

APPENDIX A



IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0035-18

FREDDY GARCIA, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

**ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HARRIS COUNTY**

KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY, RICHARDSON, NEWELL, and WALKER, JJ., joined. YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which SLAUGHTER, J., joined. KELLER, P.J., concurred. KEEL, J., dissented.

O P I N I O N

Freddy Garcia was indicted on one count of aggravated sexual assault, but at trial, the victim described two separate sexual assaults. When the State rested its case in chief, Garcia asked for an election between the two incidents. This request was denied. The court of appeals held that denying Garcia's request was error of constitutional magnitude and reversed Garcia's conviction. We agree that the trial judge committed constitutional error

but disagree that the error was harmful. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment and affirm Garcia's conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pre-trial and trial.

In 1987, the State filed an indictment against Garcia alleging that, on or about August 16, 1987, he penetrated his child step-daughter's female sexual organ with his own. Upon making bond, Garcia absconded. He was found in 2015 and extradited to Harris County.

At trial, the victim testified to multiple instances in which Garcia acted in a sexually suggestive, indecent, or assaultive manner toward her. Each time the victim began describing a different indecent or sexually assaultive act, Garcia moved that the State be required to make an election—to pick which incident it would ultimately ask the jury to base its verdict upon. Two of these incidents warrant description here.

First, the victim recounted an incident wherein Garcia called her into the bathroom and “raped” her—penetrated her sexual organ with his own. The victim estimated that she was around eleven years old when this assault occurred. The court of appeals referred to this as “the bathroom incident.” The victim also recounted an incident wherein Garcia assaulted her in her bedroom (“the bedroom incident”). The victim estimated that this assault occurred on or about August 16th of 1987, as alleged in the indictment, when she was twelve.

When the State rested its case, Garcia re-urged his motion for election. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the proper time for an election is at the close of all

evidence, and the trial judge agreed. Garcia offered to produce a citation to demonstrate his right to an election at the end of the State's case, but the trial judge declined, continuing to hold that he would not order an election until both sides rested and closed.

So, at the close of all the evidence, Garcia once again asked the trial judge to make the State elect which incident it would rely upon for conviction. To satisfy this request, the State submitted, and the trial judge adopted, an application paragraph specifically focused upon the bathroom incident:

Now, if you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 16th day of August, 1987, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Freddy Garcia, did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of [the victim] . . . by placing his sexual organ in the female sexual organ of [the victim], while inside a bathroom inside an apartment [the victim] shared with her mother, brothers, and the defendant, then you will find the defendant guilty[.]

The jury found Garcia guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child.

B. Appeal.

On appeal, Garcia complained that the trial judge committed reversible constitutional error by refusing to order an election when the State rested its case in chief. The State responded by arguing that the trial judge had not erred because there was scant evidence that genital-to-genital penetration occurred during the bedroom incident. It also argued that, if the trial judge did err, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State did not initially take issue with Garcia's assertion that the trial judge's error should be measured

against the constitutional harm standard laid out in Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a).¹

The court of appeals, following our opinion in *O’Neal v. State*, held that the trial judge should have ordered an election at the end of the State’s case in chief.² The court of appeals also concluded that, under *Phillips*, the trial judge’s failure to order an election when the State rested was constitutional error, subject to a Rule 44.2(a) harm analysis.³ Finally, citing our opinion in *Dixon v. State*, the court of appeals “consider[ed] the four purposes behind the election rule” in assaying the record for harm: (1) to protect the accused from the introduction of extraneous offenses; (2) to minimize the risk that the jury might choose to convict, not because one or more crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but because all of them together convinced the jury that the defendant was guilty; (3) to ensure a unanimous verdict as to one specific incident which constituted the offense charged in the indictment; and (4) to give the defendant notice of the particular offense the State intends to rely upon for prosecution and afford the defendant an opportunity to defend.⁴

The court of appeals first observed that, because Article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “permits the admission of evidence of relevant extraneous offenses committed by

¹ See State’s Amended Appellate Brief at 8; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) (“Constitutional Error”).

² *Garcia v. State*, 541 S.W.3d 222, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017) (citing *O’Neal v. State*, 746 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).

³ *Id.* at 232 (citing *Phillips v. State*, 193 S.W.3d 904, 912–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

⁴ *Id.* at 232–33 (citing *Dixon v. State*, 201 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

a defendant against a child victim,” the first factor did not weigh in favor of reversal.⁵ With regard to the second and third factors, the court of appeals found that there was a significant risk that the jury rendered a mixed-and-matched or non-unanimous verdict because the jury instructions “conflated the earlier bathroom incident and the separate August 16, 1987 bedroom incident.”⁶ This was essentially because, although the charge referred specifically to an incident occurring “in a bathroom,” the evidence showed that the bedroom incident, not the bathroom incident, occurred “on or about the 16th day of August, 1987.” Finally, the court found that the fourth factor also weighed in favor of reversal, albeit “not [as] heavily,” because without a timely election Garcia “had to defend against both assaults”—the bedroom incident and the bathroom incident.⁷ Because it could not say that the trial judge’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court of appeals reversed Garcia’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

C. Petition for Discretionary Review

In this petition for discretionary review, the State contends that the court of appeals’ analysis was flawed in two respects. First, the State argues that the court of appeals should not have applied the Rule 44.2(a) constitutional harm standard to the trial judge’s election error in this case. The trial judge essentially instructed the jury that, to convict Garcia of

⁵ *Id.* at 233 (citing, *inter alia*, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37).

⁶ *Id.* at 233–34.

⁷ *Id.* at 234–35.

aggravated sexual assault, it had to unanimously agree upon the bathroom incident. The State argues that this instruction satisfied Garcia’s right to a unanimous verdict and his right to be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the State argues that the trial judge’s error is not rightly characterized as a total failure to order an election; it is better understood as a failure to order an election in a timely fashion. And while a total failure to order an election might be subject to a constitutional harm analysis, a “merely delayed” election is non-constitutional error that should be reviewed under a Rule 44.2(b) non-constitutional harm analysis.⁸

The State also argues that the court of appeals was mistaken when it concluded that the application paragraph in the court’s charge conflated the bedroom incident with the bathroom incident. According to the State, the mere fact that the application paragraph contained the August 16, 1987 date did not suggest to the jury that it was free to mix and match between the bathroom incident and the bedroom incident. Instead, the State argues that the jury instructions adequately focused the jury’s deliberative attention on a single event, the bathroom incident, and that attempting to utilize an “on or about” date more closely correlated with that incident would have required the court’s instructions to deviate from what was authorized by the indictment. We address each ground in turn.

II. ANALYSIS

In a sexual assault trial, where one act of intercourse is alleged in the indictment and

⁸ See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (“Other Errors”).

more than one act of intercourse is shown by the evidence, the State must elect the act upon which it would rely for conviction.⁹ The trial judge retains the discretion to order the State to make an election at any time before the State rests its case in chief.¹⁰ But once the State rests, in the face of a timely request by the defendant, the trial court must order the State to make a decision. “Failure to do so constitutes error.”¹¹

For brevity’s sake, we will occasionally refer to the rule requiring the State to make an election at the end of its case in chief as “the rule of timely election,” or “the timely election rule.” For purposes of this opinion, a timely election means an election made at the end of the State’s case in chief.

A. Did the trial judge commit constitutional error?

In *Phillips v. State*, we identified a defendant’s due-process right to adequate notice and his due-process right to present a defense as two of several constitutional rights that are implicated by a failure to order a timely election upon request.¹² So, if followed, *Phillips* would seem to decide this issue: Based on his due-process right to receive adequate notice

⁹ *O’Neal*, 746 S.W.2d at 771 (citations omitted).

¹⁰ *Id.* at 772.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² See *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 913–14 (“No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by the charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding[.]”) (quoting *Cole v. Arkansas*, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)).

and his due-process right to present a defense, Garcia had a constitutional right to timely election. By requesting an election at the end of the State’s case in chief, he asserted that right at the appropriate time, and the trial judge erred to deny his request. As a result, constitutional error occurred, subject to a Rule 44.2(a) harm analysis.

We have previously said that “where a harm analysis is appropriate, claims of constitutional error are subject to constitutional harm analysis and all other claims of error are subject to non-constitutional harm analysis.”¹³ Constitutional errors that a party or reviewing court considers *de minimis* are not, for that reason alone, subject to non-constitutional harm analysis. They are simply less likely to be found harmful under the appropriate constitutional harm analysis. In this case, the fact that the court’s charge focused the jury’s attention on a single criminal incident may have vindicated Garcia’s right to a unanimous verdict, but it did not somehow un-violate his due-process right to adequate notice at the end of the State’s case in chief.

It follows that the only question we need to answer in this ground is whether we will continue to adhere to *Phillips*. We ordinarily observe the doctrine of *stare decisis* “to promote judicial efficiency and consistency, encourage reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute to the integrity of the judicial process.”¹⁴ An exception is made when we conclude

¹³ See *Jacobs v. State*, 560 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citations omitted).

¹⁴ E.g., *Paulson v. State*, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citations omitted).

that the precedent in question “was poorly reasoned or is unworkable.”¹⁵ So, to decide whether the trial judge’s error in this case should be analyzed under a Rule 44.2(a) constitutional harm analysis, we need only decide whether *Phillips* was poorly reasoned or if its holding has become unworkable.

We begin by observing that the rule announced in *Phillips* is hardly unworkable. The “fundamental constitutional principles” of adequate notice and an opportunity to defend require that an election be made when the State rests its case in chief.¹⁶ So, if the defendant asks for an election at that time, the trial judge violates a constitutional right by overruling the request. The defendant can complain of constitutional error on appeal.

Was *Phillips* poorly reasoned? We do not think so, at least insofar as it drew a connection between the defendant’s right to a timely election and his rights to adequate notice and an opportunity to defend. *Phillips* forthrightly acknowledged that it was the first opinion to “directly decide[] the proper harm analysis for failure to elect.”¹⁷ But it did not decide that issue on a whim. *Phillips* carefully assayed “the reasons for requiring an election” and this Court’s prior precedents on the matter. It then expressly decided that failing to comply with a motion for election at the end of the State’s case in chief offends certain “fundamental constitutional principles”—namely, the defendant’s right to receive

¹⁵ *Id.* at 571–72 (citations omitted).

¹⁶ *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 913–14 (citations omitted).

¹⁷ *Id.* at 913.

adequate notice and an opportunity to defend himself.¹⁸

The State does not really attempt to assail *Phillips*'s logic in this regard, but it does offer a hodgepodge of arguments for why, despite *Phillips*, a “merely delayed” election should be subject to non-constitutional harm analysis. For example, the State argues that delaying the election was a “procedural [error] rather than a substantive error,” which supposedly “raises the question of whether the constitutional harm standard should still apply.” We are not persuaded. The fact that a particular right can be characterized as “procedural rather than substantive” does not mean—indeed, does not even really suggest—that it is of non-constitutional import. It is not for nothing that our federal Constitution guarantees every accused person some minimal “due process.”¹⁹

But this argument does raise the question: If not the Due Process Clause, what provision of law ultimately guarantees a criminal defendant the right to force a timely election upon request? For example, does that right flow from a statute or written rule of evidence or procedure?²⁰ Were we convinced that the right of timely election is ultimately underwritten by one of these provisions of law and has no independent due-process pedigree, we might readily agree with the State that, while the defendant has a constitutional right to an election at some point in the trial, he has only a statutory or rule-based right to a timely

¹⁸ *Id.* at 913–14.

¹⁹ See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

²⁰ Cf. *Villescas v. State*, 189 S.W.3d 290, 292–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

election. If that were so, a “merely delayed” election truly would be error of non-constitutional magnitude.

But our research has revealed no statute or written rule guaranteeing the right to an election at the end of the State’s case in chief—which should come as no surprise. The timely election rule is only to be found in the pronouncements of this Court and its predecessor courts as handed down over the last century-and-a-half. And those pronouncements provide, at the very least, a reasonable basis for *Phillips*’s conclusion that the timely election rule is a requirement of fundamental due process.

One of the earliest Texas cases we have found discussing the timely election rule, *Fisher v. State*, described it as “the true rule and the one which has been uniform in this state.”²¹ *Fisher* cited Roscoe’s Digest Commentaries, the 1874 edition of which explained: “[T]he reason for putting a prosecutor to his election being that the prisoner may not have his attention divided between two charges, the election ought to be made, not merely before the case goes to the jury, as it is sometimes laid down, but before the prisoner is called on for his defence at the latest.”²²

Another early Texas case discussing the rule, *Lunn v. State*,²³ cited Bishop’s Commentaries on the Law of Criminal Procedure, which in 1872 opined that “[t]he chief

²¹ *Fisher v. State*, 33 Tex. 792, 793 (Tex. 1870).

²² Henry Roscoe, *Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases* 203 (Horace Smith et al. eds., 7th Am. from the 8th London ed. 1874) (citations omitted).

²³ *Lunn v. State*, 44 Tex. 85, 86–87 (Tex. 1875).

thing, down to the time when the government rests its case and the defence is called for, is to prevent prejudice to the defendant, in the eyes of the jury, by bringing against him testimony tending to show crimes for which he is not really indicted, and to which he is not finally to make answer in the cause.”²⁴ Bishop thus concluded: “[W]hatever may have been done at an earlier stage of the trial, it is plain that as a general rule there should be an election required before the prisoner opens to the jury his defence.”²⁵ *Lunn* ultimately adopted Bishop’s statement of the rule.²⁶

Yet another early Texas case, *Crosslin v. State*, described timely election as a “right” accorded to the defendant by law.²⁷ At least four different times, *Crosslin* drew an express connection between this legal “right” and the expectation that the defendant will receive enough notice to defend himself. *Crosslin* said that the election “should not be so long delayed that it would embarrass the accused by leaving him in doubt as against which offense he will be called upon to defend.”²⁸ It expressed a concern that a delayed election would put the defendant “at the disadvantage of having to defend, not only against one but against 50

²⁴ Joel Prentiss Bishop, *Commentaries on the Law of Criminal Procedure* § 463 (2d ed. 1872).

²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ See *Lunn*, 44 Tex. at 88 (“[I]f in any case the particular facts would make the case an exception to the rule calling for the exercise of discretion the election should be made before the defendant offers his evidence.”).

²⁷ *Crosslin v. State*, 90 Tex. Crim. 467, 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921).

²⁸ *Id.* at 470.

or more offenses.”²⁹ It concluded that the trial judge’s error in failing to order a timely election in that case ultimately forced the defendant “to proceed with his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses and in the introduction of his own in ignorance of the particular offense of which he was prosecuted.”³⁰ And it quoted approvingly of another court’s analysis of the harmful effect of an untimely election: “Such a course was calculated to confound, distract, and confuse the defendant in his defense. He was expected to meet one charge at a specified time, but was required to defend against and meet six different acts[.]”³¹

The point is not that these cases prove beyond dispute that the timely election rule is of constitutional origin. We need not and do not decide on a blank slate that the Due Process Clause guarantees the defendant a constitutional, notice-based right to force an election at the end of the State’s case in chief. The point is that even if the constitutional pedigree of the timely election rule was up for debate when *Phillips* was decided, in light of *Phillips*, it no longer is. *Phillips*’s holding was supportable at the time it was handed down, and it remains supportable now.

Because we conclude that *Phillips*’s holding was not unreasonable, and because we think the standard *Phillips* established is not unworkable, we decline to overrule it. The court of appeals rightly concluded that Garcia had a constitutional, due-process right to an election

²⁹ *Id.* at 471.

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *Id.* (quoting *State v. Hilberg*, 61 P. 215, 216 (Utah 1900)).

at the close of the State’s case in chief. Because that right was timely asserted and erroneously denied, constitutional error occurred. Whatever events unfolded after the trial judge’s timely-election error may have mitigated the harm stemming from it, but those developments did not somehow transform Garcia’s constitutional right into a non-constitutional right. The State’s first ground for review is overruled.

B. The error in this case was harmless.

As to the first of the four recognized election “purposes,”³² the court of appeals held that because Article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “permits the admission of evidence of relevant extraneous offenses committed by a defendant against a child victim,” the first factor did not support a finding of harm.³³ The parties have not challenged this holding, and our precedents support it in any event.³⁴

As to the second and third election purposes, the court of appeals acknowledged that the jury instructions in this case required the jury to “unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt” that Garcia had penetrated the victim “inside a bathroom inside an apartment” to convict him of aggravated sexual assault. But the instructions also contained an “on or about” date of August 16, 1987, which, according to the victim’s testimony and the contemporaneous evidence, is closer to when the bedroom incident occurred. The court of

³² See *Owings v. State*, 541 S.W.3d 144, 150–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); *Dixon*, 201 S.W.3d at 734.

³³ *Garcia*, 541 S.W.3d at 233 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37).

³⁴ See *Owings*, 541 S.W.3d at 151; *Dixon*, 201 S.W.3d at 734–35.

appeals held that these two data points (“inside a bathroom” and “on or about the 16th day of August, 1987”) were in conflict with one another, such that there was a significant risk that one of two things occurred: either (1) the jury returned a guilty verdict despite harboring a reasonable doubt as to each offense in isolation, or else (2) some jurors voted to convict Garcia of the bedroom incident while others voted to convict him of the bathroom incident.³⁵

We disagree with the court of appeals’ premise that the jury charge conflated the two incidents. The court’s instructions informed the jury that “the State is not bound by the specific date” alleged in the indictment. Rather, “a conviction may be had upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense . . . was committed at any time prior to the filing of the indictment which is within the period of limitations.” The jury was also told that, based on the alleged offense date, the “limitation period applicable to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child is ten years prior to August 28, 1987, the date of the filing of the indictment.”

“We generally presume the jury follows the trial court’s instructions in the manner presented.”³⁶ That being the case, we perceive no great risk that the jury would have understood August 16, 1987 as an express reference to the bedroom incident. Instead, following the court’s instructions, the jury would have understood that both incidents—the bedroom incident and the bathroom incident—fell within the time period described by the

³⁵ *Garcia*, 541 S.W.3d at 233–34.

³⁶ *E.g., Colburn v. State*, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

limitation paragraph. Based solely on the date of August 16, 1987, the jury would not have felt steered in one direction or another.

By contrast, the instructions' explicit description of an assault occurring "inside a bathroom" would have signaled to the jury that its verdict should ultimately turn on whether it harbored a reasonable doubt as to the bathroom incident. The instructions' description of the incident—occurring "inside a bathroom"—was just enough information for the jury to distinguish it from all of the other incidents upon which the jury could, consistent with the indictment and the court's instructions, vote to convict. At the same time, the description was not so detailed as to risk "summing up the testimony [or] discussing the facts" of the case.³⁷ This, coupled with the court's instruction that the jury had to unanimously agree upon this incident to convict Garcia of aggravated sexual assault, assures us beyond a reasonable doubt that Garcia's right to a unanimous verdict was not imperiled by the trial judge's election error. The third election purpose was not frustrated.

With regard to the second election purpose, we must take into account that in this case, unlike in some of our earlier election cases,³⁸ the evidence against Garcia "was presented from [multiple] different sources."³⁹ The victim testified about the bathroom and bedroom incidents, but the bedroom incident was also supported by outcry evidence and by

³⁷ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14.

³⁸ See *Owings*, 541 S.W.3d at 151; *Dixon*, 201 S.W.3d at 735.

³⁹ *Garcia*, 541 S.W.3d at 233.

the presence of semen on the victim’s underwear.

However, as previously discussed, the jury was duly informed that its job was to determine whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that, “while inside a bathroom,” Garcia had penetrated the victim’s sexual organ with his own. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that evidence of extraneous “crimes, wrongs, or acts against the child who is the victim of the alleged offense in this case” could be only considered “in determining . . . relevant matters, including: (1) the state of mind of the defendant and the child; and (2) the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the child, and for no other purpose.” This instruction would have reinforced the notion that, while the jury was permitted to consider bad acts other than the bathroom incident for some limited evidentiary purposes, its ultimate job was to decide whether the bathroom incident was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This alleviates any concern that the jury “added up two not-quite-proven offenses to get the State across the finish line.”⁴⁰ The second election purpose was not frustrated.

That leaves only the fourth and final election purpose—notice to Garcia for the purpose of mounting a defense—potentially favoring reversal. But, for the following reasons, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge’s violation of Garcia’s right to adequate notice did not contribute to his conviction.

In his defense, Garcia denied that either incident had occurred, and he adopted a

⁴⁰ See State’s Brief on Discretionary Review at 32.

defensive strategy that the State characterizes as a “blanket denial.” Garcia called, among other witnesses, his son, who testified that the victim did not like Garcia when she was growing up because he was a “strict disciplinarian.” Another of Garcia’s children echoed this description of Garcia. We have held in previous cases that these kinds of “blanket denial[s]” may render any violation of the defendant’s right to adequate notice harmless.⁴¹

We do not doubt the validity of this reasoning, but we must be careful not to take it too far. For example, there may be instances in which the defendant prepares a tailored defense as to each incident, but those defenses are inconsistent with one another. In those circumstances, if the trial judge denies the defendant’s timely motion for election, the defendant might plausibly argue that the trial judge’s ruling left him no choice but to make a blanket denial. For, without knowing which incident would be submitted to the jury before he opened his defense, what else was the defendant to do? He could not present both defenses simultaneously without losing credibility with the jury, and if he presented one defense but not the other, the State would simply elect the undefended incident. In that event, a blanket denial would have been the only reasonable option left.

Although it is a close call, we are not persuaded that Garcia was faced with any such dilemma. Arguing that (1) the bathroom incident was vaguely described and uncorroborated, (2) the physical evidence supporting the bedroom incident failed to implicate him, and (3)

⁴¹ *E.g.*, *Owings*, 541 S.W.3d at 153–54 (citing *Cosio v. State*, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).

in any event, the victim had a motive to lie, are not inconsistent defensive strategies. Even if Garcia could plausibly claim that presenting all of these defenses at the same time cost him credibility with the jury, he has made no argument to that effect. We are ultimately unconvinced that if the trial judge had put the State to its election at the appropriate time, Garcia's defensive strategy would have been meaningfully different.

For these reasons, with respect to each of the rights and interests at stake, we conclude that the trial judge's election error was harmless. The State's second ground for review is sustained.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the court of appeals' judgment. Because the court of appeals overruled Garcia's only other issue on appeal, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Delivered: November 20, 2019

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0035-18

FREDDY GARCIA, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

**ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HARRIS COUNTY**

YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which SLAUGHTER, J., joined.

CONCURRING OPINION

As it did two years ago in *Owings v. State*, 541 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), the Court today holds that the trial court's error in failing to grant Appellant's request to force the State to elect which particular act of sexual assault it would rely upon to prove the charge against him was harmless. In so holding, the Court once again employs the standard for determining whether trial error is harmful contained in Rule 44.2(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). This is the rule that governs errors of

constitutional dimension, which mirrors the standard the United States Supreme Court has mandated for errors of federal constitutional dimension, in *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For reasons that I developed in my concurring opinion in *Owings*, I remain dubious, at best, that this constitutes the appropriate harm standard for election error. *See Owings*, 541 S.W.3d at 154–56 (Yeary, J., concurring) (arguing that election error neither definitively implicates the constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict nor bedrock due process notice requirements).

But what was true of *Owings* is also true in this case: It does not ultimately matter which standard for harm is applicable, since the Court deems the error harmless even under the constitutional standard. If we can say beyond a reasonable doubt, as the Court does today, that the error did not contribute to Appellant’s conviction, then we can also say that it could not in any way have affected his “substantial rights” for purposes of the non-constitutional standard in Rule 44.2(b). TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Because, as in *Owings*, it does not matter which harm standard we employ, this case, like *Owings*, is not the best one for resolving that question, and we should not.

With these remarks, I concur in the result.

FILED: November 20, 2019
PUBLISH

**Motion for Rehearing Overruled; Opinion of July 20, 2017 Withdrawn;
Reversed and Remanded; and Substitute Opinion Filed December 14, 2017.**



**In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals**

NO. 14-16-00242-CR

FREDDY GARCIA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

**On Appeal from the 174th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 0482220**

S U B S T I T U T E O P I N I O N

We overrule the State's motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion dated July 20, 2017, and issue the following substitute opinion. The disposition remains the same.

A jury convicted appellant Freddy Garcia of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to 45 years' confinement and a \$10,000 fine.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2016). In two issues, appellant contends that: (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect at the close of its case-in-chief which alleged incident of sexual assault it sought to submit to the jury. We conclude appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, largely because he acquiesced to the delay when he became a fugitive. However, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's failure to elect which act it relied upon to pursue a conviction had no or but slight effect on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

In 1986, complainant was 11 years old when she moved from Mexico to Houston to live with her mother, two half-brothers, and appellant, her step-father. Complainant often would be left alone with appellant in the evenings while her mother went to work. Over the course of the next year, appellant allegedly sexually assaulted complainant in a series of escalating incidents. Complainant testified at trial that on one occasion during that time period appellant forced complainant into their apartment bathroom and penetrated her vagina with his penis.

On August 16, 1987, complainant's mother left complainant with appellant while she went to run an errand. Complainant's mother returned home early and found appellant in complainant's bedroom with his pants down. Complainant's mother and appellant argued, and appellant left the apartment and did not return.

Appellant was arrested the next day and was indicted on August 28, 1987. The indictment alleged a single count of sexual assault — specifically, that appellant penetrated complainant's sexual organ with his own sexual organ on or about August 16, 1987.

Appellant was released on bond, but an arrest warrant was issued when he subsequently failed to appear in court. Appellant eluded authorities for 27 years until he was located in North Carolina and arrested on November 18, 2014. Appellant was extradited to Texas on January 19, 2015.

The case went to trial on February 5, 2016. A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and the trial court sentenced him to 45 years' imprisonment and assessed a \$10,000 fine. Appellant timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. Speedy Trial

In his second issue, appellant contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated because he was not brought to trial until more than 28 years after he was indicted. Because this is a threshold issue that would serve as an absolute bar to prosecution, we address it first. *See Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (proper remedy for speedy trial violation is dismissal of indictment); *Shaw v. State*, 117 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (speedy trial violation results in dismissal of the prosecution with prejudice).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In conducting a speedy trial analysis, a reviewing court looks to the four factors set out in *Barker*. The *Barker* test balances: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. *Id.* In conducting a speedy trial analysis, we review legal issues *de novo* and review the trial court's resolution of factual issues for an abuse of discretion. *See Kelly v. State*, 163 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

A. The Length of the Delay

This first factor is a double inquiry. *See Doggett v. United States*, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). A court first “must consider whether the delay is sufficiently long to even trigger a further analysis under the *Barker* factors, and if it is, then the court must consider to what extent it stretches beyond this triggering length.” *Hopper v. State*, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

To initially trigger a speedy trial analysis, the defendant must show that the interval between accusation and trial crosses the threshold dividing ordinary delay from “presumptively prejudicial” delay. *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 651-52. Presumptive prejudice in this context simply means that a delay is facially unreasonable enough to conduct a full inquiry into the remaining *Barker* factors. *Id.* at 652 n.1. There is no bright-line rule for determining when a delay violates the right to a speedy trial. *Hull v. State*, 699 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc). Generally, courts find a delay approaching one year sufficient to trigger a full inquiry. *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1; *Dragoo v. State*, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Once the defendant establishes a presumptively prejudicial delay, the reviewing court must then consider the extent to which the delay has stretched beyond the threshold. *See Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 652. This second inquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the defendant intensifies over time. *Id.*

In this case, more than 28 years elapsed between the time of appellant’s indictment and trial. A delay of 28 years is sufficient to trigger a full *Barker* analysis. *See Dragoo*, 96 S.W.3d at 314. Given the length beyond the threshold, we conclude that this factor weighs against the State. *See Gonzales v. State*, 435 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (six-year delay weighed heavily against the State).

B. Reason for Delay

The State carries the burden of justifying its delay. *Cantu v. State*, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Valid reasons for delay do not weigh against the State, whereas bad-faith delays weigh heavily against the State. *See Hopper v. State*, 495 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), *aff'd*, 520 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

The delay here covers two distinct periods. The first period runs from the time of appellant's indictment until the appellant's re-arrest and extradition to Texas — a span of roughly 27 years. The second period runs from the time appellant came into the State's custody on January 19, 2015, until appellant's trial on February 5, 2016 — a span of approximately 13 months.

The State has valid reason for the first portion of the delay; appellant was a fugitive for nearly this entire period. *See id.* at 475 (first period of delay, where “appellant was either on the run or facing trial in Nebraska,” did not weigh against State); *Lott v. State*, 951 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. ref'd) (a fugitive “undoubtedly bears at least some fault for the length of the delay”).

Appellant nevertheless contends that this period of the delay should weigh against the State because the State was negligent in its attempts to locate appellant. The evidence demonstrates otherwise. Appellant used a different name and social security number on at least one occasion when he applied for a driver's license in Florida. Investigators periodically searched for appellant, including checking his last known address on several occasions, searching national databases, placing wanted ads in newspapers, and featuring appellant on the Crime Stoppers website. These efforts began in 1987 and continued until 2014 when an investigator with the Harris County District Attorney's Office located appellant living in North Carolina. We conclude the State was diligent in attempting to locate appellant. *See Lott*, 951

S.W.2d at 495 (State was diligent in attempting to locate appellant where search covered “many search avenues . . . over the course of thirty years and four investigations,” despite lengthy gaps between search efforts). Consequently, the reason for this part of the overall delay does not weigh against the State. *See id.* (where appellant contended that State should have located him when he received services at a veterans’ hospital, court concluded that “the State’s failure to continue with an active investigation which might have detected that Lott had ‘surfaced’ under his own name in order to receive veterans’ benefits in 1986 stemmed not from a lack of diligence, but from Lott’s own crafty, and successful, twenty-year-old disappearing act”).

Regarding the second part of the delay, spanning the period after his re-arrest but before trial, the record shows that appellant agreed to six trial resets and at one point requested a trial continuance, which was granted. Appellant therefore is partially responsible for the second period of delay between his re-arrest and trial, and this factor weighs neither for nor against the State.

C. Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial

The right to a speedy trial is unlike other rights enshrined in the Constitution because the deprivation of the right, in some instances, may actually work to the defendant’s advantage. *See Barker*, 407 U.S. at 521. As the pretrial delay increases, witnesses can die, their memories can fade, or they can become unavailable for any number of other reasons. *See Hopper*, 495 S.W.3d at 476. If these witnesses supported the State’s theory of the case, then the prosecution will be impaired, and that impairment will work to the benefit of the defendant because the State carries the burden of proof. *Id.* For that reason, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[d]elay is not an uncommon defense tactic.” *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 521.

Of course, delay also can prejudice the defendant, because with the passage of time grows the possibility that the defense may lose an alibi witness or access to other evidence with exculpatory value. *Id.* at 532. The more seriously that a defendant perceives a loss of this sort, the more likely he is to complain; accordingly, the defendant bears “some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim.” *Id.* at 529.

The record shows that appellant sat on his rights for more than 27 years before asserting his right to a speedy trial. The record also shows that for most of that time appellant was a fugitive. Appellant fled after being released on bond, indicating that he was on notice as to the charge against him. His flight evidences a lack of desire for any trial, much less a speedy one. *See Hopper*, 520 S.W.3d at 928 (“Because we have determined that the record supports a conclusion that appellant knew about his Texas charge, his complete failure to assert his right to a speedy trial for more than eighteen years suggests that he did not really want a speedy trial.”); *Lott*, 951 S.W.2d at 495 (factor weighed against appellant when the evidence “support[ed] a finding that Lott, knowing of the charges, chose to remain at large for more than thirty years without ever demanding a trial.”).

Further, appellant did not adequately assert his rights following his ultimate re-arrest. Appellant agreed to three resets between January 19 and August 31, 2015, at which time he filed a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. Following this objection (to which it does not appear appellant secured a ruling), appellant agreed to three more resets and on one occasion requested a continuance. This court previously has held that “[w]e exclude the time covered by agreed resets from the speedy trial calculation because agreed resets are ‘inconsistent with [the] assertion of a speedy trial right.’” *Smith v. State*, 436 S.W.3d 353, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (quoting *Celestine v. State*, 356 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).

Consequently, this factor weighs heavily against appellant.

D. Prejudice to Appellant

We review this final factor in light of the interests that the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect. *See Barker*, 407 U.S. at 532. The Supreme Court has identified three such interests: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize the defendant's anxiety and concern; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. *Id.* Of these, the last is the most serious because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire justice system. *Id.*

Appellant was not imprisoned during the 27 years he was a fugitive, and was tried within six months of requesting a speedy trial. Therefore, there was no risk of oppressive pretrial incarceration. *See Lott*, 951 S.W.2d at 496 (“Finally, Lott was not incarcerated for the thirty-year period between the original indictment and the final resolution of this case. Lott’s case was finally disposed of within eight months after his first, and only, demand for a speedy trial.”).

Appellant makes no claim of suffering any anxiety or concern. Regardless, any anxiety or concern suffered during his flight from justice was self-imposed. Accordingly, the second interest is not relevant here.

Appellant largely focuses on the third interest. Appellant first contends that we should presume prejudice resulted from the “excessive delay.” *See Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 655. Such a presumption may be tempered, however, by extenuating circumstances, including a defendant’s acquiescence in the delay. *See, e.g., Hopper*, 520 S.W.3d at 928; *Dragoo*, 96 S.W.3d at 315.

As we explained above, the third factor does not favor appellant and supports a finding that appellant acquiesced in the delay. Appellant was aware that a charge

was pending against him and yet sat on his rights for more than 27 years despite having the opportunity to resolve that charge by returning to Texas and demanding a trial. We conclude that, even if we applied a presumption of prejudice in this case, the presumption is rebutted because appellant acquiesced in the delay. *See Hopper*, 520 S.W.3d at 929 (“Any presumptive prejudice due to the passage of time was extenuated by appellant’s acquiescence in the delay and even further extenuated by appellant’s failure to employ a remedy that would have guaranteed him a speedy trial.”).

Appellant further contends he was actually prejudiced. Appellant relies primarily on the State’s destruction of physical evidence in 1998 — specifically, the destruction of physical evidence that reflected the presence of semen on a vaginal smear collected from complainant. Appellant argues this destruction prejudiced his defense because DNA testing of the evidence may have exonerated him.

Appellant’s argument is speculative. The destroyed evidence could have been either incriminating or exculpatory and, “[w]ithout knowing the quality of evidence, appellant can only speculate that the loss has impaired his defense.” *See Hopper*, 495 S.W.3d at 479. Moreover, appellant used the lack of DNA evidence to cast doubt on the State’s case. Appellant further argued that the State acted in bad faith when it destroyed the evidence and a spoliation instruction was included in the jury charge that permitted the jury to infer that the destroyed evidence was beneficial to appellant.

The delay also may have worked in appellant’s favor. Complainant’s mother died in the interim between appellant’s indictment and trial. The testimony of complainant’s mother — who walked in on appellant and complainant on August 16, 1987, and thereafter called the police on appellant — may have been more

damaging to the defense than the testimony of complainant, who was 12 at the time of the incident.

We conclude that this final factor does not weigh in appellant's favor. It is unclear whether appellant suffered actual prejudice, and it appears appellant received some benefit from the delay.

E. The Balancing Test

Having addressed the four *Barker* factors, we must now balance them. *See Barker*, 407 U.S. at 533. “[C]ourts must apply the *Barker* balancing test with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed.” *Cantu*, 253 S.W.3d at 281. No single factor is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 533. “Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” *Id.*

The only factor weighing in favor of a violation of appellant’s speedy trial right is the first factor: that the delay was excessive. Weighing against a violation are the second and third factors: that appellant was primarily responsible for the delay, and that appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial for more than 27 years while avoiding arrest, and then for seven months after his arrest. The fourth factor — prejudice resulting from the delay — weighs neither for nor against appellant.

Any prejudice appellant suffered as a result of the delay is attenuated by his acquiescence to the delay. Appellant knew that he was indicted and took special precautions not to be found by law enforcement, including changing his name and social security number. Appellant is responsible for more than 27 years of the

approximately 28-year-delay, and appellant agreed to trial continuances covering the majority of the remainder. Accordingly, it does not appear that appellant truly desired a speedy trial. *See Hopper*, 495 S.W.3d at 481. Consequently, after balancing the four factors, we find no violation of appellant's right to a speedy trial. We overrule appellant's speedy trial issue.

II. State's Election

In his other issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect at the close of its case-in-chief under which incident it sought to convict.

A. When an Election is Required

The long-standing general rule is that the State must elect the act that it will rely upon for conviction when an indictment alleges one sexual assault but more than one sexual assault is shown by the evidence at trial. *See O'Neal v. State*, 746 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). If a defendant timely requests an election under such circumstances, the trial court must order the State to make its election at the close of the State's case-in-chief. *Id.* at 772. The trial court's failure to do so is constitutional error, and we must reverse unless we determine that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *Phillips v. State*, 193 S.W.3d 904, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Requiring the election forces the State to formally differentiate the specific evidence upon which it relies as proof of the charged offense from evidence of other offenses or misconduct it offers only in another evidentiary capacity. *Id.* at 910. This allows the trial court to give clearer instruction to the jury on the proper use and weight to accord each type of evidence. *See id.* Further, the lack of such an election

implicates fundamental constitutional principles, *viz*: due process and due course of law. *Id.* at 913.

B. Was an Election Required Here?

The State argues that no election was required because only one act of the kind alleged in the indictment was shown by the evidence. The indictment alleged a single instance of sexual assault involving penetration of complainant's vagina by appellant's penis.

Complainant testified regarding an incident that occurred in the bathroom at the second of three apartments in which she lived with her mother and appellant. Complainant testified that appellant called her into the bathroom, made her take off her clothes, put his penis in her vagina, and raped her. Complainant did not specify a date for this incident, but believed she was 11 at the time.¹

The State does not dispute that this constitutes evidence of a penetration as alleged in the indictment. The State does dispute that any evidence was presented of a second penetrative assault like that alleged in the indictment. Appellant contends that at least some evidence was presented from which the jury could have determined that a second penetrative assault occurred on August 16, 1987, in complainant's bedroom.

Regarding the August 16 incident, complainant testified that her mother left to run an errand and that appellant followed complainant into her bedroom and pulled his pants down. Complainant provided conflicting testimony regarding whether appellant was able to remove her clothes before her mother returned. She first testified that

¹ Complainant testified that other non-penetration assaults continued to occur after this assault, thereby establishing that this assault was not the assault that took place on August 16, 1987. Likewise, the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident took place in the third apartment the family lived at, and when complainant was 12.

appellant did take her clothes off, but later could not remember whether appellant was able to take off her pants and underwear. The following exchange took place regarding whether penetration occurred on August 16:

[STATE:] Where was [appellant's penis] — where was it in relation to you?

[COMPLAINANT:] What do you mean?

[STATE:] I'm not asking that good. Was he touching you with his penis at the time?

[COMPLAINANT:] I mean, he was forcing me in that moment to try to take off my clothes.

[STATE:] Okay. Was his —

[COMPLAINANT:] Because I was refusing not to do what he wanted me to do. He's like no, forcing me on top of me and try to take off my pants and my underwear.

The State did not follow up and clarify regarding whether penetration occurred.

Other evidence suggested that penetration did occur during the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident. At trial, the police officer with the juvenile crimes division who interviewed complainant in 1987 testified that complainant told her that complainant was penetrated on August 16. The officer first testified that she remembered complainant telling her that appellant “got on top of [complainant]” and “put his penis in her vagina” on August 16. She later testified that, “[o]n the 16th, I don’t know if she was penetrated, but other days she said she was.” Finally, she testified on redirect (after reviewing her offense report) that, on the day complainant’s mother caught appellant, complainant “said that [appellant] put his penis in her vagina a little because her mother got there.”

Likewise, a report prepared by the Houston Police Department’s Crime Laboratory indicated that there was semen present in a vaginal smear taken from complainant during a sexual assault exam performed on August 17, 1987. As discussed

previously, the semen was never DNA tested and the evidence was subsequently destroyed, but the jury could have believed this to be some evidence that a penetration occurred during the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident. No evidence was presented that complainant — who was 12 years old at the time — was sexually active with any other individual; the jury therefore may have believed that the semen was appellant's.

Several times during witness testimony and again at the close of the State's case-in-chief, defense counsel objected and requested that the State elect on which act it would proceed for conviction. The trial court denied the request, incorrectly concluding that the State was not required to elect until the close of all evidence. We conclude that at least some evidence was presented of a second assault conforming with the indicted offense. Accordingly, the State was required to elect upon appellant's timely request. The trial court's failure to require the State to elect at the close of its case-in-chief was error.

We determine next whether the failure to require a timely election was harmful.

C. Harm Analysis

Having concluded that the failure to require an election at the close of the State's case-in-chief constituted error, we must reverse the conviction unless we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or had but slight effect. *See Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 912-14 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a)).

In determining whether the failure to require a timely election was harmful, we consider the four purposes behind the election rule:

- (1) to protect the accused from the introduction of extraneous offenses;
- (2) to minimize the risk that the jury might choose to convict not because one or more crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

but because all of them together convinced the jury the defendant was guilty;

(3) to ensure a unanimous verdict as to one specific incident which constituted the offense charged in the indictment; and

(4) to give the defendant notice of the particular offense the State intends to rely upon for prosecution and afford the defendant an opportunity to defend.

Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

1. Extraneous offenses

With regard to the first *Dixon* factor — protecting the accused from the introduction of extraneous offenses — Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits the admission of evidence of relevant extraneous offenses committed by a defendant against a child victim. *See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2016); Dixon*, 201 S.W.3d at 734; *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 911. Accordingly, the first purpose does not weigh in favor of reversal.

Although evidence of extraneous offenses may be admissible, their admissibility “does not restrict a defendant’s right to have the State elect the incident for which it will seek a conviction” *See Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 911. Here, appellant objected to the State’s presentation of evidence concerning extraneous sexual offenses and requested that the State be required to elect whether it sought to convict as to each of those offenses. The trial court did not require an election on any of the other non-penetrative offenses.

2. Combination of incidents and unanimity

We conclude that the second and third *Dixon* factors weigh in favor of reversal.

There was at least some evidence of two separate penetrative sexual assaults: (1) the bathroom incident; and (2) the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident. That

evidence was presented from different sources, increasing the likelihood that the jury added up different events and testimony from different witnesses in rendering its verdict.

Additional circumstances in this case further increase the likelihood that the failure to require an election at the close of the State's case-in-chief thwarted the purposes underlying the second and third *Dixon* factors.

The jury charge in this case appeared to present only one incident as a basis for conviction, but the charge referenced a single penetrative assault that occurred (1) in a bathroom; **and** (2) on or about August 16, 1987. This record demonstrates that the earlier penetrative assault in the bathroom of the family's apartment when the complainant was 11 is a separate incident distinct from the later penetrative assault in the bedroom of a different apartment on August 16, 1987, when the complainant was 12.

The trial court charged the jury with an instruction that conflated the earlier bathroom incident and the separate August 16, 1987 bedroom incident:

Now, if you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 16th day of August, 1987, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Freddy Garcia, did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of [complainant], a person younger than fourteen years of age and not his spouse, by placing his sexual organ in the female sexual organ of [complainant], while inside a bathroom inside an apartment [complainant] shared with her mother, brothers, and the defendant, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child, as charged in the indictment.

The charge also instructed the jury that the State is not bound by the specific date on which the offense is alleged in the indictment to have been committed.

The State argued in closing that appellant “took [complainant’s] virginity away in a bathroom while her mom was at work,” but also argued that the semen collected from the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident was helpful to the State because there was “no other evidence of anyone [else] in that girl’s life,” suggesting that the semen was appellant’s. The defense highlighted the ambiguity of the charge in closing:

So, now you’re given a jury instruction talking about what they have to prove to you. So, all of the evidence that was presented to you had to do with events that happened on August 16th of 1987. But then they change gears and now they’re trying to say that there was something that happened in a bathroom in some part some apartment [sic] — and this is language that you’re going to read — some bathroom, some apartment. How in a small apartment with two bedrooms that — I mean, where is the evidence here? How do we even know what apartment complex, what date it happened on?

Here, the jury charge and closing arguments conflated two incidents; but even if the jury charge had unambiguously presented only one incident for the jury’s consideration, a proper jury charge cannot take the place of a timely election. *See Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 912.

Because some evidence was presented that penetration may have occurred both in a bathroom and separately on August 16, 1987, in complainant’s bedroom, there is a significantly increased possibility that (1) the jury convicted based on a combination of the offenses without believing that the State proved one of those offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) some members of the jury convicted based on the bathroom incident and others based on the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident. *See Phillips v. State*, 130 S.W.3d 343, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004), *aff’d*, 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (finding constitutional error where “both offenses were described in detail more than once . . . yet, it was completely unclear to the jury which act the State would rely upon for conviction”).

This significant possibility is made more likely because the jury charge — and the parties’ closing arguments based on that charge — conflated these two separate incidents of penetrative assault.

3. Notice

We conclude that the fourth *Dixon* factor — providing notice to the defense of the particular offense the State intends to rely upon to convict and to afford the defendant an opportunity to defend — also weighs in favor of reversal. Because evidence of two assaults was presented, appellant had to defend against both assaults. The evidence presented concerned two discrete instances of penetration, and it was unclear in the absence of an election at the close of the State’s case which incident the State would rely upon for a conviction, especially in light of the ambiguous jury charge and closing arguments.

We note that this fourth factor does not weigh heavily in favor of reversal because no evidence was presented at trial that appellant had a different defense to the separate alleged offenses. Appellant’s defense across the board was that no sexual assaults ever occurred and that complainant fabricated the offense to get him out of her home because he was strict with her. His defense throughout trial also emphasized the lack of scientific evidence, missing evidence, and poor police investigation. It is unlikely that the jury’s belief of appellant’s defense that no sexual assault occurred at any time hinged on whether the State elected to designate one instance of sexual assault for its case-in-chief or another. *Cf. Taylor v. State*, 332 S.W.3d 483, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (where the defensive theory was that no sexual abuse occurred at any time, egregious harm did not result from jury charge error because the jury either believed the appellant or the victim).

Because of the State’s failure to elect which act it was relying upon for a conviction, it is possible that the jury convicted appellant by combining the

bathroom incident and the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident to overcome reasonable doubt. Likewise, it is possible that some members of the jury convicted based on the bathroom incident, and others convicted based on the August 16, 1987 bedroom incident. Further, as a result of the State's failure to make an election appellant did not have adequate notice of which act the State would rely upon in time to present his defense, and was therefore required to defend against both potential offenses. This last violation is somewhat moderated by appellant's outright denial of any wrongdoing, but that does not excuse the State's failure to elect.

Based on the foregoing, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in failing to require the State to elect did not contribute to appellant's conviction. *See Phillips*, 130 S.W.3d at 353-54. We sustain appellant's first issue.

D. The State's Contentions on Rehearing

On original submission, the State's brief focused initially on its contention that “[t]he State presented evidence that appellant sexually assaulted [the complainant] . . . in multiple ways, but only presented evidence of one act of penetration.” According to the State's brief, “Because evidence of multiple acts of the sexual assault alleged in the indictment were not presented, an election was not required.”

The State abandons its “one act of penetration” argument on rehearing and focuses instead on contentions that (1) the error at issue is a “delay in providing the election” or a “late election at the close of all evidence” rather than a failure to elect; and (2) any error with respect to election is harmless. We address these contentions in turn.

1. “Delay in providing the election”

According to the motion for rehearing, this court’s opinion “incorrectly decide[d] harm as if no election was made, rather than based on the error presented: a delay in providing the election.” The State contends that it “elected a specific offense at the end of all evidence.”

The State’s motion for rehearing cites to the jury charge in support of its contention that it “elected a specific offense at the end of all evidence.” The State also cites portions of the reporter’s record containing on-the-record colloquies among the trial court and counsel that occurred (1) after the State presented its case-in-chief and rested; and (2) after the defense presented evidence and both sides then rested at the close of evidence.

The cited portion of the jury charge is the same one quoted earlier, which appears to identify only one penetrative assault occurring on or about August 16, 1987 — but simultaneously references an earlier penetration incident occurring in a bathroom. This portion of the jury charge conflates the earlier bathroom incident and the separate August 16, 1987 bedroom incident.

A review of the first cited colloquy confirms that the State made no election after presenting its case-in-chief and resting. Instead, counsel for the State and the defense discussed only *timing* of the election and debated whether the State was required to elect at the close of its case-in-chief (as the defense advocated) or at the close of all the evidence (as the State advocated). The trial court erroneously concluded at the end of the first colloquy that the election had to occur at the “[c]lose of all the evidence, including the State’s case.”

A review of the second cited colloquy confirms that the State made no election at the close of all the evidence when both sides rested. Instead, the State indicated

it would make an election in the jury charge and stated: “It’s just going to be a matter of us figuring out how to word the description of the specific incident we are electing to go forward on. So, if we could be allowed some time to do that.”

There is no meaningful distinction to be drawn on this record between a failure to elect versus a late election. The State posits a “late election” that occurred in the jury charge. But “the jury charge does not serve ‘as a *de facto* election’ because it is given too late in the trial to afford a defendant the requisite notice to defend.” *Owings v. State*, No. PD-1184-16, 2017 WL 4973823, at *5 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017) (citation omitted); *see also Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 912 (“A jury charge and an election are not interchangeable in this context. The State is required to elect at the close of its evidence when properly requested.”).

In any event, the jury charge did not specify a single incident because it conflated the earlier bathroom penetrative assault and the later penetrative assault in the bedroom on August 16, 1987. On rehearing, the State no longer disputes that the earlier bathroom penetrative assault and the later August 16, 1987 penetrative assault in the bedroom of a different apartment are two separate incidents.

2. Harm

The State argues on rehearing that the second and third *Dixon* factors undergirding the election requirement “were not at issue and do not weigh in favor of harm” because “an election was ultimately made at the close of evidence and provided in the court’s charge” As discussed above, the record confirms that no purported election occurred at the close of evidence and the charge itself conflates two separate incidents involving penetrative assault. With respect to the fourth *Dixon* factor, the State argues on rehearing that it does not weigh in favor of reversal because “appellant did not distinguish between the offenses, have an alibi to one

offense, or argue that one offense was impossible. Instead, his defense was the same across the board that no sexual assaults ever occurred”

In analyzing these contentions we draw guidance from the harm analysis in *Owings*, 2017 WL 4973823, at *6-8, which was decided after the panel issued its original opinion in this case. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded in *Owings* that the second, third, and fourth *Dixon* factors did not point in favor of harmful error arising from the trial court’s erroneous failure in that case to require the State make an election at the close of its evidence.

The indictment in *Owings* “alleged one offense describing one act of genital-to-genital contact.” *Id.* at *5. But the complainant “testified that Appellant put his penis in her vagina on numerous occasions.” *Id.* “Hence, she testified to more than one act of genital-to-genital contact.” *Id.* “Therefore, because the defense made a timely request, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the act of genital-to-genital contact upon which it would rely for a conviction.” *Id.*

In assessing harm under the second *Dixon* factor, the court in *Owings* stated: “All of the incidents of sexual abuse in this case were recounted by the same source” *Id.* at *6. That source was the complainant. *Id.* “This case did not involve the presentation of evidence of different activities from different sources that a jury might perceive to ‘add up’ to the defendant being guilty even though no individual offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.*

Owings also noted that “[t]here was very little variance in how [the complainant] . . . described the genital-to-genital contact.” *Id.* “And, but for the times when [the complainant] . . . said Appellant put his penis in her vagina *and* she was also forced to perform oral sex, she described a sequence of events that happened repeatedly in the same way and under the same circumstances in the same

place.” *Id.* (emphasis in original). The complainant “described repeated genital-to-genital contact that occurred in Appellant’s bedroom, and the indictment alleged only genital-to-genital contact.” *Id.* at *7. “Despite certain varying details, these acts of abuse could reasonably be viewed as a general pattern.” *Id.*

Owings concluded that the second *Dixon* factor did not weigh in favor of reversal because the complainant “was either credible or she was not; she described the ongoing, repeated instances of genital-to-genital contact with enough detail to support a finding of guilt.” *Id.* “Likewise, we are confident that the State’s failure to elect did not result in a non-unanimous verdict.” *Id.* “As noted above, the prosecution clearly focused on the same act of genital-to-genital contact that [the complainant] . . . said occurred on numerous occasions in Appellant’s bedroom.” *Id.* “Appellant’s defense was that the sexual abuse did not occur at all.” *Id.* “There is no basis anywhere in the record for the jury to believe that one incident occurred and another did not.” *Id.* “Either they all did or they all did not.” *Id.* “We also perceive no risk that Appellant was deprived of adequate notice of which offense to defend against.” *Id.* at *8. Appellant’s defense was the same as to each incident [the complainant] . . . testified to — that no sexual abuse occurred at all.” *Id.*

In reaching these conclusions the court in *Owings* distinguished *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 913. *Phillips* “held that the trial court’s error in failing to require the State to elect was harmful constitutional error because the complainant had given more than one detailed account for each type of offense.” *Owings*, 2017 WL 4973823, at *7 n.20 (citing *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 907, 914). “Specifically, the purpose that was not satisfied [in *Phillips*] was the one requiring jury unanimity.” *Owings*, 2017 WL 4973823, at *7 n.20. “The danger was that six jurors could convict on the basis of one of the detailed incidents and six could convict on the basis of the other detailed incident.” *Id.* (citing *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 13).

Applying this teaching, we conclude that harmful error is shown because the circumstances here are much more similar to those in *Phillips* than they are to those in *Owings* or *Dixon*. Unlike *Owings*, this case does not involve evidence of a “general pattern” of genital-to-genital contact “that happened repeatedly in the same way under the same circumstances in the same place.” *See also Dixon*, 201 S.W.3d at 735 (No harm shown from failure to elect where the complainant “articulated one sequence of events and merely answered that this sequence happened one hundred times, with all but one of these instances occurring at night. The child was either credible in giving this unified account or she was not.”).

In contrast to *Owings* and *Dixon*, this case involves evidence from different witnesses who described two distinct penetrative assaults that occurred under different circumstances at different times in different rooms of different apartments. Here, as in *Phillips*, there is a significant danger that “six jurors could convict on the basis of one of the detailed incidents and six could convict on the basis of the other detailed incident.” *See Owings*, 2017 WL 4973823, at *7 n.20 (citing *Phillips*, 193 S.W.3d at 13). That danger is increased by the jury charge, and by closing arguments based on the charge’s conflated description of a single penetrative assault as occurring both (1) “while inside a bathroom inside an apartment [complainant] . . . shared with her mother, brothers, and the defendant;” and (2) “on or about the 16th day of August, 1987” — a date that corresponds to a separate bedroom incident in another apartment.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that the failure to require an election of which act the State relied upon for conviction at the close of its case-in-chief was harmful error, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial.²

/s/ William J. Boyce
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Brown.
Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

² In a cross-issue, the State requests we reform the judgment. Because we remand for a new trial, we do not reach this issue.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C



CASE NO.048222001010
INCIDENT NO/TRN: UNKNOWN 9170526753-A001

gs-2

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

GARCIA, FREDDY

STATE ID No.:TX02741352

§ IN THE 174TH DISTRICT
§
§ COURT
§
§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

ADDO
DIJDG
988

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BY JURY

Judge Presiding:	HON. RUBEN GUERRERO	Date Judgment Entered:	02/11/2016
Attorney for State:	SHANNON DREHNER	Attorney for Defendant:	HORAK, MATTHEW PATRICK

Offense for which Defendant Convicted:

AGG SEXUAL ASSAULT CHILD

Charging Instrument:	Statute for Offense:
INDICTMENT	N/A

Date of Offense:	Plea to Offense:
02-11-1987	NOT GUILTY

Degree of Offense:	Findings on Deadly Weapon:
1ST DEGREE FELONY	N/A

Verdict of Jury:	Plea to 1 st Enhancement Paragraph:	Plea to 2 nd Enhancement Habitual Paragraph:
GUILTY	N/A	N/A

Findings on 1 st Enhancement Paragraph:	Findings on 2 nd Enhancement Habitual Paragraph:
N/A	N/A

Punished Assessed by:	Date Sentence Imposed:	Date Sentence to Commence:
JURY	02/11/2016	02/11/2016

Punishment and Place of Confinement:	45 YEARS INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, TDCJ
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THIS SENTENCE SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY.

SENTENCE OF CONFINEMENT SUSPENDED. DEFENDANT PLACED ON COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR N/A.

Fine:	Court Costs:	Restitution:	Restitution Payable to:
\$ 10,000.00	As Assessed	\$ N/A	<input type="checkbox"/> VICTIM (see below) <input type="checkbox"/> AGENCY/AGENT (see below)

Sex Offender Registration Requirements apply to the Defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. chapter 62.

The age of the victim at the time of the offense was 11 years.

If Defendant is to serve sentence in TDCJ, enter incarceration periods in chronological order.

Time Credited:	From: 08/17/1987 to 09/21/1987	From: to
	From: 01/19/2015 to 02/11/2016	From: to
	From: to	From: to

If Defendant is to serve sentence in county jail or is given credit toward fine and costs, enter days credited below.

N/DAYS NOTES: N/A

All pertinent information, names and averments indicated above are incorporated into the language of the judgment below by reference.

This cause was called for trial in Harris County, Texas. The State appeared by her District Attorney.

Counsel / Waiver of Counsel (select one)

Defendant appeared in person with Counsel.

Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to representation by counsel in writing in open court.

It appeared to the Court that Defendant was mentally competent and had pleaded as shown above to the charging instrument. Both parties announced ready for trial. A jury was selected, impaneled, and sworn. The INDICTMENT was read to the jury, and Defendant entered a plea to the charged offense. The Court received the plea and entered it of record.

The jury heard the evidence submitted and argument of counsel. The Court charged the jury as to its duty to determine the guilt or innocence of Defendant, and the jury retired to consider the evidence. Upon returning to open court, the jury delivered its verdict in the presence of Defendant and defense counsel, if any.

The Court received the verdict and **ORDERED** it entered upon the minutes of the Court.

Punishment Assessed by Jury / Court / No election (select one)

Jury. Defendant entered a plea and filed a written election to have the jury assess punishment. The jury heard evidence relative to the question of punishment. The Court charged the jury and it retired to consider the question of punishment. After due deliberation, the jury was brought into Court, and, in open court, it returned its verdict as indicated above.

Court. Defendant elected to have the Court assess punishment. After hearing evidence relative to the question of punishment, the Court assessed Defendant's punishment as indicated above.

No Election. Defendant did not file a written election as to whether the judge or jury should assess punishment. After hearing evidence relative to the question of punishment, the Court assessed Defendant's punishment as indicated above.

The Court **FINDS** Defendant committed the above offense and **ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES** that Defendant is **GUILTY** of the above offense. The Court **FINDS** the Presentence Investigation, if so ordered, was done according to the applicable provisions of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12 § 9.

The Court **ORDERS** Defendant punished as indicated above. The Court **ORDERS** Defendant to pay all fines, court costs, and restitution as indicated above.

Punishment Options (select one)

Confinement in State Jail or Institutional Division. The Court **ORDERSThe** authorized agent of the State of Texas or the Sheriff of this County to take, safely convey, and deliver Defendant to the **Director, Institutional Division, TDCJ**. The Court **ORDERS** Defendant to be confined for the period and in the manner indicated above. The Court **ORDERS** Defendant remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of this county until the Sheriff can obey the directions of this sentence. The Court **ORDERS** that upon release from confinement, Defendant proceed immediately to the **Harris County District Clerk's office**. Once there, the Court **ORDERS** Defendant to pay, or make arrangements to pay, any remaining unpaid fines, court costs, and restitution as ordered by the Court above.

County Jail—Confinement / Confinement in Lieu of Payment. The Court **ORDERS** Defendant immediately committed to the custody of the **Sheriff of Harris County, Texas** on the date the sentence is to commence. Defendant shall be confined in the **Harris County Jail** for the period indicated above. The Court **ORDERS** that upon release from confinement, Defendant shall proceed immediately to the **Harris County District Clerk's office**. Once there, the Court **ORDERS** Defendant to pay, or make arrangements to pay, any remaining unpaid fines, court costs, and restitution as ordered by the Court above.

Fine Only Payment. The punishment assessed against Defendant is for a **FINE ONLY**. The Court **ORDERS** Defendant to proceed immediately to the **Office of the Harris County District Clerk**. Once there, the Court **ORDERS** Defendant to pay or make arrangements to pay all fines and court costs as ordered by the Court in this cause.

Execution / Suspension of Sentence (select one)

The Court **ORDERS** Defendant's sentence **EXECUTED**.

The Court **ORDERS** Defendant's sentence of confinement **SUSPENDED**. The Court **ORDERS** Defendant placed on community supervision for the adjudged period (above) so long as Defendant abides by and does not violate the terms and conditions of community supervision. The order setting forth the terms and conditions of community supervision is incorporated into this judgment by reference.

The Court **ORDERS** that Defendant is given credit noted above on this sentence for the time spent incarcerated. The Court **ORDERS** that Defendant is given credit noted above on this sentence for the time spent incarcerated. The Court further **ORDERS** that if the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses in a single criminal action, that each cost or fee amount must be assessed using the highest category of offense. Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 102.073.

Furthermore, the following special findings or orders apply:

Signed and entered on 02/11/2016



RUBEN GUERRERO

JUDGE PRESIDING

Notice of Appeal Filed: March 3, 2016

Mandate Received: 01/06/2020 Type of Mandate: AFFIRMANCE

After Mandate Received, Sentence to Begin Date is: 02/11/2016

Jail Credit: TO REMAIN THE SAME

Def. Received on at AM PM
By: Deputy Sheriff of Harris County

Clerk: V MASON

Case Number:

Defendant: GARCIA, FREDDY

EN/KR04: LCBT: I.CBU: EN/KR18:



Right Thumbprint



I, Marilyn Burgess, District Clerk of Harris County, Texas certify that this is a true and correct copy of the original record filed and or recorded in my office, electronically or hard copy, as it appears on this date.

Witness my official hand and seal of office
this February 18, 2020

Certified Document Number: 88825087 Total Pages: 2

Marilyn Burgess, DISTRICT CLERK
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com