ORIGINAL

DEC. 3, 2019

FILE COPY

DA 18-0522

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2019 MT 281N

JEFFERY J. LOUT,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee.

FILED

DEC 03 2019

Bowen Greenwood
Clerk of Supreme Court
State of Montana

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause Nos. DC 99-22 and DC 02-79
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Jeffery J. Lout, Self-represented, Deer Lodge, Montana

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

William Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 6, 2019

Decided: December 3, 2019

Filed:

Clerk

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Petitioner and Appellant Jeffery J. Lout (Lout) appeals the orders denying his motions to dismiss issued by the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, on July 19, 2018. We affirm because Lout's request for relief is both untimely and procedurally barred.

¶3 In DC 99-22, after pleading guilty to two counts of criminal sale of dangerous drugs, Lout was sentenced to a total prison term of 40 years, with 30 suspended. He did not appeal his conviction or sentence. In DC 02-79, after entering guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agreement, Lout was sentenced to two concurrent life prison terms for sexual offenses. Lout did not file a direct appeal in DC 02-79, but instead sought postconviction relief (PCR).[1] In April 2004, the District Court denied Lout PCR and this Court affirmed that denial in 2005. *See Lout v. State*, 2005 MT 93, 326 Mont. 485, 111 P.3d 199. In 2008, the District Court denied Lout's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in DC 02-79. In 2018,

[1] Although titled as a writ of habeas corpus, this Court concluded his claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were more appropriately considered as claims for postconviction relief and forwarded Lout's petition to the District Court with instructions for the court to review "any claims cognizable as claims for postconviction relief." *Lout v. Mahoney*, No. 03-767, Or. (Mont. Dec. 9, 2003).

Lout filed a motion entitled "Motion to Dismiss and Exonerate For the Unlawful Conviction and Illegal Incarceration For States Failure to comply with Legislative Intent of the State Law Statutes" in both DC 99-22 and DC 02-79. As the allegations therein collaterally attacked his convictions and sentences, the District Court appropriately treated the motions as petitions for PCR. The District Court then denied the motions concluding they were procedurally barred. Lout appeals from these denials.

¶4 The State argues Lout's petitions, filed in 2018, are untimely. Section 46-21-102, MCA, addresses the timeliness of PCR petitions:

> (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final. A conviction becomes final for purposes of this chapter when:
>
> (a) the time for appeal to the Montana supreme court expires;
>
> . . .
>
> (2) A claim that alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted, may be raised in a petition filed within 1 year of the date on which the conviction becomes final or the date on which the petitioner discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of the evidence, whichever is later.

An appeal must be taken within sixty days of entry of final judgment in a criminal case. M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i). Because Lout did not appeal, his convictions became final when the time for appeal to this Court expired. Section 46-21-102(1)(a), MCA.

¶5 In DC 99-22, the District Court entered its written judgment on November 9, 1999—thus, Lout's time for filing a direct appeal expired on January 10, 2000. In DC 02-79, the District Court entered its written judgment on April 14, 2003—thus, Lout's time for filing a direct appeal expired on June 13, 2003. Pursuant to § 46-21-102(1), MCA,

Lout had until January 10, 2001, in DC 99-22 and until June 14, 2004, in DC 02-79 to file petitions for PCR. Lout did not file his PCR claims until June 2018. Therefore, Lout's PCR petitions are time-barred—by 17 years in DC 99-22 and by 14 years in DC 02-79.

¶6 Lout's 2018 claims attacking the validity of his convictions and sentences are not only time-barred but procedurally barred as well. Lout claims his prosecutions were invalid because the State charged him by information and the District Court was biased because he was charged by information. As thoroughly discussed by the District Court in its orders, Montana's Constitution and statutes permit prosecution by filing an information after leave of court has been granted. Mont. Const. art. II, § 20 and §§ 46-11-101 and -102, MCA. We agree with the District Court that Lout's argument is based on his misunderstanding of the governing law and a misinterpretation of the case law upon which he relies.

¶7 For the first time, Lout now asserts the District Court was biased because he was charged by information, he was excessively sentenced, and he was denied his due process rights to challenge his Level III sexual offender designation. To the extent these claims were record-based, Lout could have raised these claims on direct appeal. He did not. To the extent these claims were not record-based, Lout could have raised them in a timely petition for PCR. He did not. These claims were known, or reasonably should have been known, to Lout upon his sentencings. Further, these claims are not based on "newly discovered evidence that, if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner

was convicted[.]" Section 46-21-102(2), MCA. Lout offers no evidence that he did not engage in the criminal conduct to which he pled guilty.

¶8 Under § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, "[t]he court shall dismiss a second or subsequent petition by a person who has filed an original petition unless the second or subsequent petition raises grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an amended original petition." Lout pursued PCR in 2003, which was denied by the District Court. In April 2005, this Court affirmed that denial. In 2008, Lout sought to withdraw his guilty pleas. This was also denied at the district court level and Lout did not appeal the denial. Lout's current appeal does not raise any grounds for relief that could not have been raised in his original 2003 filing which collaterally attacked his convictions and sentences. Lout's 2018 motions are thus procedurally barred as a second or subsequent petition under § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA.

¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶10 Affirmed.



Justice

We concur:



Chief Justice



Justices

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 18-0522

JEFFREY J. LOUT,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee.

ORDER

Appellant Jeffrey J. Lout (Lout) seeks rehearing of this Court's December 3, 2019 Opinion affirming the denial of his motions to dismiss issued by the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, on July 19, 2018. *Lout v State*, 2019 MT 281N, ___Mont. ___, ___P.3d ___.

This Court will consider a petition for rehearing on very limited grounds. We will consider the petition if the opinion "overlooked some fact material to the decision," if the opinion missed a question provided by a party that would have decided the case, or if our decision "conflicts with a statute or controlling decision not addressed" by the Court. M. R. App. P. 20. The Court has determined that "a petition for rehearing is not a forum in which to rehash arguments made in the briefs and considered by the Court." *State ex rel. Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc.*, 2009 MT 261, 352 Mont. 30, 217 P.3d 475, 486.

This Court affirmed the District Court as Lout's request for relief was both untimely and procedurally barred. Lout now seeks rehearing, primarily asserting this Court refused to address the facts and questions of law set forth in his initial appellate brief. He reiterates the arguments from his original brief but does not address how his appeal is not untimely or how it is not procedurally barred. Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED.

The Clerk of this Court shall provide a copy of this Order to Jeffrey J. Lout and to counsel of record.

DATED this 14th day of January 2020.

Chief Justice

Justices

Nov. 6, 2019

FILED

11/06/2019

Bowen Greenwood
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA

Case Number: DA 18-0522

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 18-0522

Recv'd Nov. 8, 19

FILE COPY

JEFFERY J. LOUT,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

ORDER

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee,

Pursuant to the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five-justice panel of this Court.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to Jeffrey J. Lout, to all counsel of record, and to the Honorable Howard Recht, District Judge.

For the Court,

Electronically signed by:
Mike McGrath
Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court
November 6 2019

HON. JEFFREY H. LANGTON
District Judge
Twenty-first Judicial District
Ravalli County Courthouse
205 Bedford Street
Hamilton, MT 59840
Telephone: (406) 375-6241
Fax: (406) 375-6382

MONTANA TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, RAVALLI COUNTY

STATE OF MONTANA,	)	Cause No. DC-99-22/29 and DC-02-79
Plaintiff,	)	Department No. 1
-vs-	)	**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS**
JEFFERY JOHN LOUT,	)	
Defendant.	)	

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant's identical pro se *Motion to Dismiss and Exonerate For the Unlawful Conviction(s) and Illegal Incarceration For States* [sic] *Failure to comply with Legislative Intent of Sate Law Statutes* filed on June 19, 2018, in two separate cases. Defendant's motion is supported by separate affidavit, memorandum of law, and brief. Each of these documents bears a certificate of service upon Plaintiff State of Montana (the "State") through the Ravalli County Attorney.

The State did not timely respond to Defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

In 2003, after entering guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for sexual offenses upon children.

In 2004, this Court denied Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. *Lout v. State*, 2005 MT 93, 326 Mont. 485, 111 P.3d 199.

In 2008, this Court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea.

DISCUSSION

Now, fifteen years after his convictions, Defendant argues his convictions must be dismissed with prejudice because he was charged by information instead of being indicted by a grand jury. Defendant contends the Montana legislature has never authorized the prosecution of felonies by information and, therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction over him. Defendant cites several Montana cases, including from the late 1800s that address the 1889 Constitution, in support of his legal argument that because Montana is a common law state, the use of an information is restricted to misdemeanors absent a specific statute that provides for its use in the prosecution of felonies; Defendant argues no such specific statute exists. He seeks his immediate release from his "unconstitutional and illegal incarceration," exoneration of all charges in Causes No. DC-02-79 and DC-99-22, and restoration of all of his rights as a lawful citizen. In his supporting affidavit, he asserts his motion is based on "newly discovered evidence" which he does not identify or describe in any way.

A review of Defendant's filed documents reveal that his motion to dismiss is based solely on legal argument. Montana law provides a procedure whereby a person convicted of offenses may challenge his sentence:

> The procedure by which a person adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record who has no adequate remedy of appeal and who claims that a sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or the laws of this state or the constitution of the United States . . . may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence[.]

Section 46-21-101(1), MCA. Defendant timely availed himself of the opportunity to seek postconviction relief within the one-year period after which his convictions became final, and such relief was denied. In the absence of any claim of the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that Defendant did not engage in the criminal conduct for which he was convicted, pursuant to § 46-21-102(2), MCA, Defendant's motion is procedurally barred.

Arguendo, even if Defendant's motion were not procedurally barred, his argument that his prosecution was invalid because he was prosecuted by information after leave of court instead of by indictment upon a finding by a grand jury is unpersuasive. For the entirety of Montana's statehood, the primary method of prosecuting felonies has been by information after leave of court, which was authorized under both the 1889 Constitution and the current Constitution that was adopted and ratified in 1972. *See State v. Montgomery*, 2015 MT 151, ¶ 10, 379 Mont. 353, 350 P.3d 77; *State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court*, 166 Mont. 31, 36, 530 P.2d 780, 783-84 (1975); *State v. Corliss*, 150 Mont. 40, 43, 430 P.2d 632, 634 (1967).

The current Constitution provides in Article II, Section 20:

> (1) Initiation of proceedings. (1) Criminal offenses within the jurisdiction of any court inferior to the district court shall be prosecuted by complaint. All criminal actions in district court, except those on appeal, shall be prosecuted either by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate or after leave granted by the court, or by indictment without such examination, commitment or leave.

> (2) A grand jury shall consist of eleven persons, of whom eight must concur to find an indictment. A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned only at the discretion and order of the district judge.

(Underlining added.)

The Constitution further provides in Article VII, Section 4, that district courts have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and that other courts (inferior courts) may have jurisdiction of criminal cases that do not amount to felony.

Title 46, Chapter 11, of the Montana Code Annotated, is titled "Commencement of Prosecution" and provides for four methods of commencing prosecution: (1) by complaint, (2) by information following a preliminary examination or waiver of a preliminary examination, (3) by information after leave of court has been granted, and (4) by indictment upon a finding by a grand jury. Section 46-11-101, MCA. Section 46-11-102, MCA, provides that all prosecutions of offenses charged in a district court must be by indictment or information, and all other prosecutions of offenses must be by complaint.

District courts have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony. Section 3-5-302(1)(a), MCA. Subject to a few exceptions, inferior courts (justice, municipal, and city courts) have jurisdiction over misdemeanors. Sections 3-10-303; 3-6-103; 3-11-103, MCA.

In summary, the Montana Constitution and the Montana statutes that govern prosecutions are specific and consistent in requiring that felonies are to be prosecuted by information or indictment in district court, and misdemeanors generally are to be prosecuted by complaint in courts inferior to district courts. Defendant's argument is based on a misunderstanding of the governing law and a misinterpretation of the case law upon which he relies.

Defendant's argument that his prosecution via information instead of grand jury indictment violated his Fifth Amendment rights is similarly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

> No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

(Underlining added.) Contrary to Defendant's argument, the United States Supreme Court held in 1884 that a state could proceed against criminal defendants by information rather than indictment. *Corliss*, 150 Mont. at 43-44, 430 P.2d at 634 (citing *Hurtado v. People of State of California*, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)). Nearly eighty years later, the United States Supreme Court commented: "Ever since Hurtado v. [People of State of] California . . . this Court has consistently held that there is no federal constitutional impediment to dispensing entirely with the grand jury in state prosecutions." *Corliss*, 150 Mont. at 44, 430 P.2d at 634 (citing *Beck v. Washington*, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962).

Defendant's motion to dismiss and exonerate is based on a legal argument that is wholly without merit. Furthermore, it is procedurally barred.

Accordingly:

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's *Motion to Dismiss and Exonerate For the Unlawful Conviction(s) and Illegal Incarceration For States* [sic] *Failure to comply with Legislative Intent of Sate Law Statutes* is **DENIED.**

DATED this 19th day of July, 2018.

HON. JEFFREY H. LANGTON, District Judge

cc: Jeffery John Lout, AO #45407
Montana State Prison
700 Conley Lake Road
Deer Lodge, MT 59722

Ravalli County Attorney

I certify that I forwarded copies of this instrument to counsel of record by email on 07-19-18 & mail. by regular mail on 07-20-18
Paige Trautwein, Clerk
Deputy

HON. JEFFREY H. LANGTON
District Judge
Twenty-first Judicial District
Ravalli County Courthouse
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Hamilton, MT 59840
Telephone: (406) 375-6241
Fax: (406) 375-6382

MONTANA TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, RAVALLI COUNTY

STATE OF MONTANA,	)	Cause No. DC-99-22 and DC-02-79 / 119
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	Department No. 1
	)	
-vs-	)	**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS**
	)	
JEFFERY JOHN LOUT,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant's identical pro se *Motion to Dismiss and Exonerate For the Unlawful Conviction(s) and Illegal Incarceration For States* [sic] *Failure to comply with Legislative Intent of Sate Law Statutes* filed on June 19, 2018, in two separate cases. Defendant's motion is supported by separate affidavit, memorandum of law, and brief. Each of these documents bears a certificate of service upon Plaintiff State of Montana (the "State") through the Ravalli County Attorney.

The State did not timely respond to Defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

2) In 2003, after entering guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for sexual offenses upon children.

3) In 2004, this Court denied Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. *Lout v. State*, 2005 MT 93, 326 Mont. 485, 111 P.3d 199.

4) In 2008, this Court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea.

DISCUSSION

5) Now, fifteen years after his convictions, Defendant argues his convictions must be dismissed with prejudice because he was charged by information instead of being indicted by a grand jury. Defendant contends the Montana legislature has never authorized the prosecution of felonies by information and, therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction over him. Defendant cites several Montana cases, including from the late 1800s that address the 1889 Constitution, in support of his legal argument that because Montana is a common law state, the use of an information is restricted to misdemeanors absent a specific statute that provides for its use in the prosecution of felonies; Defendant argues no such specific statute exists. He seeks his immediate release from his "unconstitutional and illegal incarceration," exoneration of all charges in Causes No. DC-02-79 and DC-99-22, and restoration of all of his rights as a lawful citizen. In his supporting affidavit, he asserts his motion is based on "newly discovered evidence" which he does not identify or describe in any way.

6) A review of Defendant's filed documents reveal that his motion to dismiss is based solely on legal argument. Montana law provides a procedure whereby a person convicted of offenses may challenge his sentence:

> The procedure by which a person adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record who has no adequate remedy of appeal and who claims that a sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or the laws of this state or the constitution of the United States . . . may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence[.]

Section 46-21-101(1), MCA. Defendant timely availed himself of the opportunity to seek postconviction relief within the one-year period after which his convictions became final, and such relief was denied. In the absence of any claim of the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that Defendant did not engage in the criminal conduct for which he was convicted, pursuant to § 46-21-102(2), MCA, Defendant's motion is procedurally barred.

Arguendo, even if Defendant's motion were not procedurally barred, his argument that his prosecution was invalid because he was prosecuted by information after leave of court instead of by indictment upon a finding by a grand jury is unpersuasive. For the entirety of Montana's statehood, the primary method of prosecuting felonies has been by information after leave of court, which was authorized under both the 1889 Constitution and the current Constitution that was adopted and ratified in 1972. *See State v. Montgomery*, 2015 MT 151, ¶ 10, 379 Mont. 353, 350 P.3d 77; *State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court*, 166 Mont. 31, 36, 530 P.2d 780, 783-84 (1975); *State v. Corliss*, 150 Mont. 40, 43, 430 P.2d 632, 634 (1967).

The current Constitution provides in Article II, Section 20:

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> (2) A grand jury shall consist of eleven persons, of whom eight must concur to find an indictment. A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned only at the discretion and order of the district judge.

(Underlining added.)

8) The Constitution further provides in Article VII, Section 4, that district courts have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and that other courts (inferior courts) may have jurisdiction of criminal cases that do not amount to felony.

9) Title 46, Chapter 11, of the Montana Code Annotated, is titled "Commencement of Prosecution" and provides for four methods of commencing prosecution: (1) by complaint, (2) by information following a preliminary examination or waiver of a preliminary examination, (3) by information after leave of court has been granted, and (4) by indictment upon a finding by a grand jury. Section 46-11-101, MCA. Section 46-11-102, MCA, provides that all prosecutions of offenses charged in a district court must be by indictment or information, and all other prosecutions of offenses must be by complaint.

10) District courts have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony. Section 3-5-302(1)(a), MCA. Subject to a few exceptions, inferior courts (justice, municipal, and city courts) have jurisdiction over misdemeanors. Sections 3-10-303; 3-6-103; 3-11-103, MCA.

11) In summary, the Montana Constitution and the Montana statutes that govern prosecutions are specific and consistent in requiring that felonies are to be prosecuted by information or indictment in district court, and misdemeanors generally are to be prosecuted by complaint in courts inferior to district courts. Defendant's argument is based on a misunderstanding of the governing law and a misinterpretation of the case law upon which he relies.

12) Defendant's argument that his prosecution via information instead of grand jury indictment violated his Fifth Amendment rights is similarly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

> No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

(Underlining added.) Contrary to Defendant's argument, the United States Supreme Court held in 1884 that a state could proceed against criminal defendants by information rather than indictment. *Corliss*, 150 Mont. at 43-44, 430 P.2d at 634 (citing *Hurtado v. People of State of California*, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)). Nearly eighty years later, the United States Supreme Court commented: "Ever since Hurtado v. [People of State of] California . . . this Court has consistently held that there is no federal constitutional impediment to dispensing entirely with the grand jury in state prosecutions." *Corliss*, 150 Mont. at 44, 430 P.2d at 634 (citing *Beck v. Washington*, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962).

13) Defendant's motion to dismiss and exonerate is based on a legal argument that is wholly without merit. Furthermore, it is procedurally barred.

Accordingly:

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//

//

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's *Motion to Dismiss and Exonerate For the Unlawful Conviction(s) and Illegal Incarceration For States* [sic] *Failure to comply with Legislative Intent of Sate Law Statutes* is **DENIED.**

DATED this 19th day of July, 2018.

HON. JEFFREY H. LANGTON, District Judge

cc: Jeffery John Lout, AO #45407
Montana State Prison
700 Conley Lake Road
Deer Lodge, MT 59722

Ravalli County Attorney

I certify that I forwarded copies of the instrument to counsel of record via email on 07-19-18 & mailed via regular mail on 07-20-18
Paige Trautwein, Clerk
Deputy

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.