No. \_\_\_\_\_

## IN THE Supreme Court of the United States

RODNEY EMIL,

Petitioner,

v.

BRIAN E. WILLIAMS, SR., WARDEN, ET AL.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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# APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF	THE STATE OF NEVADA
RODNEY LYN EMIL, Appellant,	No. 73461
vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.	FILED
	DEC 0 6 2019 ELIZABETHA BROWN CLERK OF SUR REME COURT BY DEPUTY CLERK
ORDER DENYING Rehearing denied. NRAP 4	
It is so ORDERED.	) ZNJ, C.J.
Picken, J. Pickering	Hardesty, J.
Parraguirre J.	<u>Atiquil</u> , J. Stiglich
Cadish J.	<u>Silver</u> , J.
cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, Distri Federal Public Defender/Central I Joel M. Mann, Chtd. Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk	
	19-49515

OF NEVADA

App. 01

# APPENDIX B

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RODNEY LYN EMIL, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

FILED SEP 13 2019 ELIZABETH A. BROWN CLERK OF SUPREME COURT

No. 73461

#### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Douglas W. Herndon, Judge.

Appellant filed his petition on January 11, 2017, more than one year after the remittitur issued on appeal from the judgment of conviction. *Emil v. State*, 105 Nev. 858, 784 P.2d 956 (1989). The petition was therefore untimely filed. *See* NRS 34.726(1). Moreover, because appellant previously sought postconviction relief,<sup>1</sup> the petition was successive to the extent it raised claims that were previously litigated and resolved on their merits, and it constituted an abuse of the writ to the extent it raised new claims. *See* NRS 34.810(2). Finally, because the State pleaded laches, appellant had to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. *See* NRS 34.800(2). Accordingly, the petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice, NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3), or a showing that the procedural bars should be excused to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice, *Pellegrini v. State*, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001).

<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Emil v. State, Docket No. 21663 (Order of Affirmance, June 27, 1991).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A

19-38417

Appellant argues that he demonstrated good cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural bars because Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), set forth a new retroactive rule that requires trial courts to instruct jurors that the State must prove that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. See Castillo v. State, 135 Nev., Adv. Op. 16, 442 P.3d 558 (2019) (discussing death-eligibility in Nevada and rejecting the argument that Hurst announced new law relevant to the weighing component of Nevada's death penalty procedures); Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 57-59, 412 P.3d 43, 53-54 (same), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 415 (2018). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

J. Pickering

J. Hardesty

Parraguirre

J.

Cadish

-----Stiglich

App. 03

Silver

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Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge cc: Federal Public Defender/Central Dist. of CA. Joel M. Mann, Chtd. Attorney General/Carson City **Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk** 

REME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A

# APPENDIX C

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4	DWILC	Alun D. Ehrinn
1	PWHC LAW OFFICES OF JOEL M. MANN Icel M. Mann, Esg.	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	Joel M, Mann, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 8174 601 South 7th Street	
3	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 474-6266	
4	Facsimile: (702) 789-1045 Email: joel@legalmann.com	
5	HILARY POTASHNER (Cal. State Bar No. 1456) Federal Public Defender, Central District of Calif	532) Ormia
6	CLAUDIA PAMELA GÓMEZ ( <i>pro hac vice</i> pen Assistant Federal Public Defender	
7	California State Bar No. 233848 Email: Pamela_Gomez@fd.org	
8	MARK YIM ( <i>pro hac vice</i> pending) Assistant Federal Public Defender California State Bar No. 268472	
9	Email: Mark_Yim@fd.org 321 East 2nd Street	
10	Los Angeles, California 90012-4202 Telephone: (213) 894-2854 Facsimile: (213) 894-1679	
11	Attorneys for Petitioner	
12	DISTRICT CLARK COUN	
13	RODNEY LYN EMIL,	
14	Petitioner,	Case No. C082176 Dept. No. III
15	V.	Dept. No. III
16	TIMOTHY FILSON, Warden, Ely State Prison,	PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)
17	and ADAM PAUL LAXALT, Nevada Attorney General	(Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Case)
18	Respondents.	
19	Petitioner Rodney Lyn Emil files this Peti	tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-
20	Conviction) pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute (	"NRS") sections 34.724 and 34.820. Emil
21	alleges that he is being held in custody in violatio	n of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
22	Amendments to the Constitution of the United Sta	ates of America; Article 1, sections Three, Six,
23	Eight, and Nine, and Article 4, section Twenty-Or	ne of the Constitution of the State of Nevada;

1	and the rights afforded to him under federal law enforced under the Supremacy Clause of the
2	United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI.
3	DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.
4	Respectfully submitted, HILARY POTASHNER
5	Federal Public Defender
6	/s/ Claudia Pamela Gómez CLAUDIA PAMELA GÓMEZ
7	Assistant Federal Public Defender
8	/s/ Mark Yim MARK YIM
9	Assistant Federal Public Defender
10	
11	NOTICE OF MOTION
12	TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Respondent,
13	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the "PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14	(POST-CONVICTION)" filed January, 2017 will be heard on the28 day of
15	, at the hour ofa.m./p.m., in Department XVII of the District Court.
16	
17	DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.
18	Respectfully submitted, HILARY POTASHNER
19	Federal Public Defender
20	/s/ Mark Yim MARK YIM
21	Assistant Federal Public Defender
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#### **PROCEDURAL ALLEGATIONS**

 Petitioner Rodney Lyn Emil is currently in the custody of the State of Nevada at Ely State Prison in Ely, Nevada, pursuant to a state court judgment of conviction and death sentence. Respondent Timothy Filson is the Warden of Ely State Prison. Emil's death sentence was entered on June 14, 1988, in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada.

2. On December 28, 1987, the State of Nevada filed a criminal complaint charging Emil with murder with the use of a deadly weapon. On January 26, 1988, at a preliminary hearing, the court bound Emil over to further proceedings in the Eighth Judicial Court of Clark County, Nevada. *State of Nevada v. Rodney Lyn Emil*, Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. C082176. On February 4, 1988, the State filed a one-count Information against Emil in the Eighth Judicial District Court. On May 10, 1988, the State gave notice of intent to seek death and notice of aggravating circumstances including murder committed by a person previously convicted of murder and murder for pecuniary gain.

On May 24, 26, 27, 31, and June 1, 2, 3, 1988, Emil was tried before a Clark
 County jury. The trial was presided over by the Honorable Carl J. Christensen of the Eighth
 Judicial District Court. Emil was represented at trial by David Schieck and Cal Potter. On June
 3, 1998, the jury convicted Emil on the single charge.

4. On June 8, 1988, the penalty hearing commenced before the trial jury. On June 9, 1988, the jury imposed the sentence of death. The judgment of conviction was entered on June 14, 1988. A timely notice of appeal was filed on July 12, 1988.

David Schieck also represented Emil during his direct appeal to the Nevada
 Supreme Court. On January 3, 1989, Appellant's Opening Brief was filed. The following issues
 were raised:

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1	I) It was reversible error to admit the testimony of Martin Koba without proper
2	foundation;
3	II) The evidence adduced at trial failed to establish Emil's guilt beyond a
4	reasonable doubt;
5	III) The polygraph report of Frederick Woodall should have been admitted at the
6	penalty hearing;
7	IV) The prior murder conviction should not have been allowed as an aggravating
8	circumstance;
9	V) The State should not have been allowed to offer testimony concerning the
10	Tolley murder in the penalty hearing; and
11	VI) Prosecutorial misconduct during the final argument requires a new penalty
12	hearing.
13	Rodney Emil v. State, case no. 19431 (Nev.). On December 28, 1989, Emil's conviction and
14	sentence were affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Rodney Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 784
15	P.2d 956 (1989). The petition for rehearing, which was timely filed, was denied and the
	remittitur issued on March 14, 1990.
16	6. On May 17, 1990, Emil filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and a Motion
17	for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in the Eighth Judicial District Court. The
18	Motion for New Trial was based on two grounds:
19	1) subsequent to testifying at the trial and penalty phase of this case, it was
20	determined that Mary Emil Deitrich was suffering from a brain tumor which
21	interfered with her thinking process, and
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 Alan Carmack was willing to testify that the events as testified by Frederick Woodall did not happen.

Motion for New Trial, State v. Rodney L. Emil, case no. C082176 (8th Dist. Ct. May 16, 1990).

7. On August 16, 1990 an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for New Trial was conducted in which Alan Carmack was called as the sole witness. The motion was denied by the District Court on August 23, 1990.

8. On August 20, 1990, Emil filed a timely notice of appeal of the District Court's denial of the Motion for New Trial. On August 23, 1990, Chris Maglaras was formally appointed to represent Emil in appealing the denial of his Motion for New Trial. The Nevada Supreme Court issued an order dismissing the appeal on June 27, 1991 and the remittitur issued on July 16, 1991. Attorney Chris Maglaras was permitted to withdraw from Emil's case.

9. On November 8, 1991, Emil, through his federal court-appointed counsel Patricia Erickson, filed in United States District Court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion to Stay Proceedings in Federal Court in order to exhaust issues Emil wished to present in federal court. The petition was dismissed without prejudice in order to allow Emil to return to state court and exhaust his state remedies. Dkt. 17, *Rodney Emil v. Ray Procunier, etc.*, case no. CV-N-91-524-LDG (D. Nev.).

10. On July 14, 1992, Emil filed a superseding Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court, and on September 23, 1992, the Eighth Judicial District Court appointed Patricia Erickson as counsel during the post-conviction litigation. Emil filed pro se a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with Erickson's assistance raising the following claims:

 Violation of constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing;

1	2) Violation of constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during guilt
2	phase of trial;
3	3) Violation of constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during
4	penalty phase of litigation;
5	4) Violation of constitutional right to due process by State's failure to disclose all
6	promises, inducements and benefits obtained by persons who testified at trial
7	(Giglio);
8	5) Violation of constitutional right to due process by the State's failure to disclose
9	all exculpatory (Brady, Agurs materials) evidence known to it at the time of trial;
10	and
11	6) Violation of the state and federal constitutional right to due process through the
12	erroneous instruction of the jury at both guilty and penalty phase.
13	Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Rodney Lyn Emil v. State of Nevada, case no. C82176, 8th
14	Dist. Ct. July 14, 1992. On August 11, 1993, Emil filed an Amended Petition for Post-
	Conviction Relief. Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Rodney Lyn Emil v. State,
15	case no. C82176 (8th Dist. Ct. August 11, 1993). On October 25, 1993, the State filed its
16	Answer in Opposition to Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On January 18, 1994,
17	Emil filed a Reply to Answer in Opposition to Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.
18	11. On April 21 and 26, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was held on Emil's Petition for
19	Post-Conviction Relief.
20	12. On September 12, 1995, the Eighth Judicial District Court denied Emil post-
21	conviction relief concluding that: 1) there was no willful suppression of <i>Brady</i> material; 2) trial
22	counsel's effectiveness did not fall below a reasonable standard; 3) there was evidence sufficient
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enough to convict; 4) not disclosing difficulties in locating a witness did not violate Emil's substantive rights; and 5) all other claims were summarily denied. Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, *State v. Rodney Lyn Emil*, case no. C82176 (8th Dist. Ct. September 12, 1995).

13. On March 29, 2000, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an opinion denying postconviction relief. *Emil v. State*, 116 Nev. 1370, 62 P.3d 1154 (2000).

14. Emil filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in propia persona in the United States District Court on December 13, 2000. Dkt. No. 1, *Emil v. E. K. McDaniel*, case no. CV-00654-KJD -VPC (D. Nev.). The federal court appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office of Nevada to represent Emil on January 22, 2001. Dkt. No. 12, *Emil v. E. K. McDaniel*, case no. CV-00654-KJD-VPC (D. Nev.). On March 3, 2006, Emil through counsel filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court. Dkt. No. 135, *Emil v. E. K. McDaniel*, CV-00654-HJD (VPC).

15. On June 19, 2006, Emil filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the EighthJudicial District Court. The grounds raised in the 2006 petitioner included:

 Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence;
 Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence;

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1	3) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
2	constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence
3	due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence;
4	4) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
5	constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, effective assistance of
6	counsel and a reliable sentence due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory
7	and impeachment evidence due to the State's interference with the presentation of
8	a defense;
9	5) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
10	constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, trial before an impartial
11	jury, and a reliable sentence due to the substantial and injurious effect of a
12	consistent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct and overreaching which distorted
	the fact finding process and rendered the trial and sentencing hearing
13	fundamentally unfair;
14	6) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
15	constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law,
16	equal protection of the laws, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and a
17	reliable sentence due to the failure of pre-trial, trial, and sentencing counsel to
18	provide reasonably effective assistance;
19	7) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
20	constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law,
21	equal protection of the laws, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and a
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1	reliable sentence due to the failure of trial and sentencing counsel to provide
2	reasonably effective assistance regarding murder for remuneration;
3	8) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
4	constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law,
5	equal protection of the laws, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and a
6	reliable sentence due to the failure of pre-trial, trial, and sentencing counsel to
7	provide reasonable effective assistance regarding the State's key witness;
8	9) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
9	constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law,
10	equal protection of the laws, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and a
11	reliable sentence due to the refusal of the trial court to admit polygraph of State's
	key witness;
12	10) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional
13	guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence because
14	Petitioner is actually innocent,
15	11) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
16	constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law,
17	equal protection of the laws, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and a
18	reliable sentence due to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel to not object to trial
19	court's malice instruction;
20	12) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
21	constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law,
22	equal protection of the laws, trial by jury, and a reliable sentence due to trial
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court's due process violation regarding jury's consideration of non-statutory 1 aggravators 2 13) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional 3 guarantees of due process, equal protection, access to the courts, the right to trial 4 in the state and district where his crime was committed, and a reliable sentence,  $\mathbf{5}$ and under international law, due to the State's failure to prove all elements 6 beyond a reasonable doubt; 7 14) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal 8 constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, trial before an impartial 9 jury, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable sentence because of the trial 10 court's failure to properly instruct the jury concerning reasonable doubt; 11 15) Petitioner's conviction and sentence are invalid under the constitutional 12 guarantees of due process, trial by jury, effective assistance of counsel and a 13 reliable sentence due to jury misconduct; 14 16) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional 15 guarantees of due process, equal protection, a reliable sentence, and effective 16 assistance of counsel for constitutional violations regarding punishment jury 17 instructions; 18 17) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional 19 guarantees of due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, and a 20 reliable sentence, due to trial court error in admission of non-statutory 21 aggravators; 22 23 10

1	18) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional
2	guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence, due to trial
3	court error in refusing instruction on non-statutory mitigating evidence;
4	19) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional
5	guarantees of due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, and a
6	reliable sentence, due to State's failure of notice of forensic expert and trial
7	counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to engage its own forensic expert;
8	20) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional
9	guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence, due to trial
10	counsel's ineffectiveness in the punishment phase;
11	21) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
12	constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, the effective assistance
13	of counsel, a fair tribunal, an impartial jury, and a reliable sentence due to the
	cumulative errors in the admission of evidence and instructions, gross misconduct
14	by state officials and witnesses, and the systematic deprivation of Petitioner's
15	right to the effective assistance of counsel;
16	22) Petitioner's conviction and sentence violate the constitutional guarantees of
17	due process of law, equal protection of the laws and a reliable sentence and
18	international law because Petitioner's capital trial and sentencing and review on
19	direct appeal were conducted before state judicial officers whose tenure in office
20	was not during good behavior but whose tenure was dependent on popular
21	election;
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1	23) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional
2	guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence because
3	execution by lethal injection violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel
4	and unusual punishments;
5	24) Petitioner's right to due process of law, equal protection of the laws, effective
6	assistance of counsel and a reliable sentence was violated by the ineffective
7	assistance of state post-conviction counsel;
8	25) Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the federal
9	constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence
10	due to the failure of the Nevada Supreme Court to conduct fair and adequate
11	appellate review;
12	26) Petitioner's conviction and sentence are invalid under the constitutional
13	guarantees of due process of law, equal protection of the laws, effective assistance
14	of counsel and a reliable sentence because Petitioner was not afforded effective
	assistance of counsel on appeal;
15	27) Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the federal constitutional
16	guarantees of due process, equal protection, and a reliable sentence because the
17	Nevada capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
18	16. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied Emil's petition on March 24, 2008, and
19	a Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 17, 2008. Judgment was affirmed by the Nevada
20	Supreme Court in Case No. 51474 on July 20, 2010. A Petition for Rehearing was filed on
21	August 9, 2010 and was denied on November 17, 2010. The remittitur issued on December 13,
22	2010.
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1	17. On July 1, 2011, Emil filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas		
2	Corpus in United States District Court. Dkt. No. 181, Emil v. E. K. McDaniel, CV-00654-KJD-		
3	VPC (D. Nev.). On May 23, 2012, the Federal Public Defender's Office of Nevada filed a		
4	motion requesting the substitution of counsel citing a conflict of interest. Dkt. Nos. 199, 200,		
5	Emil v. E. K. McDaniel, CV-00654-KJD-VPC (D. Nev.). On July 12, 2012, current counsel, the		
6	Federal Public Defender's Office of the Central District of California, was appointed to represent		
7	Emil. On March 11, 2013, Emil filed a Third Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in		
8	the United States District Court. Dkt. No. 212, Emil v. E. K. McDaniel, CV-00654-KJD-VPC		
9	(D. Nev.). Because newly appointed counsel discovered new, unexhausted claims, the United		
10	States District Court stayed Emil's federal case on November 15, 2013, to allow Emil the chance		
11	to present his claims to the state courts. Emil's case in the United States District Court remains		
	pending.		
12	18. On October 7, 2013, Emil filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Eighth		
13	Judicial District Court. The grounds raised in the 2013 petition included:		
14	Claim One: Petitioner's right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court		
15	coerced the jury to reach a guilty verdict;		
16	Claim Two: Petitioner's conviction is invalid because his capital jury was not		
17	required to find all the independent elements of first degree murder, thus reliving		
18	the state of the burden of proof;		
19	Claim Three: Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of appellate		
20	counsel;		
21	Claim Four: Petitioner's conviction and death sentence are invalid under the		
22	constitution because the jury committed misconduct;		
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1	Claim Five: Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of post-
2	conviction counsel
3	19. On April 8, 2014, the Eighth Judicial District Court issued an order denying
4	Emil's petition, and the Notice of Entry was entered on April 14, 2014. On May 7, 2014, Emil
5	timely filed his Notice of Appeal. After briefing by the parties, the Nevada Supreme Court
6	affirmed the Eighth Judicial District Court's denial on April 22, 2016. The remittitur issued on
7	November 7, 2016.
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1	STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
2	THE INSTANT PETITION
3	20. The claim presented in this petition has not been presented to the state courts for
4	review because the claim is based on new, intervening authority from the United States Supreme
5	Court, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). Emil can demonstrate good cause and prejudice
6	to overcome the state procedural bars when a federal court holds that a prior determination of the
0	state courts is erroneous. See Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 353, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994);
7	accord Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 643, 28 P.3d 498, 521 (2001) (good cause to overcome
8	state procedural default exists when "a federal court concludes that a determination of this court
9	is erroneous").
10	PRIOR COUNSEL
	The attorneys who previously represented Smith were:
11	A. <u>Pretrial/Trial Proceedings</u>
12	Leslie Stovall preliminary hearing David Schieck trial
13	Cal Potter trial
14	B. <u>First Direct Appeal</u> David Schieck
15	C. <u>Motion for New Trial; Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (1990)</u> David Schieck
16 17	D. <u>Appeal of Motion for New Trial</u> Chris Maglaras
18	E. <u>Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (1992)</u>
19	Patricia Erickson
20	F. <u>Appeal of 1992 PCR Petition</u> Patricia Erickson Patrick McDonald
21	G. <u>Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus</u>
22	Patricia Erickson Federal Public Defender, Nevada
23	Federal Public Defender, Central District of California
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2	H. <u>2006 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus</u> Federal Public Defender, Nevada
3	I. <u>Appeal of 2006 Post-Conviction Petition</u> Federal Public Defender, Nevada
4	J. <u>2013 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus</u>
5	Federal Public Defender, Central District of California
6	K. <u>Appeal of 2013 Post-Conviction Petition</u> Federal Public Defender, Central District of California
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#### **GROUNDS FOR RELIEF**

21. Emil hereby asserts the following ground for relief. References in this Petition to the accompanying exhibits incorporate the contents of the exhibit as if fully set forth herein.

## CLAIM ONE: PETITIONER'S SENTENCE IS INVALID BECAUSE THE JURY APPLIED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF PROOF FOR WEIGHING AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

22. Petitioner's death sentence is invalid under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article One, Sections Three, Eight, and Nine, and Article Four, section Twenty-One of the Nevada Constitution. A capital defendant, before being sentenced to death, has a right to a trial by jury and to have every fact exposing him to a death sentence proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury in Petitioner's capital trial was instructed to evaluate the evidence necessary to qualify Petitioner for a death sentence under an unconstitutionally lax standard of proof: It was instructed that as a prerequisite to sentencing Petitioner to death, it needed to find, by an undefined "sufficient" standard, that the mitigation did not outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstances. The state and federal constitutions require that finding to be made beyond a reasonable doubt.

#### A. Supporting Facts

23. The penalty phase jury was not properly instructed that in order to sentence Petitioner to death, it needed to find all statutory prerequisites to an ultimate death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Nevada law, before a defendant may be sentenced to death, the jury must make two separate findings: (1) that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, and (2) that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. NRS 175.554(3). Only after the jury makes both of those findings may it then decide whether to sentence a capital defendant to death or prison. NSC 175.554(2)(c) & (3).

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24. Petitioner's jury was instructed in the penalty phase that any findings of aggravating circumstance had to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ex. A, Penalty Phase Jury Instruction No. 7, at 264.) The jury was not instructed, however, that it had to find the second prerequisite to a death sentence, that the mitigating circumstances were not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, beyond a reasonable doubt. (*Id.*) Instead, it was instructed that it could choose whether to sentence petitioner to death if it found that "there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating" circumstances found. (*Id.*, emphasis added.)

#### B. Applicable Law

25. Under *Hurst v. Florida*, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621-24 (2016), only a jury can find the facts that permit a death sentence, and the jury must do so under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Such required jury fact finding includes the weighing of aggravation and mitigation that must occur under Nevada law before the jury may turn to the ultimate question of whether to impose a life or a death sentence.

26. The Delaware Supreme Court, on August 2, 2016, invalidated Delaware's death penalty sentencing scheme in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Hurst*. Delaware's death penalty law, the Delaware Supreme Court held, violated the sixth amendment and due process because it did not require aggravation and mitigation to be weighed beyond a reasonable doubt. *Rauf v. Delaware*, 145 A.3d 430, 434 (Del. 2016) (so holding in certified question 4); *id* at 481-82 (majority concurring opinion of Strine, CJ, joined by Holland and Seitz, JJ); *id*. at 484-85, 487 (majority concurring opinion of Holland, J., joined by Strine, CJ, and Seitz, J).

21 27. On December 15, 2016, the Delaware Supreme Court held that its decision in
22 *Rauf* was fully retroactive. *Powell v. Delaware*, 2016 WL 7243546 (Del., Dec. 15, 2016).
23 Central to *Powell*'s retroactivity holding was the fact that *Hurst* and *Rauf* demanded that all

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facts, including the determining of whether aggravators outweigh mitigators, must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to comport with the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Constitutional errors regarding the proper standard of proof, the Delaware Supreme Court held, render a decision fundamentally unfair and inaccurate, and thus require retroactivity. The *Powell* Court's retroactivity holding relied upon *Ivan V. v. City of New York*, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional violations are retroactive because "the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in *Winship* was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function") and *Hankerson v. North Carolina*, 432 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1977) (emphasizing undeviating adherence to retroactivity rule of *Ivan V*. because of the importance of the accuracy and truth-finding function). *See Powell* at \*5.

28. The weighing process performed by the penalty phase sentencer in Nevada is entirely idiosyncratic; the weighing process does not depend on the number of aggravating or mitigating circumstances; the jury may give any circumstance whatever weight it determines is appropriate. No entity other than the jury can perform the necessary weighing, and the failure to instruct the jury on the standard by which it was required to find this death-eligibility factor is prejudicial per se.

29. Failure to instruct the jury on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt violated Petitioner's right to a jury trial, due process of law, and a reliable sentence, and constitutes structural error which is prejudicial per se. In the alternative, the failure of the jury instruction to require that mitigating circumstances not be outweighed by aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt was prejudicial, and the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

1	PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2	For the reasons stated above, this Court should issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus, vacate
3	Emil's death sentence, and grant him a new sentencing hearing.
4	DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.
5	
6	HILARY POTASHNER Federal Public Defender
7	/s/ Claudia Pamela Gómez
8	CLAUDIA PAMELA GÓMEZ Assistant Federal Public Defender
9	/s/ Mark Yim
10	MARK YIM Assistant Federal Public Defender
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4	VERIFICATION
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2	Under penalty of perjury, the undersigned declares that they are counsel for Petitioner
3	Rodney Lyn Emil named in the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof; that the
4	pleading is true of their own knowledge except as to those matters stated on information and
5	belief and as to such matters they believe them to be true. Emil personally authorized
6	undersigned counsel to commence this action.
7	DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.
8	Respectfully submitted
9	HILARY POTASHNER Federal Public Defender
10	/s/ Claudia Pamela Gómez
11	CLAUDIA PAMELA GÓMEZ Assistant Federal Public Defender
12	/s/ Mark Yim MARK YIM
13	Assistant Federal Public Defender
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	In accordance with EDCR 7.26(b)(6), the undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th
3	day of January, 2017, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF
4	HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION) was filed electronically with the Eighth Judicial
5	District Court and served by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class postage
6	prepaid, addressed as follows:
7	Victor-Hugo Schulze, II Senior Deputy Attorney General
8	Office of the Attorney General 555 East Washington Avenue, #3900
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
10	Timothy Filson Warden, Ely State Prison
11	P.O. Box 1989 Ely, Nevada 89301
12	Steven S. Owens
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
15	/s/ Isabel Prado
16	An Employee of the Federal Public Defender Central District of California
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#### App. 25

## **EXHIBIT** A

## **EXHIBIT 110**

## **EXHIBIT 110**

	• • • •
	- FILED IN OPEN COURT -
1	DISTRICT COURT JUN 9 1988 62'30 PM
2	Clark County, Nevada LOPETTA EO MAN, CLERK
3	Presenter As informed
- 4	THE STATE OF NEVADA, ) CASE NO. C82176
5	Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. VII
6	-vs-
7	RODNEY LYN EMIL, <u>INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY</u>
8	Defendant, INSTRUCTION NO. I
9	
10	
11	MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
12	It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that
13	applies to this penalty hearing. It is your duty as jurors to
14	follow these Instructions and to apply the rules of law to the
15	facts as you find them from the evidence.
16	You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of
17	law stated in these Instructions. Regardless of any opinion you
18	may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation
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20	than that given in the Instructions of the Court.
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	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - Patti Erickson Rec'd 2/15/01 PE000269

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
	<b>Q</b>
1	INSTRUCTION NO. 7
2	The Charles has allowed that accomputing circumstances are
3	The State has alleged that aggravating circumstances are
4	present in this case. The Defendant has alleged that certain mitigating circum-
6	stances are present in this case.
7	It shall be your duty to determine:
8	(a) Whether an aggravating circumstance or circumstances
9	are found to exist; and
10	(b) Whether a mitigating circumstance or circumstances
11	are found to exist; and
12	(c) Based upon these findings, whether the Defendant
13	should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
14	The jury may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at
15	least one aggravating circumstance has been established beyond
16	a reasonable doubt and further finds that there are no mitigating
17	circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance
18	or circumstances found.
19	Otherwise, the punishment imposed shall be imprisonment in
20	the State Prison for life with or without the possibility of
21	parole.
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28	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY
	Prior Counsel - Patti Erickson Ree'd 2/15/01 PE000275 264

**Details of filing:** *Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-conviction)* **Filed in Case Number:** 88C082176

E-File ID: 8969304

Lead File Size: 172524 bytes Date Filed: 2017-01-11 17:06:57.0 Case Title: 88C082176 Case Name: The State of Nevada vs Rodney L Emil Filing Title: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-conviction) Filing Type: EFO Filer's Name: Mark Yim Filer's Email: Mark\_Yim@fd.org Account Name: Pro Bono Account Filing Code: PWHC Amount: \$ 0.00 Court Fee: \$ 0.00 Card Fee: \$ 0.00 Payment: Processing complete. Payment not yet captured. Comments: Courtesy Copies: Isabel\_Prado@fd.org, Gary\_Rowe@fd.org Firm Name: Office of the Federal Public Defender Your File Number: Status: Accepted - (A) Date Accepted: 2017-01-12 08:46:26.0 **Review Comments:** Reviewer: Allison Behrhorst File Stamped Copy: 88C082176-8969304 PWHC Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Post conviction .pdf Cover Document: Documents: Lead Document: 2017 Hurst State Petition.pdf 172524 bytes Attachment # 1: Ex A - Penalty Phase Jury Instruc.pdf 87765 bytes Data Reference ID: Credit Card Response: O Reference:

# APPENDIX D



App. 31

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SUPREME COURT OF NEVAOA

#### Supreme Court of Nevada

### NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

Notice is given of the following activity:

Date and Time of Notice: Jun 24 2016 11:17 a.m.

Case Title: Docket Number: Case Category:	EMIL (RODNEY) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) 65627 Criminal Appeal
Document Category:	Filed Order Denying Rehearing. "Rehearing Denied." NRAP 40(c). fn1[The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this matter.]
Submitted by:	Issued by Court
<b>Official File Stamp:</b>	Jun 24 2016 09:08 a.m.
Filing Status:	Accepted and Filed
Docket Text:	Filed Order Denying Rehearing. "Rehearing Denied." NRAP 40(c). fn1[The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this matter.]

The Clerk's Office has filed this document. It is now available on the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing website. Click <u>here</u> to login to eFlex and view this document.

Electronic service of this document is complete at the time of transmission of this notice. The time to respond to the document, if required, is computed from the date and time of this notice. Refer to NEFR 9(f) for further details.

#### Clerk's Office has electronically mailed notice to:

Joel Mann Mark Yim C. Gomez Adam Laxalt Steven Owens

## No notice was electronically mailed to those listed below; counsel filing the document must serve a copy of the document on the following:

Hilary Potashner

This notice was automatically generated by the electronic filing system. If you have any questions, contact the Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 775-684-1600 or 702-486-9300.

# APPENDIX E

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RODNEY LYN EMIL, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 65627 FILED APR 2 2 2016 TRACIE K. LINDEMAN CLERK OF SUPREME COURT BY \_\_\_\_\_\_ DEPUTY CLERX

### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a fourth postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Douglas W. Herndon, Judge.

Appellant Rodney Lyn Emil shot and killed his stepfather on Father's Day in 1984. A jury convicted him of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. *Emil v. State*, 105 Nev. 858, 784 P.2d 956 (1989). In this appeal from the denial of his fourth postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Emil argues that the district court erred by denying his petition as procedurally barred without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Because he filed his petition on October 7, 2013, approximately 23 years after this court resolved his direct appeal, the petition was untimely under NRS 34.726(1). The petition was also successive because he had previously sought postconviction relief and therefore was procedurally barred. NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2). To overcome the procedural defaults, Emil had to demonstrate good cause and prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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As cause to overcome the procedural default rules, Emil argues that postconviction counsel who represented him in his 1992 postconviction proceedings rendered ineffective assistance and abandoned him, as evidenced by this court's removal of counsel.<sup>1</sup> Emil v. State, Docket No. 28463 (Order, June 24, 1997). His claim lacks merit because he had no right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel. While it is arguable whether the petition filed in 1992 can be considered his first postconviction petition in light of his 1990 postconviction petition that was not expressly resolved by the district court, both postconviction petitions were filed before the effective date of the statute mandating appointment of counsel for a first postconviction habeas petition in a death penalty case. See NRS 34.820(1); 1991 Nev. Stat., ch. 44, §§ 32-33, at 92; Mazzan v. Warden, 112 Nev. 838, 841 n.1, 921 P.2d 920, 921 n.1 (1996). Because counsel was not appointed pursuant to NRS 34.820, Emil did not have a right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel. See Bejarano v. Warden, 112 Nev. 1466, 1470 n.1, 929 P.2d 922, 925 n.1 (1996); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255, 258 n.5 (1996).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>To the extent Emil relies on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. \_\_\_, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. \_\_\_, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), as good cause to excuse the delay in raising his postconviction claims, his claim lacks merit. His postconviction petition was filed more than one year after Martinez and Maples were decided, and therefore he did not raise this claim within a reasonable time. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252-53, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Moreover, we held in Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 60, 331 P.3d 867, 871-72 (2014), that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory procedures. To the extent Emil relies on Maples for the proposition that counsel's abandonment may constitute good cause, we conclude that he was not abandoned as contemplated by Maples.

Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel cannot serve as good cause to overcome the procedural bars.<sup>2</sup> *Pellegrini v. State*, 117 Nev. 860, 887-88, 34 P.3d 519, 537-38 (2001). Therefore, the district court did not err by denying the petition as procedurally barred without conducting an evidentiary hearing. *See Nika v. State*, 124 Nev. 1272, 1300-01, 198 P.3d 839, 858 (2008) (observing that an evidentiary hearing is warranted only where a petitioner "asserts specific allegations that are not belied or repelled by the record and that, if true, would entitle him to relief").

In addition to the procedural bars in NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810, the district court denied the petition based on laches under NRS 34.800. Emil argues that NRS 34.800 does not apply because the State failed to explain how it was prejudiced by the delay in filing the petition. His contention lacks merit for two reasons. First, because five years elapsed between the appeal of the judgment of conviction and the filing of the postconviction petition, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State arose. NRS 34.800(2). Therefore, Emil, not the State, bore the burden of overcoming that presumption, id., and he has not done so. Second, even assuming that he could overcome the laches bar, his petition is procedurally barred under NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810.<sup>3</sup>

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>To the extent Emil argues that he continued to be deprived of conflict-free counsel after initial counsel was removed, that circumstance does not constitute good cause because he still did not have the right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Emil argues that he is actually innocent of first-degree murder and the death penalty. Below, he asserted a claim that he is actually innocent of the death penalty because the jurors' "deliberations did not involve *continued on next page...* 

Having considered Emil's arguments and concluded that no relief is warranted, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.<sup>4</sup>





#### ... continued

substantial mitigating circumstances, and evidence of innocence, which trial counsel never investigated, identified or presented." We conclude that the district court did not err by denying this claim. See generally Lisle v. State, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 351 P.3d 725, 734 (2015) (observing that "an actual-innocence inquiry in Nevada must focus on the objective factors that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty," that is, the aggravating circumstances, and, therefore, a claim of actual innocence of the death penalty offered as a gateway to reach a procedurally defaulted claim cannot be grounded in new evidence of mitigating circumstances). Further, because he did not raise a claim in his postconviction petition that he is actually innocent of first-degree murder, we need not consider that claim. See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606, 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 25 (2004). As to Emil's contention that the district court misapplied the law-of-the-case doctrine in denying his petition, we conclude that no relief is warranted.

<sup>4</sup>The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this matter.

OF NEVADA

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cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge Federal Public Defender/Central Dist. of CA. Joel M. Mann, Chtd. Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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# APPENDIX F

FILED IN OPEN COURT JUN 9 1 DISTRICT COURT LOPETA 2 2OV Clark County, Nevada 3 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 4 CASE NO C82176 5 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. VII 6 -vs-7 RODNEY LYN EMIL, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 8 Defendant, INSTRUCTION NO. 1 9 10 11 MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 12 It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this penalty hearing. It is your duty as jurors to 13 14 follow these Instructions and to apply the rules of law to the 15 facts as you find them from the evidence. 16 You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of 17 law stated in these Instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation 18 of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law 19 20 than that given in the Instructions of the Court. 21 22 23 <u>24</u> 25 26 27 28 FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-292 - Page 249 -

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REmil - PMc D-00297

1	INSTRUCTION NO
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3	If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is
5	repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is
6	intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason,
7	you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual
8	point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consi- der all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light
9	of all the others.
10	The order in which the instructions are given has no
11	significance as to their relative importance.
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	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY
	Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-293 - Page 250

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INSTRUCTION NO. The trial jury shall fix the punishment for every person convicted of murder of the first degree. FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-294 - Page 251 -

1	INSTRUCTION NO. 4
2	
3 The jury shall fix t	the punishment at:
4 (1) Death, or	
5 (2) Life imprisonme	ent without the possibility of parole
6 or	
7 (3) Life imprisonme	ent with the possibility of parole.
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	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald

App. 41

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INSTRUCTION NO. 1. Life imprisonment with the possibility of parole is a sentence to life imprisonment which provides that the defendant would be eligible for parole after a period of ten years. This does not mean that he would be paroled after ten years, but only that he would be eligible after that period of time. 2. Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole means exactly what it says, that the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. 3. If you sentence the Defendant to death you must assume that the sentence will be carried out. Although under certain circumstances and conditions 4. sentences, you are instructed that you may not speculate as to whether the sentence you impose may be changed at a later date. FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald

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
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13 the State Board of Pardons Commissioners has the power to modify 14 15 16

- Page 253 -

Rec'd 3/5/01

PM-296



FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-297

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1	INSTRUCTION NO
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* 5	present in this case.
6	The Defendant has alleged that certain mitigating circum-
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8	It shall be your duty to determine:
o 9	(a) Whether an aggravating circumstance or circumstances
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11	are found to exist; and
12	(c) Based upon these findings, whether the Defendant
13	should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
14	The jury may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance has been established beyond
16	
17	circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance
18	or circumstances found.
19	Otherwise, the punishment imposed shall be imprisonment in
20	the State Prison for life with or without the possibility of
21	parole.
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	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY
	Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-298 - Page 255 -

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REmil - PMc.D-00303

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ISTRUCTION NO. 8
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person who was previously
person, for himself or
ney or any other thing of
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1-289 EMIL, RODNEY Counsel - P. McDonald

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
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2-INSTRUCTION NO. The conviction of the Defendant for Murder of the First Degree with Use of a Deadly Weapon on February 9, 1988 may be used as an aggravating circumstance in this case even though that conviction occurred subsequent to the murder of Charles Howard Emil. The only requirement is that the other murder conviction must have occurred prior to this penalty hearing. The focal point is the time of sentencing. The trial jury is entitled to consider all relevant aspects of the defendant's criminal background prior to rendering sentence. FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald PM-300 Rec'd 3/5/01 - Page 257 -

REmil-PMcD-00305



REmil - PMc D- 00306

INSTRUCTION NO. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and sub-stantial, not mere possibility or speculation. FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-302 - Page 259 -

REmil-PMcD-00307

1	INSTRUCTION NO
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3	Murder of the First Degree may be mitigated by any of the
4	following circumstances, even though the mitigating circumstance
5	is not sufficient to constitute a defense or reduce the degree of
6	the crime:
7	(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior
8	criminal activity.
9	(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under
10	the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
11	(3) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed
- 1	by another person and his participation in the murder was rela-
13	tively minor.
14	(4) The victim was a participant in the defendant's criminal
15	conduct or consented to the act.
16	(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination
17	of another person.
18	(6) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
19 20	(7) Any other mitigating circumstance.
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	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY
1	Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-303

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1	INSTRUCTION NO. 13
2	The credibility or believability of a witness should be
3	and a spon the stand, his relationship to the
4	parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportu-
5	nity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the rea-
6	sonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his
7	recollections.
8	If you believe that a witness has lied about any material
	fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that
10	witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.
11 · 12	other evidence.
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	FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY
	Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-304 - Page 261 -
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1	INSTRUCTION NO. 14
2	Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case
3	in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of
4	the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reaso-
5	nable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what
6	you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reaso-
7	nable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified
8	in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such
9	inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.
10	A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or
11	public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere
12	judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of
13	law.
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1	INSTRUCTION NO. 15
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3	The Court has submitted two sets of verdicts to you. One
4	set of verdicts reflects the three possible punishments which may
5	be imposed. The other set of verdicts are special verdicts. The
6	are to reflect your findings with respect to the presence or
7	absence and weight to be given any aggravating circumstance and
	any mitigating circumstances.
9	It will be the jury's duty to select one appropriate verdict
10	pertaining to the punishment which is to be imposed and one appro
11	priate special verdict pertaining to the jury's findings with
11	respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
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INSTRUCTION NO. During your deliberation you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions, and forms of verdicts which have been prepared for your conven-ience. Your verdicts must be unanimous. When you have agreed upon your verdicts, they should be signed and dated by your foreman. FPD 01-289 EMIL, RODNEY Prior Counsel - P. McDonald Rec'd 3/5/01 PM-307 - Page 264 -

# APPENDIX G

Emit - 8 JD CQ1 838 1 DISTRICT COURT 2 Clark County, Nevada 3 4 THE STATE OF NEVADA. CASE NO. C92176 5 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. VII 6 -vs-- FILED IN OPEN COURT -JUN 9 1988 C 2:30 7 RODNEY LYN EMIL, 8 LORETTA BOWMAN, CLERK Defendant, By Elizabeth D'Ang 9 Deputy 10 11 SPECIAL 12 VERDICT 13 We, the Jury in the above entitled case, having found the defendant, RODNEY LYN EMIL, GUILTY of Murder of the First Degree, 14 designate that the aggravating circumstance(s) checked has (have) 15 been established beyond a reasonable doubt and further find that 16 17 there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the 18 aggravating circumstance(s) found. 19 The murder was committed by a person who was 20 previously convicted of another murder. 21 The murder was committed by a person, for himself 22 or another, for the purpose of receiving money or 23 any other thing of monetary value. DATED in Las Vegas, Nevada, this  $\underline{9^{t^{A}}}$  day of June, 1988. 24 25 26 Holiert Dale Hilbard 27 28