

No. _____

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Dustin Larmon McDonald

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. Must challenges to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence be preserved by a separate “reasonableness” objection in district court?
- II. Whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate the sentence and remand to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of *United States v. Haymond*, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (June 26, 2019)?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Dustin Larmon McDonald, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the court below. Respondent, the United States of America, was the Plaintiff-Appellee in the court below.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Dustin Larmon McDonald seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is located within the Federal Appendix at *United States v. Dustin Larmon McDonald*, 773 Fed. Appx. 788 (5th Cir. July 18, 2019) (unpublished). It is reprinted in Appendix A to this Petition. The Court of appeals denied Petitioner's petition for rehearing. That order is reprinted and attached as Appendix B. The district court's judgement and sentence is attached as Appendix C. The district court's judgment revoking supervised release is attached as Appendix D.

JURISDICTION

The panel opinion and judgment of the Fifth Circuit were entered on July 18, 2019. The Court of Appeals issued its order denying the petition for rehearing on September 11, 2019. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND RULES PROVISIONS

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 provides:

(a) Exceptions Unnecessary.

Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary.

(b) Preserving a Claim of Error.

A party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court – when the court ruling or order is made or sought – of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party's objection to the court's action and the grounds for that objection. If a party does not have an

opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party. A ruling or order that admits or excludes evidence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 103.

This Petition also involves 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) which provides the following:

(g) Mandatory revocation for possession of controlled substance or firearm or for refusal to comply with drug testing.--If the defendant--

(1) possesses a controlled substance in violation of the condition set forth in subsection (d);

(2) possesses a firearm, as such term is defined in [section 921](#) of this title, in violation of Federal law, or otherwise violates a condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm;

(3) refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised release; or

(4) as a part of drug testing, tests positive for illegal controlled substances more than 3 times over the course of 1 year;

the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in part:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed

LIST OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

1. *United States v. Dustin Larmon McDonald*, 5:13-CR094-01-C. United States District Court, Northern District of Texas. Judgment entered March 21, 2014.

2. *United States v. Dustin Larmon McDonald*, 5:13-CR094-01-C, United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, petition for offender under supervision. Petition filed July 20, 2018. Judgment revoking supervised release and imposing an 18-month term of imprisonment and no additional term of supervised release was entered on November 1, 2018.

3. *United States v. Dustin Larmon McDonald*, CA No. 18-11463, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Opinion and judgment affirming the sentence entered July 18, 2019. Order denying petition for rehearing filed September 11, 2019.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dustin Larmon McDonald was originally sentenced on March 21, 2014, to 27 months in prison and three years of supervised release for a being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. (ROA.74–76).¹ He began his term of supervised release on March 4, 2016. (ROA.79). Mr. McDonald’s term of supervision was revoked on September 7, 2018, and he was sentenced to 18 months in prison with no additional term of supervised release. (ROA.97).

In petitioning the court for action against McDonald, the probation officer reported that McDonald faced “[m]andatory revocation for possession of a controlled substance” and was subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1). (ROA.80).

On appeal, McDonald raised the issue that the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence of imprisonment. The court of appeals, however, held that the court’s procedures of imposing its sentence did result in plain error. *See* Appendix A. Between the time of briefing and the issuance of the opinion by the court of appeals, this Court issued its opinion in *United States v. Haymond*, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (June 26, 2019). McDonald petitioned the court of appeals for rehearing because McDonald’s revocation procedures applied the mandatory revocation statute of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), a statute that McDonald argued was unconstitutional in light of *Haymond*. The court of appeals denied rehearing. *See* Appendix B.

¹ For the convenience of the Court and the parties, the Petitioner has included citations to the page number of the record on appeal below.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

- I. The courts of appeals are divided as to whether a defendant must lodge a separate objection to the district court's failure to respond to arguments for leniency.**
- A. The conclusion of the court below implicates an entrenched division of circuit authority.**

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 requires the party seeking relief on appeal to “inform[] the court—when the court ruling or order is made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party's objection to the court's action and the grounds for that objection.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). As the Fourth Circuit has persuasively reasoned, presenting a ground for lesser sentence informs the court that the party would like it addressed. *See United States v. Lynn*, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010) (“By drawing arguments from § 3553 for a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed, an aggrieved party sufficiently alerts the district court of its responsibility to render an individualized explanation addressing those arguments, and thus preserves its claim.”).

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has vacated without the use of plain error where the district court simply passed over compelling mitigation arguments in silence. *See United States v. Cunningham*, 429 F.3d 673, 675-680 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.). And the D.C. Circuit has likewise declined to apply plain error to a defendant's failure to consider the §3553(a) factors. *See United States v. Bras*, 483 F.3d 103, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

But the court below applied plain error review to Petitioner's claim of procedural reasonableness because it found no specific objection to the court's

procedures below. *See* Appendix A. It is joined in this approach by the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, all of which require a separate objection to a court's failure to explain the sentence. *See United States v. Gilman*, 478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st Cir. 2007); *United States v. Villafuerte*, 502 F.3d 204, 208-09 (2nd Cir. 2007); *United States v. Penson*, 526 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Bistrup*, 449 F.3d 873, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2006), *United States v. Knows His Gun, III*, 438 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2006), and *United States v. Romero*, 491 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 2007).

B. This case presents an appropriate vehicle.

Petitioner has never been afforded procedural reasonableness review of his sentence without the erroneous barrier of plain error review. Substantial justice would thus be accomplished even if the Court merely remanded for review under the correct standard. In the absence of plain error review, moreover, the district court's imposition of sentence would be reversed as procedurally unreasonable. The district court offered no response to claims in mitigation, and very little affirmative explanation of the sentence in any case. It is the plain error rule that requires clear error and that shifts the burden of showing an effect on substantial rights to the defendant rather than the government. *See United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). In the absence of this rule, there would therefore be no barrier to reversal.

II. This Court should grant certiorari, vacate the sentence and remand to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of, *United States v. Haymond*, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (June 26, 2019).

This Court’s recent decision in *Haymond* makes clear that, even in the context of supervised release, “a jury must find any facts that trigger a *new* mandatory prison term.” *Haymond*, 139 S.Ct. at 2380 (emphasis in original). Here, McDonald was sentenced under a statute that required mandatory imprisonment after failing to afford him the right to a jury trial to determine the truth of the allegations against him.

From the opening paragraph of the *Haymond* decision, the Supreme Court made clear that the mandatory revocation statute of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) violated the Constitution by failing provide the accused with the right to a jury and the reasonable doubt standard:

Only a jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may take a person’s liberty. That promise stands as one of the Constitution’s most vital protections against arbitrary government. Yet in this case a congressional statute compelled a federal judge to send a man to prison . . . without empaneling a jury of his peers or requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As applied here, we do not hesitate to hold that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Haymond, 139 S.Ct. at 2373.

In his initial trial, Haymond was convicted of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). *Id.* Haymond was sentenced to 38 months’ imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. *Id.* After completing his prison sentence and beginning his term of supervised release, Haymond was found with

several “images that appeared to be child pornography” on his phone. *Id.* at 1374. The government moved to revoke Haymond’s supervised release and imposed a new, additional prison sentence. *Id.*

After a hearing, the district judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond possessed some of the images. *Id.* The district judge felt “bound by [18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)] to impose an additional term of prison.” *Id.* at 2375.

Section 3583(k) of United States Code Title 18 states in relevant part:

Notwithstanding subsection (b), the authorized term of supervised release for any offense under section 1201 involving a minor victim, and for any offense under section 1591, 1594(c), 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2250, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425, is any term of years not less than 5, or life. If a defendant required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act commits any criminal offense under chapter 109A, 110, or 117, or section 1201 or 1591, for which imprisonment for a term longer than 1 year can be imposed, the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) without regard to the exception contained therein. Such term shall be not less than 5 years.

18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(k).

On appeal, Haymond challenged the constitutionality of the punishment, and the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 3583(k) violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. *Id.* The Tenth Circuit concluded that the last two sentences of § 3583(k) were “unconstitutional and unenforceable.” *Id.* (citing 869 F.3d 1153, 1168 (10th Cir. 2017)).

On review the Court explained:

[T]he Framers adopted the Sixth Amendment’s promise that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” In the Fifth Amendment, they added

that no one may be deprived of liberty without “due process of law.” Together, these pillars of the Bill of Rights ensure that the government must prove to a jury every criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt, an ancient rule that has “extend[ed] down centuries.”

Id. at 2376 (citing *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)).

Despite these rights, the Court noted that Haymond’s revocation involved “a judge—acting without a jury and based only on a preponderance of the evidence—[who] found that Mr. Haymond had engaged in additional conduct in violation of the terms of his supervised release.” *Id.* at 2378. Then, “[u]nder § 3583(k), that judicial fact-finding triggered a new punishment in the form of a prison term of at least five years and up to life. [Thus,] the facts the judge found here increased ‘the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences’ in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” *Id.* (citing *Alleyne v. United States*, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)).

Our precedents, *Apprendi*, *Blakely*, and *Alleyne* included, have repeatedly rejected efforts to dodge the demands of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by the simple expedient of relabeling a criminal prosecution a “sentencing enhancement.” Calling part of a criminal prosecution a “sentence modification” imposed at a “postjudgment sentence-administration proceeding” can fare no better. As this Court has repeatedly explained, any “increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact” requires a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt “no matter” what the government chooses to call the exercise.

Id. at 2379.

In a concurrence, Justice Breyer did not go so far. In his view supervised release may be likened to parole, violations of which may be ordinarily found without the aid of a jury. *See Haymond*, 139 S.Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring). But he vacated Haymond’s sentence because of three features of 3583(k):

First, § 3583(k) applies only when a defendant commits a discrete set of federal criminal offenses specified in the statute. Second, § 3583(k) takes away the judge's discretion to decide whether violation of a condition of supervised release should result in imprisonment and for how long. Third, § 3583(k) limits the judge's discretion in a particular manner: by imposing a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of "not less than 5 years" upon a judge's finding that a defendant has "commit[ted] any" listed "criminal offense."

Id. at 2386.

Two of the three of these criteria are present in 3583(g). Subsection (g) names "a discrete set of federal criminal offenses," namely: unlawful possession of controlled substances, 3583(g)(1), possession of a firearm (necessarily a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) when the underlying offense is a felony), 3583(g)(2), and repeated use of a controlled substance, as evidenced by positive drug tests, 3583(g)(4). The only other basis for mandatory revocation named in 3583(g)(3) – non-compliance with drug testing – is so closely associated with illegal drug use as to be essentially a means of proving a discrete federal offense. The statute thus creates the appearance of a legislative effort to provide punishment for criminal offenses while circumventing cumbersome constitutional guarantees. *See Haymond*, 139 S.Ct. at 2381 (Gorsuch, J., plurality op.) ("If the government were right, a jury's conviction on one crime would (again) permit perpetual supervised release and allow the government to evade the need for another jury trial on any other offense the defendant might commit, no matter how grave the punishment.")

Here, like Mr. Haymond, McDonald also had his supervised release revoked and was subjected to mandatory imprisonment without being afforded the right to a jury trial and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. In petitioning the court for

action against McDonald, the probation officer reported that McDonald faced “[m]andatory revocation for possession of a controlled substance” and was subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1). (ROA.79).

Section 3583(g) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides:

(g) Mandatory revocation for possession of controlled substance or firearm or for refusal to comply with drug testing.--If the defendant--

(1) possesses a controlled substance in violation of the condition set forth in subsection (d);

(2) possesses a firearm, as such term is defined in [section 921](#) of this title, in violation of Federal law, or otherwise violates a condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm;

(3) refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised release; or

(4) as a part of drug testing, tests positive for illegal controlled substances more than 3 times over the course of 1 year;

the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3).

18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). This statute shares substantially similar language to the unconstitutional language of subsection (k): “the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment.”

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), *with* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).

The application of the mandatory revocation statute of § 3583(g) was illegal under the dictates of *Haymond*. “[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear

break’ with the past.” *Griffith v. Kentucky*, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). Mr. McDonald’s case remains on direct review, so *Haymond* is fully applicable to his case.

It is true that consideration of this sentencing issue would be ordinarily barred by the law of the case doctrine. *Tollett v. City of Kemah*, 285 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 2002). But there are three exceptions:

(1) The evidence at a subsequent trial is substantially different; (2) there has been an intervening change of law by a controlling authority; and (3) the earlier decision is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002). Here, *Haymond* represents an intervening change of law by a controlling authority. And because Mr. McDonald was denied his constitutional rights by the application of the mandatory revocation statute, refusal to entertain these issues would create a manifest injustice. Also, McDonald recognizes that this issue was not raised in the trial court nor initially before appellate court below. However, because the *Haymond* case was decided on June 26, 2019, between the time of briefing and the issuance of the opinion of the court of appeals, McDonald contends that a GVR is still appropriate remedy.

GVR is not a decision on the merits. *See Tyler v. Cain*, 533 U.S. 656, 665, n.6 (2001); accord *State Tax Commission v. Van Cott*, 306 U.S. 511, 515-516 (1939). Any possible or arguable procedural obstacles to reversal – such as the consequences of non- preservation or harmless error analysis – should be decided in the first instance by the court of appeals. *See Henry v. Rock Hill*, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964) (*per curiam*) (GVR “has been our practice in analogous situations where, not certain that the case was free from all obstacles to reversal on an intervening precedent”); *Torres-Valencia*

v. United States, 464 U.S. 44 (1983) (*per curiam*) (GVR utilized over government's objection where error was conceded; government's harmless error argument should be presented to the Court of Appeals in the first instance); *Florida v. Burr*, 496 U.S. 914, 916-919 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (speaking approvingly of a prior GVR in the same case, wherein the Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of a new precedent, although the claim recognized by the new precedent had not been presented below); *State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel*, 324 U.S. 154, 161 (1945) (remanding for reconsideration in light of new authority that party lacked opportunity to raise because it supervened the opinion of the Court of Appeals).

In the present case, the Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Court of Appeals. However, because neither the Petitioner nor the Fifth Circuit had the benefit of this Court's decision in *United States v. Haymond*, 139 S. Ct. at 2369, this Court should vacate and remand for re-consideration in light of *Haymond*. See *Henderson v. United States*, 568 U.S. 1121, 1130 (2013) (For the purposes of determining whether error is plain, "it is enough that an error be plain at the time of appellate consideration.").

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court should grant *certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of December, 2019.

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