

No: _____

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

**Jonathan Crupi,
Petitioner – Pro Se**


v.

**The People of the State of New York
Respondent**

**On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari To
New York State Court of Appeals**

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
APPENDIX**

**Jonathan Crupi
DIN #: 15A4042
Clinton Correctional facility
P.O. Box 2001
Dannemora, NY, 12929**



APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

- A- Application for an Extension of Time to File a Petition For a Writ of Certiorari**
- B- State of New York Court of Appeals Order Denying Leave**
- C- Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division Decision and Order Denying Appeal**
- D- Judge Rienzi's Decision and Order on Search Warrants**
- E- People's Motion In Support of Search Warrants**
- F- Defendant's Motion to Controvert Search Warrants**
- G- Defendant's Motion *In Limine***

Appendix

A

A

Supreme Court of the United States
Office of the Clerk
Washington, DC 20543-0001

Scott S. Harris
Clerk of the Court
(202) 479-3011

December 13, 2019

Mr. Jonathan Crupi
Prisoner ID #15A4042
Clinton Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 2001
Dannmora, NY 12929

Re: Jonathan Crupi
v. New York
Application No. 19A656

Dear Mr. Crupi:

The application for an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice Ginsburg, who on December 13, 2019, extended the time to and including February 16, 2020.

This letter has been sent to those designated on the attached notification list.

Sincerely,

Scott S. Harris, Clerk

by 

Clara Houghteling
Case Analyst

Appendix

B

B

State of New York

Court of Appeals

BEFORE: HONORABLE PAUL G. FEINMAN
Associate Judge

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondent,
-against-

JONATHAN CRUPI,
Appellant.


**ORDER
DENYING
LEAVE**

Appellant having applied for leave to appeal to this Court pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 460.20 from an order in the above-captioned case;*

UPON the papers filed and due deliberation, it is

ORDERED that the application is denied.

Dated: September 19, 2019



Associate Judge

*Description of Order: Order of the Appellate Division, Second Department, dated May 8, 2019, affirming a judgment of Supreme Court, Richmond County, rendered September 23, 2015.

Appendix

C

C

Supreme Court of the State of New York
Appellate Division: Second Judicial Department

D59215
Q/afa

AD3d

Argued - January 29, 2019

MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
HECTOR D. LASALLE
BETSY BARROS
LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

2015-09972

DECISION & ORDER

The People, etc., respondent,
v Jonathan Crupi, appellant.

(Ind. No. 315/12)

Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant.

Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, NY (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Anne Grady of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mario F. Mattei, J.), rendered September 23, 2015, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, without a hearing (Leonard P. Rienzi), of those branches of the defendant's motion which were to controvert two search warrants.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of the murder of his wife.

We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of those branches of the defendant's motion which were to controvert the search warrant dated July 5, 2012, authorizing a search of "computers, laptops, computer tablets, or cellular phones," and the search warrant dated July 12, 2012, authorizing a search of four specific laptops, a cell phone, and a detachable hard drive, made on the ground that these warrants were not supported by probable cause and were overbroad. "To establish probable cause, a search warrant application must provide sufficient information 'to support a reasonable belief that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place'" (*People v Murray*, 136 AD3d 714, 714, quoting *People v McCulloch*, 226 AD2d 848, 849; see *People v Augustus*, 163

AD3d 981, 982). Great deference should be accorded to the court's determination to issue a search warrant (*see People v Griminger*, 71 NY2d 635, 640; *People v Johnson*, 66 NY2d 398, 406; *People v Kane*, 175 AD2d 881, 883).

Here, each of the challenged warrants was supported by an affidavit of a police witness providing the requisite probable cause to believe that evidence relating to the victim's murder would be found on the identified devices (*see People v Smith*, 163 AD3d 1005; *see also People v Hanlon*, 36 NY2d 549, 559). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the description of the objects to be seized in each of the challenged warrants was not broader than was justified by the probable cause upon which the warrants were based (*see United States v Ulbrecht*, 858 F3d 71, 102 [2d Cir]; *U.S. v Galpin*, 720 F3d 436, 445-446 [2d Cir]). Thus, the warrants were not overbroad (*see People v Armstrong*, 267 AD2d 120, 121; *People v Durante*, 131 AD2d 499; *cf. People v Couser*, 303 AD2d 981; *People v Brown*, 96 NY2d 80, 85). The defendant's contention that the search of these devices was improper absent probable cause to believe that he, in particular, was involved in the victim's murder, is unpreserved for appellate review (*see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Toellner*, 299 AD2d 567). In any event, the contention is without merit.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (*see People v Contes*, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (*see People v Danielson*, 9 NY3d 342, 349). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (*see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson*, 9 NY3d 342), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (*see People v Romero*, 7 NY3d 633).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining a police witness with respect to the allegations of false arrest and/or police brutality in four federal lawsuits filed against that witness. "Where a lawsuit has not resulted in an adverse finding against a police officer . . . defendants should not be permitted to ask a witness if he or she has been sued, if the case was settled (unless there was an admission of wrongdoing) or if the criminal charges related to the plaintiffs in those actions were dismissed. However, subject to the trial court's discretion, defendants should be permitted to ask questions based on the specific allegations of the lawsuit if the allegations are relevant to the credibility of the witness" (*People v Smith*, 27 NY3d 652, 662). "In cross-examining a law enforcement witness, the same standard for good faith basis and specific allegations relevant to credibility applies, as does the same broad latitude to preclude or limit cross-examination" (*People v Enoe*, 144 AD3d 1052, 1054). "First, counsel must present a good faith basis for inquiring, namely, the lawsuit relied upon; second, specific allegations that are relevant to the credibility of the law enforcement witness must be identified; and third, the trial judge exercises discretion in assessing whether inquiry into such allegations would confuse or mislead the jury, or create a substantial risk of undue prejudice to the parties" (*People v Smith*, 27 NY3d at 662). Here, the complaints in each of the identified actions contain only allegations of unlawful police conduct by large groups of officers, and did not set forth specific acts of misconduct against the police witness individually. Thus, cross-examination of this witness regarding the federal lawsuits was properly denied (*see People v Watson*, 163 AD3d 855, 859-861).

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to permit the introduction of evidence of the defendant's 2011 internet search history, concerning methods of killing and crime scene clean up. This evidence was relevant to demonstrate the defendant's intent to commit murder, and his development of a plan or scheme to do so, and its probative value outweighed any potential undue prejudice to the defendant (see *People v Frumusa*, 29 NY3d 364; *People v Jin Cheng Lin*, 26 NY3d 701).

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to admit evidence that the defendant patronized prostitutes during his marriage and subsequent to the murder of his wife. The evidence was relevant to establish the victim's state of mind regarding the parties' marriage, to provide the jury with background information regarding the defendant's relationship with the victim and to show that there was marital strife, and to complete the narrative of the defendant's post-murder behavior (see *People v Gomez*, 153 AD3d 724,725; *People v Curran*, 139 AD3d 1085, 1086; *People v Wisdom*, 120 AD3d 724). Moreover, the court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant (see *People v Gomez*, 153 AD3d at 725; *People v Curran*, 139 AD3d at 1086; *People v Wisdom*, 120 AD3d 724). Further, the court gave a sufficient limiting instruction regarding the use the jury could make of the evidence, which the jury is presumed to have followed (see *People v Gomez*, 153 AD3d at 725; *People v Curran*, 139 AD3d at 1087).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.

DILLON, J.P., LASALLE, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.

ENTER:



Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court

Appendix

D

D

**SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF RICHMOND, PART VI**

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
-against-
Jonathan Crupi,
Defendant(s)

DECISION AND ORDER

Indictment No. 00315-2012

Date: April 16, 2014

Hon. Leonard P. Rienzi

Defendant moves to controvert search warrants issued during the investigation of this case.

Defendant argues that errors in the address delineated in several search warrants and inconsistencies relating to addresses in search warrant applications constitute either perjurious statements (see, People v. Alfinito, 16 NY2d 181 [1965] or knowingly and intentionally false statements (Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154[1978]) or statements made with reckless disregard for the truth (Franks v. Delaware, op cit). In addition, defendant argues that the warrants lack probable cause and particularity. The Search Warrants at issue are:

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 1
(R127); Signed by Justice Meyer, 7/5/12
1446 Richmond Hill Road
2012 Chevrolet Equinox
2010 Volkswagen Jetta
Computers, cell phones and their contents

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 2
(R128); Signed by Justice Meyer, 7/5/12
1446 Richmond Hill Road
Hair, fibers, serology

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 3
(R128); Signed by Justice Meyer, 7/5/12
2012 Chevrolet Equinox
Hair, fibers, serology

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 4
(R128); Signed by Justice Meyer, 7/5/12
2010 Volkswagen Jetta
Hair, fibers, serology

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 5
(R128); Signed by Justice Meyer, 7/5/12
Person of Jonathon Crupi
Bruises, blood, DNA, etc.

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 6
(78/12); Signed by Justice Aliotta, 7/12/12
1446-1 Forest Hill Road
Hair, fibers, serology

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 7
(79/12); Signed by Justice Aliotta, 7/12/12.
Vouchered Property: Laptop #R8BZXRI;
black Lenovo laptop, Pan Tech cell phone;
laptop #R8BZXM3; compaq laptop;
detachable hard drive; contents of each

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 8
(82/12); Signed by Justice McMahon, 7/20/12
Lenovo computer #SIH4677
contents

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 9
(92/12); Signed by Justice Minardo, 8/16/12
Jonathan Crupi Yahoo account information

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 10
(93/12); Signed by Justice Minardo, 8/16/12
Jonathan Crupi AOL account information

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 11
(94/12); Signed by Justice Minardo, 8/16/12
Simeonette Mapes Yahoo account information

SEARCH WARRANT NUMBER 12
(168/12); Signed by Justice Meyer, 9/12/12
1446-1 Forest Hill Road
Blood, serology, DNA, etc.

Motion to controvert is denied with respect to SW#5 (128/12, Person of Jonathan Crupi) SW#8 (82/12, Board of Education Lenovo computer) and SW#11 (94/12 Mapes Yahoo account).

It is the determination of this court that the supporting affidavits were factually and legally sufficient to permit "the issuing (justices to have)...reasonably...concluded that probable cause existed" for the issuance of each search warrant. People v. Castillo, 80 NY2d 578, 585 (1992).

With respect to SW#5 (128/12, Person of Jonathan Crupi) defendant raises an insufficient factual basis for relief sought. The search warrant and application describe the area to be searched and the evidence sought with particularity and establish probable cause.

With respect to SW#8 (82/12, Board of Education Lenovo computer) and SW #11 (94/12, Mapes Yahoo information) the warrants are supported by particularity and probable cause and defendant lacks standing to controvert.

With respect to search warrants Number 1-4 (127/12 and 128/12, issued by Justice Meyer 7/5/12) a hearing on defendant's motion to controvert is ordered to determine whether the address discrepancies constituted a violation of Franks v. Delaware or People v. Alfinito, and whether despite the inaccurate addresses, the executing officers could with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the places intended to be searched. Steel v. US, 267 US 498 (1925); People v. Graham, 220 AD2d 769 (2d Dept 1995).

Whether or not a hearing on a motion to controvert relating to search warrants (#6, #7, #9, #10 and #12) is necessary is respectfully referred to judge conducting the motion to controvert hearings on search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4)..

The court notes that the applications for above search warrants (#6, #7, #9, #10, #12) specifically incorporate the applications supporting search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4). Accordingly an issue arises with respect to the validity of search warrants (#6, #7, #9, #10 and #12) which may depend on the validity of search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4). If, for example, search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4) are found to be valid, then that factor would be relevant in assessing the validity of search warrants (#6, #7, #9, #10 and #12). If, for example, search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4) are found to be invalid, then a determination must be made concerning whether search warrants (#6, #7, #9, #10 and #12) are valid when reference to search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4) is deleted from the applications for search warrants (#6, #7, #9, #10 and #12). Whether this determination can be made on the face of the applications or requires further hearing is respectfully referred to the judge who conducts the motion to controvert hearings with respect to search warrants (#1, #2, #3 and #4).

The defendant's motion for a Dunaway/Mapp hearing is denied. Specifically, the People do not allege that any property was recovered from the Defendant's person subsequent to his arrest. Nor does defendant identify alleged the fruits of his arrest. Assuming *arguendo*, there was no probable cause for an arrest, there are no fruits of the arrest to suppress. The Court additionally notes, however, that potential suppression of any property recovered as a result of the various search warrants will be the subject to the analysis detailed above.

This constitutes the decision, opinion, and order of the Court.

Dated: April 16, 2014
Staten Island, New York



Leonard P. Rienzi

**Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.**