

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 17-3201

Mario Ronrico Smith

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

United States of America

Respondent - Appellee

Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

Submitted: February 14, 2019

Filed: July 18, 2019

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In 2013, a jury convicted Mario Ronrico Smith of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (“Count 1”), using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (“Count 2”), and felon in possession of a firearm (“Count 3”). At sentencing,

the district court¹ overruled Smith’s objection that two prior convictions for fleeing an officer in a vehicle were not violent felonies and crimes of violence under the “residual clauses” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) and the career offender advisory guidelines. Therefore, the court sentenced Smith as an armed career criminal on Count 3, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and USSG § 4B1.4, and as a career offender under the advisory guidelines on Counts 1 and 2, see USSG §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. This resulted in a guidelines sentencing range of 420 months to life in prison. Varying downward, the court imposed concurrent 220-month sentences on Counts 1 and 3 and a consecutive 60-month sentence on Count 2. The court stated that “it would have imposed the same sentence had it sustained defendant’s . . . objections” to the armed career criminal and career offender determinations. On direct appeal, Smith raised no sentencing issues; we affirmed. United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2015).

One week after we decided Smith’s direct appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), holding the residual clause of the ACCA void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment. In June 2016, Smith filed a timely *pro se* motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing, as relevant here, that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to note that a Supreme Court decision was pending in Johnson; and that his sentence should be vacated because, after Johnson, his fleeing convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA *or* crimes of violence under the career offender guidelines. The district court appointed post-conviction counsel who filed a memorandum supporting Smith’s motion.

At the government’s request, the district court stayed the § 2255 proceedings until the Supreme Court decided, in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017),

¹The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

that the residual clause in the advisory career offender guidelines was *not* subject to a Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge. After Beckles, the government opposed Smith's § 2255 motion, conceding that his Count 3 ACCA sentence was no longer valid under Johnson but arguing that he was not entitled to § 2255 relief because appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance and because Smith was not entitled to sentencing relief under the concurrent sentence doctrine.

Agreeing with the government, the district court denied Smith's § 2255 motion. Smith did not establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the court concluded, because counsel's failure to anticipate Johnson's change in the law did not constitute deficient performance. Although Smith's ACCA sentence on Count 3 was no longer valid after Johnson, the concurrent sentence doctrine applied, the court concluded, because Beckles had foreclosed Smith's challenge to his concurrent career offender sentence on Count 1. Therefore, "even if the court . . . granted Smith relief on count 3, his imprisonment term would remain the same because his conviction on count 1, which is still valid, is the same as his sentence for count 3." We granted a certificate of appealability on these issues. Reviewing *de novo*, we affirm.

I. The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Issue.

Smith's § 2255 motion argued that both his Count 1 career offender sentence and his Count 3 ACCA sentence must be vacated under Johnson. Beckles established that Johnson provides no basis for § 2255 relief from the Count 1 career offender sentence under the advisory guidelines. The district court therefore invoked the discretionary concurrent sentence doctrine to deny sentencing relief. That doctrine "allows courts to decline to review the validity of a concurrent conviction or sentence when a ruling in the defendant's favor 'would not reduce the time he is required to serve' or otherwise 'prejudice him in any way.'" Eason v. United States, 912 F.3d 1122, 1123 (8th Cir. 2019), quoting United States v. Olunloyo, 10 F.3d 578, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1993). Here, as in Eason, 912 F.3d at 1123, Smith did not challenge the

validity of his Count 3 conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and reducing his ACCA sentence on Count 3 would not affect his total sentence because the concurrent 220-month sentence on Count 1 and consecutive 60-month sentence on Count 2 are still valid.

On appeal, Smith argues that he is entitled to have his entire sentence vacated because the concurrent sentences on Counts 1 and 3 are “interdependent.” Smith repeatedly asserts that his sentence on Count 1 “was impacted by the unlawful ACCA enhancement” on Count 3. But repeating this assertion does not make it true. Under the Guidelines in effect when he was sentenced, Smith’s total offense level on Count 1 standing alone, with the career offender enhancement, was 37; on Count 3 standing alone, with the ACCA enhancement, it was 34. Compare USSG § 4B1.1(b)(1), with USSG § 4B1.4(a)(3). The enhancements put Smith in criminal history category VI on both counts. See USSG §§ 4B1.1(b), 4B1.4(c)(2). The Count 1 enhanced offense level of 37 resulted in an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life under § 4B1.1(c)(3); § 4B1.1(c)(2) added the mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence for Count 2, making the advisory guidelines range for Count 1 *alone* 420 months to life. Counts 1 and 3 were grouped under § 3D1.2(c), resulting in concurrent ranges of 420 months to life for each Count. Thus, Count 3 did not increase the guidelines sentence for Count 1; if anything, the opposite was true. Moreover, the typical impact of an ACCA enhancement -- its mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence -- had no impact in this case because Smith’s total sentence was far above fifteen years, before and after the district court granted a 200-month downward variance. Indeed, at sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to impose a fifteen-year sentence.

Smith further argues the district court abused its discretion in applying the concurrent sentence doctrine because, with his Count 3 sentence vacated under Johnson, he is entitled to a full resentencing under the sentencing package doctrine. At that resentencing, Smith asserts, the current career offender guidelines would apply. Therefore, because the Sentencing Commission eliminated the career offender

residual clause after Johnson, his Count 1 sentence would not be subject to the career offender enhancement. This establishes prejudice, Smith argues, so the concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply. He urges us to vacate his sentence and remand for *de novo* resentencing.

Under the sentencing package doctrine, when a defendant successfully attacks one but not all counts of conviction on appeal, we “may vacate the entire sentence on all counts so that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure that it remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 943 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 253 (2008). Here, Smith’s *conviction* on Count 3 was not vacated, and the district court properly held that the Count 1 sentence was not open to challenge under Beckles. At the initial sentencing, the district court emphasized that the concurrent 220-month sentences on Counts 1 and 3 were based on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, not on the ACCA and career offender determinations. The court explicitly stated “that it would have imposed the same sentence had it sustained defendant’s . . . objections.” Thus, the record gives us no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in not ordering a complete resentencing. See Wright v. United States, 902 F.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2018); cf. United States v. Dace, 842 F.3d 1067, 1069-70 (8th Cir. 2016) (career offender error harmless where district court “made clear that it relied on the § 3553(a) factors -- independent of the Guidelines range”).

II. The Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Issue.

Smith argues that his appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to inform this court on direct appeal that Smith’s sentence might be affected by the Supreme Court’s impending decision in Johnson. The district court ruled that Smith failed to establish that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance, relying on our prior decisions holding that “[t]he failure of counsel to

anticipate a rule of law that has yet to be articulated does not render counsel's performance professionally unreasonable." Allen v. United States, 829 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). We agree.

There is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). Smith argues that appellate counsel knew or should have known that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Johnson and that its decision could potentially impact whether the district court erred in overruling Smith's objection to counting his fleeing convictions as violent felonies and crimes of violence. However, we have upheld the denial of appellate ineffective assistance claims in analogous circumstances. See Walker v. United States, 810 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Armontrout, 923 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1991).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court denying Smith's motion to vacate his sentence is affirmed. We deny his Motion To Supplement the Record on Appeal.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Today, the court leaves in place a sentence that all agree is unlawful; the statutory maximum sentence on Smith's ACCA count is 120 months' imprisonment, yet Smith received a sentence of 220 months. To do so, the court relies on the concurrent sentence doctrine. In my view, that doctrine is inapplicable here, so I respectfully dissent.

Because Smith's § 2255 petition was successful on the merits, the district court could invoke the concurrent sentence doctrine to deny the petition only if a ruling in Smith's favor "would not reduce the time he is required to serve or otherwise prejudice him in any way." Eason, 912 F.3d at 1123 (cleaned up). But it is possible

that a ruling in Smith’s favor would reduce the time he is required to serve. “[A] district court proceeding under § 2255 may vacate the entire sentence so that the district court can reconfigure the sentencing plan to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Tidwell, 827 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). The current version of the Guidelines would apply upon resentencing. See id. at 764 & n.3 (explaining that when resentencing a defendant under § 2255, a district court must apply “the guidelines in effect at the time of the resentencing, not at the time of the original sentencing”).

Under the current Guidelines, Smith would not qualify for a career offender enhancement on Count 1, yielding a recommended Guidelines range significantly lower than the range applicable at his original sentencing.² Smith received a 140-month downward variance at his original sentencing; to reimpose the same term of imprisonment upon resentencing would likely require the district court to vary upwards, a variance that might prove difficult to justify.

United States v. Fletcher provides a useful illustration. Fletcher filed a meritorious § 2255 petition challenging the ACCA enhancement on one count of conviction; the district court denied the petition based on the concurrent sentence doctrine. Order at 3–4, United States v. Fletcher, No. 11-cr-193 (D. Minn. May 9, 2016), ECF No. 65. On appeal, we granted the government’s motion to vacate the judgment, as the government noted that Fletcher’s sentence would exceed the

²The current Guidelines omit the residual clause that originally allowed for the career offender enhancement. Based on the district court’s original non-career offender calculations of a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of IV, I estimate a new Guidelines range (including the mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence for Count 2) of 195 to 228 months, as compared to Smith’s original Guidelines range of 420 months to life. Of course, other changes to the Guidelines since Smith’s original conviction could result in a different base offense level or criminal history category.

recommended Guidelines range under the current version of the Guidelines and therefore application of the concurrent sentencing doctrine was “questionable.” See United States v. Fletcher, No. 16-3025 (8th Cir. 2017). On remand, the district court reduced Fletcher’s overall sentence by 80 months. See Resentencing Judgment, No. 11-cr-193 (D. Minn. July 27, 2017), ECF No. 90.

As the court acknowledges, Smith’s ACCA sentence is no longer valid. As a result, I would vacate it. And because it is possible for the district court to sentence Smith to a shorter term of imprisonment, I would remand the case to the district court for resentencing.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No: 17-3201

Mario Ronrico Smith

Appellant

v.

United States of America

Appellee

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
(0:16-cv-01869-DSD)

ORDER

A certificate of appealability is granted on the following issues:

(1) Whether the district court erred in relying on the concurrent sentence doctrine to deny relief on Smith's meritorious claim that his ACCA sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), without examining (a) whether the sentencing package doctrine required the entire sentence to be vacated, (b) whether Smith would face any prejudicial collateral consequences, or (c) whether the concurrent sentence doctrine is appropriate when the government conceded the claim was meritorious; and

(2) Whether the district court erred in concluding that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform this court that Smith's sentence was affected by Johnson.

The request for a certificate of appealability is denied as to all other issues.

April 24, 2018

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Michael E. Gans

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Criminal No. 12-17(DSD)

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER

Mario Ronrico Smith,

Defendant.

Amber M. Brennan, United States Attorney's Office, 300 South 4th Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN, counsel of plaintiff.

Mario Ronrico Smith, #10377-041, FCI Terre Haute, P.O. Box 33, Terre Haute, IN 47808, defendant pro se.

This matter is before the court upon the pro se motion¹ by defendant Mario Ronrico Smith to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the court denies the motion.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of December 4, 2011, Crystal Lake Police performed a traffic stop on a speeding Dodge Charger.² The driver

¹ After filing his motion, Smith was appointed counsel who submitted a memorandum on his behalf. See ECF Nos. 117, 118. On March 28, 2017, the court granted counsel's motion to withdraw. See ECF No. 129.

² The court provides a summary of the facts as recited in United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2015).

provided the officer with a Minnesota driver's license identifying him as Mario Ronrico Smith. The officer noticed an odor of marijuana coming from the car and called for a back up K-9 unit to assist in a search of the vehicle. As the K-9 unit approached, Smith fled from the officers. In pursuit, the officers performed a "PIT" maneuver, stopping the vehicle. Smith fled on foot and escaped into a residential neighborhood. Although the officers were not able to apprehend Smith, they retained his driver's license. On a search of the Charger, the officers found two kilograms of cocaine, \$6,000 in U.S. currency, and a Glock .40 caliber hand gun with 12 live rounds of ammunition.

On January 10, 2012, a grand jury indicted Smith on three counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute cocaine; (2) using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime; and (3) felon in possession of a firearm. On May 17, 2013, Smith was arrested in Chicago, Illinois. On November 19, 2013, a jury found Smith guilty on all three counts. On July 30, 2014, the court sentenced to 280 months' imprisonment: 220 months for counts 1 and 3 to be served concurrently and 60 months for count 2 to be served consecutive to the sentence for counts 1 and 3. Smith now moves for relief pursuant to § 2255.³

³ On July 28, 2016, the court stayed this action pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Smith argues that he is entitled to relief because both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. To show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must meet both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a movant must show that his counsel's performance was so deficient that it was objectively unreasonable. See id. at 688. Because "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case" and different attorneys "would not defend a particular client in the same way," the court reviews the performance of defense counsel with significant deference. Id. at 689. There is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 699. Second, a movant must demonstrate prejudice by showing "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 694.

A. Trial Counsel

Smith argues that his trial counsel, Ryan Garry, was ineffective because he failed to investigate and raise an available alibi defense, namely, that he was at a family gathering on the night in question and, therefore, could not have been the driver of the Dodge Charger. The decision of whether to pursue a particular

defense is a strategic choice that, when "made after a thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). But a counsel's "strategic choices resulting from lack of diligence in preparation and investigation [are] not protected by the presumption in favor of counsel." Armstrong v. Kemna, 534 F.3d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In preparing for Smith's defense, Garry hired a private investigator with almost thirty years of law enforcement experience. Garry Aff. ¶ 6. On being told by Smith that he was at a family gathering on the night of the offense, both Garry and the investigator interviewed several of Smith's family members. Id. ¶ 7. After reading the investigator's report and conducting his own interviews, Garry concluded that Smith's family members were lying and that a jury would not find them credible. Id. Smith argues that Garry did not fully investigate his alibi defense but fails to point to any specific deficiencies in Garry's investigation. Indeed, it appears that Garry interviewed all relevant witnesses; affidavits from family members, which were submitted by Smith, indicate they spoke with Garry. See ECF Nos. 120-23, 126-28. As a result, Smith fails to meet the first

Strickland prong.⁴

Even assuming that Garry's performance was deficient, Smith has not shown that, but for Garry's failure to present the alibi defense, the jury would not have convicted him. Indeed, the evidence that Smith was the driver of the Charger was strong: the driver's license provided to the officer identified the driver as Smith; the officer testified at trial that he recognized Smith from the traffic stop; officers recovered a wallet from the vehicle with credit cards and insurance cards in Smith's name and medication bottles prescribed to Smith; and Smith's DNA was recovered from a soda can in the car. See Smith, 789 F.3d at 926-27. Therefore, Smith also fails to meet the second Strickland prong.

B. Appellate Counsel

Smith also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to appeal the court's determination that he was subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), even though Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the residual clause of the ACCA, was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of his appeal. But Johnson was decided on June 26, 2015, and Smith's appeal was submitted on March 13, 2015. Although in retrospect, Smith may have successfully challenged his enhanced sentence, "[t]he failure

⁴ Nor is Smith entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Smith's submitted affidavits and the case record as a whole "conclusively show that [he] is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

to anticipate a change in the law will not generally constitute an ineffective assistance of counsel." Brunson v. Higgins, 708 F.2d 1353, 1356 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding counsel was not ineffective where "the theory on which Batson was based was certainly available at the time of jury selection ... Batson itself had not yet been decided"); Johnson v. Armontrout, 923 F.2d 107, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that failure to submit an appeal based on reasoning later adopted by the Supreme Court did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). As a result, Smith's appellate counsel's performance did not fall below "the deferential standard of reasonableness established in Strickland." Randolph v. Delo, 952 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 1991).

II. Johnson

A. Applicability of Johnson

Smith argues that his sentence should be corrected because it was based on the residual clause of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The government agrees that, in light of Johnson and Matthis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), the sentencing provisions of the ACCA no longer apply to Smith because his two previous convictions for fleeing police in a motor vehicle are no longer violent felonies under the ACCA. Although Smith's sentence for count 3, felon in possession of a

firearm, is not valid in light of Johnson, because Smith's sentence for count 3 is concurrent with his sentence for count 1, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the court must still determine whether Smith is entitled to a reduced sentence.

B. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine

Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, a court, in its discretion, may decline to grant a defendant relief where the defendant was sentenced on concurrent counts and a "ruling in the defendant's favor on the conviction at issue would not reduce the time he ... is required to serve under the sentence for the valid conviction(s)." United States v. Smith, 601 F.2d 972, 973 (8th Cir. 1979). Here, even if the court to granted Smith relief on count 3, his imprisonment term would remain the same because his conviction on count 1, which is still valid, is the same as his sentence for count 3. Indeed, at the time of sentencing, the court determined that the guidelines' sentence for count 1 was 420 months to life imprisonment. In sentencing Smith to 220 months, the court granted him a 200-month downward variance. Therefore, if re-sentenced on counts 1 and 2, Smith would not receive a lower sentence. The court, therefore, declines to grant Smith the relief requested.

III. Beckles

Lastly, Smith argues that, in light of Johnson, he is no longer a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1. When

Smith filed his motion, courts were divided as to Johnson's impact on the residual clause in the Guidelines. See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-96 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Guidelines were not subject to vagueness challenges); United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague). In Beckles, however, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were not subject to vagueness challenges. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892. Therefore, the Guidelines under which Smith was sentenced are not unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

To warrant a certificate of appealability, a defendant must make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A "substantial showing" requires a petitioner to establish that "reasonable jurists" would find the court's assessment of the constitutional claims "debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). The court is firmly convinced that Smith is not entitled to relief and reasonable jurists could not differ on the result. As a result, a certificate of appealability is not warranted.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

1. Defendant's motion to vacate his sentence [ECF No. 113] is denied; and

2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, the court denies a certificate of appealability.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Date: July 14, 2017

s/ David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Criminal No. 12-17(DSD)

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER

Mario Ronrico Smith,

Defendant.

Amber M. Brennan, United States Attorney's Office, 300 South 4th Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN, counsel of plaintiff.

Mario Ronrico Smith, #10377-041, FCI-Greenville, P.O. Box 5000, Greenville, IL 62246, defendant pro se.

This matter is before the court upon pro se defendant Mario Ronrico Smith's motion to reconsider. Smith urges the court to reconsider its July 14, 2017, order denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Motions to reconsider require the "court's prior permission," which will be granted only upon a showing of "compelling circumstances." D. Minn. LR 7.1(j). Smith has not received such permission from the court, and this alone warrants denial of his motion to reconsider.

Even if the court were to construe Smith's motion as a request for permission to file a motion to reconsider, it would be denied. A motion to reconsider should not be employed to relitigate old issues but rather to "afford an opportunity for relief in

extraordinary circumstances." Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (D. Minn. 1993). Here, Smith raises arguments that the court previously addressed in its order; therefore, reconsideration is not warranted.

Accordingly, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that the motion to reconsider [ECF No. 144] is denied.

Dated: August 21, 2017

s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court