

S.D.N.Y.-N.Y.C.
19-cv-6591
McMahon, C.J.

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of January, two thousand twenty.

Present:

Susan L. Carney,
Joseph F. Bianco,
Michael H. Park,
Circuit Judges.

Frederick Banks,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

19-2700 (L),
19-4085 (Con)

Scooter Braun, et al.,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appellant, pro se, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is DENIED and the appeals are DISMISSED because they "lack[] an arguable basis either in law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe



Appendix #

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of February, two thousand twenty.

Frederick Banks,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

Scooter Braun, Big Machine Records, Central
Intelligence Agency, Gina Hospel,

Respondents - Appellees.

ORDER


Docket Nos: 19-2700 (Lead)
19-4085 (Con)

Appellant, Frederick Banks, filed a motion for panel reconsideration, or, in the alternative, for reconsideration *en banc*. The panel that determined the appeal has considered the request for reconsideration, and the active members of the Court have considered the request for reconsideration *en banc*.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FREDERICK BANKS,

Plaintiff,

-against-

SCOOTER BRAUN; BIG MACHINE
RECORDS; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY; GINA HASPEL,

Defendants.

19-CV-6591 (CM)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail, brings this action *pro se* on his own behalf and as a “next friend” to Taylor Swift. (ECF No. 2 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”). Plaintiff is barred, however, from filing any new action IFP while a prisoner. *See Banks v. Tibco*, No. 14-CV-5270 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014); *see also Banks v. U.S. Marshal*, 274 F. App’x 631, 634-35 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that Plaintiff accumulated four strikes and is barred from proceeding IFP while a prisoner); *Banks v. Unknown Named Number of U.S. Postal Inspectors*, No. 13-CV-1198, 2013 WL 5945786, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2013) (noting that Plaintiff has filed hundreds of federal lawsuits and that his attempts to proceed IFP have been barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in at least fifteen cases). Those orders relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which provides that:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Appendix B

Although Plaintiff has filed this new action seeking IFP status, his complaint does not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.¹ Instead, Plaintiff challenges an allegedly “unlawful FISA warrant.” (ECF No. 2 at 8.) Plaintiff is therefore barred from filing this action IFP.

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).² Plaintiff remains barred from filing any future action IFP while in custody, unless he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury.³ *Id.*

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a “written opinion” within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002.

¹ An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” *Malik v. McGinnis*, 293 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a complaint is filed” is not sufficient. *Pettus v. Morgenthau*, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).

² Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the filing fee. If Plaintiff does so, that complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss *any* civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

³ The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future actions (even if the filing fee is paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. *See In re Martin-Trigona*, 9 F.3d 226, 227-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement).

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.

See Coppededge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2019
New York, New York



COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FREDERICK BANKS,

Plaintiff,

-against-

SCOOTER BRAUN; BIG MACHINE
RECORDS; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY; GINA HASPEL,

Defendants.

19-CV-6591 (CM)

CIVIL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the order issued July 23, 2019, dismissing the complaint,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's "three-strikes" rule. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff continues to be barred from filing any civil action under the *in forma pauperis* (IFP) statute while a prisoner unless Plaintiff is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the Court's judgment would not be taken in good faith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court mail a copy of this judgment to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2019
New York, New York



COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FREDERICK BANKS,

Plaintiff,

-against-

SCOOTER BRAUN, *et al.*,

Defendants.

19-CV-6591 (CM)

ORDER

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated, filed this action *pro se*. On July 23, 2019, the Court dismissed this *pro se* action because Plaintiff is barred, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), from filing any civil action *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”) as a prisoner. The Court dismissed this action without prejudice, and noted that Plaintiff was not barred from filing a new case by paying the filing fee or seeking IFP status as a nonprisoner. On August 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal.¹

The Court liberally construes this submission as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend judgment and a motion under Local Civil Rule 6.3 for reconsideration, and, in the alternative, as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from a judgment or order. *See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Tracy v. Freshwater*, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (The solicitude afforded to *pro se* litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations on the

¹ The Court received the notice of appeal and the motion for reconsideration several days apart, but both documents are dated August 8, 2019. Because Plaintiff is incarcerated, his documents are deemed filed as of August 8, 2019. *See Houston v. Lack*, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988) (holding that under the prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date that it is given to prison officials for mailing.)

amendment of pleadings,” leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a *pro se* litigant understands what is required of him”) (citations omitted). After reviewing the arguments in Plaintiff’s submission, the Court denies the motion.

DISCUSSION

Because Plaintiff has filed a notice of appeal, the Court must first address whether it has jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff’s motion. Normally, “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance – it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, if a party (1) files a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) within 28 days after judgment is entered, *see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi)*, and (2) files a notice of appeal before the district court disposes of that motion, then the notice of appeal does not become “effective” until after the district court rules on the motion, *see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i)*. That is the case even if the motion is filed the same day as the notice of appeal, *see Sankara v. City of New York*, 745 F. App’x 426, 427 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction where party simultaneously filed notice of appeal with letter that could be construed as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.), or if it is filed *after* the notice of appeal, *see* advisory committee note to 1993 amendment (“A notice filed before the filing of one of the specified motions … is, in effect, suspended until the motion is disposed of, whereupon, the previously filed notice effectively places jurisdiction in the court of appeals.”).

Plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration within 28 days of entry of judgment and filed his notice of appeal before the Court disposed of that motion. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to address the motion.

The standards governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 are the same. *R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So*, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The movant must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. *Id.* at 509 (discussion in the context of both Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); *see Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd.*, 636 F. Supp. 2d 256, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” *Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp.*, 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); *see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc.*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’” (internal quotation and citations omitted)).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate in his motion that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. Plaintiff’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 is therefore denied.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court’s order or judgment for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

The Court has considered Plaintiff's arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) apply. Therefore, the motion under any of these clauses is denied.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5).” *United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien*, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting *Smith v. Sec'y of HHS*, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A party moving under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to claims under clauses (1)-(3) by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b). *Id.* A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both that the motion was filed within a “reasonable time” and that “‘extraordinary circumstances’ [exist] to warrant relief.” *Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs. of America, Inc.*, 301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). *See Ackermann v. United States*, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (ECF doc. #5) is denied.

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a “written opinion” within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppededge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2019
New York, New York



COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge