

No. _____

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

CARLIN ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY, AS GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND
OF I.Y., M.Y., AND A.Y., AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF VERONICA WILLIAMS, DECEASED,

Petitioners,

v.

DANIEL A. LIOI, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

APPENDIX

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-1848

EUNICE GRAVES,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
and

CARLIN ROBINSON, individually, as Guardian and
next Friend of I.Y., M.Y. and A.Y., and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Veronica Williams,
Deceased,

Plaintiff,
v.

DANIEL A. LIOI; MELVIN RUSSELL, Major,
Defendants – Appellees
and

BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant,
CLEAVEN L. WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant.

No. 17-1857

CARLIN ROBINSON, individually, as Guardian and
next Friend of I.Y., M.Y. and A.Y., and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Veronica Williams,
Deceased,

Plaintiff – Appellant,
and

EUNICE GRAVES,
Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL A. LIOI; MELVIN RUSSELL, Major,
Defendants – Appellees,
and

BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant,
CLEAVEN L. WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C.
Blake, District Judge. (1:12-cv-00192-CCB)

Argued: September 26, 2018 Decided: July 16, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER
and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the
opinion in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Chief
Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Cary Johnson Hansel, III, HANSEL
LAW, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants.
Elisabeth Susanne Walden, BALTIMORE CITY
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Appellees. **ON BRIEF:** Daniel L. Cox, THE COX
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Affairs, Kara K. Lynch, Assistant Solicitor,
BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Cleaven Williams stabbed his pregnant wife, Veronica (“Mrs. Williams”), outside a Baltimore, Maryland, courthouse where she had just obtained a protective order against him. Mrs. Williams and her unborn child died from their injuries a few days later. Carlin Robinson, the Personal Representative of Mrs. Williams’ estate and Guardian and Next Friend of her children, and Eunice Graves, Mrs. Williams’ mother, filed federal and state claims against Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) officer Daniel A. Lioi. The Complaint alleged that Lioi was responsible for Mrs. Williams’ death because he enabled Williams to postpone his self-surrender on a misdemeanor arrest warrant, which provided Williams the opportunity to murder his wife.

We previously affirmed, on interlocutory appeal, the district court’s denial of Lioi’s motion to dismiss the claims against him as being barred by qualified immunity. *Robinson v. Lioi*, 536 F. App’x 340 (4th Cir. 2013). Thereafter, Robinson and Graves (collectively “Robinson”) amended their complaint to add another BCPD officer, Major Melvin Russell, as a defendant. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to both officers, *Robinson v. Lioi*, No. 1:12-cv-00192-CCB, 2017 WL 2937568 (D. Md. June 30, 2017), concluding that the evidence was not sufficient to allow a verdict in Robinson’s favor and, in the alternative, the officers were entitled to qualified and public official immunity.

Robinson now appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In reviewing the propriety of granting summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, Robinson, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. *See Doe v. Rosa*, 795 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir. 2015).

A.

In the summer of 2008, Williams met Deputy Major Lioi and Major Russell of the BCPD's Eastern District in the course of Williams' role as the president of a Baltimore-area community association. The men interacted at a handful of civic events that summer and fall.

The events forming the basis of Robinson's claims occurred over a nine-day period from Sunday, November 9, 2008, when a misdemeanor arrest warrant was issued for Williams' arrest, to Monday, November 17, 2008, when Williams fatally stabbed his pregnant wife.

On the evening of Sunday, November 9, Mrs. Williams obtained a temporary protective order against Williams based on an assault that occurred the prior month in which he physically restrained her and cut off some of her hair. Based on the same incident, the Baltimore City Court Commissioner also issued an arrest warrant for Williams charging him with the misdemeanor offenses of second-degree assault and unauthorized removal of property.

Minutes after the warrant issued, a police dispatcher notified BCPD Officer Jose Arroyo that a misdemeanor warrant was ready to be picked up

from the Court Commissioner's office.¹ Had Arroyo followed normal procedure, he would have taken the warrant directly to the "hot desk" at Central Records to have it logged into the police computer database. J.A. 575. Instead, Arroyo took the warrant to the BCPD's Eastern District office. Arroyo indicated that he sometimes bypassed the normal procedure if a supervisor ordered him to do so, but he could not remember whether anyone had issued such an order regarding this warrant. Nor could he provide any explanation for why he deviated from the procedure this time.

After Arroyo arrived at the Eastern District, an unidentified person instructed him to leave the arrest warrant on the desk handling the Sector 1 region. Arroyo could not recall who told him to leave the warrant there, or why, but the address listed on the warrant for Williams was located in Sector 1. Arroyo knew both Lioi and Russell, and when he was specifically asked if Russell or Lioi had instructed him to bring the warrant to the Eastern District, Arroyo testified that he "d[id]n't recall." J.A. 578. He then clarified that, given the chain of command, he would not have received an order directly from either officer and that he "d[id]n't know" whether either of them had given such an instruction to someone else. J.A. 579–80.

At some point over the weekend, Williams contacted Russell and was concerned that his wife "got papers on him." J.A. 706. Williams asked

¹ When a police dispatcher alerts an officer that a warrant is ready to be picked up, the arrestee is not identified. *See* J.A. 549.

Russell if he could find out what happened.² In his deposition, Russell stated that he first learned of the arrest warrant when he returned to work on Monday or Tuesday (November 10 or 11) and Officer Adrienne Byrd showed it to him.³ Russell had observed Byrd holding the warrant for Williams in her hands, but he testified that he never took physical possession of the warrant at that time or later.

Russell later spoke with Williams, confirming that there was a warrant for his arrest and encouraging him to turn himself in. J.A. 451–54, 707. Russell advised that Williams should not wait to turn himself in because if he were arrested on a Friday and his arraignment were to be delayed, he could be detained over the weekend.

Beginning on Monday, police officers attempted to arrest Williams at his residence, but were unsuccessful. J.A. 112, 451–52, 485, 707–08, 762, 815. Russell said he personally went by Williams' residence to arrest him "once, maybe twice," but it was dark and no one answered the door. J.A. 451.

On Wednesday (November 12), Williams texted Russell to say that he would like to turn himself in the following Tuesday in order to have time to raise

² In his statement during the internal investigation, Russell said that Williams had called him over the weekend "concerned that his wife, as he described it got some papers on him. He was concerned that his wife lied on him, went down to wherever and got papers on him, and he wanted me to see if that was actually true." J.A. 706.

³ Russell could not recall whether he returned to work that week on Monday or Tuesday, but stated that the earliest his conversation with Byrd would have occurred was the morning of Monday, November 10. J.A. 445, 470.

sufficient bond money. Russell called Williams and encouraged him to turn himself in without delay. J.A. 451–52, 482–83. Later that afternoon, Russell informed Lioi—who was the next senior officer in the Eastern District—that Williams would be turning himself in the next evening. Russell asked Lioi to oversee the process because Russell was not scheduled to work Thursday evening.⁴

On Thursday afternoon (November 13), Williams texted Russell that he was “running behind,” but “should be there in 15.” J.A. 480. Russell replied, “K.” J.A. 480. Both men stated in their depositions that the texts referred to Williams self-surrendering, but Williams did not show up at the station that afternoon.

Instead, at about 9:00 p.m., Williams arrived at the Eastern District to self-surrender. Lioi called Central Records to get the arrest warrant and learned that it had not been logged into their database and they did not have the warrant. Lioi enlisted help in searching for the warrant at the Eastern District and in calling other possible locations, but no one could locate it. For example, Lioi called Russell to see if he could help them locate the warrant, but Russell did not answer his phone,

⁴ Russell and Lioi both stated that Russell did not ask that Williams be given special treatment, but just that “because of [Williams’] role in the community, to make sure this was being taken care of.” J.A. 467 (Russell); J.A. 287–88 (Lioi: “Russell said just be at the district and meet him when he comes in to make sure the process goes well, but nobody said, you know, do anything out of the unusual. . . . He was a community leader, so just make sure everything goes well and that, you know, he’s processed and goes to central booking and they walk him through the system.”).

so Lioi left him a voice mail message. And when Lioi called the court commissioner, he was told “that the warrant possibly could be at the North Avenue Courthouse,” which he also tried to reach, but it was closed for the night. J.A. 562.

After concluding that they were not going to promptly locate the arrest warrant, Lioi allowed Williams to leave the Eastern District station so long as he agreed to return once they found the warrant. Williams agreed and asked if he could self-surrender after the weekend. He mentioned having several things to do and not wanting to risk being detained if the arraignment was delayed on Friday. It’s not clear from the record what agreement Lioi and Williams reached at that time, but Williams departed the police station.

Shortly thereafter, Russell returned Lioi’s call and recommended that Lioi contact Byrd because he had seen her with the warrant earlier that week and believed she had attempted to arrest Williams. In addition, Russell suggested that Lioi search Byrd’s patrol car for the paperwork.

After Russell’s call, Sergeant Todd Tugya, who was helping Lioi search for the warrant, telephoned Byrd. She “advised that she did, indeed, have possession of the warrant . . . and that she had attempted to serve it. However, she advised that she left the warrant in the visor of her patrol car because she intended to continue her attempts to serve it on her next shift.” J.A. 112. She told Tugya which patrol car she had used, so that they could search it.⁵

⁵ When deposed in this case, Byrd could not recall many of the details surrounding these events. She knew she had received some paperwork on Williams at roll call, but did not recall what the papers were. She also could not recall what happened to the

Just after midnight on Friday (November 14), officers located the warrant over the visor of Byrd's patrol car.

Later that day, Lioi "confirmed" with Russell that Williams could self-surrender after the weekend. J.A. 277. Russell indicated to Lioi that was "fine." J.A. 277. Lioi also called Williams to let him know they had found the warrant and he needed to turn himself in. Williams indicated he would self-surrender on Tuesday, and Lioi agreed.

Later that evening, Williams contacted Lioi and said that he was meeting with his lawyers to prepare for his criminal case. Williams suggested that having a letter explaining that he had attempted to self-surrender, but that the warrant could not be located, may help him in court. Lioi agreed to write the letter because those were "the facts." J.A. 285. His letter explained that Williams had been "very cooperative and willing to turn himself in" but that Central Records did not have the warrant on file and had "advised that the warrant was being held at North Avenue Court House, which was closed for the night." J.A. 631.

Williams later asked Lioi for a second letter because his lawyers had discovered an arrest warrant from another Maryland locality charging a "Cleaven Williams" with offenses unrelated to those known to be pending against him. Williams asked Lioi to write about that warrant, too; Lioi provided a

papers; she believed "[s]omeone took the paperwork" from her, but she did not know who or when. J.A. 108. She did not recall trying to serve the arrest warrant or having the papers in her patrol car. J.A. 106-09.

letter stating that he had reviewed the other arrest warrant and observed that it contained minimal identifying information about the named individual, referenced an address that “[t]o [Lioi’s] understanding[,] [Williams] had never resided at,” and that the wanted individual “should not be considered to be [Williams] based on the name alone.” J.A. 632. In texting about the letters, Williams asked Lioi for “an overview of the night” and “not too much detail.” J.A. 101. When Lioi agreed, Williams expressed his appreciation, texting “There is a method to my madness:-/,” to which Lioi replied, “That’s what I’m afraid of.” J.A. 101.

On Monday afternoon (November 17), Williams and Lioi exchanged another set of text messages—

[Williams:] . . . I just left my home 2 meet w/my lawyer...I saw my wife drive by...can I go home or what?

[Lioi:] I wouldn’t be alone with her. She could say you did anything. Have a witness with you if you meet.

[Williams:] Thanks Dan[.]

[Williams:] Can she do another protection order & try 2 keep me from the house?

[Lioi:] She could. I would avoid her. She could call the police and say u have the warrant and she is afraid of you. It would force our hand to serve the warrant.

J.A. 559. Williams later called Lioi from his lawyer’s office to discuss the two warrants again, at which time Lioi “t[old] him that he should, you know, turn himself in, the weekend’s over, let’s get this taken care of today.” J.A. 286. Williams indicated Tuesday

was still better, and Lioi told him to call after leaving the lawyer's office.

A few hours later, Williams stabbed his wife, which resulted in her death and that of her unborn child.⁶

B.

Robinson filed a complaint in Maryland state court alleging that Lioi was liable for Mrs. Williams' death under several state and federal laws. Lioi removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland and moved to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.⁷ The district court denied Lioi's motion. He appealed, and we affirmed in an unpublished decision. *Robinson*, 536 F. App'x at 340.

Critically, our decision on the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) necessarily accepted as true all of the allegations in Robinson's Complaint. *Id.* at 341. On that basis, we concluded that the Complaint adequately alleged that Lioi engaged in affirmative acts that could make him liable to Robinson for a violation of Mrs. Williams' due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine. *Id.* at 343–44 (discussing the development of the doctrine that had its genesis in *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). Robinson alleged that Lioi

⁶ Williams was prosecuted in state court, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment for his crime.

⁷ Robinson also brought claims against the BCPD and Williams, but the district court separately dismissed those claims and they are not at issue on appeal.

“withheld the warrant [from the unit that should have served it] so that [the Eastern District] could retain control over whether it would be served or not;” “warned Mr. Williams of the warrant and their feigned efforts to serve him;” “purposefully refused to serve or arrest [Williams when he self-surrendered], falsely claiming instead that the warrant allegedly could not be found. This was an intentional and malicious act . . . for the purpose of allowing Mr. Williams to remain free despite the warrant;” and “placed Mrs. Williams in a police-created zone of danger by intentionally conspiring with Mr. Williams to permit him to remain free despite ample opportunity to arrest him.” Complaint at 4–5, 9, *Robinson v. Lioi*, No. 1:12-cv-00192-CCB, 2012 WL 2992251 (D. Md. July 18, 2012), ECF No. 2.

When we considered whether Lioi was entitled to dismissal of the claims against him, we specifically pointed to these allegations as the basis for our decision. *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 341, 344. We concluded that, as a whole, these allegations encompassed affirmative acts that could have “directly enabled” Williams to harm Mrs. Williams. *Id.* at 345. Accordingly, we held that the Complaint adequately alleged a due process violation for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.

In so doing, we rejected Lioi’s reliance on *Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), in which the Supreme Court held that no due process violation occurred when police officers failed to enforce a restraining order. *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 345. We explained that “Lioi’s alleged conduct in this case was not confined to a failure to execute [an] arrest warrant,” but rather included allegations that he “affirmatively acted to interfere with execution of

the warrant by conspiring with Cleaven Williams to evade capture and remain at large.” *Id.*

C.

After Lioi’s prior appeal, Robinson amended her Complaint to add Russell as a defendant. She alleged the following claims against both officers: violation of Mrs. Williams’ due process rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to violate Mrs. Williams’ constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and numerous Maryland state law claims.⁸ The alleged factual basis of the claims remained substantively the same as in her original Complaint.

After discovery, Lioi and Russell moved for summary judgment, challenging the substantive claims and arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and to public official immunity on the state claims. In addition to deposition statements, affidavits, and other records from the participants in the events described above, Lioi and Russell submitted an affidavit from an expert witness, Stanford O’Neill Franklin, an officer with thirty-four years of law enforcement experience in Maryland, including time with the BCPD. In relevant part, Franklin stated that, in his experience, if Williams had “been arrested and processed” following his Thursday evening self-surrender, “he would have been released within 24 hours on his personal recognizance, or required to post minimum bail, which means he

⁸ Robinson alleged Maryland claims of wrongful death, survival action, gross negligence, reckless endangerment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and common law conspiracy.

would have been back on the street by Saturday morning, November 15, 2008.” J.A. 127–28.

The district court awarded summary judgment to Lioi and Russell. *Robinson*, 2017 WL 2937568, at *14. It concluded that a jury could not find in favor of Robinson on the substantive question of whether the officers’ conduct constituted a state-created danger because Robinson’s evidence did not show that Lioi and Russell “committed affirmative acts that created or enhanced the danger to” Mrs. Williams. *Id.* at *9. The district court held in the alternative that Lioi and Russell were entitled to qualified immunity because, even if a violation had occurred, it was not clearly established. The court explained: “the facts are not sufficient to show that a reasonable officer in either defendant’s position would have understood he was violating” Mrs. Williams’ rights by “using [his] discretion not to aggressively serve an arrest warrant and instead allow Mr. Williams to delay his date of voluntary surrender by several days.” *Id.* at *10.

The district court also granted Lioi and Russell summary judgment on Robinson’s other claims. *Id.* at *10–14. In relevant part, it held that the conspiracy claims could not survive because Robinson produced no evidence of a conspiracy to violate Mrs. Williams’ constitutional rights and no evidence that Lioi’s and Russell’s conduct caused her death. *Id.* at *10–11. Similarly, the court held that the officers were entitled to summary judgment on the gross negligence claim because Robinson produced no evidence that they intended to injure Mrs. Williams or were so utterly indifferent to her rights that they acted as if her rights did not exist. *Id.* at *11–12. In addition, it held that the causation

element had not been satisfied. *Id.* at *12–13. The district court also granted Lioi and Russell summary judgment on the wrongful death and survival actions because they were entitled to public official immunity under Maryland law for any negligent conduct and no evidence supported intentional misconduct or gross negligence. *Id.* at *14. It further concluded those claims would also fail on causation grounds. *Id.*

Robinson noted a timely appeal, and the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

Robinson’s appeal focuses on the district court’s award of summary judgment to Lioi and Russell on her § 1983 substantive due process claim. She contends the record adequately demonstrates that Lioi and Russell committed various affirmative acts that could make them liable under the state-created danger doctrine. Robinson further challenges the district court’s alternative holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim. Lastly, she challenges its judgment in favor of Lioi and Russell on her state-law claims.

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 436. Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), such that “a reasonable jury could [not] return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 436 (alteration in original) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

Stating the standard of review is usually a fairly rote practice, but it has particular significance in this case given the contrast that it signals between this appeal and our prior review of Robinson’s allegations. In this case, we are confronted with the view proposed in Robinson’s briefs and adopted by the dissenting opinion that the outcome of this appeal should be dictated by our prior decision. *E.g.*, Opening Br. 19 (asserting the district court’s opinion “virtually ignored” the Court’s prior decision, which had “already held” that Lioi and Russell’s conduct fell within the state-created danger theory). Relying on the law-of-the-case doctrine, the dissent accuses us of “rescind[ing] our prior holding, shielding [this] decision . . . with the defense that we are now at the summary judgment stage.” *Infra* at 64–65. But there is nothing remarkable in the black-letter law understanding that plaintiffs are held to different standards at different stages of the proceedings in the district court, or that appeals from those decisions are also subject to different standards.

It cannot be put more plainly: we previously considered whether Robinson’s *allegations* stated a claim against Lioi because we were considering only the district court’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Now, we are reviewing whether Robinson’s *evidence* supports a claim against Lioi and Russell because we are considering the district court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(a). *Bennet v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997) (contrasting the pleading stage, where “on a motion to dismiss [courts] presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” with the summary judgment stage, where “a

plaintiff must set forth [specific facts] by affidavit or other evidence" (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). This "wholly different substantive and procedural context" matters when analyzing Robinson's claim. *See SD3 II LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.*, 888 F.3d 98, 109 (4th Cir. 2018). Unlike the first time this case came before us, we are no longer obliged to accept Robinson's allegations as true. While Robinson is still entitled to have the record viewed in the light most favorable to her, we can no longer simply accept her characterizations of what occurred. Now that the parties have completed discovery, we have a "fully-developed record" to apply "to those allegations upon a motion for summary judgment," *id.*, and Robinson must present more than a "scintilla" of evidence to support her allegations, *Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty.*, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

There is also nothing remarkable in concluding that some plaintiffs whose claims survive a motion to dismiss are unable to meet their burden to survive summary judgment. In *Behrens v. Pelletier*, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), for example, the Supreme Court held that a defendant was entitled to raise the defense of qualified immunity in more than one interlocutory appeal—initially, after denial of a motion to dismiss, and, subsequently, after denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court explained that more than one appeal was warranted because

the legally relevant factors . . . will be different on summary judgment than on an earlier motion to dismiss. . . . It is no more true that the defendant who has

unsuccessfully appealed denial of a motion to dismiss has no need to appeal denial of a motion for summary judgment, than it is that the defendant who has unsuccessfully *made* a motion to dismiss has no need to *make* a motion for summary judgment.

Id. at 309.

Nothing inherent in our prior decision or the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes our conclusion in this appeal that Robinson has failed to meet her burden on summary judgment. The law-of-the-case doctrine recognizes that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” *Arizona v. California*, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). But it poses no bar to the assessment of past holdings based on a different procedural posture when, as is the case in the progression from review of a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, that later review expands the court’s inquiry based on development of actual facts underlying a plaintiff’s claims. *Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp.*, 812 F.3d 319, 329–30 (3d Cir. 2016) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that because the court had previously held that her complaint sufficiently alleged a claim, the district court was precluded from granting summary judgment under the law-of-the-case doctrine and describing that argument as resting on a “critical misapplication of the fundamental distinction between a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56”). Indeed, consistent with this recognition, this Court’s articulation of the law-of-the-case doctrine also acknowledges that different

facts will lead to a different legal analysis to which the doctrine cannot apply. *Sejman v. Warner Lambert Co.*, 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies “unless” one of several exceptions applies, including the subsequent development of “substantially different evidence”).

As the dissent acknowledges, nothing in the law-of-the-case doctrine or our prior decision compelled a particular result in this appeal except to the extent the facts remained the same as the allegations. *Infra* at 64–67. The cases the dissent relies on to support the doctrine’s applicability reiterate that when a court is presented with a different record at a new stage of the case, the law-of-the-case doctrine will no longer constrain the court’s review. *E.g., TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot*, 572 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2009). But only when the facts alleged in a complaint are subsequently proven during discovery will the law-of-the-case doctrine continue to govern how the law applies to those facts. *U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency*, 804 F.3d 646, 665–66 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine was relevant to the Court’s review because the case’s evidence developed during discovery and considered as part of the motion for summary judgment “confirmed the existence of the[] facts” previously relied on in considering the propriety of a motion to dismiss).

Discovery produced substantially different facts than Robinson alleged in her Complaint which requires us to alter our understanding of the factual underpinnings of Robinson’s claim for purposes of summary judgment. Based on this divergence, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not constrain our

review of how the governing legal principles apply to Robinson’s claim. At bottom, the evidence that Robinson marshaled during discovery demonstrates that Russell and Lioi’s conduct cannot support a state-created danger substantive due process claim and that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

III.

Individuals can hold state actors liable under § 1983 for deprivations of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including deprivations of a person’s “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Because the Due Process Clause protects individuals “against arbitrary action of government,” with “arbitrary” in this context encompassing “only the most egregious official conduct,” no constitutional violation occurs where the state actor “negligently inflicted harm.” *Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46, 49 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, the Due Process Clause “cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.” *DeShaney*, 489 U.S. at 195. And “because ‘the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective services, [state actors] cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.’” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 437 (quoting *DeShaney*, 489 U.S. at 196–97).

Based on this understanding of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court held in *DeShaney* that a county social services department had not violated a four-year-old's substantive due process rights by failing to protect the child from his abusive father. 489 U.S. at 191–94. The department had received numerous reports of abuse but failed to remove the child from his father's custody. *Id.* at 192–93. The Supreme Court recognized that although “in certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection” based on a “special relationship,” no such relationship existed in this case because the child was not in the State's custody (e.g., through “incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty”) when his father harmed him. *Id.* at 197–200. As part of its due process analysis, the Supreme Court observed that the department was also not liable because, “[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the child] faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” *Id.* at 201. “This language in *DeShaney* is commonly acknowledged as the genesis of the state-created danger doctrine.” *Robinson*, 536 F. App'x at 343.

But the state-created doctrine is a “narrow” exception to the general rule that state actors are not liable for harm caused by third parties. *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 437. It applies only when the state affirmatively acts to create or increase the risk that resulted in the victim's injury. Specifically, “a plaintiff must show that the state actor created or increased the risk of private danger, and did so directly through affirmative acts, not merely through

inaction or omission.” *Id.* at 439. A direct, affirmative act is necessary because liability is premised on the understanding that state actors cannot “disclaim liability when they themselves throw others to the lions” and that where they have engaged in affirmative conduct that creates or increases “the dangerous situation that resulted in a victim’s injury,” “it becomes much more akin to a[] [state] actor itself directly causing harm to the injured party.” *Pinder v. Johnson*, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The doctrine’s conception of an “affirmative act” is also quite limited: “[i]t cannot be that the state commits an affirmative act or creates a danger every time it does anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely. If so, the state would be liable for every crime committed by the prisoners it released.” *Id.* at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted). This narrowly confines the scope of qualifying “affirmative acts” to those that directly create or increase, i.e., cause, the risk a third party posed to the victim.

In this appeal, Robinson argues that the district court erred because the record demonstrates that Lioi and Russell took “affirmative acts” from which a reasonable jury could conclude that they directly increased the risk Williams posed to his wife.⁹ To support her argument that the officers are liable for a state-created danger, Robinson relies on the following eight “affirmative acts” that she claims made summary judgment inappropriate:

⁹ Robinson’s Amended Complaint also appears to have alleged liability based on the existence of a special relationship, but she does not rely on that ground on appeal.

- (1) Lioi “acted affirmatively” to free Williams from the Eastern District station after he could not locate the arrest warrant instead of placing Williams under arrest without the warrant and temporarily detaining him in the holding cell while the search for the missing warrant continued;
- (2) Lioi “affirmatively agreed” to permit Williams to remain free between the time Williams tried to self-surrender and the time of Mrs. Williams’ stabbing;
- (3) Lioi wrote two letters to Williams “in an effort to aid Williams in avoiding lawful arrest on valid warrants”;
- (4) “Lioi texted Williams regarding when it was safe to return home without fear of arrest and how to avoid service of his warrant”;
- (5) “Lioi prevented other officers from attempting to arrest” Williams by not assigning anyone to serve the arrest warrant and not logging it into a system that would have allowed other officers to serve it;
- (6) “Russell ordered that the warrant not be logged in with Central Records”;
- (7) “Russell orchestrated the unavailability of the warrant during” the time when Williams appeared to self-surrender; and
- (8) “Russell affirmatively ordered that Williams not be arrested” after the warrant was located.

Opening Br. 17–18.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Robinson's arguments lack merit. Contrary to Robinson's argument and the dissent's conclusion, discovery did not strengthen her earlier allegations that BCPD officers actively conspired to help Williams avoid arrest by interfering with the execution of his arrest warrant. Quite to the contrary. Even viewing the evidence in Robinson's favor, none of the "affirmative acts" she relies on can support a due process claim. Our conclusion follows from a straight-forward application of the Supreme Court's decisions in *DeShaney* and *Town of Castle Rock*, as well as this Court's decisions in *Pinder* and *Doe*.

As discussed in greater detail below, most of Robinson's characterizations of the record are not supported by the record or are pure speculation. Several of Robinson's key allegations in her Complaint concerning Lioi's supposed affirmative acts ultimately proved to be untenable. And other distinctions between Robinson's allegations in her Amended Complaint and the evidence now in the record show that her claim is mostly based on conduct properly categorized not as legally cognizable affirmative acts, but as nonactionable inactions and omissions.

Equally fatal to Robinson's claim, she has failed to produce evidence demonstrating the requisite causal link between the officers' purported "affirmative acts" and the harm that befell Mrs. Williams. Without evidence to support the conclusion that their conduct increased the danger Williams posed to his wife, we can hold neither Lioi nor Russell liable under the state-created danger doctrine. In short, what occurred in this case is not

the sort of conduct that the Supreme Court or this Court has said can give rise to liability. The state-created danger doctrine requires proof that Lioi or Russell *created* the harm that befell Mrs. Williams or *directly* “render[ed] [her] any more vulnerable to” Williams. *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 438 (emphasis omitted) (quoting *DeShaney*, 489 U.S. at 201). That is, it requires proof that Lioi or Russell were more than merely negligent or that they could have done more to ensure Williams was arrested earlier, which is the most that Robinson’s and the dissent’s view of the record allows.

A. Lioi’s Letters and Texts to Williams Cannot Support Liability

The record confirms that Lioi wrote two letters at Williams’ request and responded to a few texts Williams sent between his attempted self-surrender Thursday evening and Mrs. Williams’ murder the following Monday. Robinson, however, mischaracterizes those acts and draws conclusions that the record does not support.¹⁰ These events cannot support a state-created danger claim because the record does not allow for the conclusion that they created or increased the risk Williams posed to his wife.

Before turning to the legal principles, it is necessary to first understand what the record shows Lioi actually did. Robinson points to the letters Lioi wrote for Williams, which she characterizes as

¹⁰ This section specifically addresses Robinson’s third and fourth “steps,” namely: that Lioi (3) wrote two letters for Williams about the arrest warrants, and (4) texted Williams in the days prior to Mrs. Williams’ death.

giving Williams “get out of jail free’ cards.” Opening Br. 27. Neither letter provides any such instruction or request. The first letter truthfully describes the contents of the arrest warrant, Williams’ voluntary appearance at the Eastern District station “to turn himself in to be processed,” and his permitted departure when “Central Records did not have the warrant on file.” J.A. 631. It also truthfully states that when Lioi decided to allow Williams to leave, he had been told that the warrant may be in the courthouse, which was closed for the night.

The second letter accurately recounted that another warrant issued by a different Maryland locality sought the arrest of “a Cleaven Williams, black male with no date of birth or any other identifiers such as a social security number, height, weight, etc.,” and listing an address that—to Lioi’s understanding—had never been Williams’ address. J.A. 632. The second letter observed that the arrest warrant’s information was “very limited and should not be considered to be [Williams] based on the name alone.” J.A. 632.

A jury could not conclude from these letters that Lioi wrote them “in furtherance of a conspiracy to allow Williams to evade arrest . . . that ultimately enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams.” *Infra* at 68. Both letters state facts and neither makes any demands on a recipient or requests that anyone who reviewed their contents not arrest Williams on either warrant. Nor is the first letter misleading, as the dissent suggests, as Lioi accurately described the events leading to the decision not to arrest Williams on the evening he attempted to self-surrender. The “omission” of additional information about where the warrant was eventually located has no bearing on

Williams' cooperation or Lioi's decision to allow him to leave. Similarly, the second letter simply concludes that the warrant had few details; it does not purport to be the result of a thorough investigation or a final conclusion as to the proper subject of the warrant. In short, Robinson has provided no facts to support her continued characterization of the letters as evidence that Lioi "scheme[d] to secure [Williams'] freedom." Opening Br. 28.

Lioi's texts cannot support liability either. Robinson posits that Lioi "texted Williams regarding when it was safe to return home without fear of arrest and how to avoid service of his warrant." Opening Br. 18. The record does not support that characterization of the texts. The texts instead show that Lioi relayed factual information about the status of the warrant¹¹ and its possible execution before Williams' intended self-surrender date¹² and that Lioi encouraged Williams to "avoid" Mrs. Williams. J.A. 559 ("I wouldn't be alone with her. . . . Have a witness with you if you meet. . . . I would avoid her."). Contrary to Robinson's contention, the texts do not reasonably suggest that Lioi was helping Williams to "avoid[] his lawful arrest" or

¹¹ J.A. 696–97 (responding to Williams' question about whether Mrs. Williams could "resc[i]nd the charges/warrant" with, "No. She should contact the Court Comm[issioner] that she saw, but they won't rescind.").

¹² J.A. 559 (responding to Williams' question about whether his wife could "do another protection order & try 2 keep me from the house" with, "She could. I would avoid her. She could call the police and say u have the warrant and she is afraid of you. It would force our hand to serve the warrant.").

otherwise endangering Mrs. Williams in any way. See Opening Br. 30.

Nothing else the dissent points to alters this analysis. For instance, the dissent asserts “Lioi had never written such letters before in his twenty years of law enforcement experience.” *Infra* at 60 (citing J.A. 287–88). But Lioi never stated that he had not previously written such letters; instead, he responded by reflecting on Williams having been “a community leader” who was “known to us, and one of the key factors in everything would be is he a flight risk, is he attempting to turn himself in, which he did, so I think all that weighed into the – the process.” J.A. 287. Even granting Robinson the inference that the letters were a “first,” that fact would not allow for any inference concerning Lioi’s intent or to connect Lioi’s letters to Mrs. Williams.

In addition, the dissent posits that Lioi’s texts suggest “his desire *not* to do his job and instead to defer to Williams’s prearranged self-surrender schedule.” *Infra* at 71. Even accepting the dissent’s view, that would show only (1) that Lioi decided not to serve the warrant sooner, a decision amounting to no more than an omission or failure to act that falls under the ambit of *Town of Castle Rock*, or (2) that Lioi may have been negligent in pursuing service of the warrant, a decision that also could not give rise to a due process claim. See *Lewis*, 523 U.S. at 849 (stating that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process”); *Slaughter v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.*, 682 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2012) (reiterating that negligence cannot support a due process violation).

Regardless, neither the letters nor the texts can support a cognizable due process claim because they are not causally connected to Mrs. Williams' harm. Whatever "affirmative acts" a plaintiff relies on must have a direct causal connection to the harm that ultimately befell the victim. *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 439; *see also Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth.*, 672 F.3d 909, 916–17 (10th Cir. 2012) (calling "unremarkable" the proposition that a state-created danger claim must prove "a sufficient *causal link* between the danger created by an affirmative act of the State and the harm inflicted upon the victim by a private party"); *Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks*, 455 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[A] specific and deliberate exercise of state authority, while necessary to [state a claim under this theory], is not sufficient. There must be a direct causal relationship between the affirmative act of the state and the plaintiff's harm. Only then will the affirmative act render the plaintiff more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Neither Lioi's letters nor his texts created any danger to Mrs. Williams. Indeed, Lioi "could not have created a danger that already existed." *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the circumstances of the misdemeanor assault warrant and other evidence in the record indicate, any threat that Williams posed to his wife existed prior to and independent of Lioi's interactions with Williams. Nothing in the record suggests Lioi had any particularized reason to believe that Williams posed an ongoing—let alone imminent—threat to his wife; at most, he knew that probable cause supported issuance of a misdemeanor arrest warrant

for assaulting her in the past, which is the only information contained in the arrest warrant. As such, Lioi's letters and texts did not *create* any danger to Mrs. Williams.

Nor did Lioi's letters or texts increase the risk Williams posed to Mrs. Williams. In *Doe*, we held that a state actor did not increase the risk a child predator posed to his victims where the state actor's conduct placed the victims in "no worse position than that in which [they] would have been had [he] not acted at all." *Id.* (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). That's precisely the case here. For instance, the record does not indicate that Williams ever showed the letters to anyone, let alone that he used them to avoid arrest. Similarly, it would be patently unreasonable to conclude that texts encouraging Williams *not* to see his wife at all, or at least not alone, heightened any risk to her. Nor can any viable connection be made between any threat Williams posed to his wife and his texts to Lioi concerning the contents of the letters. In short, the letters and texts simply do not establish the requisite connection between Lioi and Mrs. Williams that would create liability under the state-created danger doctrine. See *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1177 (providing that, to state a claim, there must be evidence that the state actors did something "akin to . . . directly causing harm to the injured party").

These "acts" do not constitute the sort of direct acts the state-created danger doctrine requires for a state actor's conduct to create or increase the risk that a third party poses to a victim. As in *Doe*, we conclude that the sort of "downstream, but-for connection alleged here simply stretches the 'affirmative acts' concept too far." 795 F.3d at 442.

Consequently, they cannot support Robinson's claim against Lioi.

B. Russell's Conduct Concerning the Arrest Warrant Cannot Support Liability

The three "acts" Robinson asserts that Russell took do not support her claim against him.¹³ Robinson asserts as fact that Russell "ordered that the warrant not be logged in with Central Records"; "orchestrated the unavailability of the warrant during the attempted surrender"; and "ordered that Williams not be arrested . . . even after the warrant was found." Opening Br. 18. But Robinson's characterizations of the record stretch beyond permissible inferences to impermissible speculation. Moreover, they do not demonstrate that Russell engaged in the sort of affirmative acts that created or increased any danger to Mrs. Williams as required for a state-created danger claim.

Even assuming Russell had the warrant "pulled" and routed to the Eastern District office, the record contains no evidence that Russell was aware that the warrant had not been logged into Central Records prior to its arrival there, that he directed that it not be logged into Central Records, or that he instructed his officers not to attempt to arrest

¹³ This section specifically addresses Robinson's sixth, seventh, and eighth (in part) asserted "affirmative steps," i.e., that Russell (6) ordered Arroyo to divert the arrest warrant so that it would not be logged into the Central Records system; (7) arranged for the warrant to be in the visor of Byrd's vehicle so that it could not be located when Williams arrived to self-surrender; and (8) ordered that no one arrest Williams after the arrest warrant was located.

Williams. Nor does the record contain evidence to allow the inference that Russell “orchestrated the unavailability of the warrant” when Williams arrived to self-surrender on Thursday, November 13. *See* Opening Br. 18. To support her view, Robinson weaves mischaracterizations of the record with pure speculation to contend that a jury could infer that her allegations actually occurred. That is not a valid means of surviving summary judgment, which requires evidence, not unsupported conjecture. *See, e.g., Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard*, 673 F.3d 308, 320 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s “attempt[] to build his case through pure inference”); *Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg*, 81 F.3d 416, 423 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding a claim was “ripe for an adverse summary judgment determination” when “it was based upon a theory without proof” and dependent on “speculation and the piling of inferences”); *Barwick v. Celotex Corp.*, 736 F.2d 946, 962 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting plaintiff’s “attempt[] to build one vague inference upon another vague inference to produce a factual issue”).

By way of background, Robinson relies on a supposed “friendly relationship” between Russell and Williams, Opening Br. 33, pointing out that they communicated via their cell phones throughout the days in question and that Williams used informal language when texting Russell. In addition, she notes that Russell had been to Williams’ home and met his family and had discussed a spiritual matter with Williams in the past. These isolated parts of the record do not support Robinson’s conclusion that the men were more than professional acquaintances.¹⁴

¹⁴ The dissenting opinion also relies on Russell’s supposed “relationship” with Williams and the fact they “spoke of

Even if they did, these facts offer no information about Russell's conduct with respect to the warrant.

Robinson also points to a text Williams sent to Russell on Thursday afternoon saying, "I'm running behind. I should be there in 15," J.A. 480, as the basis for accusing Williams and Russell of having a "secret meeting," Opening Br. 34. But no evidence suggests that such a meeting occurred, and both men explained that the text referred to Williams intending to self-surrender on Thursday earlier than when he eventually arrived. Moreover, neither the text nor even an imagined secret meeting could demonstrate that Russell made the warrant unavailable or did anything else regarding the warrant; Robinson is impermissibly piling inference upon inference to reach her desired conclusion.

Next, Robinson takes Lioi's deposition testimony concerning the decision to let Williams leave the Eastern District Thursday evening and speculates that Russell and Williams "had already agreed" to a Tuesday surrender date because Russell "assured that the warrant [would be] unavailable" on Thursday. Opening Br. 34–35. That conjecture is an unsupported reading of what Lioi said. Instead, Lioi testified that prior to allowing Williams to leave on Thursday evening, he ensured that Williams agreed to return and self-surrender once the warrant was found. Lioi knew that "Russell had communicated

personal matters." *Infra* at 72. The implication from both the dissent and Robinson overstates what the record shows, which is that the men interacted at a handful of community events, that Russell entered Williams' home briefly on one occasion during a community walk that passed by Williams' residence, and that they briefly discussed religion during one of those walks because Russell was also a minister at the time.

with [Williams] that if he turn[ed] himself [in] on a Friday, [he] could get stuck in the system all weekend.” J.A. 277. Williams told Lioi he wanted to wait to turn himself in until after the weekend. Lioi then confirmed with Russell that this would be acceptable. Contrary to Robinson’s contention, Lioi’s statement does not permit the inference that Russell and Williams had previously arranged for a Tuesday self-surrender because Russell knew (or orchestrated that) Williams would not be able to self-surrender on Thursday. Nor does Lioi’s statement support *any* conclusion about Russell and the location of the warrant.

Robinson further posits that Russell put the warrant in the visor of Officer Byrd’s squad car, where it was found several hours after Williams attempted to self-surrender. As “proof” for that conclusion, Robinson points to evidence that Russell saw Officer Byrd with the warrant earlier, that Byrd denied having put the warrant in the visor, and that Russell suggested Lioi search there for the warrant. The conclusion Robinson draws from the gaps between these three fragments leaps well beyond the bounds of permissible inferences and crosses into rampant speculation. Although Robinson is entitled to all reasonable inferences in her favor, we cannot ignore undisputed evidence that contradicts her allegations. Russell explained that he suggested to Lioi several places where the warrant might have been, based on his past experience and knowledge of where officers habitually put paperwork. J.A. 456–58. What’s more, Tugya stated that the warrant was eventually located based on specific information Byrd provided to them via telephone Sunday

evening.¹⁵ No jury could conclude that Russell orchestrated the warrant’s unavailability on Thursday evening when the evidence shows that Russell provided Lioi with general information about the warrant’s whereabouts and that same evening Byrd confirmed with specific information about its location.

Nor do any of the dissent’s additional considerations connect the dots between record evidence and facts from which a jury could hold Russell liable. For instance, the dissent overstates what could be reasonably inferred from Byrd’s inability to remember the details of her role in these events. She testified only that she did not “recall” driving to Williams’ residence to attempt to arrest him; she was not sure what had happened to the paperwork on Williams; and she did not know prior to her deposition that the warrant was found in the visor of her patrol car. J.A. 106. Byrd’s testimony does not implicate Russell in anything, nor does it give rise to the inference that he took the paperwork

¹⁵ The dissent faults us for relying on Tugya’s affidavit. But “materials capable of being reduced to admissible evidence at trial” can be the basis for summary judgment even though “hearsay, like other evidence inadmissible at trial, is ordinarily an inadequate basis for summary judgment.” *U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc.*, 64 F.3d 920, 926 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1995); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). To the extent Tugya’s affidavit describes what he did during the search for the missing warrant and what effect his conversation with Byrd had on his actions and directions that evening, it is not hearsay and is therefore properly considered. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); *see also United States v. Safari*, 849 F.2d 891, 894 (noting that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered to prove knowledge, or to show the effect on the listener).

from Byrd and hid it in her patrol car. Simply put, a witness's statement that she does not know that something happened or how it happened is not affirmative evidence that something else happened or how.

This commonsense conclusion is particularly apt given the additional evidence in the record that fills in gaps in Byrd's recollection in a way that contradicts Robinson's speculation as to Russell's conduct. Specifically, Tugya's affidavit states that when he called Byrd during the Thursday evening search for the warrant, she advised that she had put the warrant in the visor of her patrol car earlier in the day, that he tracked down which patrol car she had used, and that officers found the warrant. Thus, the record evidence shows that Russell's conversation with Lioi led officers to Byrd and eventually to the discovery of the warrant. No reasonable jury could conclude in the face of this evidence that Russell had orchestrated the warrant being unavailable when Williams' self-surrendered or that Russell conspired to help Williams to evade arrest.

To bolster its conclusion that Russell could be held liable, the dissent takes certain statements out of context to create the illusion that Russell's willingness to allow Williams to self-surrender was unprecedented. But the record demonstrates that Lioi estimated 15 to 20 people a year would self-surrender in the Eastern District, and Russell agreed that sounded right. J.A. 468. And while Russell admitted that "it could have been the only time" at the Eastern District that someone called and said he would self-surrender "more than 24 hours after the call," he immediately stated that

“during [his] tenure, that has happened not an enormous amount, but it has happened before.” J.A. 469. Moreover, Russell and Lioi stated repeatedly that the turn-ups revealed that Williams was not staying at his residence; that they did not know his precise whereabouts; that they repeatedly encouraged him to turn himself in; and that they wanted to keep him communicating and cooperating with them rather than go silent, so they were willing to have him return to self-surrender.

To recap, the record demonstrates at most that Russell had the arrest warrant “pulled” and routed to the Eastern District. But the record does not support either Robinson’s or the dissent’s remaining characterizations of Russell’s behavior during the events in question. When comparing this proper view of the record against what is required to survive summary judgment, Robinson has not proffered sufficient evidence to show that a jury could find that Russell’s conduct created or increased any danger to Mrs. Williams. Russell could not create a pre-existing danger. *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 439. Nor would his “act” of pulling the warrant to the Eastern District be the sort of conduct that could render him liable under the state-created danger theory. Not every act that could possibly “make[] injury at the hands of a third party more likely” gives rise to liability, only acts that are “more akin to . . . directly causing harm” to Mrs. Williams would do so. *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1175, 1177. Russell’s decision had only the sort of “downstream, but-for connection [that] simply stretches the ‘affirmative acts’ concept too far.” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 442. As such, this cannot be the basis of a state-created danger due process claim against Russell.

**C. Lioi and Russell’s Decisions to Allow
Williams to Leave the Eastern District Office
and Self-Surrender “After the Weekend”
Cannot Support Liability**

What remains is Robinson’s reliance on Lioi and Russell’s decisions relating to Williams’ attempted and agreed-to self-surrenders.¹⁶ Given the evidence that developed at discovery, Robinson’s argument concerning these events merely recharacterizes inactions or omissions related to executing a misdemeanor arrest warrant, conduct that makes this case indistinguishable from *Town of Castle Rock, DeShaney, Pinder, and Doe*.

Given the “narrow limits . . . to establish § 1983 liability based on a state-created danger theory,” it is unsurprising that plaintiffs often attempt to recharacterize inactions and omissions as affirmative acts to satisfy their pleading and proof obligations. *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 439. What is more, we have previously cautioned that “courts should resist the temptation” to accept plaintiffs’ attempts to “artfully recharacterize[]” inaction as action. *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1176 n.*.

¹⁶ This discussion relates to Robinson’s first, second, fifth, and eighth (in part) “affirmative acts,” namely: that Lioi (1) allowed Williams to leave the Eastern District station instead of detaining him when the warrant could not be readily located; (2) allowed Williams to self-surrender after the weekend even though the arrest warrant was located early Friday morning; (5) did not assign officers to execute the arrest warrant once it was located and did not return the arrest warrant to Central Records for logging; and that Russell (8) allowed Williams to self-surrender after the weekend even though the arrest warrant was located early Friday morning.

In *Pinder*, we observed that a plaintiff brought “purely an omission claim” when she argued that a police officer had affirmatively acted to enhance the danger posed by her ex-boyfriend when the officer reassured her that the ex-boyfriend would be “locked up overnight,” but then decided to charge the ex-boyfriend with less serious offenses that resulted in his immediate release. *Id.* at 1172, 1176. That decision proved fatal, as it allowed the ex-boyfriend to return to the plaintiff’s home and set it on fire, resulting in the deaths of the plaintiff’s three children. *Id.* at 1172.

In analyzing the plaintiff’s state-created danger claim, we explained that “[n]o amount of semantics can disguise the fact that the real ‘affirmative act’ here was committed by” the ex-boyfriend, not by the officer. *Id.* at 1175. “[T]he state did not ‘create’ the danger, it simply failed to provide adequate protection from it,” meaning that, at most, the state actors “stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the officer’s conduct could not support a claim and further cautioned that were we to accept the plaintiff’s definition of an “affirmative act,” “every representation by the police and every failure to incarcerate would constitute ‘affirmative actions,’ giving rise to civil liability.” *Id.*

A decade after our decision in *Pinder*, the Supreme Court reiterated that “the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.” *Town of Castle Rock*, 545 U.S. at

768. As often occurs in this type of case, *Town of Castle Rock* arose out of “horrible” circumstances—a woman obtained a restraining order against her husband, but the order gave him the right to visit the home to have limited interaction with the couple’s three children on alternating weekends and, “upon reasonable notice,” allowed for a “midweek dinner visit.” *Id.* at 751–52 (internal quotation marks omitted). Without any notice or coordination with his wife, the husband took his daughters from the home early on a weekday evening. *Id.* at 753. When she discovered their absence, the wife called the police and asked them to enforce the restraining order. *Id.* The police “refused to do so,” telling her to wait until 10:00 p.m. to see if the husband returned the girls home. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). She called the police again at 10:00 p.m. because they had not returned, and the police told her to wait until midnight. *Id.* She called a third time shortly after midnight, then went to her husband’s apartment and found it empty, called the police again, and was told to wait for a police officer to arrive. *Id.* When no officer arrived, she went to the police station to file a report. *Id.* at 753–54. “The officer who took the report made no reasonable effort to enforce the [restraining order] or locate the three children. Instead, he went to dinner.” *Id.* at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). About two hours later, the husband appeared at the police station and opened fire. *Id.* After the husband was killed, police discovered that he had already murdered his three daughters. *Id.*

The Supreme Court rejected the wife’s claim that the police officers violated the Due Process Clause by “fail[ing] to respond properly to her repeated reports

that her estranged husband was violating the terms of a restraining order.” *Id.* at 751. It observed that, despite the language mandating enforcement of the restraining order, “[a] well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.” *Id.* at 760. The Supreme Court noted that even if enforcement was mandatory, “that would not necessarily mean that” a private citizen has an “entitlement” to the enforcement of such an order. *Id.* at 764–65. And, in any event, the Court concluded that any such right under state law would not necessarily “constitute a ‘property’ interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause.” *Id.* at 766. Consequently, the wife “did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband.” *Id.* at 768. In so holding, the Court cautioned that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be treated “as a font of tort law.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Slaughter*, 682 F.3d at 323 (discussing the dangers of constitutionalizing ordinary state tort claims).

At its core, Robinson’s claim suffers the same fundamental problem identified in *Town of Castle Rock*, *DeShaney*, *Pinder*, and *Doe*—an attempt to turn inactions and omissions into affirmative acts and to convert what might be a basis for state tort liability into a federal constitutional violation. As the Supreme Court recognized in *Town of Castle Rock*, even mandatory language in a temporary restraining order—or, here, an arrest warrant—does not strip police officers of enforcement discretion. When Lioi and Russell allowed Williams to self-surrender, they were exercising the long tradition of police discretion

concerning the circumstances of enforcing a misdemeanor arrest warrant. *See Town of Castle Rock*, 545 U.S. at 760–61. Exercising this sort of routine police discretion does not give rise to a state-created danger. *Id.* To hold otherwise would turn the thousands of instances where the police agree to allow a charged individual to self-surrender into a conspiracy to evade arrest. No precedent countenances such a reading.

The record reveals the rest of Lioi and Russell’s conduct is properly characterized as inaction or omission. For instance, Robinson challenges Lioi’s failure to make different decisions when the warrant could not be located after Williams attempt to self-surrender. She further seeks to hold both officers liable for failing to execute the arrest warrant earlier rather than allowing Williams to self-surrender later. Neither of these claims is any different than the claims rejected as mere failures to act on the abuse reports in *DeShaney* and on the failure to enforce the restraining order in *Town of Castle Rock*.

As we observed in *Pinder*, the state does not “commit[] an affirmative act [for purposes of the state-created danger doctrine] . . . every time it does anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely,” and the Due Process Clause does not require state actors to protect individuals from the harms they face from third parties. 54 F.3d at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted); *accord Estate of Smithers ex rel. Norris v. City of Flint*, 602 F.3d 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding police officers not liable under state-created danger doctrine where they arrested an individual and allowed her to leave rather than detaining her on that charge because that exercise of discretion “did not constitute an

affirmative act” and did not increase the danger to the victims); *Burella v. City of Phila.*, 501 F.3d 134, 146–47 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding police officers not liable under state-created danger doctrine where they did not enforce a court order or follow state law requiring the perpetrator’s arrest because what the plaintiff “actually contend[ed] [was] that the officers failed to act,” which is not cognizable).

The affirmative act that caused Mrs. Williams’ injury was Williams’ decision to stab her; “[n]o amount of semantics can disguise [that] fact.” *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1175; *see Doe*, 795 F.3d at 441 (holding that a state actor’s decision not to report a known concern is the same as an “officer’s decision not to file . . . more serious charges,” both of which constitute nonactionable omissions). In short, these circumstances do not give rise to liability under the Due Process Clause. Notably, neither Robinson nor the dissenting opinion cites a single case where an officer’s failure to serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant or decision to allow an individual to self-surrender constituted an “affirmative act” establishing liability under the state-created danger theory. Nor could they do so, as such acts fail to meet the high standard of being “akin to [the state] actor itself directly causing harm to” Mrs. Williams. *Cf. Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1177.

Our reliance on *Town of Castle Rock* and conclusion that many of Robinson’s arguments are based on facts that are properly characterized as omissions or failures to act do not constitute an “about-face,” *infra* at 64, from our prior decision. We previously recognized the Supreme Court’s holding in that case that police officers have discretion in such enforcement and service decisions and cannot

be liable for exercising that discretion because individuals do not have a property interest in such police enforcement. *Robinson*, 536 F. App'x at 345. We held that Robinson's allegations were distinguishable from *Town of Castle Rock*, however, because "Lioi's alleged conduct . . . was *not confined to* a failure to execute the arrest warrant" given that Robinson alleged that he "*affirmatively acted to interfere with execution of the warrant by conspiring* with Cleaven Williams to evade capture and remain at large." *Id.* (emphases added). But after discovery, Robinson has marshaled evidence supporting only conduct that *is* confined to a failure to execute the warrant.

For example, Robinson has presented no evidence to support her allegation that Lioi (or Russell) conspired with Williams to evade arrest by preventing the "proper" domestic violence unit from serving the warrant. To the contrary, the Eastern District officers had the authority to arrest Williams and were responsible for the neighborhood where Williams lived. And while the Complaint alleged that Lioi (or Russell) warned Williams about the existence of the arrest warrant, the record now shows that *Williams contacted Russell* about its possible existence. The Complaint also alleged BCPD officers feigned attempts to serve the arrest warrant, but the record contains no such evidence. And perhaps most importantly, the record lacks evidence to substantiate the Complaint's allegation that Lioi *lied* about not knowing where the warrant was on the evening of Williams' attempted self-surrender or that he falsified information to avoid having to arrest Williams that night. None of those allegations in the Complaint, which were the subject of the

motion to dismiss and our prior decision, are borne out by evidence at the summary judgment stage.

Instead, Robinson has presented only recharacterizations of acts that amount to a simple failure to arrest: Lioi allowed Williams to leave the Eastern District rather than detaining him until the warrant—which was in fact missing and which he had been told may be at a location that was closed for the night—was found; that Lioi and Russell did not aggressively pursue Williams' arrest after the warrant was located; and that they agreed to allow him to self-surrender after the weekend. For the reasons stated, all of those “acts” are appropriately characterized as omissions and failures to act, not the sort of affirmative acts originally alleged that would distinguish this case from *Town of Castle Rock, DeShaney, Pinder, and Doe*.

Robinson’s arguments concerning these events fail for the additional reason that none of Lioi’s or Russell’s decisions occurred in “the context of immediate interactions between the [state actor] and” Mrs. Williams. *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 441 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In *Pinder*, this Court cautioned that not “every representation by the police and every failure to incarcerate . . . constitute[s] [an] ‘affirmative action[],’ giving rise to civil liability.” 54 F.3d at 1175. We concluded that the state’s conduct constituted a “fail[ure] to provide adequate protection from” a third party’s danger, which is not cognizable, even though the officer in that case explicitly reassured the plaintiff that he would charge the ex-boyfriend with an offense that would keep him detained overnight and then failed to do so. *Id.*

Here, no evidence shows that Mrs. Williams or anyone else on her behalf ever approached Lioi or Russell to seek protection from her husband. And the arrest warrant, which simply charged Williams with second-degree assault and named Mrs. Williams as the victim, would have provided scant additional information to a reviewing officer. J.A. 764. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, there's no basis to believe that the officers knew that Mrs. Williams was "afraid" of her husband, but even that would not be enough on its own to establish liability for decisions based on that knowledge. *See Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1172 (holding no liability under the state-created danger doctrine for the officer's conduct reassuring the plaintiff of her safety and charging the former boyfriend on lesser charges than he'd promised after having responded to a domestic disturbance call and hearing the plaintiff express fear for herself and her children in light of the boyfriend's abusive and violent conduct and death threats that occurred on the same night). The lack of direct contact between the victim and the officers prevents any conclusion that the officers affirmatively acted and thereby increased the danger to Mrs. Williams. Indeed, this case involves almost no personal knowledge on the part of Lioi or Russell that Williams posed a threat—let alone an ongoing, immediate, or increasingly violent threat—toward Mrs. Williams. In that regard, it is akin to *Doe*, where the record did not show that the defendant met or spoke with the plaintiffs and he "could only speculate that the . . . allegations were true and that [the third party] would pose future danger" to the plaintiffs. 795 F.3d at 441. We observed that this fact—which is also present in this case—meant that

the case “st[ood] on weaker ground than” the *DeShaney* claim, where the defendants “knew the child victim and were aware of the specific danger the father posed to him.” *Id.* at 441–42. Even in *Pinder*, where the defendant had also spoken directly with the plaintiff and had specific and immediate knowledge of the risk the third party posed to the plaintiff and her children, the defendant was not liable. 54 F.3d at 1172. Accordingly, even in the face of much closer interactions between the plaintiff (or victim) and the defendant(s), there was no liability. Here, Lioi and Russell had no “immediate interactions” with Mrs. Williams, so this case is on even weaker ground. *Id.* at 1176 n.*.

Lastly, we note that the record also lacks evidence demonstrating the requisite causal link to Mrs. Williams’ death. As the district court noted, the officers proffered an expert witness who opined, given his experience regarding arrests made on the charges against Williams and his background, that Williams would have been free well before Monday afternoon and could have committed the offense even if he were detained when he attempted to self-surrender or if he were arrested earlier. J.A. 128. Williams would have been arrested and detained for only a limited time, then released pending further proceedings. Moreover, there’s evidence that even if Williams was not aware of his wife’s location at all times during the events in question, he did know where she was at other times besides her courthouse appearance. *E.g.*, J.A. 818, 834. Accordingly, he could have committed the crime on more than one occasion.

Because the evidence concerning these events does not support Robinson’s characterization of them

as “affirmative acts” creating or increasing a risk to Mrs. Williams, the record does not support a claim under the state-created danger doctrine.

IV.

The above analysis demonstrates why Robinson failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to support her claim that Mrs. Williams’ constitutional rights were violated under the state-created danger theory of liability. That same analysis conclusively demonstrates why Lioi and Russell are also entitled to qualified immunity, which “shields government officials from liability for civil damages, provided that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights within the knowledge of a reasonable person.” *Lawson v. Union Cty. Clerk of Court*, 828 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2016). Because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Lioi and Russell violated Mrs. Williams’s constitutional rights, it follows that the district court properly concluded that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Nonetheless, even if the facts proven during discovery set out a constitutional violation, Lioi and Russell would still have been entitled to qualified immunity because that right was not clearly established. Once again, we note that our consideration of this legal question is governed by the changes in the facts developed during discovery as opposed to those that had been alleged in Robinson’s Complaint. We previously affirmed the denial of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage because we accepted Robinson’s allegations concerning Lioi’s conduct, including the allegations

that Lioi actively interfered with the execution of the warrant by lying about not being able to find it on the evening Williams attempted to self-surrender, feigned the BCPD's efforts to arrest Williams, and conspired with him to remain free despite multiple opportunities to arrest him. Based on those allegations we concluded that

in 2008, a reasonable police officer in Lioi's position would have known that a law enforcement officer affirmatively acting in a conspiracy with a third party to avoid arrest on assault charges could give rise to a constitutional violation when the third party acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to injure another person.

Robinson, 536 F. App'x at 347.

As already described at length, the evidence does not allow for the conclusion that Lioi or Russell were lying about the warrant being missing or their inability to serve the warrant. Instead, the record shows that—at most—they agreed to allow a cooperating individual that posed no known immediate risk to self-surrender. And it was not clearly established in 2008 that a decision to allow self-surrender rather than aggressively serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant would serve as a basis of liability under the state-created danger doctrine. Indeed, no case then or now could be taken to stand for that proposition.

“A right is clearly established when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1181. To be

sure, *DeShaney* and other cases have acknowledged the existence of the state-created danger theory of liability to establish a due process violation. But in determining whether a right is clearly established, courts do not look at the right “at its most general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged.” *Wiley v. Doory*, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1994). Although there does not need to be a case identical to the facts of a particular case for the right to be clearly established, there must be a reasonable correlation. *Edwards v. City of Goldsboro*, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). Put simply, a reasonable officer must have been able to ascertain the “apparent” unlawfulness of his conduct “in light of the pre-existing law.” *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1173.

Applying these principles here, while a reasonable officer in 2008 would have notice that the state-created danger theory existed in the abstract, no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit case law would have described when its requirements had been met in *any* particular set of circumstances. Instead, officers would have recognized multiple cases setting forth the general framework that, to be held liable under this doctrine, an officer had to engage in conduct that created or increased “the dangerous situation that resulted in a victim’s injury” such that the circumstances were “much more akin to an actor . . . directly causing harm to the injured party.” *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1177. But they would have encountered no cases discussing the state-created danger doctrine in the context of serving an arrest warrant. Nor would they have encountered any cases holding an officer liable under the doctrine for harm that arose from an officer’s decision to allow a party

named on an arrest warrant to self-surrender. The absence of case law in this area coupled with the Supreme Court's statements in *Town of Castle Rock* regarding police discretion executing a warrant means that Lioi and Russell did not have "fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional" even if we were to conclude that a violation occurred in this case. *Iko v. Shreve*, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008). In sum, as the district court held, "[a] reasonable police officer in Lioi and Russell's position could not have known that the failure to guarantee [Williams'] arrest on a misdemeanor warrant prior to [the date of his wife's death] would violate [Mrs. Williams'] constitutional rights." *Robinson*, 2017 WL 2937568, at *10. Lioi and Russell are entitled to qualified immunity for this additional reason as well.

V.

Both Robinson and the dissenting opinion contrive to create a genuine issue of material fact through the officers' omissions and "mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another," *Barwick*, 736 F.2d at 963. To survive summary judgment, Robinson had to "do more than present a scintilla of evidence in [her] favor." *Sylvia*, 48 F.3d at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted). She had to present "sufficient evidence such that reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence" for her. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). But Robinson's version of events is not supported by sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Lioi or Russell undertook any affirmative acts that would support

liability for a state-created danger substantive due process claim. *See id.* As such, she has not shown that the district court erred in granting the officers summary judgment.¹⁷

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

GREGORY, Chief Judge, dissenting:

In our previous decision in this case, we held that Appellants had sufficiently alleged that Appellee Deputy Major Daniel Lioi is liable for violating Veronica Williams's due process rights because he acted affirmatively to create or enhance the danger that she faced at the hands of her husband. Although Appellants have now come forward with evidence to support their section 1983 due process claim, the majority has abandoned our prior ruling. The majority now takes the view that the police officers' conduct amounts, as a matter of law, to nothing more than a failure to act, which is not actionable under a state-created danger theory. In so holding, the majority not only dismisses the law of this case but also takes great pains to

¹⁷ Although Robinson's appeal centers on the § 1983 claim, she also challenges the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to Lioi and Russell on her state claims of gross negligence, wrongful death, and survival. Those claims are meritless, and we affirm the district court's judgment on them for the reasons set out in the district court's opinion. *Robinson*, 2017 WL 2937568, at *11–14.

construe the evidence that has since been developed in the improper light.

At bottom, Appellants have shown that Deputy Lioi and Major Melvin Russell took affirmative steps to allow Cleaven Williams—a community leader and their acquaintance—to evade arrest until a date deemed most convenient by him, a date after he was able to fatally stab his wife. Although the officers did not know that Williams would kill his wife, they were well aware of the domestic assault charges pending against him and that his wife was afraid of him. The officers' conduct amounts to more than mere negligence, and a jury could find true the complaint's allegations—allegations we have said amount to a constitutional violation. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I.

Before I explain my disagreement with the majority, I believe it is important to review the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Appellants, the parties that did not move for summary judgment.

In 2008, Williams resided in Baltimore with his wife, Veronica Williams. Williams served as the president of the Greater Greenmount Community Association. J.A. 241. Through his affiliation with the Association, Williams met members of the Baltimore City Police Department's Eastern District, including Deputy Lioi and Major Russell. J.A. 439, 444. Major Russell and Williams interacted with each other during community meetings and community walks. J.A. 441. The two men also exchanged text messages at times. J.A. 453.

Williams and his wife were having problems. During one community event, Williams confided in Major Russell that he had concerns about the fact that his wife was a Jehovah's Witness and was instilling her beliefs in their children. *Id.* Things apparently escalated, and in October 2008, Williams pinned down his wife and cut off her hair. The following month, Mrs. Williams sought a protective order against her husband based on the October assault.

At some point during the weekend of November 8, 2008, Williams called Major Russell to determine whether "it was actually true" that his wife had "got some papers on him." J.A. 706. On November 9, Mrs. Williams obtained a temporary protective order against her husband, and a warrant issued for Williams's arrest.

Officer Jose Arroyo was dispatched from the Eastern District to pick up the arrest warrant from the Court Commissioner's office. J.A. 549, 580, 585. Although police department policy requires that an arrest warrant be forwarded directly from the Court Commissioner to Central Records for processing, Arroyo did not take the warrant to Central Records and instead returned directly to the Eastern District. J.A. 581, 589. Arroyo could not recall if his superior officers, including Deputy Lioi and Major Russell, ordered him to bypass the Court Commissioner. J.A. 578–79. Nonetheless, Arroyo testified in deposition that the only circumstances under which he would not have taken a warrant to Central Records were (1) if he were ordered not to, or (2) if an officer had the suspect in custody already and was transporting the suspect to Central Booking. J.A. 577–78. It is

undisputed that no police officer had Williams in custody at the time.

On Monday morning, November 10, Williams sent Major Russell a text message saying, “Call me, major.” J.A. 99. Also that day, Officer Adrienne Byrd—the officer assigned to Williams’s area—approached Major Russell about the warrant, which she had in hand. J.A. 445, 450, 707. Although Major Russell was not typically informed about every warrant that issued in his district, Officer Byrd “thought it was important to bring [this warrant] to [his] attention.” J.A. 450. Major Russell “glossed over the warrant, read the warrant,” and “saw it was for [Williams].” J.A. 451.

The next day, Tuesday, November 11, Major Russell called Williams and told him that he should turn himself in, but to not “come in later in the week, like on a Friday or something, because you don’t want to sit in jail the entire weekend, but you need to get in as soon as possible.” J.A. 707. This advice was far from typical. J.A. 277–78.

On Wednesday, November 12, Williams texted Major Russell, saying, “I would really like 2 do it on Tuesday . . . I am still trying to get capital . . . I only have 3000 right now . . . I have some favors coming though.” J.A. 100. Later that afternoon, however, Major Russell told Deputy Lioi that Williams was “scheduled” to turn himself in the following day, Thursday, November 13, at 9:00 p.m. J.A. 249. Major Russell was working the day shift, which ended around 5:00 p.m., and it was Deputy Lioi who worked the night shift. J.A. 248–49. According to Deputy Lioi, Major Russell instructed him to be at the Eastern District when Williams came to turn himself in “to make sure the process [went] well.”

J.A. 288. Major Russell's request was unusual; Deputy Lioi had not arrested anyone "since the late '90s." J.A. 467. Yet, because Williams was a community leader, Major Russell wanted his second-in-command to be there. *Id.* In fact, Deputy Lioi interpreted Major Russell's request for his presence to mean that he was to ensure the process went "smoothly" for Williams because Williams was a community leader, he "was different." J.A. 288.

Meanwhile, between November 9 and 13, Eastern District officers may have attempted to serve the arrest warrant at Williams's house during unannounced "turn-ups." J.A. 707. Major Russell testified that he drove by Williams's home one night but that it was "blacked out, darked out." J.A. 451. Deputy Lioi acknowledged that it was possible the turn-ups were not conducted. J.A. 341. And Officer Byrd—whose job it was to serve the warrant—could not recall ever going to Williams's area to serve the warrant. J.A. 106, 451. In fact, after she had brought the warrant to Major Russell's attention on November 10, "[i]t was, like [she] had the paperwork in [her] hand, and then the paperwork just disappeared. Someone took it from [her]." J.A. 108.

On November 13, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Williams sent Major Russell a text message advising, "I am running bhind. I should b there n 15." J.A. 101. Major Russell responded, "K." *Id.* When asked in deposition about this text exchange, Major Russell answered that he believed Williams was referencing his intent to turn himself in during Major Russell's shift. J.A. 480. As Major Russell explained, he did not meet with Williams, or make any arrangement to meet with Williams, apart from Williams's self-surrender. J.A. 481.

Williams, in fact, did not appear at the Eastern District in the afternoon of November 13. Rather, he arrived at the district around 9:00 p.m. on that day. J.A. 257. Deputy Lioi—who was certain the warrant had issued—called Central Records and was told they did not have the warrant. J.A. 257–58. This was the first time in Deputy Lioi’s twenty-year law enforcement career that a warrant existed for someone whom Central Records was unable to locate in the system. J.A. 289–90. Deputy Lioi then began a brief search for the warrant. J.A. 562. He contacted the Court Commissioner, the North Avenue Courthouse, and the Baltimore City Sheriff’s Office. *Id.* Deputy Lioi was told by the Court Commissioner that a warrant had issued and could be at the courthouse, which was closed for the night. J.A. 334, 562, 631. Deputy Lioi also left a voicemail message for Major Russell. J.A. 268. Deputy Lioi had no doubt that the warrant existed and could have arrested Williams without the physical warrant. J.A. 234, 258. And although Central Booking would not put Williams in a cell without the physical warrant, the Eastern District had a “hot box” in which Deputy Lioi could have detained Williams for up to eight hours while “every absolute effort was made to locate the warrant” or overnight until the courthouse opened the next morning. J.A. 252, 456–57.

Deputy Lioi, however, did not hold Williams in the hot box. Instead, he allowed Williams to wait in a public “desk area” of the station. J.A. 259–60. And rather than make “every absolute effort” to locate the warrant, Deputy Lioi searched for the warrant for a mere 20 to 30 minutes and, after not immediately finding it, let Williams leave the precinct. He told Williams that officers would contact

him after the warrant was located and would then either “have him picked up” or arrange for Williams to turn himself in. J.A. 257–58. Deputy Lioi did not ask Williams about where he was staying or otherwise confirm that officers would be able to locate him after the warrant was found.

After Deputy Lioi let Williams leave, Major Russell returned his call. J.A. 268. Deputy Lioi explained to Major Russell that Williams had come to the station and that Deputy Lioi let him leave because he could not locate the warrant. *Id.* Major Russell then told Deputy Lioi that the warrant had been “pulled.” *Id.* Major Russell also suggested that Deputy Lioi search Officer Byrd’s patrol car. J.A. 456, 458. Deputy Lioi called Officer Byrd, as Major Russell had told Deputy Lioi that she had the warrant. *Id.* Officer Byrd recalled receiving paperwork for Williams from either her supervisor or the person giving “roll call.”¹ J.A. 105. However, as described earlier, she could not recall what happened to that paperwork, only that someone had taken it from her. J.A. 108.² The warrant was found

¹ As Officer Byrd explained, “when you are in roll call, they give you like the information that’s on your post.” J.A. 105.

² The majority cites to an affidavit of Sergeant Todd Tugya that recounts the details of a conversation Sergeant Tugya had with Officer Byrd during the search for the warrant. Maj. Op. at 9. Those statements are inadmissible hearsay. *See Fed. R. Evid. 802.* Although the majority suggests that the statements are admissible to show the effect of Officer Byrd’s remarks on Sergeant Tugya’s search for the warrant, Maj. Op. at 34 n.15, the majority cites to the statements for their truth—that Officer Byrd had the warrant, had attempted to serve it, and had left it in the visor of her patrol car, *id.* at 9. Because of this, I do not believe that an exception to the rule against hearsay applies, and the majority improperly considers Sergeant

in the window visor of Officer Byrd's patrol car in the early morning hours on Friday, November 14, about two hours after Williams left the station. J.A. 269, 283.

Rather than immediately contact Williams after the warrant was found, Deputy Lioi did not speak with Williams until after 7:00 p.m. on that day—over twelve hours later. J.A. 284. Williams asked if he could turn himself in after the weekend. J.A. 277. Williams explained to Deputy Lioi that he had “some issues,” including that his mother was moving out of town. *Id.* Williams was concerned that, as he had been warned by Major Russell, if booked on Friday, he could be in custody all weekend. *Id.* Deputy Lioi conferred with Major Russell, who confirmed that “after the weekend’s fine.” *Id.* Deputy Lioi then arranged for Williams to self-surrender on the

Tugya’s affidavit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); *U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc.*, 64 F.3d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[H]earsay, like other evidence inadmissible at trial, is ordinarily an inadequate basis for summary judgment.”); *see also Niblock v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp.*, 134 F.3d 363 (Table), No. 97-1229, 1998 WL 27153, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 1998) (affirming district court’s determination that affidavit did not contain “competent, admissible evidence” because its statements were inadmissible hearsay).

Even if Sergeant Tugya’s affidavit statements were admissible, they are contradicted by Officer Byrd’s deposition testimony that after her conversation with Major Russell three days earlier, someone took the warrant from her hand and it “disappeared.” J.A. 108. The affidavit also contradicts Officer Byrd’s testimony that she first became aware that the warrant was located in her patrol car during her deposition in this case. J.A. 107. By portraying the facts related to Officer Byrd’s possession of the warrant in the light least favorable to Appellants, the majority ignores the contradictory evidence and flips the summary judgment standard on its head.

following Tuesday. *Id.* As Deputy Lioi later explained to internal affairs, “We knew him. I felt confident that we would be able to find him.” J.A. 563. This was Deputy Lioi’s explanation despite the fact that officers had up to that point allegedly been unable to locate Williams to serve the warrant.

Also on Friday, Deputy Lioi, at Williams’s request, wrote a letter stating that Williams had been “very cooperative and willing to turn himself in,” that the Eastern District verified that a warrant for second degree assault was open, and that the warrant was not at Central Records but rather “was being held at North Avenue Court House, which was closed for the night” of November 13, when Williams had attempted to self-surrender. J.A. 285, 631. This letter was written after the warrant had in fact been located at the Eastern District, yet the letter made no mention of the warrant having been found. In a text message to Deputy Lioi, Williams also asked that Deputy Lioi “leave off the Tuesday part . . . thats [sic] just for us . . . I just wanted an overview of the night . . . not too much detail.” J.A. 686. Deputy Lioi complied. He omitted any information about Williams’s scheduled self-surrender. J.A. 631.

After Deputy Lioi provided the letter to Williams, Williams texted Deputy Lioi: “Thank you Dan. There is a method to my madness:-/” J.A. 101. Deputy Lioi responded, “That’s what I’m afraid of,” to which Williams wrote, “Its [sic] cool:-)” *Id.* Deputy Lioi wrote back, saying “I trust u.” J.A. 692. Williams then wrote, “Thanks . . . we both have shown good favor.” J.A. 693.³

³ When asked in deposition about whether he would have issued a similar letter for someone that Lioi did not know personally, Lioi responded, “[p]robably not, no.” J.A. 288.

On Sunday, November 16, Williams informed Deputy Lioi that his attorney had located a different assault warrant from March 7, 2003, that was issued for a Maryland resident named Cleaven Williams. J.A. 285–86.⁴ Deputy Lioi contacted Central Records’ “hot desk” and confirmed that there was an outstanding warrant for a Cleaven Williams. J.A. 286. The warrant was for a black male with the address of 2928 Ruskin Court, Abingdon, Maryland. J.A. 632. The warrant contained no further identifying information, such as date of birth, height, or weight. J.A. 286, 632. And as Williams explained, his father was also named Cleaven Williams. J.A. 809. At Williams’s request, Deputy Lioi sent him an email confirming the existence of the March 7, 2003, warrant for first-degree assault and asserting that “[t]he information in the Criminal System Inquiry Case History Display in reference to the subject of the warrant is very limited and should not be considered to be you based on the name alone.” J.A. 632. The record does not show that Deputy Lioi conducted any investigation into the 2003 warrant, even though he acknowledged in deposition that he could have contacted the 2003 complainant or the jurisdiction that sought the 2003 warrant to confirm the identify of that Cleaven Williams. J.A. 288.

Deputy Lioi had never written such letters before in his twenty years of law enforcement experience. J.A. 287–88. However, this was an “unusual circumstance based on the fact that we knew this guy as a community leader.” J.A. 287. It

⁴ The 2003 warrant was based on an incident in which Williams fired a gun into a car. J.A. 308.

was later determined that Williams was in fact the subject of the 2003 warrant. J.A. 287–88.

On Monday, November 17, Williams and Deputy Lioi exchanged the following text messages:

Williams: Cool . . . I just left my home 2 meet w/ my lawyer . . . I saw my wife drive by . . . can I go home or what?

Lioi: I wouldn't be alone with her. She could say you did anything. Have a witness with you if you meet.

Williams: Thanks Dan.

Williams: Can she do another protection order & try 2 keep me from the house?

Lioi: She could, I would avoid her. She could call the police and say u have the warrant and she is afraid of you. It would force our hand to serve the warrant.

J.A. 700–05. At some point after the text message exchange, at around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. that day, Williams called Deputy Lioi from his attorney's office. J.A. 291. Deputy Lioi encouraged Williams to turn himself in that same day, rather than wait until the following day. *Id.* Williams commented that Tuesday, the prearranged date, was "still better." *Id.* At the end of the conversation, Deputy Lioi told Williams to call him after he left his attorney's office. *Id.*

Deputy Lioi had the warrant with him at that time. J.A. 305. The parties point to no evidence in the record showing that Deputy Lioi ever logged the warrant with Central Records after it was found the previous Friday; instead, it appears that Deputy Lioi kept the warrant with him. Although Deputy Lioi

knew where Williams was, he again did nothing to serve the warrant.

Also on November 17, the Maryland District Court for Baltimore City held a final protective order hearing on Mrs. Williams's petition. At around 3:00 p.m., Deputy Lioi called Williams back, having not heard from him after Williams left his attorney's office. J.A. 291. Williams answered the phone and said, "hey, let me call you back." *Id.* Approximately forty minutes later, Mrs. Williams, who was pregnant, left the courthouse. Outside of the courthouse, Williams stabbed her multiple times in the face, head, and neck. She miscarried and died in the hospital on November 21, 2008. Williams was convicted of murder and is currently serving a life sentence. *State v. Williams*, No. 108350013 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Feb. 25, 2011); *State v. Williams*, No. 11-0672 (Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 5, 2013) (affirming conviction).

II.

"Section 1983 imposes liability on state actors who cause the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'" *Doe v. Rosa*, 795 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir. 2015), *cert. denied*, 136 S. Ct. 811 (2016). Those rights include the right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to be free from "conduct that deprives an individual of bodily integrity." *Id.* at 436–37. Although "[a]s a general matter . . . a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause," *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989), an exception

to this rule exists “[w]hen the state itself creates the dangerous situation that resulted in a victim’s injury,” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 438 (quoting *Pinder v. Johnson*, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir.) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 516 U.S. (1995)). This exception, the state-created danger exception, applies where a state official’s affirmative act created or enhanced the danger to the individual. *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1175.

A.

As an initial matter, I take issue with the majority’s easy disregard of our prior opinion in this case. We are not merely presented for a second time with the argument that members of the Baltimore City Police Department created or enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams and are thus liable for violations of the Due Process Clause. Rather, we are tasked with applying what we have already established as the law of this case to the facts that have been developed since the last appeal. In the previous appeal, we considered the sufficiency of Appellants’ allegations against Deputy Lioi. *Robinson v. Lioi*, 536 F. App’x 340 (4th Cir. 2013), *cert. denied*, 572 U.S. 1002 (2014).⁵ In those allegations—allegations which survived a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—Appellants asserted that Deputy Lioi “conspired with Cleaven Williams ‘to evade capture’ and ‘to remain free despite the finding of probable cause,’ thereby directly enabling him to harm Mrs. Williams.” *Id.* at 344. We affirmed

⁵ Appellants’ claims against Major Russell were brought after our decision affirming denial of the motion to dismiss the claims against Deputy Lioi.

the district court’s denial of Deputy Lioi’s motion to dismiss, determining that Deputy Lioi’s alleged actions—actively interfering with execution of the warrant by failing to turn the warrant over to the appropriate unit, warning Williams, giving Williams advice about how to avoid service, and falsely stating the warrant could not be found—were affirmative acts that created or enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams. *Id.* at 344, 346.

In so holding, we rejected Deputy Lioi’s argument that “because a police officer has discretion in the execution of arrest warrants, his conduct in this case did not violate Veronica Williams’ substantive due process rights.” *Id.* at 345 (citation omitted). Critically, we found that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), was not controlling. *Id.* In *Town of Castle Rock*, a mother of three filed suit against the town of Castle Rock, Colorado, alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause when the police did nothing to respond to requests to enforce a restraining order against her husband who later killed her daughters. 545 U.S. at 751, 753–54. The Court held that the mother had no property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order because there was no “legitimate claim or entitlement to it” where government officials retained discretion over enforcement. *Id.* at 756, 766.

We distinguished *Town of Castle Rock*, characterizing it as “fundamentally, a case about inaction”; yet Appellants had “alleged affirmative misconduct on Lioi’s part such that his actions ‘directly caus[ed] harm to the injured party.’” *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 345 (alteration in original)

(quoting *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1177). Therefore, we held that Deputy Lioi’s actions “were on that ‘point on the spectrum between action and inaction’ such that his acts created ‘the dangerous situation that resulted in [Mrs. Williams’] injury.’” *Id.* at 345–46 (alteration in original) (quoting *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1175, 1177).

We also rejected a defense of qualified immunity, explaining that “a reasonable police officer in Lioi’s position would have known that a law enforcement officer affirmatively acting in a conspiracy with a third party to avoid arrest on assault charges could give rise to a constitutional violation when the third party acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to injure another person.” *Id.* at 347. That is, Deputy “Lioi’s conduct as alleged in the complaint was not in a gray area; he crossed a bright line.” *Id.*

The majority now does an about-face, finding that *Town of Castle Rock* is in fact controlling and that Appellants’ evidence amounts to nothing more than omissions by Deputy Lioi and Major Russell. Despite, as discussed below, disputes with respect to several facts that support the allegations this Court previously held sufficient to show a state-created danger, the majority now holds that this case involves “only conduct that is confined to a failure to execute the warrant.” Maj. Op. at 42 (emphasis omitted). This conclusion, in my view, is not only unwarranted in light of the disputed facts, but it also flies in the face of the well-established doctrine that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” *TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot*, 572 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); *accord Carlson v. Boston Scientific Corp.*, 856 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017); *United*

States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 804 F.3d 646, 666 (4th Cir. 2015); *Winston v. Pearson*, 683 F.3d 489, 498 (4th Cir. 2012); *L.J. v. Wilbon*, 633 F.3d 297, 308 (4th Cir. 2011).

Rather than follow the law-of-the-case doctrine, the majority seeks to rescind our prior holding, shielding its decision to do so with the defense that we are now at the summary judgment stage. However, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not cease to have import merely because a different standard now applies at this later stage of the case. Instead, the doctrine contemplates that the same legal ruling will continue to apply despite the varying standards that may apply in subsequent stages of litigation; the court's decision of law continues to govern the "same issues *in subsequent stages* in the same case." *TFWS*, 572 F.3d at 191 (emphasis added). Those subsequent stages include not only those in the same court, but "all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal." *Everett v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 788 F.3d 132, 142 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting *United States v. Aramony*, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999)). The standard applied by a reviewing court on appeal will often differ from the standard applied by the trial court. And our standard of review in a subsequent appeal may also differ from the standard under which we reviewed the case in a prior appeal. Yet the law-of-the-case doctrine continues to apply. See, e.g., *Oberg*, 804 F.3d at 657 (applying law of the case established in first appeal to subsequent appeal); *S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Silver Anchor, S.A. (Panama)*, 23 F.3d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that district court misapplied the law of the case when it considered a narrower question than that which this Court remanded for

determination); *Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Price*, 116 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1940) (“When the finding upon the first hearing was affirmed, it became the law of the case and was binding upon the parties, as well as upon the lower court, and was not subject to re-examination upon the remand.”).

Of course, I remain mindful of the summary judgment standard under which this appeal is reviewed. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude proper application of that standard of review. Nonetheless, the fact that we are now at summary judgment by itself does not warrant a departure from the law of the case. If that were so, the doctrine would have little, if any, effect. Any legal determination made at the pleading stage would never be applicable in later stages of the case where more than the pleadings are before the court. Moreover, and ironically, it is the majority that misapplies the summary judgment standard here, as I discuss below.

I am also mindful that the law-of-the-case doctrine “is not absolute” and has exceptions. *Capital Inv’rs Co. v. Ex’rs of Morrison’s Estate*, 584 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1978). It need not be followed where “substantially different evidence” is developed after the law of the case is decided, where “controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the issue,” or where “the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” *TFWS*, 572 F.3d at 191 (citations omitted); *Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., Inc.*, 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1988). Adherence to the law of the case may also give way when a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is in question. *See Am. Canoe*

Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003).

I cannot agree, however, that the facts developed in discovery in this case are “substantially different” such that they warrant a departure from our prior holding that the affirmative acts committed by Deputy Lioi created or enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams. *See* Maj. Op. at 20. I also cannot agree that Appellants’ burden at this stage is to present facts that “strengthen” their “earlier allegations.” *Id.* at 24. We have already concluded that the allegations as pleaded—absent any strengthening—sufficiently stated a claim. Appellants’ burden at this stage, a burden which I believe to be satisfied, is merely to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find their pleaded allegations to be true.⁶

⁶ The majority cites to *Wiest v. Tyco Electronics Corp.*, 812 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2016), for the proposition that the law-of-the-case doctrine “poses no bar to normal reassessment of past holdings based on a different procedural posture when, as is the case in the progression from review of a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, that later review expands the court’s inquiry based on development of actual facts underlying a plaintiff’s claims.” Maj. Op. at 18–19. *Wiest*, however, does nothing to support the majority’s view that the law of the case does not apply here. In *Wiest*, the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s summary judgment motion “was procedurally barred” by the district court’s prior determination that the complaint stated a claim. 812 F.3d at 329–30. That is not the case here. Neither Appellants nor I assert that summary judgment is barred altogether because of the favorable motion-to-dismiss decision. Rather, as the *Wiest* panel appropriately explained, the question now presented to the Court is whether Appellants have “come forward with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the [complaint’s] allegations are, indeed, true.” *Id.* at 330

“We are not writing on a blank slate, at liberty to revisit our [prior] decision . . . on a whim.” *Winston*, 683 F.3d at 498. Because the record contains sufficient evidence to support the allegations of Appellants’ complaint—allegations which we have already concluded state a due process claim—I would reverse summary judgment and allow Appellants to try their case to a jury.

B.

On the record developed since the previous appeal, a reasonable jury could conclude that Deputy Lioi and Major Russell took several affirmative steps to allow Williams to evade arrest and that, as a result, Williams remained free from arrest long enough to stab his wife on a date on which he knew exactly where she would be.

In evaluating the evidence, we must remember what Appellants’ claim is and what this Court has already decided. Appellants do not claim that each of the officers’ alleged actions individually resulted in Williams’s wholesale escape from arrest. Nor do they claim that the officers were complicit in Williams’s plan to murder his wife, or even that they knew of that plan. Appellants claim instead that Deputy Lioi and Major Russell participated in a conspiracy to allow Williams—a prominent community figure—to remain free from arrest. And it was Williams’s ability to remain free from arrest until November 17, 2008, that gave him the opportunity to fatally attack his wife. Each of the officers’ acts was taken in furtherance not of a conspiracy to kill Mrs. Williams,

(citation omitted). To that question, I believe the answer is a resounding “yes.”

but a conspiracy to keep Williams out of jail. And because that conspiracy enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams, we found that Appellants had successfully pleaded a due process claim under a state-created danger theory. *Robinson*, 536 F. App'x at 344.

1.

The acts performed by Deputy Lioi are undisputed. He authored two letters and several text messages regarding the events leading up to Mrs. Williams's miscarriage and death. And instead of arresting Williams, he arranged for Williams to turn himself in on the date Williams requested. No semantic acrobatics are needed to deem these actions affirmative acts and not mere omissions. Of course, what is disputed is whether these affirmative acts were in furtherance of a conspiracy to allow Williams to evade arrest—a conspiracy that ultimately enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams. A reasonable jury could find that they were.

Construed in the light most favorable to Appellants, the letters that Deputy Lioi wrote can reasonably be viewed as his attempt to assist Williams in evading arrest by any authorities presented with the letters. Though the first letter explained that Williams had attempted to turn himself in, it misleadingly omitted the fact that the warrant had been located shortly after Williams was allowed to leave the precinct and that Williams had secured another four days of freedom before he agreed to turn himself in. The subsequent email implied that Williams was not otherwise a wanted man. The email was prepared without any investigation by Deputy Lioi into the identity of the

Cleaven Williams listed on the 2003 warrant, despite Deputy Lioi's testimony that he could have ascertained the proper identity.

The majority concludes that these letters cannot support Appellants' claim in part because they "state facts." Maj. Op. at 26. Apparently, the majority believes that an affirmative act requires more than affirmative action; it also requires deceit or express inaccuracies. Such a rule finds no support in the law. Moreover, the mere recitation of facts or "then-existing opinions" did not, as I have highlighted, make the letters any less misleading. Deputy Lioi carefully selected the facts that he included in the letters and purposely excluded other highly relevant facts. Crafting the letters in such a way only supports Appellants' allegation that Deputy Lioi was conspiring with Williams to allow him to remain a free man a while longer; if Deputy Lioi were merely documenting the facts, with no motive to assist Williams in evading arrest, there would be no reason to cherry-pick the information he included.

Indeed, the men's text message exchange suggests that Deputy Lioi's "then-existing opinions" were not so benign. Despite expressing some misgivings about Williams's request for the letters, Deputy Lioi nonetheless "trust[ed]" Williams's "method to [his] madness." J.A. 101, 692. And this letter-writing was far from routine. Deputy Lioi had never before in his twenty-year law enforcement career written such letters and confirmed he would "[p]robably not" write any such letters for someone that he did not personally know, but that Williams was an "unusual" case; the officers knew him and he

was a community leader. J.A. 287–88.⁷ These acts do not show simple “negligen[ce] in pursuing service of the warrant.” Maj. Op. at 28. Construed in the proper light, the letters demonstrate Deputy Lioi’s highly unusual acts to provide assistance to Williams, assistance aimed at keeping Williams out of police custody a while longer, assistance that Deputy Lioi otherwise has not and does not provide but provided to Williams because of his status as a community leader.

Similarly, Deputy Lioi’s text message exchange with Williams on the day Williams killed his wife is evidence of his participation in the conspiracy to delay Williams’s arrest until the date of Williams’s choosing. As with the letters, those text messages conveyed “factual information.” Maj. Op. at 27. But they also advised Williams of the consequences of his failure to avoid contact with his wife: such contact could “force [the officers’] hand to serve the warrant.” J.A. 705. Those text messages demonstrate, in Deputy Lioi’s own words, his desire *not* to do his job and instead to defer to Williams’s prearranged self-surrender schedule. Indeed, despite the difficult time that officers had in locating the warrant, Deputy Lioi held onto the warrant for three days without delivering it to Central Records when it was finally located. The text exchange also suggests that Deputy Lioi sought to avoid doing his job

⁷ When Deputy Lioi was asked “how many other times have you written a letter for somebody” like the letters he wrote for Williams, Deputy Lioi responded “[r]emember, this was an unusual circumstance based on the fact that we knew this guy as a community leader.” J.A. 287. As the majority appears to accept, the reasonable inference can be made that Deputy Lioi had never previously written such letters.

despite his knowledge that Williams could seek out his wife—the victim of domestic violence whose testimony provided probable cause for the issuance of the warrant in the first place. Deputy Lioi knew that Mrs. Williams had sought protection from her husband. Had Deputy Lioi simply not desired to serve the warrant, this might have been a different case. But Deputy Lioi communicated his desire to avoid being “force[d]” to do his job to the very subject of the arrest warrant. In doing so, Deputy Lioi went beyond simply refraining from aggressively serving the warrant. Viewing the text message exchange in combination with the letters that Deputy Lioi wrote and Deputy Lioi’s arrangement with Williams to turn himself in on entirely his own terms, a juror could certainly conclude that his conduct assisted Williams in delaying his arrest until the date Williams selected.

This affirmative conduct is distinguishable from the omissions and failures to act that we have found insufficient to show a state-created danger. *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 431, 439 (concluding that no affirmative act created danger when college president *failed to report* child abuse to law enforcement); *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1172, 1175 (finding no affirmative act when officer *failed to charge* petitioner’s ex-boyfriend with more serious crime); *see also Town of Castle Rock*, 545 U.S. at 753, 756 (finding no liability where police *failed to respond* to mother’s requests to enforce restraining order against her husband). Had the developed record shown that Deputy Lioi merely sat on his hands and failed to pursue any course of action with respect to Williams’s arrest, the law-of-the-case doctrine may not have applied, relieving the Court of its obligation to adhere to its prior ruling.

See Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325 (explaining that a court may depart from the law of the case when “a subsequent trial produc[es] substantially different evidence” (internal citation omitted)). In that case, this matter may very well have fallen neatly in line with *Doe*, *Pinder*, and *Town of Castle Rock*, as the majority holds. But the record shows that Deputy Lioi chose to act. And his conduct “was far more than a mere passive failure to act”; it could reasonably be construed by a jury as affirmative action to permit Williams to “remain free despite the finding of probable cause” for his arrest. *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 344.

2.

As for the evidence of Major Russell’s conduct, a reasonable jury could likewise conclude that he took affirmative steps, similar to those which we previously held to constitute affirmative acts, to allow Williams to remain at large until Williams himself determined the most convenient time for his arrest.

Like with Deputy Lioi, the record shows that Williams had a relationship with Major Russell. J.A. 439, 444. It is undisputed that the two texted each other and spoke of personal matters and that Major Russell instructed Deputy Lioi to ensure that Williams’s self-surrender went “well” and “smoothly.” J.A. 288. The fact that Major Russell *said* that he did not ask Deputy Lioi to give Williams any special treatment does not change the other record evidence showing that Major Russell did, in fact, treat Williams differently. *See* Maj. Op. at 8

n.4.⁸ He asked his second-in-command to be responsible for Williams's self-surrender, despite the fact that Deputy Lioi had not arrested anyone "since the late '90s" and despite Major Russell's admission that it was "unusual" for someone of Deputy Lioi's rank to supervise a self-surrender. J.A. 467. And Major Russell provided Williams with advice on how to avoid spending an entire weekend in jail, advice that was not routinely given to those with outstanding arrest warrants. J.A. 277–78.

While Major Russell's relationship with Williams alone is not dispositive of Appellants' claim, it informs a factfinder's view of Major Russell's conduct. With respect to that conduct, there is a dispute—a dispute that even the majority acknowledges, Maj. Op. at 36—as to whether Major Russell ordered that the warrant be "pulled," or diverted from the regular course of processing. Major Russell testified in deposition that he was unaware of the warrant until it had already reached Officer

⁸ In attempting to minimize the relationship between Williams and the police officers, the majority relies on statements made by those officers that Major Russell did not ask that Williams be given any special treatment. Maj. Op. at 8 n.4. These are nothing more than self-serving statements that are contradicted by other evidence in the record, as I discuss. In fact, Major Russell makes other self-serving statements that clearly are not borne out by the record. For example, he testified that if the officers "knew where [Williams] was he would have been arrested at that time, especially if [the officers] had that warrant in hand." J.A. 468–69. Yet, the warrant was in the hands of the officers as of Friday, November 14; Deputy Lioi testified that they knew how to locate Williams; and yet Williams was not arrested at that time and instead was permitted to prearrange for a second time his self-surrender four days later—an arrangement that Major Russell endorsed.

Byrd, the day after it was issued and brought directly to the precinct, that he did not pull the warrant after Officer Arroyo picked it up, and that he never possessed it. However, Deputy Lioi testified that after Williams told Major Russell about the warrant, Major Russell “had the warrant pulled.” J.A. 270. Moreover, Officer Arroyo testified that he would have bypassed Central Records in this case only upon a superior’s orders. And Officer Byrd explained that “[s]omeone took” the warrant from her hand after she discussed the warrant with Major Russell, J.A. 108, that she never attempted service of the warrant, and that she learned that the warrant was found in her patrol car only during discovery in this case. In discussing Major Russell’s communication with Williams and the subsequent “pull[ing]” of the warrant, Deputy Lioi described “the whole thing” as “unusual.” J.A. 270. Yet Williams was also an unusual suspect; he was a community leader, and Deputy Lioi and Major Russell both treated him differently because of that fact.

With respect to that different treatment, there is also a dispute as to whether Major Russell made “arrangements” for Williams to turn himself in at a date and time certain. Major Russell testified that he “didn’t make arrangements for him to turn himself in.” J.A. 455. Rather, according to Major Russell, he “simply said you need to turn yourself in, and [Williams] agreed.” *Id.* Major Russell could not recall deciding on a date and time. *Id.* Major Russell also stated that it “sound[ed] odd” that Williams “pretty much prearranged when he should turn himself back in.” J.A. 468. In fact, Williams’s arrangement to self-surrender was the first and only such arrangement

to be made at the Eastern District during Major Russell's tenure. J.A. 469.⁹

The record also shows that Major Russell did in fact arrange for Williams to turn himself in. Major Russell informed Deputy Lioi of the November 13 arrangement and ensured that Deputy Lioi would be there to process Williams. J.A. 100, 249. Major Russell exchanged text messages with Williams on November 13 regarding Williams's estimated time of arrival. And after the warrant could not be located and Williams was allowed to leave the police station, Deputy Lioi testified that Major Russell agreed with him to allow Williams to "turn himself in at a later date," on Tuesday, November 18. J.A. 277. Moreover, while denying any "prearrangement that [Williams] could stay free for this long," Major Russell also acknowledged that an "agreement" was in place and explained that he was "almost handcuffed" to the "agreement" to allow Williams to self-surrender because police officers "had no clue where [Williams] was." J.A. 469. Yet Deputy Lioi did not hesitate to allow Williams to leave the Eastern District on November 13 after a mere 20-minute search for the warrant because the district police officers "knew [Williams]" and Deputy Lioi was "confident that we would be able to find him." J.A. 563.

In light of this testimony, I disagree with the majority that any involvement by Major Russell in

⁹ The majority highlights testimony that 15 to 20 people self-surrender in the Eastern District each year. Maj. Op. at 35 (citing J.A. 468). The record shows, however, that those people do not prearrange their self-surrender. J.A. 468. Williams's case was the only case of a prearranged self-surrender in the Eastern District that Major Russell could recall. *Id.* at 468–69. In fact, Major Russell characterized such a pre-scheduled self-surrender as "odd." *Id.* at 468.

the willful mishandling of the warrant and the broader conspiracy to help Williams evade arrest is supported by nothing more than “impermissible speculation.” Maj. Op. at 30. Major Russell knew Williams and gave his case particular attention because he was a community leader. Major Russell had the warrant pulled, reviewed the warrant right before it disappeared from Officer Byrd’s hand, gave Williams advice he did not routinely give to those who are subject to an arrest warrant, told Deputy Lioi where the warrant could be found,¹⁰ and arranged with Williams two separate dates for his self-surrender—dates that he let Williams determine and the second of which was several days after the warrant was actually located. This all took place despite the fact that, as Major Russell himself explained, open warrants are typically acted upon very quickly in the Eastern District. J.A. 470.

On the evidence presented by Appellants, a reasonable jury could conclude that Major Russell—who knew Williams personally and respected him as a community leader—actively participated in the diversion and delay in execution of the warrant. Such interference with the warrant rises to the level of affirmative action. *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 345.

C.

I also disagree with the majority that Deputy Lioi and Major Russell did not enhance the danger to Mrs. Williams. In our prior opinion in this case, we

¹⁰ Again, the majority’s reliance on the statements in Sergeant Tugya’s affidavit about his conversation with Officer Byrd regarding the location of the warrant are inadmissible hearsay. *See supra*, note 2.

determined that “Lioi’s alleged affirmative acts with his co-conspirator, Cleaven Williams, to avoid arrest directly enabled Mr. Williams to perpetrate the harm to Mrs. Williams.” *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 345. In my view, nothing in the now-developed record supports the opposite conclusion as a matter of law.

First, in relying heavily on the defense expert’s testimony that Williams was likely to be released on his own recognizance or on bond within 24 hours of his arrest, the majority overlooks other critical evidence in the record. *See Maj. Op.* at 45–46 (citing J.A. 128). One of the reasons Williams gave for wanting to delay his arrest was that he needed time to raise money for his bail. J.A. 100. Therefore, even if Williams were released on bond—which, of course, was a decision left to the sole discretion of the judge and over which the expert ultimately had no say—the record suggests that he would not have been able to make the bond payment to be released from jail. Moreover, if Williams had been arrested on Friday, November 14 (after the warrant was located), that weekend, or even Monday morning, it is not at all certain that he would have been released from custody by the time his wife left the court proceeding.

More importantly, though, because Williams was a community leader and their acquaintance, Deputy Lioi and Major Russell affirmatively acted so that Williams’s arrest was delayed, and their acts “creat[ed] the opportunity for [Williams] to murder his wife.” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 440 (discussing and distinguishing *Robinson*). Although the majority goes to great lengths to downplay the relationship between Williams and the officers, *Maj. Op.* at 8 &

n.4, 31–32 & n.14, the record undisputedly shows that both officers viewed Williams as someone to be treated differently because he was a community leader. Williams was not the ordinary suspect. He enjoyed the special favor of Deputy Lioi and Major Russell, and the officers' conduct implicitly assured Williams that he would not be arrested until the date of his choosing. The officers knew how to locate him, yet they did not serve the warrant. Deputy Lioi provided him with unusual supportive letters, told him to avoid forcing the officers' hands to arrest him, and told him that he trusted him. Both officers ultimately made arrangements that allowed Williams to stay out of jail until the date that *he* requested.¹¹

To be clear, the nexus between the officers' affirmative acts and the enhanced danger to Mrs. Williams does not turn on whether the officers had knowledge of Williams's specific intention to kill his wife. Williams told the officers that he needed the additional time to raise capital for bail, assist his mother, and take care of other unspecified matters. It was unbeknownst to the officers that Williams had more sinister plans.

But the officers' ignorance of those plans is not dispositive of the question of liability. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, both officers did have

¹¹ Neither officer was “handcuffed” to the self-surrender arrangements that they made with Williams, as Major Russell and the majority suggest. J.A. 469; *see* Maj. Op. at 35–36 (explaining that the officers “wanted to keep [Williams] communicating and cooperating with them rather than go silent, so they were willing to have him return to self-surrender”). Williams was a known community leader, communicated openly with both officers, and Deputy Lioi was confident that they could locate him.

“personal knowledge” that Williams posed *some* threat to Mrs. Williams’s safety. Maj. Op. at 45. Mrs. Williams had in fact sought police protection from her husband. *Cf.* Maj. Op. at 44 (“[N]o evidence shows that Mrs. Williams or anyone else on her behalf ever approached Lioi or Russell to seek protection from her husband.”). She sought a protective order, and a warrant was issued for her husband’s arrest on domestic assault charges. Major Russell was informed by Williams that his wife had “got some papers on him,” J.A. 706, and personally saw the warrant right after it was issued. Deputy Lioi was also aware of the warrant, certain that it had issued, and exchanged text messages with Williams about the importance of avoiding his wife because “she could say you did anything” and could tell the police that she was “afraid” of Williams. J.A. 702, 705. The officers knew that Williams’s assault of his wife was supported by probable cause and that she would likely express fear of her husband if she saw him again. Deputy Lioi was even “afraid of” Williams’s “method to [his] madness.” 689–90.

It is not impermissible speculation, nor does it require a great leap, to conclude that on this evidence, the officers knew that Williams posed some level of danger to his wife while he remained free from arrest. That is, an increased danger to Mrs. Williams’s safety was the natural and foreseeable consequence of the officers’ affirmative acts to delay Williams’s arrest on the assault warrant. It was not the “indirect and incidental result” of the police department’s lack of enforcement. *Town of Castle Rock*, 545 U.S. at 767 (quoting *O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr.*, 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980)). Rather, as we previously held, the officers’ conduct

“directly enabled [] Williams to perpetrate the harm to Mrs. Williams” and, therefore, “affirmatively placed [Mrs. Williams] in a position of danger.” *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 345 (second alteration in original) (quoting *Wood v. Ostrander*, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989)).

In concluding that the causal nexus is lacking here, the majority relies improperly, in my view, on our decisions in *Doe* and *Pinder*. Those cases rested primarily on the finding that the defendants did not affirmatively act. *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 441 (“Rosa’s alleged ‘affirmative acts’ boil down to a particular inaction.”); *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1176 (“Pinder’s case is purely an omission claim.”). And to the extent that *Doe* found that there was an insufficient nexus between the alleged conduct and the harm to the victim because the conduct occurred “beyond the context of immediate interactions between the [state actor] and the plaintiff,” *Doe* is readily distinguishable as the defendant there “did not meet or speak with the [plaintiffs], and by all accounts, was not even aware the [plaintiffs] existed.” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 441 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).

I also am not persuaded that Williams’s pre-existing risk to his wife means that nothing the officers did enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams. As we explained in *Doe*— while distinguishing *Doe* from our prior decision in this case—the officers here “substantially changed a pre-existent danger” to Mrs. Williams; they did not “simply fail to intervene to stop it.” *Id.* at 440. For “[t]hough the risk of domestic abuse already existed, the officer[s] ‘directly enabled [Williams] to perpetrate the harm to [his wife]’ and ‘affirmatively placed [Mrs.

Williams] in a position of danger.” *Id.* (quoting *Robinson*, 536 F. App’x at 345). It was the inescapable facts of the officers’ affirmative actions that kept Williams out of jail and thus made viable his plan to murder his wife. While the officers were unaware of that murderous plot, a jury could reasonably find that they did conspire to allow Williams to choose the date of his arrest and to remain free from arrest until that date. And it happened that Williams chose to submit to arrest the day after his wife’s protective order hearing—the day after he knew with certainty where she would be and at what time, and the day after he fatally stabbed her. Therefore, to hold as a matter of law that Mrs. Williams faced the same risk of death at the hands of her husband regardless of the officers’ actions is to do the very thing of which the majority accuses Appellants—engage in impermissible speculation.

Appellants have presented evidence that Deputy Lioi and Major Russell placed Mrs. Williams in greater danger, and a jury should decide whether the nexus requirement is satisfied.

D.

Finally, I cannot agree that Deputy Lioi and Major Russell are entitled to qualified immunity.

In finding that it was not clearly established in 2008 that an officer’s “decision to allow self-surrender rather than aggressively serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant” would be a constitutional violation, the majority again improperly construes the disputed facts of this case in the light most favorable to the wrong party. Maj.

Op. at 47. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, it is critical that courts evaluating a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage construe disputed facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, "even when, as here, a court decides only the clearly-established prong of the [qualified immunity] standard." *Tolan v. Cotton*, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014). This is because courts define the clearly established right at issue "on the basis of the 'specific context of the case.'" *Id.* (citation omitted). Therefore, our review of a summary judgment order must "take care not to define a case's 'context' in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions." *Id.*; *West v. Murphy*, 771 F.3d 209, 213–14 (4th Cir. 2014). By defining the right at issue in the way that it does—as nothing more than a right to be free from a police officer's failure to aggressively serve an arrest warrant and to instead allow the subject of a warrant to self-surrender—the majority accepts Deputy Lioi and Major Russell's construction of the record evidence, effectively "weigh[ing] the evidence and resolv[ing] disputed issues in favor of the moving party." *Tolan*, 572 U.S. at 657 (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). This is patently improper. *Id.*

Moreover, the mere lack of binding precedent in 2008 regarding the application of the state-created-danger doctrine in this context is insufficient grounds to conclude that the right at issue was not clearly established. It is settled that an officer can be placed on notice that an action is unconstitutional even when "the very action in question" has not previously been found unlawful. *Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). That is, "officials can still be

on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” *Id.* at 741. As the majority concedes, the general right to be free from affirmative state conduct that creates or enhances the danger that a person faces at the hands of a private citizen was clearly established at the time of Deputy Lioi and Major Russell’s actions. And while there may have been no binding precedent addressing the specific circumstances of the case at hand, it requires little more than common sense to understand that a police officer could face liability when she acts to assist the subject of an arrest warrant in evading arrest until a date of his own choosing. *See id.* (determining that a constitutional violation, though novel, “was so obvious” that the Court’s case law “gave respondents fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution”). Such conduct is not the failure to act that *Deshaney* and *Pinder* had rejected as a basis for liability. Nor is it a simple exercise of police discretion in executing warrants that the Supreme Court spoke of in *Town of Castle Rock*. Rather, it is a “misuse of state authority,” which before 2008 had been held to violate the Due Process Clause. *Bright v. Westmoreland Cty.*, 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2006); *Natale v. Town of Ridgefield*, 170 F.3d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[G]ross abuse of governmental authority [] will offend the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.”); *see also Cromer v. Brown*, 88 F.3d 1315, 1329 n.9 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In deciding whether [a plaintiff] is asserting a clearly established right, we may examine the pre-existing law outside this circuit.” (citing *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1176–78)).

In short, this is not a case “in which an officer would be required to reason backward from case law ‘at a high level of generality’ to determine whether his conduct violated a constitutional right.” *Harris v. Pittman*, --- F.3d ---, ---, No. 17-7308, 2019 WL 2509240, at *11 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). I would find that Deputy Lioi and Major Russell are not entitled to qualified immunity.

III.

Contrary to the majority’s holding, this is not a case of a negligent failure to act. This is not a case in which officers “had no hand in creating the danger but simply stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.” *Doe*, 795 F.3d at 440–41 (brackets and citation omitted). The officers here *took* an “active role.” They actively allowed and even helped Williams to evade an arrest warrant for which there was probable cause, despite their knowledge of the pending domestic assault charges.

If this case does not present a jury question under a state-created danger theory, it is hard to imagine what would. Must the officers have placed the knife in Williams’s hand, diverted the entire police force from the steps of the courthouse where Mrs. Williams was stabbed, and themselves assisted in the killing of Mrs. Williams, as the State suggested during oral argument? The bar to recovery under the theory is a high one, but surely not that high. Indeed, it is imperative in these cases that we refrain from finding that “the line between action and inaction, between inflicting and failing to

prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is.” *Bowers v. DeVito*, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). Before this case, our Court had not encountered a case in which the line between inaction and action was crossed. It is disheartening to see that, when finally faced with a record that supports a state-created-danger due process claim, the Court casts it aside into the pile of omission claims.

I would instead find that the law of the case applies, that Appellants have come forward with sufficient evidence to support their due process claim, and that they are entitled to have a jury decide whether Deputy Lioi and Major Russell affirmatively enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams. And because the disputed facts underlie Appellants’ state claims of gross negligence, wrongful death, and survival, I would reverse summary judgment on those claims as well.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Civil No. CCB-12-192**

CARLIN ROBINSON, ET AL.

v.

DANIEL A. LIOI, ET AL.

MEMORANDUM

This case arises from the November 2008 murder of Veronica Williams (“Ms. Williams”) by her husband, Cleaven Lawrence Williams, Jr. (“Mr. Williams”). Mr. Williams stabbed Ms. Williams outside a Baltimore court following that court’s grant of her request for a protective order against Mr. Williams. Although Ms. Williams had filed assault charges against Mr. Williams several weeks earlier, the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”) did not serve the arrest warrant on him. Carlin Robinson (“Ms. Robinson”), as Guardian and Next Friend of Ms. Williams’s children, and Eunice Graves (“Ms. Graves”), Ms. Williams’s mother (collectively, “the plaintiffs”), initially filed this civil suit against Mr. Williams, the BCPD, and Daniel A. Lioi (“Lioi”), a Deputy Major of the BCPD’s Eastern District. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint after this court dismissed their claims against the BCPD, adding as a defendant Melvin Russell (“Russell”), a BCPD Major. The plaintiffs alleged that due to their prior relationship with Mr. Williams, Russell and Lioi departed from normal procedures in serving the arrest warrant, thereby

enabling Mr. Williams to remain free at the time he killed his wife.

The plaintiffs have asserted claims against defendants for violating Ms. Williams's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for conspiring to violate Ms. Williams's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. They also have asserted state law tort claims for wrongful death, survival action, battery, gross negligence, reckless endangerment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, common law conspiracy, conversion, fraud, and intentional misrepresentation. Now pending are Lioi's and Russell's Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 144; ECF No. 146), plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Lioi's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 153), and Lioi's Cross-Motion to Modify Scheduling Order (ECF No. 166). The motions have been fully briefed, and no oral argument is necessary. *See* Local R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' Motion to Strike will be denied, Lioi's Cross-Motion to Modify Scheduling Order will be granted, and defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted.

BACKGROUND

The uncontested facts are as follows. Mr. and Ms. Williams lived with their three young children in Baltimore, Maryland. (PL Opp'n at p. 5, ECF No. 175-1). Mr. Williams served as the president of the Greater Greenmount Community Association. (Russell Mot. Sumra. J. at p. 7, ECF No. 144-1).¹ It

¹ Lioi "expressly incorporates by reference" the undisputed facts as set forth in pp. 5-14 in Russell's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Lioi Mot. Summ. J. at p. 3, ECF No. 146-1).

was in this capacity that Mr. Williams first met Russell and Lioi; their interactions were limited to joint participation in several “community meetings” and “community walks.” (*Id.*) On Sunday, November 9, 2008, Ms. Williams filed for and was granted a protective order against Mr. Williams for “second-degree assault and unauthorized removal of property arising out of an October incident where Mr. Williams assaulted her by pinning her down and using a pair of scissors to cut off her hair.” (*Id.* at p. 5-6). A warrant was then issued for Mr. Williams’s arrest in connection with the October incident. (Arrest Warrant, ECF No. 144-3, Ex. 1). At approximately 11:30 p.m. on Sunday, November 9, 2008, BCPD Officer Jose Arroyo, following instructions from a dispatcher, picked up the arrest warrant from the Court Commissioner. (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 6, ECF No. 144-1). Despite the fact that arrest warrants are generally first brought to “central records” for logging unless the warrant requires “immediate service” or the subject of the warrant is in custody (Arroyo Dep. 47:6-19, ECF No. 175-8, Ex. 6; ECF No. 174-12, Ex. 10),² neither of

² Russell disputes the fact that “fresh warrants . . . hot right off the presses,” are generally brought to central records first. Instead, he suggests warrants are brought directly to the district where the warrant is to be served and that warrants are later brought to central records only if patrol officers fail to serve the warrant for several days. (Russell Dep. 78:15-81:6, ECF No. 175-4, Ex. 4). BCPD General Order K-4 does not entirely clarify; it states:

“If the arrest warrant must be served immediately, have the warrant logged in the district where the offense occurred. However, if a warrant does not require immediate service the warrant will be forwarded to the Central Records Division

which was the case here, Officer Arroyo returned to the Eastern District with the warrant without first stopping at “central records.” (*Id.* at 58:22-59:8). While it is possible Officer Arroyo bypassed bringing the warrant to “central records” upon the orders of a superior officer, Officer Arroyo does not recall if Russell, Lioi, or any other superior officer issued any such order. (Arroyo Dep. 47:6-20, 49:11-54:2, ECF No. 175-8, Ex. 6). Officer Arroyo had no further involvement with the arrest warrant or with Mr. Williams, Russell, or Lioi after bringing the warrant to the Eastern District. Over the next several days, officers may have attempted to serve the warrant on Mr. Williams by “turning up” at his residence; if these “turn-ups” were indeed occurring, however, officers were unsuccessful in locating Mr. Williams and serving the warrant.³ (Internal Incident Report, ECF No. 175-10, Ex. 8).

Russell eventually learned about the warrant on or about Monday, November 10, 2008. (Russell Dep. 69:11-70:22, ECF No. 175-4, Ex. 2). On that day, Mr. Williams sent the following text to Mr. Russell: “Call me, major.” (Mr. Williams’s Texts at p. 5, ECF No.

by the Court Commissioner, where the appropriate administrative controls will be initiated for the warrant.”

(ECF No. 175-9, Ex. 7).

³ The parties dispute whether these “turn-ups” occurred. Russell contends multiple turn-ups occurred, and that he himself attempted to personally serve the warrant. (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 9, ECF No. 144-1). Conversely, plaintiffs contend it is equally likely that “the turn-ups were not being conducted at all.” (Robinson Opp’n at p. 15-16, ECF No. 175-1). In any event, what is uncontested is that the warrant was not successfully served at this time.

175-6, Ex. 4). Two days later, on Wednesday, November 12, 2008, around 3:20 p.m., Mr. Williams texted Russell regarding turning himself in, stating: “I would really like to do it on Tuesday[.] I am still trying to get capital[.] I only have \$3,000 right now[.] I have some favors coming through.” (*Id.* at p. 6). At deposition, Mr. Williams explained that he wanted to turn himself in on Tuesday after speaking with his lawyers, who advised “him not to turn [himself in on a . . . Friday or Monday.” (Mr. Williams Dep. 36:9-37:15, ECF No. 144-8, Ex. 6). Later that Wednesday afternoon, Russell informed Lioi that Mr. Williams had an arrest warrant out for “common assault.” (Lioi Dep. 79:1-81:22, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1). Russell informed Lioi that Mr. Williams was scheduled to turn himself in the next day, Thursday, November 13, 2008, at 9:00 p.m., and asked if Lioi could be present. (*Id.* at 82:2-14). Russell made this request because he was working the day shift from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and Lioi was covering the night shift, which typically ran from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. at night. (*Id.* at 80:18-81:2).

On Thursday, November 13, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Mr. Williams sent Russell a text stating: “I am running behind. I should be there in 15.” (Mr. Williams’s Texts at p. 7, ECF No. 175-6, Ex. 4). In response, Russell replied: “K.” (*Id.*) At this time, Russell did not inform Lioi that he was in contact with Mr. Williams. (Lioi Dep. 264:10-267:2, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1). This 1:00 p.m. text exchange occurred roughly eight hours before Mr. Williams eventually turned himself in at the Eastern District at 9:00 p.m. When asked at deposition regarding this text exchange, Russell indicated his belief that Mr. Williams was referencing his intent to “com[e] to the

station” to turn himself in during the time Russell was working. (Russell Dep. 210:17-21, ECF No. 175-4, Ex. 2). Specifically, Russell stated he “didn’t meet [Mr. Williams] or make any arrangement to meet [Mr. Williams] outside of [Mr. Williams] turning himself in,” and that Mr. Williams must have “never show[n] up” around 1:15 p.m. as suggested in the text message. (*Id* at 214:11-215:2, 210:17-21).

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on Thursday, November 13, 2008, Mr. Williams arrived at the Eastern District to turn himself in. (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 11, ECF No. 144-1; Robinson Opp’n at p. 10, ECF No. 175-1). Mr. Williams stated at deposition that he went to the Eastern District that night believing he would be incarcerated and released the following morning on Friday, November 14, 2008. (Mr. Williams Dep. 42:21-43:13, ECF No. 144-8, Ex. 6). When Mr. Williams arrived, Lioi and another officer inquired with “central records” regarding Mr. Williams’s arrest warrant because that is where warrants generally are stored. (Lioi Dep. 115:12-22, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1). Central records, however, did not have a copy of the warrant because Officer Arroyo had brought it directly to the Eastern District without first stopping at central records. After checking with central records, Lioi made various inquiries to the commissioner’s office, the sheriff’s office, and the North Avenue courthouse to locate the warrant. (*Id.* at 116:5-117:5). After a period of time,⁴ realizing that central booking would

⁴ Lioi estimated this period of time was approximately “an hour and a half” at deposition. (Lioi Dep. 116:14-22, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1). However, during a 2008 Internal Affairs investigation; Lioi estimated the time was between twenty or thirty minutes. (Lioi Internal Affairs Statement at p. 3, ECF No. 175-7, Ex. 5).

not accept Mr. Williams without a warrant, and acknowledging the warrant might not be located in a timely manner, Lioi allowed Mr. Williams “to leave [the station] with the agreement that he would come back” once the warrant was located. (Russell Dep. 115:1-5, ECF No. 175-4, Ex. 2). The warrant was eventually located “a little after midnight,” on Friday, November 14, 2008, in the patrol car of Officer Adrienne Byrd, who had attempted to serve the warrant during the previous shift. (Sgt. Todd Tugya Aff. ¶¶ 4-5, ECF No. 144-12, Ex. 10). Despite finding the warrant the morning of Friday, November 14, 2008, Russell and Lioi authorized Mr. Williams to turn himself in on Tuesday, November 18, 2008. (Lioi Dep. 221:19-223:17, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1).

On Friday, November 15, 2008, Lioi issued a letter, at Mr. Williams’s request, explaining that although Mr. Williams had been “very cooperative and willing to turn himself in,” he was not ultimately arrested because the police did not have his warrant on file. (Lioi Dep. 228:1-18, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1; *see also* ECF No. 175-11, Ex. 9). Later, on Sunday, November 16, 2008, Mr. Williams informed Lioi that there was a separate assault warrant from March 7, 2003, for a Maryland resident named “Cleaven Williams.” (Lioi Dep. 228:19-229:2, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1). At Mr. Williams’ s request, Lioi issued a second letter indicating this earlier warrant for a “Cleaven Williams” “is very limited and should not be considered to be [Mr. Williams] based on the name

Russell characterized this simply as a “lengthy period of time.” (Russell Dep. 115:1-5, ECF No. 175-4, Ex. 2).

alone.”⁵ (*Id.* at 234:10-235:16; *see also* ECF No. 175-12, Ex. 10). These letters, according to Mr. Williams, were requested from Lioi because Mr. Williams’s lawyers told him they would be “beneficial” to obtain. (Mr. Williams Dep. 154:19-155:20, ECF No. 144-8, Ex. 6). Neither of these two letters “was ever presented by [Mr.] Williams to, or considered by, a judge, Commissioner, or any third party.” (Lioi Mot. Summ. J. at p. 4, ECF No. 146-1).

On Monday, November 17, 2008, Mr. Williams and Lioi had the following text exchange:

Mr. Williams: “Cool . . . I just left my home 2 meet w/my lawyer . . . I saw my wife drive by . . . can I go home or what?”

Lioi: I wouldn’t be alone with her. She could say you did anything. Have a witness with you if you meet.

Mr. Williams: Thanks Dan . . . Can she do another protection order & try 2 keep me from the house?

Lioi: She could. I would avoid her. She could call the police and say u have the warrant and she is afraid of you. It would force our hand to serve the warrant.

(Mr. Williams’s Texts at p. 9, ECF No. 175-6, Ex. 4).

⁵ The other warrant from March 7, 2003, was for Mr. Williams, but this was determined “[a]fter the fact.” (Lioi Dep. 236:22-237:11, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1). Regardless, the letter Lioi issued never affirmatively stated Mr. Williams was not the subject of the warrant, but rather that Mr. Williams should not be presumed to be the same Cleaven Williams from the March 2003 warrant based on name alone.

Ultimately, Mr. Williams did not turn himself in on Tuesday, November 18, 2008. Rather, Mr. Williams travelled to a Baltimore District Court on Monday, November 17, 2008, where Ms. Williams was seeking a protective order against him. Mr. Williams attacked Ms. Williams outside the courthouse, stabbing her repeatedly and ultimately killing her and their unborn child in the process. (Pl. Opp'n at p. 17, ECF No. 175-1); *State v. Williams*, Case No. 108350013 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Feb. 25, 2011); *State v. Williams*, Case No. 11-0672 (Ct. Spec. App. April 5, 2013) (affirming conviction), Mr. Williams was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. (*Id.*)

The plaintiffs commenced this action on November 15, 2011, by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. The defendants removed the case to this court on January 19, 2012. On July 18, 2012, the court denied Mr. Lioi's motion to dismiss but granted the BCPD's motion to dismiss the claims against it. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished decision. *Robinson v. Lioi*, 536 Fed. App'x 340 (2013), *cert. denied*, 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014). On June 12, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Mr. Russell as a defendant. The amended complaint included claims against defendants for violating Ms. Williams's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), and for conspiring to violate Ms. Williams's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count III). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 87). It also contained state law tort claims for wrongful death (Count IV), survival action (Count V), battery (Count VI), gross negligence (Count VII), reckless endangerment (Count VIII), intentional infliction of

emotion distress (Count IX), common law conspiracy (Count X), conversion (Count XI), and fraud and intentional misrepresentation (Count XII). (*Id.*). On September 22, 2016, Russell and Lioi each filed a motion for summary judgment on Counts I, III—V, and VII-X. (Russell Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 144; Lioi Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 146). The plaintiffs opposed the motions (Robinson Opp'n, ECF No. 174; Robinson Opp'n, ECF No. 175), and Russell and Lioi filed responses. (Russell Resp., ECF No. 182; Lioi Resp., ECF No. 186).⁶

LEGAL STANDARD

The case was removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441(c) because plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are founded in federal law and arise under the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, this court has federal question jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no *genuine* dispute as to any *material* fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

⁶ Count II alleging a violation of § 1983 against the BCPD was previously dismissed by this court. (ECF No. 24). Mr. Williams had not filed a Motion for Summary Judgment; the claims against Mr. Williams include: Count III alleging conspiracy; Count IV alleging wrongful death; Count V alleging survival action; Count VI alleging battery; Count VII alleging gross negligence; Count VIII alleging reckless endangerment; Count IX alleging IIED; Count X alleging common law conspiracy; Count XI alleging conversion; and Count XII alleging fraud and intentional misrepresentation.

(emphases added). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” *Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd*, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am.*, 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” *Id.* (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, *All U.S.* 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). Accordingly, “the mere existence of *some* alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment [.]” *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 247-18, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, *Tolan v. Cotton*, — U.S. — 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014) (per curiam), and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (citations omitted); *see also Jacobs v. N. C. Admin. Office of the Courts*, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015). At the same time, the court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” *Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc.*, 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Drewitt v. Pratt*, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Lioi’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs move to strike Lioi’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Lioi’s motion was

untimely filed. Plaintiffs note that on May 5, 2014, this court granted a “Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order” and set the deadline for filing dispositive motions as September 14, 2014. (Robinson Mot. to Strike ¶3, ECF No. 153). The scheduling order was modified on five separate occasions. (*Id.* at ¶¶4-10). The motions to modify the scheduling orders contained language stating: “Defendant Dan Lioi joins this motion with respect to the extension of the discovery deadline for all parties and intends to submit a separate motion regarding the deadline for dispositive motions.” (*Id.* at ¶¶6 - 9). Despite this language, Lioi failed to file a motion to extend his deadline for dispositive motions, but nonetheless filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on September 22, 2016. (*Id.* at ¶ 12). Subsequently, plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Strike Lioi’s Motion for Summary Judgment on October 12, 2016. (Robinson Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 153).

Lioi argues he was not required to file a motion to modify the scheduling order because he can file a dispositive motion “after the close of all discovery.” (Lioi Opp’n ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 166). Lioi further contends the matter was complicated when Russell was formally added to the case, because Lioi did not “contemplate . . . [the need] to file a separate formal motion to modify the scheduling order to extend the date for dispositive motions from September 17, 2014.” (*Id.* at ¶7). Furthermore, Lioi argues his motion did not prejudice plaintiffs because he had advised the “Court and the parties of [his] intention to file a dispositive motion in this case, including in all Status Reports to the Court.” (*Id.* at ¶5). For example, on February 5, 2014, Lioi submitted a

status report to this court stating “[a]s of February 3, 2014, Defendant does intend to file a dispositive pre-trial motion.” (Lioi Status Rept. at p. 2, ECF No 73). Lastly, in the alternative, Lioi “cross-moves to modify the Scheduling Order to [extend his filing deadline for dispositive motions] on or before September 22, 2016, the same deadline accorded to Defendant Melvin Russell, with whom Lioi is, in all material respects, similarly situated.” (Lioi Opp’n ¶ 13, ECF No. 166).

Plaintiffs’ argument has merit; defendant Lioi should have been aware of the filing deadlines and language contained in the modified scheduling orders. Accordingly, he should have filed a motion to extend the deadline for his dispositive motions prior to filing his Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, the language contained in the numerous Joint Motions to Modify Scheduling Order is clear: “Defendant Dan Lioi . . . intends to submit a separate motion regarding the deadline for dispositive motions.” (See, e.g., Joint Mot. to Modify Sch. Order ¶3, ECF No. 137). Nonetheless, defendant Lioi’s Cross-Motion to Modify Scheduling Order will be granted. Despite their arguments to the contrary, plaintiffs have not been prejudiced by Lioi’s filing. Plaintiffs received “multiple extensions of time to respond” to Lioi’s motion, and the motion has been fully briefed. (Lioi Resp. ¶¶3—4, ECF No. 179). Lioi is, as he argues, similarly situated to Russell, and it should not have been a surprise that Lioi intended to file a dispositive motion, given that Lioi had stated his intention in status reports. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike will be denied, Lioi’s Cross-Motion will be granted, and the court will consider Lioi’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. State-Created Danger Doctrine

“Section 1983 imposes liability on state actors who cause the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.’” *Doe v. Rosa*, 795 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir. 2015), *cert. denied sub nom. John Doe 2 v. Rosa*, 136 S. Ct. 811 (2016). “Under established precedent, these constitutional rights include a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right against state actor conduct that deprives an individual of bodily integrity.” *Id.* at 436-37 (citing *Hall v. Tawney*, 621 F.2d 607, 612-13 (4th Cir. 1980)). However, “[a]s a general matter . . . a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. of Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*’, 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). Indeed, liability of state actors is significantly limited, as the Supreme Court explained in *DeShaney*.

[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without “due process of law,” *but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to*

harm through other means. Nor does history support such an expansive reading of the constitutional text. Like its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression[.] Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.

Id. at 195 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted “state actor liability might attach in two narrow circumstances.” *Rosa*, 795 F.3d at 437. The first exception, “when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,” is not at issue here.⁷ *Id.* (citing *DeShaney*, 489 U.S. at 199-200). Rather, at issue is the second exception, the “state-created danger exception,” which arises “[w]hen the state itself creates the dangerous situation that resulted in a victim's injury.” *Id.* at 438 (citing *Finder v. Johnson*, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1995)). “In such instances, the state is not merely accused of a failure to act; it becomes much more akin to an actor itself directly causing harm to the injured party.” *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1177. It should be noted, however, that this state-

⁷ This court already decided the first exception does not apply because “[e]ven drawing all inferences in favor of Ms. Williams as the non-moving party, the court sees no evidence that Ms. Williams faced ‘a restraint of personal liberty . . . triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause.’” (ECF No. 24, pp. 8-9) (citing *DeShaney*, 489 U.S. at 200).

created danger exception is a narrow exception requiring some affirmative action, and not inaction, attributable to the state, creating or enhancing the danger; “[i]t cannot be that the state ‘commits an affirmative act’ or ‘creates a danger’ every time it does anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely.” *Id.* at 1175. Furthermore, “[w]hile it is true that inaction can often be artfully recharacterized as ‘action,’ courts should resist the temptation to inject this alternate framework into omission cases by stretching the concept of ‘affirmative acts’ beyond the context of immediate interactions between the officer and the plaintiff.” *Id.* at 1176, fn 1.

The leading Fourth Circuit case regarding the state-created danger doctrine, as applicable here, is *Pinder v. Jonhnson*. 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995). There, Carol Pinder brought a § 1983 action “seek[ing] to impose civil liability against Officer Donald Johnson of the Cambridge, Maryland, Police Department for his failure to safeguard her children from the criminal depredations of plaintiffs ex-boyfriend.” *Id.* at 1171-72. Officer Johnson had responded to a call reporting a domestic disturbance stemming from an incident where Ms. Pinder’s former boyfriend, Don Pittman, had broken into her home. *Id.* at 1172. Ms. Pinder told Officer Johnson that Mr. Pittman had been “abusive and violent,” and that he had “pushed her, punched her, and threw various objects at her.” *Id.* Ms. Pinder also told Officer Johnson that Mr. Pittman had threatened “both Pinder and her children, saying he would murder them all.” *Id.* Officer Johnson arrested Mr. Pittman and informed Ms. Pinder she could return to work that evening because “Pittman would

be locked up overnight.” *Id.* Officer Johnson ultimately filed lesser charges against Mr. Pittman, who was released from custody that same night. *Id.* Mr. Pittman then returned to Ms. Pinder’s home and set fire to it; Ms. Pinder’s three children, who were home asleep, died of smoke inhalation. *Id.* The Fourth Circuit rejected Ms. Pinder’s attempts to characterize Officer Johnson’s “actions”—including making assurances to Ms. Pinder and charging Mr. Pittman with a lesser charge—as “*affirmative* misconduct.” *Id.* at 1175. Accepting such an argument, the Fourth Circuit concluded, would ensure that “every representation by the police and every failure to incarcerate would constitute ‘affirmative actions,’ giving rise to civil liability.” *Id.* And although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that “at some point on the spectrum between action and inaction, the state’s conduct may implicate it in the harm caused,” “[n]o amount of semantics can disguise the fact that the real ‘affirmative act’ here was committed by Pittman, not by Officer Johnson.” *Id.* Accordingly, finding Pinder’s case to be “purely an omission claim,” the Fourth Circuit found Officer Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity. *Id.* at 1176, 1179.

In a more recent case, *Doe v. Rosa*, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. *Doe v. Rosa*, 795 F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 2015), *cert. denied sub nom. John Doe 2 v. Rosa*, 136 S. Ct. 811, 193 L. Ed. 2d 715 (2016). There, the Does alleged a § 1983 violation against John W. Rosa, president of The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, for allegedly covering up complaints that Louis ReVille, a camp counselor, was sexually abusing minor camp

attendees. *Id.* at 436. Rosa’s “actions” in failing to report the complaints, the plaintiffs argued, allowed ReVille to remain free and continue abusing other minors. *Id.* In concluding the Does could not establish a § 1983 state-created danger claim against Rosa, the Fourth Circuit noted that the abuser, Louis ReVille, had been abusing the Does for years before Rosa became aware that he was a pedophile, and therefore Rosa “could not have created a danger that already existed.” *Id.* at 439 (citing *Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch.*, 159 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir.1998)). The court also found Rosa did not “create or increase the risk of the Does’ abuse,” because “allowing continued exposure to an existing danger by failing to intervene is not the equivalent of creating or increasing the risk of that danger.” *Id.* Furthermore, the court found that Rosa’s failure to report the complaints regarding ReVille to the Citadel police or to a Title IX agency could not constitute an “affirmative act”; rather, the claim against Rosa was rather “purely an omission claim,” and “[n]o amount of semantics can disguise the fact that the real ‘affirmative act’ here was committed by [ReVille], not by [Rosa].” *Id.* at 441 (citing *Pinder*, at 1175-76).

III. Russell’s and Lioi’s § 1983 Liability

Russell and Lioi argue that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim must fail because Russell and Lioi did not commit any affirmative acts that created or enhanced the danger to Ms. Robinson. This court previously denied Lioi’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in an

unpublished decision, *Robinson v. Lioi*. 536 F. App'x 340 (4th Cir. 2013). At the 12(b)(6) stage, this court and the Fourth Circuit accepted as true all material facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, and drew all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. The Fourth Circuit stressed certain affirmative acts alleged in the complaint, including that Lioi, *inter alia*: (1) "conspired with Cleaven Williams" to help him avoid arrest, (2) "actively interfered with the execution of the warrant by . . . failing to turn the warrant over to the proper unit with[in] the BCPD responsible for its execution," (3) warned "Mr. Williams and g[ave] him advice about how to avoid service of the warrant," and (4) "lied to avoid service of the arrest warrant by falsely contending that it could not be found." *Id.* at 344. The Fourth Circuit found these alleged acts amounted to "more than a mere passive failure to act," *id.*, that "affirmatively placed [Mrs. Williams] in a position of danger," *id.* at 345.

However, at the summary judgment stage of litigation, plaintiffs' allegations must be supported by admissible evidence. Plaintiffs have not proffered sufficient evidence of a conspiracy, of any active interference with the warrant process, or of Russell or Lioi advising Mr. Williams on how to avoid service. Rather, as discussed below in further detail, I find that Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment because they did not: (a) commit any "affirmative acts," that (b) "created or enhanced the danger" to Ms. Robinson. Additionally, Russell and Lioi are entitled to qualified immunity, as discussed in Section IV, *infra*.

A. Affirmative Acts

Defendants Russell and Lioi argue that this is a case of “inaction,” and that their actions amount to a “failure to guarantee the arrest and detention (for an unspecified period of time) of Mr. Williams on November 13, 2008.” (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 19, ECF No. 144-1). The record supports the defendants’ contention that this is an omission claim, as in *Pinder* and *Rosa*, rather than “affirmative acts” of the type that could result in liability.

First, while there is evidence that defendants texted and conversed with Mr. Williams between Sunday, November 9, 2008, and Monday, November 17, 2008, defendants primarily were coordinating the date and logistics of Mr. Williams’s voluntary surrender, and indeed on November 17, 2008, advised him to avoid interactions with his wife. These messages—when viewed in conjunction with the fact Mr. Williams was not only willing to surrender himself voluntarily, but that he attempted to do so on Thursday, November 13, 2008—suggest that defendants merely used their discretion and best judgment to allow Mr. Williams to select a later date of self-surrender.

Second, plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Russell or Lioi were themselves responsible for any of the alleged deficiencies with the warrant process. The fact that the physical warrant was misplaced when Mr. Williams attempted to surrender himself on Thursday, November 13, 2008, and later found in Officer Adrienne Byrd’s patrol car, does not suggest Lioi purposely hid the warrant or prevented Mr. Williams’s arrest. Moreover, even if Mr. Williams had been arrested that night, he likely would have

been released within twenty-four hours, as discussed in further detail *infra*, which would have provided Mr. Williams the same opportunity to murder his wife on Monday, November 17, 2008.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales*, where the Court stated a "warrant . . . remains within the discretion of the police whether and when to execute it," is instructive. 545 U.S. 748, 764 (2005). While *Castle Rock* concerned an alleged procedural, rather than substantive, due process violation, the Court also acknowledged that "the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime *generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause*, neither in its procedural nor in its 'substantive' manifestations." *Id.* at 768. The Court continued, stating "the Fourteenth Amendment . . . did not create a system by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented." *Id.* at 768-69. This is precisely what plaintiffs seek to do here by holding Russell and Lioi liable for not having Mr. Williams arrested, suggesting that "better policing" might have prevented Ms. Williams's murder.

Furthermore, as the court stated in *Pinder*, "[w]hile it is true that inaction can often be artfully recharacterized as 'action,' courts should resist the temptation to inject this alternate framework into omission cases by stretching the concept of 'affirmative acts' *beyond the context of immediate interactions between the officer and the plaintiff* *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1176, fn. 1 (emphasis added). Here, neither Russell nor Lioi had *any* "immediate interactions" with Ms. Williams. Ultimately, this

case is governed by *Pinder* and *Rosa*, and based on the evidence, Russell and Lioi’s conduct never reached the “point on the spectrum between action and inaction, [where] the state’s conduct [] implicate[s] it in the harm caused.” *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1175.

B. Creating or Enhancing the Danger to Ms. Williams

Even if Russell and Lioi’s conduct constitutes “affirmative acts,” however, plaintiffs would still need to demonstrate these acts “created or substantially enhanced the danger which resulted” in Ms. Williams death. *Rosa*, 795 F.3d at 439. They have failed to do so.

Plaintiffs argue that Russell and Lioi’s failure to arrest Mr. Williams—either on Thursday, November 13th, 2008, or at some time prior to the murder—directly caused Ms. Williams’s death by allowing Mr. Williams to remain free until he murdered his wife. To support their argument, they selectively cite to portions of Russell and Lioi’s deposition testimony. For example, plaintiffs cite to a section of Lioi’s deposition testimony where Lioi stated: “If [Mr. Williams had] been arrested *at that time*, then yeah, he probably wouldn’t have had that window of opportunity right then [to murder his wife].” (Lioi Dep. 308:20-309:4, ECF No. 174-3, Ex. 1) (emphasis added). However, the “time” Lioi mentions during this portion of his deposition testimony is the morning of the murder on Monday, November 17, 2008. *Id.* Of course if Mr. Williams had been arrested on the day of the murder, he would not have had that specific opportunity to murder his wife.

However, it does not follow from Lioi's statement at deposition that any act of Lioi's created or enhanced the danger to Ms. Williams. Indeed, Lioi could not have arrested Mr. Williams that day because he did not know Mr. Williams's exact location; there was also no known urgency to do so because Mr. Williams was scheduled to turn himself in the next day.⁸ Similarly, plaintiffs cite to a portion of Russell's deposition testimony where Russell expressed he was "very grievous" when he saw Ms. Williams's slain body because if "[Mr. Williams] had been arrested then, you know, Veronica would probably still be with us." (Russell Dep. 140:2-22, ECF No. 175-4, Ex. 2).

Cutting against plaintiffs' argument is the Fourth Circuit's language in *Doe v. Rosa*, where the court clarified that "allowing continued exposure to an existing danger by failing to intervene is not the equivalent of creating or increasing the risk of that danger." *Rosa*, 795 F.3d at 439; There is little doubt that Mr. Williams posed an "existing danger" to Ms. Williams given his earlier abuse of Ms. Williams. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the ultimate act of murder was earned out by Mr. Williams, and not by defendants Russell and Lioi.

Additionally, plaintiffs' argument that Russell or Lioi created or enhanced the danger to Ms. Williams by failing to ensure Mr. Williams's arrest on or prior

⁸ Plaintiffs, on several occasions, argue that Russell or Lioi knew Mr. Williams's "exact location" and failed to execute the warrant. (See, e.g., PI. Opp, at p. 25, fn. 28, ECF No. 141-1) ("This text message also represents yet another time in which either Major Russell or Deputy Major Lioi knew of Mr. Williams's location and failed to execute his warrant."). However the texts that plaintiffs reference never actually provide Mr. Williams's "exact location." *Id.*

to his original date of voluntary surrender, Thursday, November 13, 2008, is speculative at best. Indeed, defendants provide compelling evidence that even if they had arrested Mr. Williams on Thursday, November 13, 2008, “the holding period on a misdemeanor warrant for second-degree assault is likely to be less than 24 hours.” (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 23, ECF No. 144-1; Stanford O’Neill Franklin Aff. ¶¶ 51-53, ECF No. 144-13, Ex. 11). Stanford O’Neill Franklin, an officer with thirty-four years of law enforcement experience, submitted an affidavit stating that if Mr. Williams had been arrested, “it is reasonable to believe [Mr. Williams] would have been released within 24 hours on his personal recognizance,” because “an established member of the community with local ties, no violent criminal history and no apparent danger to society is [generally] released on [his] personal recognizance.” (Stanford O’Neill Franklin Aff. ¶¶ 53, ECF No. 144-13, Ex. 11). Even if Mr. Williams were forced to post bail, Franklin also attested that in the context of “misdemeanor assault arrests,” he “never experienced an arrestee receiving a bail too high, preventing immediate posting.” *Id.* Therefore, Mr. Williams likely would have been free to murder his wife the following Monday. Additionally, it is highly speculative to suggest that Monday, November 17, 2008, was Mr. Williams’s *only* opportunity to attack his wife, as plaintiffs contend. Indeed, at deposition Mr. Williams suggested that he knew where his wife was because he had “sent her to Carlin [Robinson’s] house” and he knew “where she lived at.” (Mr. Williams Dep. 148:14-149:13, 144-8, Ex. 6).

Ultimately, plaintiffs have failed to establish that Russell or Lioi committed affirmative acts that

created or enhanced the danger to Ms. Williams. Accordingly, Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 1983 state-created danger claim in Count I.

IV. Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, Russell and Lioi argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, *inter alia*, "it was not clearly established in 2008 that a supervisory police officer's reasonable exercise of discretion in attempting to facilitate a citizen's voluntary surrender would violate the constitutional rights of his murder victim." (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 27, ECF No. 144-1; Lioi Mot. Summ. J. at p. 13, ECF No. 146-1). Government actors, such as defendants Russell and Lioi, are entitled to qualified immunity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers from 'bad guesses in gray areas' and ensures that they are liable only 'for transgressing bright lines.' *Schultz v. Braga*, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Maciariello v. Sumner*, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992)). Furthermore, qualified immunity "balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

In determining whether qualified immunity applies, courts previously were required to follow a

“two-step sequence”; they decided first “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and second, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of a defendant’s alleged misconduct.” *Id.* at 232. Courts now have the discretion, however, to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” *Id.* at 236. The second prong, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of a defendant’s alleged misconduct,” *Pearson*, 555 U.S. at 232, requires the right to be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” *Reichle v. Howards*, 566 U.S. 658, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (quoting *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U. S. 731, 741 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” *Id.* (quoting *Ashcroft* , 563 U.S. at 741). “Existing precedent” does not, however, require a case directly on point. *United States v. Lanier*, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (“The easiest cases don’t even arise.”). “In the end, the lodestar for whether a right was clearly established is whether the law gave the officials fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional.” *Iko v. Shreve* , 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Ridpath v. Bd. Of Governors Marshall Univ.*, 447 F.3 d 292, 313 (4th Cir. 2006)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Even if the analysis in Section III is incorrect, and the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is sufficient to prove a constitutional violation, the facts are not sufficient to show that a reasonable officer in either

defendant's position would have understood he was violating that right. Russell's and Lioi's actions, when viewed in sum, amount to using their discretion not to aggressively serve an arrest warrant and instead allow Mr. Williams to delay his date of voluntary surrender by several days.⁹ A reasonable police officer in Lioi and Russell's position could not have known that the failure to guarantee Mr. William's arrest on a misdemeanor warrant prior to November 17, 2008, would violate Ms. Williams's constitutional rights.

A. Conspiracy (Counts 3 and 10)

Plaintiffs allege Russell, Lioi, and Mr. Williams conspired to violate Ms. Williams rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the common law.¹⁰ "Under Maryland law, civil conspiracy is defined as the 'combination of two or more persons by an agreement or understanding to accomplish an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal, with the further requirement that the act or the means employed must result in damages to the plaintiff.'" *Marshall v. James B. Nutter & Co.*, 758 F.3d 537, 541 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Hoffman v. Stamper*, 867 A.2d 276, 290 (Md. 2005)). Furthermore, "[i]n addition to

⁹ Plaintiffs also repeatedly highlight two "letters" that Lioi wrote for Mr. Williams as evidence that Lioi conspired with Mr. Williams; however, these letters were requested by Mr. Williams upon his lawyer's advice, and there is nothing inaccurate regarding their contents.

¹⁰ The court notes that Russell's alleged involvement in any "conspiracy" is less than Lioi's alleged involvement.

proving an agreement, ‘the plaintiff must also prove the commission of an overt act, in furtherance of the agreement, that caused the plaintiff to suffer actual injury.’” *Id.* (citing *Hoffman*, A.2d at 290). In comparison, to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),¹¹ which creates a private cause of action against “two or more persons . . . [who] conspire . . . for the purposes of depriving . . . any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove the following:

- (1) A conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.

Facey v. Dae Sung Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (D. Md. 2014) (citing *A Society Without a Name v. Virginia*, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011)). In order to prove a section 1985 conspiracy “a claimant must show an *agreement or a ‘meeting of the minds’* by defendants *to violate the claimant’s constitutional rights.*” *Id.* at 541 (citing *Simmons v. Poe*, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added).

¹¹ The parties do not clarify whether Count 3 is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985(1) or § 1985(3). I consider this count to be brought pursuant to § 1985(3), given the allegations in the complaint and discussion in the briefing.

Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit has clarified, this standard is “relatively stringent,” and under this standard, courts “rarely, if ever, [find] that a plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to establish a section 1985 conspiracy, such that the claim can withstand a summary judgment motion.” *Simmons*, 47 F.3d at 1377.

Defendants first argue these conspiracy claims fail because “agents of a government entity cannot conspire with each other” “under the ‘intracorporate conspiracy doctrine[.]’” (Russell Mot. Summ. J. at p. 28, ECF No. 144-1). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, however, does not apply when actors perform “unauthorized acts.” *Facey*, 992 F. Supp. at 536 (citing *Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown*, 716 F.3d 342, 353 (4th Cir. 2013)) (explaining the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine will not apply “where the agent’s acts were not authorized by the corporation.”). Assuming Russell or Lioi committed “unauthorized acts,” an issue I do not decide, this defense would not assist defendants.

Regardless of whether the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine” defense applies, plaintiffs have failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish their conspiracy counts. As an initial matter, § 1985 is inappropriate because Russell and Lioi were not “motivated by a[ny] specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Next, even assuming Russell and Lioi permitted Mr. Williams to delay his date of voluntary surrender until Tuesday, November 18, 2008, this does not establish that the “defendants each conspired with the other to violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and the decedent and to proximately cause her death.” (Am. Compl ¶66, ECF No. 87). Furthermore, both causes

of action contain an element of causation. For example, regarding civil conspiracy, plaintiffs must establish that the “act or the means employed . . . *result[ed]* in damages to the plaintiff.” *James B. Nutter & Co.*, 758 F.3d at 541 (quoting *Hoffman*, 867 A.2d at 290) (emphasis added). And the fourth element of a § 1985 claim requires that the conspiracy “*result* [] in injury to the plaintiff.” *Facey*, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (emphasis added). As discussed above, the evidence that any actions undertaken by Russell and Lioi resulted in Ms. Williams’s murder is too speculative to support the plaintiffs’ claim. Accordingly, the court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts 3 and 10.

B. Gross Negligence (Count 7)

Defendants Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ gross negligence claims. Under Maryland law, gross negligence is defined as:

[A]n intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life . . . of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard to the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them. Stated conversely, a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts wantonly and willfully *only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is*

*so utterly indifferent to the rights of others
that he acts as if such rights did not exist.*

Gray v. Kern, 124 F. Supp. 3d 600, 611 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting *Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Md.*, 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)) (emphasis added). In addition to proving defendants Russell and Lioi “inflict [ed] injury intentionally,” or were “so utterly indifferent to the rights of [Ms. Williams] that [defendants acted] as if such rights did not exist,” *id.*, plaintiffs must establish, “as with other negligence claims, [] a duty of care, a breach of that duty, and damages as a proximate cause of the breach.” *Pasternak & Fidis, P.C. v. Recall Total Info. Mgmt., Inc.*, 95 F. Supp. 3d 886, 895 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting *Swedish Civil Aviation Admin. v. Project Mgmt. Enters., Inc.*, 190 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803 (D. Md. 2002)). “Ordinarily, unless the facts are so clear as to permit a conclusion as a matter of law, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether a defendant’s negligent conduct amounts to gross negligence.” *Cooper v. Rodriguez*, 118 A.3d 829, 846 (Md. 2015) (quoting *Taylor v. Harford Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs.*, 862 A.2d 1026, 1034 (Md. 2004)).

Defendants Russell and Lioi first argue they are entitled to “public official immunity” for their discretionary acts. “Common law public official immunity applies to ‘public officials (as opposed to mere employees) who perform negligent acts during the course of their discretionary (as opposed to ministerial) duties.’” *Cooper*, 118 A.3d at 848 (quoting *Houghton v. Forrest*, 989 A.2d 223, 227 (Md. 2010)). “If those three conditions are met, the public official enjoys a qualified immunity in the absence of

‘malice.’” *Thomas v. City of Annapolis*, 688 A.2d 448, 454 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). Malice, in this context, requires a “deliberate, intentional, nonprivileged, non-legally justified act[,] or one committed with actual malice.” *Id.* at 456. Here, Russell and Lioi meet the initial requirements for asserting public official immunity; both were public officials acting within the scope of their discretionary duties, and there is no evidence they acted with “malice.” The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held, however, that “gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity” and that if a police officer “act[s] with gross negligence, [he or she] is not entitled to immunity under common law public official immunity.” *Cooper*, 118 A.3d at 849. Accordingly, Russell and Lioi are not entitled to public official immunity if plaintiffs can establish a viable gross negligence claim against them.

Even if all genuine factual disputes are resolved in favor of plaintiffs, however, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Russell or Lioi were grossly negligent with respect to Ms. Williams. Despite plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, they have provided no evidence that Russell or Lioi “inflicted injury intentionally” on Ms. Williams. *Gray v. Kern*, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 611. Furthermore, neither Russell nor Lioi acted “so utterly indifferent[ly] to the rights of [Ms. Williams] that [they acted] as if such rights did not exist.” *Id.*

Additionally, the court finds plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim fails on the causation element. To establish causation, plaintiffs must prove Russell and Lioi’s “negligence was ‘both a cause in fact of the injury and a legally cognizable cause.’” *Pasternak*, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 895 (citing *Casey v. Geek Squad*

Subsidiary Best Buy Stores, L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 351 (D. Md. 2011)).

The “cause in fact” inquiry “concerns whether defendant’s negligent conduct actually produced an injury.” Maryland courts consider two tests in determining whether causation-in-fact exists: the “but for” test and the substantial factor test.

The “but for” test considers whether the injury would not have occurred absent defendant’s negligent conduct. The substantial factor test applies in situations where more than one independent negligent act may be responsible for a plaintiff’s injury. Under the substantial factor test, an action is viewed as the cause of an injury only if the action was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury.

The “legal causation” inquiry is a policy-oriented doctrine designed to be a method for limiting liability after cause-in-fact has been established. Commonly, this inquiry involves a determination of whether the injuries were a foreseeable result of the negligent conduct. (“In applying the test of foreseeability [or, legal causation] . . . it is well to keep in mind that it is simply intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm, and to avoid the attachment of liability where . . . it appears ‘highly extraordinary’ that the negligent conduct should have brought about the harm.”).

Id. at 895 (citing *Casey*, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 351) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, plaintiffs' gross negligence claim-fails both the "cause in fact" and "legal causation" inquiries.

First, as discussed *supra*, it cannot be argued that Russell or Lioi caused the harm suffered by Ms. Williams by failing to ensure Mr. Williams's arrest. As Stanford O'Neill Franklin attested, Mr. Williams "would have been released within 24 hours on his personal recognizance," because "an established member of the community with local ties, no violent criminal history and no apparent danger to society is [generally] released on [his] personal recognizance." (Stanford O'Neill Franklin Aff. ¶¶ 53, ECF No. 144-13, Ex. 11). Therefore, even if Mr. Williams had been arrested when he initially surrendered himself at the Eastern District on Thursday, November 13, 2008—or any date prior during one of the "turn ups"—he would have been free the following Monday to attack Ms. Williams. Furthermore, such an argument relies on the assumption that Mr. Williams needed to be free on Monday, November 17, 2008, to murder his wife because that was the only day he knew of his wife's location (at the courthouse). However, there is evidence suggesting Mr. Williams knew where Ms. Williams was during this time period, which farther suggests defendants did not "cause" the injury to Ms. Williams.

Next, even assuming Russell and Lioi purposely diverted the arrest warrant and purposely delayed Mr. Williams's voluntary surrender date, thereby allowing Mr. Williams to remain free until the day he murdered his wife, these actions still would not be the "but for" cause of Ms. Williams's death. Nor can it be argued these acts were a "substantial

factor" in her death. Here, the "but for" cause or "substantial factor," simply put, was Mr. Williams's decision to murder his wife and his completion of that act. Furthermore, even assuming, *arguendo*, that "cause in fact" is satisfied, "legal causation" is not. The fact that Mr. Williams eventually murdered his wife on Monday, November 17, 2008, was not a foreseeable result of any acts committed by Russell or Lioi. Given that Mr. Williams was willing to turn himself in voluntarily, there was no reason for Russell or Lioi to believe Mr. Williams would attack Ms. Williams, let alone murder her. None of Russell or Lioi's alleged acts was the proximate cause of Ms. Williams death; rather, the proximate cause was Mr. Williams's decisions and actions.

Accordingly, Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' gross negligence claim because, in addition to failing to establish causation, plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence suggesting Russell or Lioi "inflicted injury intentionally" on Ms. Williams, *Gray v. Kern*, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 611, or that they acted "so utterly indifferently] to the rights of [Ms. Williams] that [they acted] as if such rights did not exist," *id.*

C. Reckless Endangerment (Count 8)

"Reckless endangerment is purely a statutory crime." *Holbrook v. State*, 772 A.2d 1240, 1246 (Md. 2001). Defendants argue this count fails as a matter of law because plaintiffs cannot impose civil liability on Russell and Lioi for alleged criminal activity. Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument, seemingly recognizing this count fails. Accordingly,

the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' reckless endangerment claim.

**D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Count 9)**

Defendants Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claims. Maryland courts have emphasized "[t]he tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is rarely viable, and is 'to be used sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that includes truly outrageous conduct.'" *Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr.*, 665 A.2d 297, 319 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (quoting *Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat. Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby*, 607 A.2d 8, 11 (Md. 1992)). Furthermore, the "general rule that emerges from caselaw" is that "the requirements of the rule are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy." *Id.* citing W. Page Keeton, *Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts* § 12, pp. 60-61 (5th ed. 1984). "A claim of IIED has four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct that is (2) extreme and outrageous and is (3) causally connected to the emotional distress, which is (4) severe." *Doe v. Salisbury Univ.*, 123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 759 (D. Md. 2015); *see also Harris v. Jones*, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977) (listing elements). Regarding the second element, the defendants' conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." *Khalifa v. Shannon*, 945 A.2d 1244, 1254 (Md. 2008) (citing *Harris v. Jones*, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977)).

In this case, even assuming Russell's and Lioi's conduct was "intentional or reckless," plaintiffs' IIED claim fails. First, Russell's and Lioi's actions, construed in plaintiffs' favor, were not sufficiently "extreme and outrageous" to support an IIED claim. The facts presented, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, suggest that: (1) BCPD did not follow proper procedures for handling warrants, allegedly at Russell's instruction; (2) Russell and Lioi communicated with Mr. Williams via phone and text, predominantly for the purpose of scheduling his date of voluntary surrender; and (3) Russell and Lioi allowed Mr. Williams to leave the station on Thursday, November 13, 2008, when the arrest warrant could not be located, ultimately delaying his voluntary surrender date to Tuesday, November 18, 2008. None of these acts, viewed individually or together, are "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." *Khalifa*, 945 A. 2 d at 1254 (citing *Harris v. Jones*, 380 A.2d at 614). Furthermore, this IIED claim fails on causation grounds as discussed *supra* in Section V(B). Accordingly, defendants Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' IIED claim.

***E. Wrongful death and Survival Action
(Counts 4 and 5)***

"Under the Survival Act, the personal representative of an estate may bring 'a personal action which the decedent might have commenced or prosecuted' including an action 'against a tort-feasor

for a wrong which resulted in the death of the decedent.” *Littleton v. Prince George’s Cty., Md.*, 797 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658 (D. Md. 2011), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Littleton v. Swonger*, 502 F. App’x 271 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Md. Code Ann., Est & Trusts § 7-401(y)(2008)). The survival action “arises from the tortious infliction of injury upon the victim” and “damages are measured in terms of *harm to the victim [.]*” *State v. Copes*, 927 A.2d 426, 434 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (quoting *Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp.*, 873 A.2d 463, 480 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)) (emphasis in original). In contrast, “[u]nder the Maryland Wrongful Death Act, a party may bring an action for wrongful death against a person ‘whose wrongful act causes the death of another.’” *Littleton*, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-902(a)). “An action under Maryland’s wrongful death statute is separate, distinct, and independent from a survival action, even when those actions arise out of a common tortious act.” *FutureCare NorthPoint, LLC v. Peeler*, 143 A.3d 191, 203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). “A wrongful act is ‘an act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.’” *Id.* at 204 (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-901(e)). “Therefore, a party may only prevail in either cause of action if it can show that the Defendant committed a wrongful act.” *Littleton*, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 658. Furthermore, both causes of action require a showing of causation. *See, e.g., Osunde v. Lewis*, 281 F.R.D. 250, 260 (D. Md. 2012) (granting summary judgment because “[p]laintiffs [we]re unable to establish the causation element of their wrongful

death claim with specific facts that would be admissible at trial).

Plaintiffs argue that “wrongful acts” include not only “negligent conduct (with its focus on a duty and corresponding breach), but also on intentional and other tortious misconduct including the constitutional claims at issue here.” (Pl. Opp’n at 31, ECF No. 175-1). Even if plaintiffs’ expansive view of “wrongful acts” is correct, they have failed to proffer evidence to support these other claims. Furthermore, ordinary negligence cannot serve as the basis for either claim, because Russell and Lioi are accorded public official immunity. *See Cooper*, 443 Md. at 680 (explaining that public officials are accorded immunity in cases of ordinary negligence). Lastly, these claims also would fail on the causation grounds discussed above. Accordingly, defendants Russell and Lioi are entitled to summary judgment on these two counts.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike will be denied, Lioi’s Cross- Motion to Modify Scheduling Order will be granted, and Lioi’s and Russell’s Motions for Summary Judgment on counts I, III-V, and VII-X, will be granted. A separate Order follows.

Date: 06/30/17

/s/ Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

FILED: September 18, 2019

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

No. 17-1848
(1:12-cv-00192-CCB)

EUNICE GRAVES,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
and

CARLIN ROBINSON, individually, as Guardian and
next Friend of I.Y., M.Y. and A.Y., and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Veronica Williams,
Deceased,

Plaintiff,
v.

DANIEL A. LIOI; MELVIN RUSSELL, Major,
Defendants – Appellees,
and

BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant,

CLEAVEN L. WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant.

No. 17-1857
(1:12-cv-00192-CCB)

CARLIN ROBINSON, individually, as Guardian and next Friend of I.Y., M.Y. and A.Y., and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Veronica Williams, Deceased,

Plaintiff – Appellant,
and

EUNICE GRAVES,
Plaintiff,
v.

DANIEL A. LIOI; MELVIN RUSSELL, Major,
Defendants – Appellees,
and

BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant,

CLEAVEN L. WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant.

ORDER

The Court denies the petition for rehearing en banc.

A requested poll of the court failed to produce a majority of judges in regular active service and not disqualified who voted in favor of rehearing en banc. Chief Judge Gregory voted to grant rehearing en banc; Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, Judge King, Judge Agee, Judge Wynn, Judge Diaz, Judge Floyd, Judge Thacker, Judge Harris, Judge

Quattlebaum, Judge Richardson, and Judge Rushing voted to deny rehearing en banc. Judge Motz and Judge Keenan did not participate in the poll.

Entered at the direction of Judge Agee.

For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

AGEE, Judge, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc:

The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "But nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Social Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). A "narrow" exception to this general rule exists when a state actor "created or increased the risk of private danger, and did so directly through affirmative acts, not merely through inaction or omission." *Doe v. Rosa*, 795 F.3d 429, 439 (4th Cir. 2015).

Viewing the facts developed during discovery in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the majority opinion explains at length that they failed to satisfy their burden at summary judgment to show the defendant Baltimore City Police Department officers created or increased the risk of harm that Veronica Williams' husband posed to her

and her unborn child. As Judge Blake found in a thorough and meticulous review, there is simply no evidence in the summary judgment record to match the plaintiffs' allegations. There is no evidence the defendant officers diverted the arrest warrant. Nor is there any evidence that either officer assisted Williams with avoiding arrest, ordered that he not be arrested, or affirmatively prevented Williams from being arrested earlier. And there is no evidence that either officer had reason to believe Williams posed a specific or immediate danger to his wife apart from the mere existence of the misdemeanor warrant. Finally, Officer Lioi's texts to Mr. Williams, without contradiction, told him to avoid his wife. J.A. 559 ("I wouldn't be alone with her. . . . Have a witness with you if you meet. . . . I would avoid her.").

In short, the record does not allow for the conclusion that the officers undertook affirmative acts that would allow for liability under the state-created danger doctrine. *Pinder v. Johnson*, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175, 1177 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating that state actors do not "'commit[] an affirmative act' or 'create[] a danger' every time [they] do[] anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely," and that instead, would-be plaintiffs must come forward with evidence of an act "more akin to a[] [state] actor [himself] directly causing harm to the injured party"). As Judge Blake's detailed opinion noted, the record is devoid of evidence of an act "'akin to a[] [state] actor [himself] directly causing harm to the injured party.'" *Pinder*, 54 F.3d at 1177.

The panel majority faithfully applied the principles set out in *Deshaney*, *Doe*, and *Pinder* as

well as *Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). The plaintiffs simply failed to meet their burden to survive summary judgement as properly determined on the record applying the high bar set by these cases. I therefore concur in the Court's decision to deny en banc rehearing.

GREGORY, Chief Judge, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

The state-created danger doctrine is narrow, but it isn't naught. It provides a cause of action where, as here, there is triable evidence of injury resulting from state officers' affirmative conduct that enhanced a dangerous situation, which a reasonable officer would have known to exist. *See Doe v. Rosa*, 795 F.3d 429, 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2015). The injury need not result from the hand nor intent of the officers to do harm. In this case, the enhanced danger resulted in the death of a mother and her unborn child.

An analysis of the doctrine is assisted by a methodical approach: (1) understanding the danger; (2) determining whether a reasonable officer would have understood the danger existed; (3) assessing whether the danger was enhanced by the officer's affirmative conduct; and (4) deciding whether the injury was within the scope of reasonable consequences that flow from the enhanced danger. With all due respect, this Circuit's new precedent is wanting in this regard. I write to note how important it is to analyze the state-created danger

doctrine properly. The rigor and reason of the full Court would have been helpful.

Viewed through the proper framework, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the non-movant as required on summary judgment, the facts in this case present a jury question on state-created danger. First, the evidence shows that Williams posed a threat to Mrs. Williams because she swore out a warrant for his arrest by reporting that he had restrained her and cut off her hair. J.A. 311. Second, a reasonable officer would have known that Mrs. Williams's swearing out a warrant for the assault posed a danger to her. Even without the specifics of her report, the domestic assault charge in the warrant would have placed a reasonable officer on notice of the danger she faced as a victim of domestic violence.¹ J.A. 764.

Third, a jury could find that Major Russell and Deputy Lioi enhanced the danger to Mrs. Williams by deliberately acting to help Williams delay his arrest, even though they had no intent to harm her. Our prior cases have established that the state-created danger doctrine does not apply to failures or omissions. *See Doe*, 795 F.3d at 431, 439–41 (deciding that a college president did not affirmatively increase the risk of child abuse by

¹ About half of all female homicides result from domestic violence. Emiko Petrosky, MD, et al., *Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence – United States, 2003-2014*, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (July 21, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6628a1.htm?s_cid=d=mm6628a1_w#T1_down. Critically, the same report found that one in ten victims of intimate partner homicide was reported to have experienced violence in the month preceding their death. *Id.*

failing to report it to law enforcement); *Pinder v. Johnson*, 54 F.3d 1169, 1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that an officer’s failure to charge the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend with a “serious offense” did not qualify as an affirmative act). But the officers’ conduct in this case goes beyond a mere failure to arrest.

For instance, there is evidence that the officer who picked up the arrest warrant for Williams did not take it to Central Records pursuant to protocol, and that he would only depart from protocol (1) if an officer already had the suspect in custody (which is not the case here), or (2) if a superior officer, like Deputy Lioi or Major Russell, gave an order to do so. J.A. 575–78, 589. Indeed, there is evidence that Major Russell said the warrant had been “pulled” from its normal processing route. J.A. 268. Both officers also made arrangements with Williams to allow him to self-surrender on his terms. *See, e.g.*, J.A. 277.

Additionally, the record shows that Deputy Lioi advised Williams to stay away from his wife, so as to avoid forcing the officers’ hands to serve the warrant. *See, e.g.*, J.A. 700–05. Deputy Lioi also took the liberty of providing Williams with two letters, including one that confirmed Williams had tried to turn himself in without any mention of the coordinated plan for Williams to self-surrender the following week. J.A. 631–32. Taken together, this evidence shows that the officers committed affirmative acts—not mere failures or omissions—to help Williams delay arrest on domestic assault charges. Accordingly, a jury could find that, by delaying Williams’ arrest, the officers enhanced the danger Williams posed to his wife.

Fourth, the death of Mrs. Williams and her unborn child fell within the scope of reasonable consequences of the officers' conduct to assist her abusive husband in delaying arrest. In light of the clear danger that domestic violence victims face, especially after reporting their abusers to authorities, *see supra* n.*, the officers nevertheless worked with Williams to postpone his arrest until a time of his choosing. Thus, a jury could find that the officers' deliberate conduct to help Williams delay arrest enhanced the known danger that led to Mrs. Williams and her unborn child being stabbed to death. And it is simply error to say as a matter of law that a jury could not so find.

There are cases that instruct us as to when the state-created danger doctrine *does not* apply, but unless we analyze the law and facts through the appropriate framework, we may never find a case in which the doctrine *does* apply. Here, we had a chance to say what the doctrine is and how it should be applied, and we failed to do so. Because this leaves our jurisprudence wanting, I dissent from the decision to deny rehearing en banc.