent the arrest of innocent people.

In the case at bar, Mr. Trezevant's incarceration was the result of numerous mistakes which were caused by the policeman and deputies carrying out the policies and procedures of the City of Tampa and the HBCJ...

The failure of the procedure to adequately protect the constitutional rights of Mr. Trezevant was the direct result of the inadequacies of the policy established by these defendants.

In addition, the issue in Gilmere was very similar to the Petitioner's circumstances:

In Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 f. 2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984)(this court explained that a municipality may be liable under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 if unconstitutional action is taken to implement or execute officially adopted and promulgated decisions. Gilmere @ 901... “official policy or custom must be the moving force of the constitutional violation” before civil liability will attach under sec. 1983.

Therefore, in Trezevant @ 340, the Court elucidated the violation:

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr. Trezevant’s unconstitutional incarceration was the result of an official policy.

Continuing the Trezevant @341 in part:

Mr. Trezevant is certainly entitled to compensation for the incarceration itself and for the mental anguish that he has suffered from the entire episode.

It is clear that the contractual obligation SRCJ was under when the Petitioner was released wasn’t working for the policy the SRCJ had in place failed and caused an unconstitutional incarceration of the Petitioner. Therefore due to the deliberate actions, SRCJ checks and balances were not working on the date determined as the Petitioner’s “official release date.” Accordingly, the actions of the SRCJ were “deliberate.” And thus deprived the Petitioner of his right to liberty under the Constitution.

In addition, the SRCJ actions are “egregious” and are thus “compounded” by the fact that the Petitioner had spent 21 – long years in prison. It is [virtually-impossible] for the BOP not to know the Petitioner’s official release date. For Grand Prairie, Texas is where [all] official BOP sentencing records are stored. And it is Grand Prairie that calculates the official sentence computation. Yet @ no time in the documents the court took “Judicial Notice” of this there an “official” computation from Grand Prairie. And since the SRCJ is the contract facility, they are entitled to the same “deference” that BOP institutions have. Therefore, the District Court is in

error of law by failing to request the SRCJ for the official document from Grand Prairie showing the exact computation of Petitioner's sentence.

Furthermore, [if] the BOP provided the SRCJ with an incorrect release date, it was the "contractual" obligation of SRCJ to [verify] if the BOP furnished them with an [official document of release]. Therefore, the document[s] Her Honor took Judicial Notice of "[are] subject to reasonable dispute." Foronda @ 3.

In addition, the SRCJ . . . "should have known that the Petitioner was entitled to be released." Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir, 1985) (A wrongful detention can ripen into a due process violation if "it was or should have been known [by the defendant] that the [Plaintiff] was entitled to release." Gant v. City of L.A., 772 f. 3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2014) (Quotation omitted; alterations in original). "Cases holding that an incarceration violated the due process clause because defendants should have known the plaintiff was entitled to release fit at least one of two categories: (1) the circumstances indicated to the defendants that further investigation was warranted, or (2) the defendants denied the Plaintiff . . . Id. @621 (quotation omitted).

The "circumstances indicated to the SRCJ that the BOB [failed] to include in the documents of release, an official sentencing computation from Grand Prairie, Texas." For with this document the SRCJ would have been able to use their system of checks and balances to determine if the release date on the BOP forms [match] the release date calculated by Grand Prairie, Texas.

For in the case at bar, the Petitioner spent 21 plus years in prison. Therefore, the Petitioner had spent a long-time locked-up as a [first-time-offender] and was psychologically destroyed because of the [cruel] sentence he had to bear. Petitioner spent many years trying to

get his sentence corrected but with no avail. After the 2 point reduction passed, the Petitioner was anticipating getting his sentence reduced and released back to society. The act of sentence reduction took place on April 21, 2015. See Appendix E. Therefore SRCJ had a duty under "contract" to release the petitioner according to Grand Prairie's specific instructions.

The SRCJ [knew] that their checks and balances under "administrative procedures" were [not] functioning properly @ the time the Petitioner was released. And thus deprived the Petitioner of his right to liberty after 21 long years. So it was the deliberate actions of the SRCJ that caused the Petitioner to remain an extra 11 – days illegally incarcerated. For the Petitioner had anticipated this day coming for 21 long years. Petitioner "paraphrases" the Supreme Court ... "Petitioner could taste freedom in the air, smell freedom with his nose, touch freedom with his hands and see freedom with his eyes." Therefore, to deny the Petitioner freedom is to deny him is inalienable rights protected by the Constitution and American Jurisprudence.

Petitioner now appeals to the High Court that he was truly [unaware of when was his "official release date"]. Initially, Petitioner was reacting to information that was told to him in the SHU @ Terminal Island, and once November 1st passed, Petitioner accepted that the person in the SHU was mistaken. Therefore, once the Petitioner was released from custody, he had not given it a "second thought" that the SRCJ had violated his right to liberty.

In fact, had Social Security not denied the Petitioner's initial "disability claim," the Petitioner would have [never] filed the original complaint against SRCJ under 1983. But once the Monterey College of Law reviewed various documents in relation to a Social Security "disability" claim, Petitioner was then informed that he spent 11 – extra days in custody past his "official release date." Therefore, the SRCJ should be held liable by law for their actions against the Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Eugene R. Washington

Date: 5-21-20

1 will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim.” *Usher v.*
2 *City of L.A.*, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
3 motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
4 the ‘grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
5 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do Factual allegations must
6 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550
7 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

8 A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer “enough facts to
9 state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” *Id.* at 570. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
10 generally proper only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts
11 alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” *Navarro v. Block*, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)
12 (citing *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). The court is not
13 “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
14 or unreasonable inferences.” *Sprewell v. Golden St. Warriors*, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

15 IV. DISCUSSION

16 Defendant argued that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because the BOP Documents
17 reveal plaintiff has failed to state a claim. In the alternative, defendant argued that plaintiff’s
18 claim is time-barred. The Court will address each argument in turn.

19 A. Plaintiff fails to state a claim.

20 Plaintiff alleged that defendant “deliberately deprived” the plaintiff of his constitutional
21 right to liberty.” Am. Compl. at 9.

22 “A prisoner’s petition for damages for excessive custody can be a legitimate § 1983
23 claim.” *Haygood v. Younger*, 769 F.2d 1350, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, “[i]t is not
24 every erroneous administration of state law that results in a denial of due process.” *Id.* at 1357. A
25 wrongful detention can ripen into a due process violation if “it was or should have been known
26 [by the defendant] that the [plaintiff] was entitled to release.”” *Gant v. Cty. of L.A.*, 772 F.3d 608,
27 620 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted; alterations in original). “Cases holding that an

1 incarceration violated the Due Process Clause because defendants should have known the plaintiff
2 was entitled to release fit at least one of two categories: (1) the circumstances indicated to the
3 defendants that further investigation was warranted, or (2) the defendants denied the plaintiff
4 access to the courts for an extended period of time.” *Id.* at 621 (quotation omitted).

5 Here, the BOP Documents reveal that defendants did not know plaintiff’s correct release
6 date was November 1, 2015. The BOP Documents, incorporated by reference into the Amended
7 Complaint, show that the BOP told SRC Jail at least three separate times that plaintiff’s release
8 date was November 12, 2015. *See RJN, Ex. A at 1-4.* Plaintiff did not explain how a local agency
9 such as SRC Jail would know, or should have known, that a federal agency’s calculation of a
10 federal prison sentence was erroneous. *See generally, Am. Compl.* (failing to explain how SRC
11 Jail would acquire knowledge of BOP’s internal calculations); *see also id.* at 3 (stating plaintiff
12 was released from federal prison), 11 (“the BOP, who was holding the plaintiff in custody”). In
13 fact, plaintiff argued that the BOP would have told SRC Jail plaintiff’s release date, *see id.* at 13
14 (explaining that SRC Jail contracts to hold BOP prisoners for short sentences, and “presume[ing]
15 that the BOP provided [SRC Jail] with a copy of the plaintiff’s ‘official’ release date”), which
16 suggests that plaintiff agrees SRC Jail should rely on the date provided by the BOP. Accordingly,
17 plaintiff has not shown that defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff’s correct release
18 date was November 1, 2015.

19 Moreover, it does not appear that the instant case falls into the category of cases where
20 “the circumstances indicated to the defendants that further investigation was warranted,” because
21 there is no indication that plaintiff drew the attention of SRC Jail officials to any possible error in
22 computing plaintiff’s sentence. *Cf. Alexander v. Perrill*, 916 F.2d 1392, 1394-99 (9th Cir. 1990)
23 (holding federal prison officials liable for over-detention where plaintiff brought over-detention to
24 the officials’ attention, requested an investigation, and the officials took no action). Plaintiff
25 explained that his sister checked SRC Jail’s website in the latter half of October, 2015, to discover
26 plaintiff’s release date. *See Am. Compl. at 6-8.* Plaintiff does not allege that his sister believed
27 plaintiff’s projected release date to be erroneous or that she notified the jail of any potential error.

1 See generally, *id.* Nor does plaintiff describe any actions he took to dispute his release date or
2 alert SRC Jail of an error. See generally, *id.*

Finally, there are no facts that suggest the instant matter falls into the category of cases where the defendant denied the plaintiff access to the courts. As noted above, plaintiff did not describe any efforts he made to bring the miscalculation to the attention of SRC Jail officers, much less any efforts taken to challenge this miscalculation in the courts.

7 Because it is clear from the Amended Complaint and the judicially noticeable BOP
8 Documents that SRC Jail did not know that plaintiff's sentence had been miscalculated, plaintiff
9 has failed to state a claim for deprivation of due process.

10. B. Plaintiff's claim is time-barred.

11 As an alternative basis to dismiss plaintiff's claim, defendant argued that plaintiff's claim
12 is time-barred. *See* Mot. at 5. The Court finds that defendant is correct.

13 Section 1983 “borrows” a statute of limitations from the forum state’s statute of limitations
14 for personal injury actions. *See Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 278-80 (1985). Here, that statute
15 of limitations is two years. *See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.* “Although state law determines the
16 length of the limitations period, ‘the determination of the point at which the limitations period
17 begins to run is governed solely by federal law.’” *McCoy v. S.F., City & Cty.*, 14 F.3d 28, 29 (9th
18 Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he touchstone for determining the commencement of the
19 limitations period is notice: ‘a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has
20 reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’” *Stanley v. Trustees of Cal. State*
21 *Univ.*, 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006).

22 Here, the Amended Complaint revealed that plaintiff was aware of his injury on or before
23 November 1, 2015. Plaintiff stated that the reduction in his sentence was calculated on April 21,
24 2015,” but was “effectuated on November 1, 2015 . . . so the plaintiff had to wait an entire year
25 before he could be released from custody.” Am. Compl. at 11. Plaintiff did not explain why he
26 waited a year. Nonetheless, the fact that plaintiff was “waiting” to be released on November 1,
27 2015, shows that he knew that was his proper release date. Plaintiff thus knew of his injury on

1 November 1, 2015, when he was not released.

2 Because plaintiff's cause of action accrued on November 1, 2015, the two-year statute of
3 limitations for his due process claim began to run on that date. To bring a timely claim, plaintiff
4 had to file a civil rights suit by November 1, 2017, two years from November 1, 2015. However,
5 as noted above, plaintiff did not file the instant civil rights suit until May 29, 2018 – nearly seven
6 months too late.

7 Plaintiff's delayed filing is not cured by tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff did
8 not respond to defendant's Motion, and so raised no grounds on which the statute of limitations
9 could have been tolled. Upon independent review, the Court concludes that plaintiff is not entitled
10 to equitable tolling because, as noted above, he knew of his injury on November 1, 2015. *See*
11 *Johnson v. Henderson*, 314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (Equitable tolling focuses on "whether
12 there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: if a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the
13 existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to
14 extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he
15 needs."). And although California tolls the statute of limitations for persons "imprisoned on a
16 criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for
17 life," Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a), this does not cure plaintiff's tardiness. Plaintiff was only
18 imprisoned for eleven days of the limitations period, and so tolling under California's procedure
19 would render plaintiff's civil rights suit six-and-one-half months late, rather than seven months
20 late. This still falls outside the statute of limitations.


21 Accordingly, plaintiff's claim is time-barred and must be dismissed.

22 **V. CONCLUSION**

23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** defendant's RJN and Motion. This action
24 is **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

25 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

26 DATED: August 7, 2019


27 LUCY H. KOH
28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUGENE WASHINGTON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE SANTA RITA COUNTY JAIL,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-03420-LHK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:

- (1) I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California; and
- (2) On 8/7/2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an interoffice delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Eugene Washington
2420 107th Avenue
Oakland, CA 94603

Dated: 8/7/2019

Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

By: Kassandra Dibble
Kassandra Dibble, Deputy Clerk to the Hon.
Lucy H. Koh

APPENDIX C

Court ID:cv-03320-LHK Document 23 Filed 01/30/19 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUGENE WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff

vs.
THE SANTA RITA COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant

Case No. 2:18-cv-03320-LHK

CLERK'S NOTICE VACATING
HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. No. 21

Pursuant to this notice, the Motion to Dismiss for April 11, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. is
VACATED. The Court to issue written ruling.

Dated: 1/30/2019

Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

By: Elizabeth C Garcia
Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable Lucy H. Koh

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APPENDIX D

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUGENE WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA RITA COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-CV-03420 LHK (PR)

**ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND**

16 Plaintiff, a former federal prisoner proceeding *pro se*, has filed a civil rights complaint
17 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons
18 stated below, the court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

19 A. Standard of review

20 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks
21 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. *See* 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims
23 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek
24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),

25
26 Case No. 18-CV-03420 LHK (PR)

27 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

28

1 (2). *Pro se* pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. *See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police*
2 *Dep't.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

3 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1)
4 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the
5 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. *See West v.*
6 *Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

7 B. Legal claims

8 In plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff names as defendants the Bureau of Prisons and Santa Rita
9 County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that he was held for 11-days past his official release date of
10 November 1, 2015. Plaintiff requests monetary damages.

11 Plaintiff's complaint contains several deficiencies that must be corrected before this case
12 may proceed. First, the Bureau of Prisons is not a proper defendant. While the U.S. Supreme
13 Court has held that a private right of action for damages may be implied from the U.S.
14 Constitution itself for constitutional violations by federal employees or their agents, *see Bivens v.*
15 *Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents*, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971), sovereign immunity shields
16 the federal government from suit, *see Loeffler v. Frank*, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988). Absent a
17 waiver of sovereign immunity, the *Bivens* remedy exists solely against individual federal officials,
18 not against the United States. *See Kreines v. United States*, 33 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1994).
19 Because the purpose of *Bivens* is to deter the individual officer, the *Bivens* remedy does not extend
20 to damages actions against federal agencies. *See FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994).
21 Here, there is no indication that the federal government has waived sovereign immunity. Thus, the
22 Bureau of Prisons must be DISMISSED with prejudice from this suit.

23 Second, plaintiff does not state a claim for relief against the Santa Rita County Jail. A city
24 or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under
25 the theory of respondeat superior. *See Board of Cty. Comm'r's. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown*, 520 U.S.

1 397, 403 (1997). To impose municipal liability under Section 1983 for a violation of
2 constitutional rights resulting from governmental inaction or omission, a plaintiff must show:
3 (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the
4 municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's
5 constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
6 See *Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill*, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff
7 has not alleged any facts sufficient to support a claim for municipal liability against Santa Rita
8 County Jail. Thus, Santa Rita County Jail is DISMISSED from this suit. The dismissal is with
9 leave to amend should plaintiff be able to allege sufficient facts to cure the deficiency.

10 Plaintiff is advised that liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42
11 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant's actions both actually and proximately
12 caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. *Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections &*
13 *Rehabilitation*, 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013); *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.
14 1988). Either personal involvement or integral participation of the officers in the alleged
15 constitutional violation is required before liability may be imposed. See *Hopkins v. Bonvicino*,
16 573 F.3d 752, 769-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that although "integral participant" rule may not be
17 limited to officers who provide armed backup, officer who waits in front yard and does not
18 participate in search of residence not an integral participant). Here, plaintiff does not name any
19 individual defendant who was responsible for plaintiff's overdetention.

20 Finally, plaintiff does not allege that his overdetention violated a right secured by the U.S.
21 Constitution or laws of the United States. Thus, his claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

22 To the extent plaintiff's claim should be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
23 ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, plaintiff is advised that he must exhaust administrative remedies for
24 his claim before filing an FTCA action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); *Jerves v. United*
25 *States*, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992). An administrative claim is deemed exhausted once the

1 relevant agency finally denies it in writing, or if the agency fails to make a final disposition of the
2 claim within six months of the claim's filing. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA's exhaustion
3 requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. *Jerves*, 966 F.2d at 519.

4 Plaintiff must keep in mind that “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions,
5 that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” *Barren*
6 *v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the federal rules require brevity in
7 pleading, a complaint must be sufficient to give the defendants “fair notice” of the claim and the
8 “grounds upon which it rests.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
9 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Bell*
10 *Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007) (citations omitted). In his amended
11 complaint, plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” actions which
12 violated his or her rights. *Leer*, 844 F.2d at 634. Plaintiff must name each individual defendant,
13 and clearly state what each defendant did that made him or her liable for violating plaintiff’s
14 constitutional rights. Plaintiff should specifically state what happened, when it happened, what
15 each defendant did, and how those actions or inactions rise to the level of a federal constitutional
16 violation.

17 In light of these deficiencies, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. The
18 amended complaint need not be long. In fact, brief and clear statements with regard to each claim
19 listing each defendant’s actions regarding that claim is preferable.

20 **CONCLUSION**

21 1. The Bureau of Prisons is DISMISSED with prejudice. Santa Rita County Jail is
22 DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
23 2. If plaintiff believes he can state a cognizable claim for relief, he shall file an
24 AMENDED COMPLAINT within thirty days from the date this order is filed. The amended
25 complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (C 18-CV-03420 LHK

26 Case No. 18-CV-03420 LHK (PR)
27 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND


1 (PR)) and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. If plaintiff files an amended
2 complaint, he must allege, in good faith, facts - not merely conclusions of law - that demonstrate
3 that he is entitled to relief under the applicable federal statutes. **Failure to file an amended**
4 **complaint within thirty days and in accordance with this order will result in a finding that**
5 **further leave to amend would be futile, and this action will be dismissed.**

6 3. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.
7 “[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in
8 the amended complaint.” *London v. Coopers & Lybrand*, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981).
9 Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. *See Ferdik v. Bonzelet*,
10 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).

11 4. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court
12 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of
13 Change of Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so
14 may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
15 Procedure 41(b).

16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 DATED: 8/27/2018


18 LUCY H. KOH
19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX E

(Prob12B)

United States District Court
for
The Northern District of Illinois

Judge: Honorable Robert W. Gettleman

Date: November 16, 2015

**Request for Modifying the Conditions or Term of Supervision
With Consent of Offender
(Probation Form 49, Waiver of Hearing is Attached)**

Offender Name:	Washington, Eugene	Case Number:	94CR00339
Sentencing Judicial Officer:	Suzanne B. Conlon		
Date of Original Sentence:	December 21, 1994		
Original Offense:	Conspiracy to Distribute Cocaine in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846 Use of a Communication Facility in Felony Offense in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b) Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1)		
Original Sentence:	360 Months custody 60 Months supervised release		
Court Ordered Modifications:	On August 29, 2013, per Order of the Executive Committee, this matter was reassigned to Your Honor. On April 21, 2015, Mr. Washington's sentence was reduced to 292 months, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3582(c)(2).		
Type of Supervision:	Supervised Release		
Date Supervision Began:	November 12, 2015	Date Supervision Expires:	November 11, 2020

SUMMARY

Mr. Washington was released from the Bureau of Prisons on November 12, 2015, after serving a 21 year custody sentence, and reported to the U.S. Probation Office in the Central District of California, where he will complete his supervision. As stated in the letter by the U.S. Probation Office in the Central District of California, Mr. Washington has severe mental health conditions, as documented by the Bureau of Prisons. During his Bureau of Prisons commitment he sustained brain trauma which led to his civil commitment within the Bureau of Prisons system.

U.S. Probation Officer Action:

The 1994 Judgment and Commitment Order contains a pre-guideline sentence, and the offender does not have any special conditions. Attached is signed Waiver of Hearing to Modify Conditions of Supervised Release signed by the offender, following his release. It is requested that the Court modify the conditions to add mental health, reasonable search, and substance abuse testing. It is the opinion of the United States Probation Office in the Northern District of California that these conditions will assist them in appropriately monitoring the offender during the community based portion of his sentence.

PETITIONING THE COURT

- To extend the term of supervision for [Mos] months, for a total term of [Months] months.
- To modify the conditions of supervision as follows:
 - 1). The defendant shall participate in a program for testing and treatment for drug abuse, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from treatment by the probation officer. The defendant is to pay part or all of the cost of this treatment, at an amount not to exceed the cost of treatment, as deemed appropriate by the probation officer. Payments shall never exceed the cost of urinalysis or counseling. The actual co-payment shall be determined by the probation officer.
 - 2). The defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from treatment by the probation officer. The defendant is to pay part or all of the cost of this treatment, at an amount not to exceed the cost of treatment, as deemed appropriate by the probation officer. Payments shall never exceed the cost of mental health counseling. The actual co-payment shall be determined by the probation officer.
 - 3). The defendant shall submit to a search of his person, residence, office, vehicle, or any property under his control. Such a search shall be conducted by a U.S. Probation Officer or any federal, state, or local law enforcement officer at any time with or without suspicion. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation; the defendant shall warn any residents that the premises may be subject to searches.

**Bureau of Prisons
Health Services
Clinical Encounter**

Inmate Name: WASHINGTON, EUGENE	Reg #: 05972-424
Date of Birth: 02/03/1957	Facility: TRM
Encounter Date: 07/24/2015 15:19	Unit: 201

Chronic Care - Chronic Care Clinic encounter performed at Health Services.

SUBJECTIVE:

COMPLAINT 1 **Provider:** Cutillar, Dean MD

Chief Complaint: Behavioral Health Problem

Subjective: Inmate states he's been doing well, states he'll be released soon, and questioned me about his medications when he's released. I informed him that BOP policy was that he would receive a 30 day supply of psych meds upon his release. Mood has been good. Self esteem intact. No si/his/violent thoughts now or recently.

No problems with his medications, and he feels they are helping him.

Inmate also mentioned he will be applying for Disability when released. I feel that he does need to be placed on Soc Sec Disability as his Psychological and mental deficits make it a challenge for him to accomplish his ADL's.

Pain: Not Applicable

Seen for clinic(s): Mental Health

OBJECTIVE:

Exam:

Mental Health

Grooming/Hygiene

Yes: Unkempt, Disheveled, Malodorous

Affect

Yes: Bland

Speech/Language

Yes: Normal Rate, Normal Articulation

Thought Process

Yes: Circumstantial

Thought Content

Yes: Delusional

No: Suicidal or Homicidal Ideation

Perceptions

No: Hallucinations-Auditory, Hallucinations-Visual, Hallucinations - Tactile, Hallucinations - Olfactory

Orientation

Yes: Alert and Oriented x 3

Attention

Yes: Within Normal Limits, Appropriate

ASSESSMENT:


Axis I: Delusional disorder, 297.1 - Current, Chronic, Improved - *Low risk for violence to self or others at this time.*

RE: Washington, Eugene
Docket No: 1:94CR00339

Page 4 of 6
PACTS#: 48711


I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully submitted



Nikki Vogelsburg
U.S. Probation Officer
Tel: 312-435-5732

Reviewed by:



Brian R. Driver
Supervising U.S. Probation Officer
Tel: 312-435-5836

Enclosures: Probation Form 49
Letter from U.S. Probation in California
Judgment in a Criminal Case

cc: Morris Pasqual
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U. S. Attorney's Office
219 South Dearborn Street, 5th Floor
Chicago, IL 60604
312 353-5300

MiAngel C. Cody
Attorney at Law
Federal Defender Program
55 E. Monroe Street, Suite 2800
Chicago, IL 60603
312 621-8300

Eugene Washington
2420 107th Avenue
Oakland, California 94603

J.D. Woods
U.S. Probation Officer
1301 Clay Street – Suite 220S
Oakland, California 94612

APPENDIX F

INMATE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Current Program Review: 04-13-2010



Name: WASHINGTON, EUGENE
Register Number: 05972-424
Security/Custody: LOW/IN
Projected Release: 07-29-2020 / GCT REL

Institution: LOMPOC FCI
3600 GUARD ROAD
LOMPOC, CA 93436
Telephone: 805-736-4154
Fax: 805-736-1292

Next Review Date:	04-17-2010	Driver's License/State:	/
Next Custody Review Date:	01-27-2011	FBI Number:	263068FA8
Age/DOB/Sex:	53 / 02-03-1957 / M	DCDC Number:	
CIM Status:	Y	INS Number:	
	If yes, reconciled: Y	PDID Number:	
		Other IDs:	

Release Residence:	[POC] 2745 EAST LOUIS DRIVE VAIL, AZ 85641	Release Employer:	[Name] [Address]
Telephone:	[Phone]	Contact	[POC]
		Telephone:	[Phone]

Primary Emergency Contact:	Marion Washington, Mother 1662 Kenneth Street Seaside, CA 93955	Secondary Emergency	[POC]
Telephone:	831-394-3950	Contact:	[Address]
		Telephone:	[Phone]

Mentor Information:

Sentence/Supervision: 360 Months / 5 Years - SRA

Sentence Began	Time Served/Jail Credit/Inoperative Time	Days GCT/EGT/SGT	Days FSGT/WSGT/DGCT	Parole Status
12-21-1994	183 Months 23 Days / 212 Days / 0 Days	1393 / 789 / 0	0 / 0 / 21	Hearing Date: Hearing Type: Last USPC Action: NOT ELIGIBLE

Detainers: N
Pending Charges: None known

Financial Responsibility	Imposed	Balance	Case No/Court of Jurisdiction	Assess/Schedule Payment
ASSESSMENT	\$650.00	\$0.00	94 CR 339-1	FINANC RESP-COMPLETED

Financial Plan Active: N Financial Plan Date: [Date]	Comm Dep-6 mos: \$696.25 Commissary Balance: \$35.74	Cost of Incarceration Fee:	Waived based on inability to pay
---	---	-----------------------------------	----------------------------------

Payments

Commensurate: [Y,N]
Missed: [Y,N]

Judicial Recommendations: Tex / N/A / N/A

Special Conditions of Supervision: See Judgement

USPO Sentencing:	Richard L. Tracy, CUSPO 55 East Monroe Street Chicago, IL 60603	USPO Relocation:	[POC] [Address] [Phone]
Telephone:	312-435-5700	Telephone:	
Fax	312-408-5045		

APPENDIX G

11/11/2015

Inmate Locator

A-Z Topics Site Map FOIA

Search bop.gov

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Find an inmate.

Locate the whereabouts of a federal inmate incarcerated from 1982 to the present.

[Find By Number](#)

[Find By Name](#)

First: **Eugene** Middle: Last: **Washington** Race: **Black** Age: **58** Sex: **Male**

2 Results for search Eugene Washington, Race: Black, Age: 58, Sex: Male

[Clear Form](#)

[Search](#)

Name	Register #	Age	Race	Sex	Release Date	Location
EUGENE WASHINGTON	24667-016	58	Black	Male	01/24/2006	RELEASED
EUGENE WASHINGTON	05972-424	58	Black	Male	11/12/2015	Sacramento RRM

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Statistics	Visiting		Our Hiring Process		Research & Reports	Media Reps
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