

## **APPENDIX**

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## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of Iowa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ERWIN KEITH BELL

## JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

)

) Case Number: 0862 1:17CR00027-001

)

) USM Number: 18041-030

)

**Melanie S. Keiper**

Defendant's Attorney

 ORIGINAL JUDGMENT AMENDED JUDGMENT

Date of Most Recent Judgment:

Reason for Amendment:

**THE DEFENDANT:** pleaded guilty to count(s) 1 of the Indictment filed on May 3, 2017 pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ which was accepted by the court. was found guilty on count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

| <u>Title &amp; Section</u>           | <u>Nature of Offense</u>         | <u>Offense Ended</u> | <u>Count</u> |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) | Felon in Possession of a Firearm | 02/04/2017           | 1            |

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 8 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ Count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are dismissed on the motion of the United States.


It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States Attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

**Linda R. Reade**  
**United States District Court Judge**

Name and Title of Judge

December 21, 2017

Date of Imposition of Judgment

  
Signature of Judge

December 21, 2017

Date

DEFENDANT: **ERWIN KEITH BELL**  
CASE NUMBER: **0862 1:17CR00027-001**

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## PROBATION

The defendant is hereby sentenced to probation for a term of:

## IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:  
**248 months on Count 1 of the Indictment.**

The court makes the following recommendations to the Federal Bureau of Prisons:  
**It is recommended that the defendant be designated to a Bureau of Prisons facility as close to the defendant's family as possible, commensurate with the defendant's security and custody classification needs.**  
**It is recommended that the defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons' 500-Hour Comprehensive Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program or an alternate substance abuse treatment program.**

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant must surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at \_\_\_\_\_  a.m.     p.m.    on \_\_\_\_\_

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant must surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons:

before 2 p.m. on \_\_\_\_\_

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the United States Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

## RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
at \_\_\_\_\_, with a certified copy of this judgment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By \_\_\_\_\_  
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

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## SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant will be on supervised release for a term of:  
**5 years on Count 1 of the Indictment.**

## MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) The defendant must not commit another federal, state, or local crime.
- 2) The defendant must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
- 3) The defendant must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.  
The defendant must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
  - The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future controlled substance abuse. *(Check, if applicable.)*
- 4)  The defendant must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(Check, if applicable.)*
- 5)  The defendant must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 16901, *et seq.*) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where the defendant resides, works, and/or is a student, and/or was convicted of a qualifying offense. *(Check, if applicable.)*
- 6)  The defendant must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(Check, if applicable.)*

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

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## STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of the defendant's supervision, the defendant must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for the defendant's behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in the defendant's conduct and condition.

- 1) The defendant must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where the defendant is authorized to reside within 72 hours of the time the defendant was sentenced and/or released from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
- 2) After initially reporting to the probation office, the defendant will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when the defendant must report to the probation officer, and the defendant must report to the probation officer as instructed. The defendant must also appear in court as required.
- 3) The defendant must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where the defendant is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
- 4) The defendant must answer truthfully the questions asked by the defendant's probation officer.
- 5) The defendant must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant lives or anything about the defendant's living arrangements (such as the people the defendant lives with), the defendant must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 6) The defendant must allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at the defendant's home or elsewhere, and the defendant must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant's supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
- 7) The defendant must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment, the defendant must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about the defendant's work (such as the defendant's position or the defendant's job responsibilities), the defendant must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 8) The defendant must not communicate or interact with someone the defendant knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
- 9) If the defendant is arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, the defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
- 10) The defendant must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
- 11) The defendant must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
- 12) As directed by the probation officer, the defendant must notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and must permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.
- 13) The defendant must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

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## SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

*The defendant must comply with the following special conditions as ordered by the Court and implemented by the United States Probation Office:*

1. The defendant must not have contact during the defendant's term of supervision with the victims set out in paragraph 182 of the presentence report, in person or by a third party. This includes no direct or indirect contact by telephone, mail, email, or by any other means. The United States Probation Office may contact the aforementioned individual(s) to ensure the defendant's compliance with this condition.
2. The defendant must not knowingly communicate, or otherwise interact, with any member, prospect, or associate member of a gang, crime organization, or threat group, without first obtaining the permission of the United States Probation Office.
3. The defendant must submit the defendant's person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers [as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)], other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, or office, to a search conducted by a United States Probation Officer. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. The defendant must warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition. The United States Probation Office may conduct a search under this condition only when reasonable suspicion exists that the defendant has violated a condition of supervision and that the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation. Any search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
4. The defendant must participate in a mental health evaluation. The defendant must complete any recommended treatment program, and follow the rules and regulations of the treatment program. The defendant must take all medications prescribed to the defendant by a licensed medical provider.
5. The defendant must participate in an evaluation for anger management and/or domestic violence. The defendant must complete any recommended treatment program, and follow the rules and regulations of the treatment program.
6. The defendant must participate in a substance abuse evaluation. The defendant must complete any recommended treatment program, which may include a cognitive behavioral group, and follow the rules and regulations of the treatment program. The defendant must participate in a program of testing for substance abuse. The defendant must not attempt to obstruct or tamper with the testing methods.
7. The defendant must not use or possess alcohol. The defendant is prohibited from entering any establishment that holds itself out to the public to be a bar or tavern without the prior permission of the United States Probation Office.

*Continued on following page.*

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### SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

*The defendant must comply with the following special conditions as ordered by the Court and implemented by the United States Probation Office:*

8. The defendant must participate in the Remote Alcohol Testing Program during any period of the defendant's supervision. The defendant must abide by all rules and regulations of the Remote Alcohol Testing Program. The defendant will be responsible for the cost of participation in the Remote Alcohol Testing Program.
9. If not employed at a lawful type of employment as deemed appropriate by the United States Probation Office, the defendant must participate in employment workshops and report, as directed, to the United States Probation Office to provide verification of daily job search results or other employment related activities. In the event the defendant fails to secure employment, participate in the employment workshops, or provide verification of daily job search results, the defendant may be required to perform up to 20 hours of community service per week until employed.
10. The defendant must pay any fine, restitution, and/or special assessment imposed by this judgment.
11. For as long as the defendant owes any fine, restitution, and/or special assessment imposed by this judgment, the defendant must provide the United States Probation Office with access to any requested financial information.
12. For as long as the defendant owes any fine, restitution, and/or special assessment imposed by this judgment, the defendant must not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the United States Probation Office unless the defendant is in compliance with the installment payment schedule.

These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions and have been provided a copy of them. Upon a finding of a violation of supervision, I understand the Court may: (1) revoke supervision; (2) extend the term of supervision; and/or (3) modify the condition of supervision.

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Defendant

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Date

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United States Probation Officer/Designated Witness

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Date

DEFENDANT: **ERWIN KEITH BELL**  
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## CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

| <u>TOTALS</u> | <u>Assessment</u> | <u>JVTA Assessment<sup>1</sup></u> | <u>Fine</u> | <u>Restitution</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|
|               | <u>\$ 100</u>     | <u>\$ 0</u>                        | <u>\$ 0</u> | <u>\$ 408.96</u>   |

The determination of restitution is deferred until \_\_\_\_\_. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C)* will be entered after such determination.

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

| <u>Name of Payee</u>       | <u>Total Loss<sup>2</sup></u> | <u>Restitution Ordered</u> | <u>Priority or Percentage</u> |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| City of Mount Vernon, Iowa |                               | <u>\$408.96</u>            |                               |

**TOTALS**      \$ \_\_\_\_\_      \$ 408.96

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ \_\_\_\_\_

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

the interest requirement is waived for the  fine  restitution.

the interest requirement for the  fine  restitution is modified as follows:

<sup>1</sup>Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, 18 U.S.C. § 3014.

<sup>2</sup>Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

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## SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

A  Lump sum payment of \$ 100 due immediately, balance due

not later than \_\_\_\_\_, or  
 in accordance with  C,  D,  E, or  F below; or

B  Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with  C,  D, or  F below); or

C  Payment in equal \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., months or years), to commence \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

D  Payment in equal \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., months or years), to commence \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

E  Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or

F  Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

If any of the defendant's court ordered financial obligations are still owed while the defendant is incarcerated, the defendant must make monthly payments in accordance with the Bureau of Prisons Financial Responsibility Program. The amount of the monthly payments will not exceed 50% of the funds available to the defendant through institution or non-institution (community) resources and will be at least \$25 per quarter. If the defendant still owes any portion of the financial obligation(s) at the time of release from imprisonment, the defendant must pay it as a condition of supervision and the United States Probation Office will pursue collection of the amount due pursuant to a payment schedule approved by the Court. The defendant must notify the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Iowa within 30 days of any change of the defendant's mailing or residence address that occurs while any portion of the financial obligation(s) remains unpaid.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant will receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

The defendant must pay the cost of prosecution.

The defendant must pay the following court cost(s):

The defendant must forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:  
**As set forth in the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture filed on July 6, 2017, Document No. 19 (which the Court orally made a Final Order of Forfeiture on December 21, 2017).**

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) JVTA assessment, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

United States Court of Appeals  
For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-3817

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United States of America

*Plaintiff - Appellee*

v.

Kyle Dwayne Boleyn

*Defendant - Appellant*

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No. 18-1021

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United States of America

*Plaintiff - Appellee*

v.

Erwin Keith Bell

*Defendant - Appellant*

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No. 18-2248

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United States of America

*Plaintiff - Appellee*

v.

Justin Scott Vasey

*Defendant - Appellant*

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No. 18-2286

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United States of America

*Plaintiff - Appellee*

v.

Demetrius Marcellus Green

*Defendant - Appellant*

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No. 18-2562

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United States of America

*Plaintiff - Appellee*

v.

Robert Joseph Fisher

*Defendant - Appellant*

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Appeals from United States District Courts  
for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa

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Submitted: January 17, 2019  
Filed: July 8, 2019

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Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

We consolidated these five sentencing appeals because they present a common issue: whether a prior conviction under Iowa Code § 124.401 qualifies as a predicate offense warranting sentence enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), and the career offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines if the Iowa law of aiding and abetting liability is “overly broad.” Five judges of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa concluded that a conviction under § 124.401 is a

“serious drug offense” under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii); a “felony drug offense” under the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D); or a “controlled substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b) of the Guidelines.<sup>1</sup> Separately considering the three enhancement provisions, we agree with the district courts’ conclusions and therefore affirm each of the five sentences.<sup>2</sup>

## I. The Common Issue.

Kyle Dwayne Boleyn and Erwin Keith Bell each pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district courts concluded that their multiple prior convictions under Iowa Code § 124.401 were “serious drug offenses” under the ACCA. This determination increased their advisory guidelines ranges and subjected them to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence, rather than the maximum ten-year sentence under § 922(g). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).

Justin Vasey, Robert Fisher, and Demetrius Green each pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) or (D). The district courts determined they were subject to the career offender enhancement under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines because their

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<sup>1</sup>The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Linda R. Reade, and Leonard T. Strand, United States District Judges for the Northern District of Iowa, and the Honorable John A. Jarvey and Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judges for the Southern District of Iowa.

<sup>2</sup>Appellant Robert Fisher also argues that one Iowa drug conviction does not qualify as a career offender predicate because the government failed to prove he was incarcerated during the fifteen years prior to the instant offense. See USSG § 4A1.2(e)(1). After careful review of the sentencing record as a whole, we conclude the district court’s finding on this issue was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Simms, 695 F.3d 863, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review).

prior convictions under § 124.401 were “controlled substance offenses.” This significantly increased their advisory guidelines ranges. The district court also determined that one of Green’s two convictions under § 124.401 qualified as a prior “felony drug offense” under the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). This increased the statutory maximum sentence for his marijuana offense of conviction from five to ten years under § 841(b)(1)(D).

On appeal, each defendant argues that the district court erred in determining that his prior convictions under § 124.401 warrant a drug offense enhancement under the ACCA, the career offender guidelines provisions, or the CSA. The Iowa statute at issue provides:

it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance, a counterfeit substance, or a simulated controlled substance, or to act with, enter into a common scheme or design with, or conspire with one or more other persons to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, a counterfeit substance, or a simulated controlled substance.

Iowa Code § 124.401(1). Raising an issue of first impression in this circuit, defendants argue that *no* conviction under this statute can be a predicate prior conviction under the ACCA, the CSA, or the career offender guidelines because aiding and abetting liability is inherent in the definition of all drug offenses, and Iowa’s doctrine of aiding and abetting is broader than “the generic definition of aiding and abetting.” More specifically, defendants argue that a “vast majority of relevant authorities -- the federal courts, 45 state jurisdictions, and the Model Penal Code -- [hold] that a defendant cannot be convicted on an aiding and abetting theory on only a ‘knowledge’ *mens rea*.” By contrast, Iowa is one of the few States that “only requires mere knowledge that one’s actions will facilitate a crime.” Because “knowledge” is a lesser *mens rea* than “intent,” defendants posit, “it follows, with

respect to aiding and abetting liability, that Iowa § 124.401 is broader than" drug offenses as defined in the ACCA, the CSA, or the career offender guidelines.

We review *de novo* the determination that a prior conviction qualifies as a sentence enhancing predicate. See United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2009) (ACCA); United States v. Sturdivant, 513 F.3d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 2008) (CSA); United States v. Eason, 643 F.3d 622, 623 (8th Cir. 2011) (USSG). Though creative, we conclude defendants' contention is unsound.

## II. The Analytical Framework.

In determining whether a prior § 124.401 conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for purposes of these federal sentencing enhancements, we apply a categorical approach that looks to the statutory definition of the prior offense, not to the facts underlying a defendant's prior convictions. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). In Taylor, the Court considered whether a burglary conviction fell within the ACCA provision defining violent felony to include certain enumerated offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) ("is burglary"). If the state statute "sweeps more broadly" than the generic crime enumerated, a conviction "cannot count as an ACCA predicate, even if the defendant actually committed the offense in its generic form." Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013).

By contrast, when a federal enhancement provision incorporates state offenses by language other than a reference to generic crimes, the categorical approach still applies, but the inquiry is focused on applying the ordinary meaning of the words used in the federal law to the statutory definition of the prior state offense. See United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) ("aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct with a minor or ward," 18 U.S.C. § 2252); cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36-38 (2009) ("aggravated felony" in the Immigration and Nationality Act). In United States v. Maldonado, 864 F.3d 893, 897-

901 (8th Cir. 2017), we applied the categorical approach in rejecting the argument that Iowa Code § 124.401 is not a “controlled substance offense” under the career offender guidelines because it could be construed to apply to offers to sell.

This case presents a different issue, whether Iowa’s doctrine of aiding and abetting liability renders every § 124.401 conviction overly broad under each of the three federal enhancement provisions at issue. The argument was “teed up,” in defendants’ view, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez that “every jurisdiction -- all States and the Federal Government -- has expressly abrogated the distinction among principals and aiders and abettors.” 549 U.S. 183, 189 (2007) (quotation omitted). This is certainly true in Iowa, where a separate statute provides that aiders and abettors are to be “charged, tried and punished as principals.” Iowa Code § 703.1. Thus, § 124.401, the statute at issue, defines the criminal offense but contains no reference to aiding and abetting liability. Iowa law does not require that an individual be charged as an aider and abettor for the theory to apply, see State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 842-45 (Iowa 1994), nor does it require a unanimous verdict that defendant acted as a principal as opposed to an aider and abettor, see White v. State, 380 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa App. 1985).

### III. The ACCA and CSA Enhancements.

Defendants Bell and Boleyn were sentenced under the ACCA’s sentencing enhancement because they violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and have three prior convictions for a “serious drug offense.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) and (e)(1). The ACCA defines “serious drug offense” as (i) an offense under enumerated federal controlled substances statutes or “(ii) an offense under State law, *involving* manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance” as defined by federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).

Defendant Green's sentence was enhanced under the CSA to a maximum of ten rather than five years in prison because he violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) after a prior conviction for a "felony drug offense." "Felony drug offense," as used in § 841 is defined as "an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct *relating to* narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances." 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (emphasis added). "Section 802(44) defines the precise phrase used in § 841(b)(1)(A) -- 'felony drug offense.'" Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008).

Iowa Code § 124.401 provides that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." Defendants argue that their convictions under § 124.401 cannot be ACCA and CSA drug offense predicates because the required *mens rea* under Iowa's doctrine of aiding and abetting is mere knowledge, which is broader than "generic" aiding and abetting.<sup>3</sup> This issue turns on the definitions of predicate state offenses in the ACCA and the CSA: we must determine whether a conviction under Iowa Code § 124.401, which may have been based on aiding and abetting liability, is categorically a conviction for an offense that "involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), or for an offense that "prohibits or restricts conduct relating to

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<sup>3</sup>We reject the government's contention that the categorical approach permits us to look only to § 124.401, the statute of conviction. The Supreme Court explained in Duenas-Alvarez that, in determining whether a prior state conviction was a "theft offense" listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act, "one who aids or abets a theft falls, like a principal, within the scope of [the theft offense's] generic definition." 549 U.S. at 189. As aiding and abetting liability is inherent in every conviction under Iowa Code § 124.401, it is consistent with the categorical approach to look to Iowa's aiding and abetting statute in determining whether the prior offense of conviction is overbroad. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02.

narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances,” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).

In United States v. Bynum, we concluded that a conviction for knowingly offering to sell an illegal drug was sufficiently related to drug distribution to qualify as a “serious drug offense” predicate under the ACCA. We explained that the ACCA “uses the term ‘involving,’ an expansive term that requires only that the conviction be related to or connected with drug manufacture, distribution, or possession, as opposed to including those acts as an element of the offense.” 669 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Likewise, this expansive language includes all conduct encompassed by aider and abettor liability under § 124.401. Whether Bell, Boleyn, and Green were convicted of knowingly aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance, as opposed to intentionally aiding and abetting delivery, makes no difference. They were convicted of conduct that “involved” and “related to” drug distribution. We note that, in other contexts, other circuits have ruled that “[n]o element of *mens rea* with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled substance is expressed or implied by” these ACCA and CSA definitions. United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Curry, 404 F.3d 316, 319 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2005). We disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s contrary ACCA analysis in United States v. Franklin, 904 F.3d 793, 800-802 (9th Cir. 2018).<sup>4</sup>

Looking only to the fact of a prior conviction and the statutory definition of a drug offense under Iowa Code § 124.401, including the Iowa law of aiding and abetting liability, as the categorical approach requires, we conclude that convictions under this state statute categorically “involve” and “relate to” the offenses described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). Accordingly, the district

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<sup>4</sup>The Supreme Court recently granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits regarding this issue. Schular v. United States, No. 18-6662 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2019).

courts properly imposed the ACCA and CSA statutory enhancements based on prior convictions of Bell, Boleyn, and Green under Iowa Code § 124.401.

#### **IV. The Career Offender Enhancement.**

Defendants Vasey, Green, and Fisher were sentenced as career offenders under the Guidelines because they have at least two prior felony convictions of a “controlled substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a)(3). The Guidelines define “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” § 4B1.2(b). This definition expressly includes “the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” § 4B1.2, comment. (n.1). Again, we apply a categorical approach to determine whether Iowa Code § 124.401 “criminalize[s] more than the guidelines definition of ‘controlled substance offense.’” United States v. Thomas, 886 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 2018).

Defendants argue that § 124.401 is broader than the guidelines definition of controlled substance offense because Iowa law imposes aiding and abetting liability more broadly than the “generic” definition of aiding and abetting.<sup>5</sup> Application note 1 to § 4B1.2 includes “the offenses of aiding and abetting” but does not define that term. In general, “[c]onsiderable confusion exists as to what the accomplice’s mental state must be in order to hold him accountable” as an aider or abettor. 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., *Substantive Criminal Law* § 13.2(b) (3d ed. 2018). As the Seventh Circuit succinctly explained some years ago:

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<sup>5</sup>Defendants do not contend that the substantive provisions of § 124.401 include conduct not encompassed by the definition of controlled substance offense in § 4B1.2(b), the issue in Maldonado, 864 F.3d at 899. Only the extent of aiding and abetting liability is at issue on these appeals.

Under the older cases . . . it was enough that the aider and abettor knew the principal's purpose. Although this is still the test in some states . . . after the Supreme Court in *Nye & Nissen v. United States*, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949), adopted Judge Learned Hand's test -- that the aider and abettor "in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed," *United States v. Peoni*, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) -- it came to be generally accepted that the aider and abettor must share the principal's purpose in order to be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal aider and abettor statute. . . . But . . . there is support for relaxing this requirement when the crime is particularly grave.

United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 797-98 (7th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court's recent opinion addressing this issue at length confirms the evolution described by the Seventh Circuit but suggests that confusion lingers. See Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 76-77, 81 n.10, and 84-89 (Alito, J., dissenting) (2014).

For a controlled substance offense under federal law, § 4B1.2(b) obviously incorporates the scope of aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2. But for a controlled substance offense under state law, the concept of a "generic" aiding and abetting offense is far from clear. Defendants argue that comparing the scope of Iowa aiding and abetting law to federal law is not enough; we must also consult treatises, Section 2.06(3)(a) of the Model Penal Code, and survey the laws of forty-five other States.<sup>6</sup> They argue that the "vast majority" of these sources, including federal law as

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<sup>6</sup>The author questions whether the Sentencing Commission intended to limit § 4B1.2(b) in this fashion. When it included "aiding and abetting" offenses in the career offender definition of a "controlled substance offense," the Commission was surely aware that, "because the difference between acting purposefully (when that concept is properly understood) and acting knowingly is slight, this is not a matter of great concern." Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 85 (Alito, J., dissenting) (2014); see Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193 (a more expansive concept of "intent" must "extend significantly beyond the concept as set forth in the cases of other States" to create a

reflected in Judge Hand's opinion in Peoni, establish that "generic" aiding and abetting requires proof that the accomplice intended to promote or facilitate the underlying crime; as Iowa law only requires the lesser "knowledge" *mens rea*, § 124.401 is broader than the guidelines definition of controlled substance offense.

Assuming without deciding that defendants have posited the proper standard, we conclude that Iowa law, as determined by the Supreme Court of Iowa, requires more than mere "knowledge" to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting liability. In 1977, the Supreme Court of Iowa expressly linked its law of aiding and abetting liability to the federal standard articulated in Peoni:

The underlying precept of aiding and abetting is a requirement that the accessory in some way "associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed." United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2 Cir. 1938). This precept was satisfied by the evidence in the present case.

State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 1977). Defendants concede, as they must, that the federal standard reflected in Peoni adopts their "generic" standard of aiding and abetting liability -- intent to promote the underlying crime. See Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 76-77, citing and quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949), United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2nd Cir. 1938), Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), and Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947). In numerous

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state crime that is outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute). Thus, I conclude that the Commission's simple inclusion of "aiding and abetting" offenses in Application Note 1 is best viewed as a decision that the slight *mens rea* difference between knowing and intentional participation in a drug offense does not affect whether a conviction was for an offense "that prohibits" that conduct. See United States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 1991) ("the [Sentencing] Commission could not anticipate definitional deviations in state law from the 'classic terminology' of 'aiding and abetting'").

other cases, the Supreme Court of Iowa has confirmed and applied the intent standard in Lott. See State v. Henderson, 908 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Iowa 2018); State v. Allen, 633 N.W.2d 752, 754-56 (Iowa 2001); State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 573-74 (Iowa 2000); State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1994); see also State v. Gordon, 531 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Iowa App. 1995).

These cases establish that the Iowa law of aiding and abetting liability is substantially equivalent to, not meaningfully broader than, the standard adopted by federal courts in applying 18 U.S.C. § 2 and urged by defendants in these appeals. Both require that the defendant have knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense *and* actively “participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about.” Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 108 (quoting Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402). Here, each defendant failed to show a realistic probability that Iowa would apply § 124.401 to conduct that falls outside these cases defining aiding and abetting liability, for example, by “point[ing] to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute” in the manner they urge. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. Accordingly, the district courts properly applied the career offender guidelines enhancement in sentencing Vasey, Fisher, and Green.

## V. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court in each of the five cases is affirmed.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No: 18-1021

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United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Erwin Keith Bell

Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids  
(1:17-cr-00027-LRR-1)

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**JUDGMENT**

Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

This appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on the record of the district court and briefs of the parties.

After consideration, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

July 08, 2019

Order Entered in Accordance with Opinion:  
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

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/s/ Michael E. Gans

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
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No: 18-1021

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**ORDER**

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

Judge Kelly did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

August 22, 2019

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:  
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

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/s/ Michael E. Gans