No. 19-6189

ORIGINAL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

LEWIS BROWN - PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

UNITED STATES -RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO

SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LEWIS BROWN RBG. H 52293-060 pro se

(Your Name)

McRae Correction Facility
P.O. Drawer 55030
(Address)

McRae Helena, GA 31055
(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A
(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1) Did the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals abuse its discretion when it committed clear error of judgment, by relying on clearly erroneous findings of fact?

2) Did District Court Judge Aaron Dan Polster abuse his discretion/commit structural error when he openly admitted that he was a party (adverse party opponent) to the "proceedings," yet proceeded to preside over. the "proceedings" anyway (In re Murchison, 340 U.S.133, 75 S.Ct.623, 99. L. Ed. 942 (1955)?

Petitioner is Pro Se litigant pursuant to Haines v. Kerner

(404 U.S. 519)

LIST OF
PARTIES

(x) All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

TABLE OF
CONTENTS

INDEX TO
APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES PAGE NUMBER

STATUTES AND RULES

§ 455a, b

§ 1 44

18 u. s.c..§ 401

Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure 60(d)(3) Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure

42(a)(1)

U.S.Const. Amend. V - Due Process Clause

U.S.Const. Amend. XIV - Due Process Clause

OTHER

Circuit Court Cases

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix to the petition and is
[ ] reported at; or,
[X] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix to the petition and is
[ ] reported at; or,
[X] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts: N/A

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix to the petition and is
[ ] reported at; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the court appears at Appendix to the petition and is
[ ] reported at; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[xl For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was 12/20/2018
No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

x · A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: 4-23, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _c2_.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including N/A (date) on N/A (date) in Application No. _A_

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts: N/A

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was-
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] .An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including (date) on (date) in Application No. _A_

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution, Amendment V - Due Process Clause

U. S · Constitution, Amendment XIV - Due Process Clause

§455a, b

§144

18 U.S.C. § 401

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 13, 2017, Dkt. # 222, Petitioner filed a Motion titled, "Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 42(a)(1)" Petition in the District Court (NDOH). The motion was assigned to District Court Judge Dan a. Polster ("Polster"), a former undisclosed employee of the office of the United States Attorney (NDOH (the "AUSA")) during the time period Petitioner was prosecuted based on false, fabricated, manufactured and known and unknown perjured testimony of government trial witness Levester Johnson and DEA Agent James Hummeell along with others who knowingly and willfully committed perjury, suborned by the AUSA. Polster was an undisclosed former employee.

Petitioner sought to exercise his legal right to enforce a Discovery Order, margin entry 5/24/1995 (Dkt. # 24-1) (granting in part Dkt. #24) (the "Discovery Order").

Rather than issuing a show cause order as Rule 42(a)(1) requires, Polster ignored the Rule 42(a)(1) motion without even serving notice to the other party. Part of the plan, scheme orchestrated by officers of the court directed towards the judicial machinery implemented and designed to delay and impede Petitioner's legal right to impartial and unbiased adjudication of Petitioner's claims on the merits. This is per se Fraud on the Court.

On March 15, 2017, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, reconsideration (Dkt. #255). Polster again summarily denied Petitioner's Reconsideration Motion without opinion or written reason as the means and method to shield his former employee, the AUSA, from compelled to come on the record under oath and defend against Petitioner's claims.

Polster's divided loyalty caused him to obstruct, impede and render futile the Rule of Law (Rule 42(a)(1) demands the issuance of a show cause order), flagrantly refused to recuse himself from the proceedings knowing he has a covert undisclosed conflict of interest.

On April 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion titled "Fraud on the Court and Renewed 42(a)(1)" naming Dan Aaron Polster as Adverse Party Opponent (Dkt. #226. Again, Polster rules in summary judgment in this case to which he is a Adverse Party Opponents.

On May 18, 2017 (Dkt. #227), Polster disregarded the fact that he was named as opponent in the Fraud on the Court and made another summary ruling, without making any fact findings or conclusion of law (seeking to keep all his ruling unappealable). All party of the scheme to keep his employer/colleagues away from the show cause order and from being given a notice in open Court.

Polster chose to be a judge in his own case and ruled. As a matter of law, ispo facto, He is judicially disqualified from the proceedings pursuant to Federal law (28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b) and the Constitution's Due Process Clause.

On May 19. 2017, Petitioner filed his timely Notice of Appeal of the District court's Order (May 18-Dkt. #227) denying Fraud on the Court/Rule 42(a)(1) Petition (Dkt. #226, 223, and 225).

On June 15, 2017, via U.S. Mail, Petitioner filed a Writ of Mandamus to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals per the Mailbox Rule. Petitioner's Writ of Mandamus was denied by the Sixth Circuit which never addressed the primary issue: No man can be a judge in his own case. Instead the Circuit Court misstated the facts, declaring that Petitioner never sought recusal before the District Court, thus concluding that Petitioner has adequate alternative means to obtain relief. See Exhibit C3, Mandamus Order.

On October 10, 2017, pursuant to Houston v. Lack, Petitoner filed a Petition titled "fraud on the Court, Recusal, and Rule 42(a)(1) Contempt Motion." DKT 232 Exhibit C4.

After several requests, on October 30, 2017, the filing of Petitioner's Motion (Exhibit C4) was finally docketed after Petitioner informed the clerk that he/she would also be a subject to the Fraud on the Court and obstruction of justice (See, letter dated January 8, 2018, 2 months after the Motion was filed).

On March 9, 2018, Polster again violated the Constitution's Due Process Clause by "acting as a judge in his own case" and ruled on the Motion, Petitioner's October 10, 2017, Fed R. Crim. P. 42(a)(1). Criminal Contempt, 18 U.S. C § 401(2),

401(3) Fraud on the Court (Aaron Polster, et al) and Recusal Motion (Polster, J.). United States v. Brown, 05:95-CV-00147-KMO-1.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (See, Exhibit E in which Polster again ruled, outlining the law and the facts concerning the scenario where such action as his constitutes structural error when he presides over his own case.

Polster again ignored the Rule of Law and its consequences, and ruled in the case denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. #235), entered April 24, 2018).

Petitioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, appealing the issues before the District Court in the "Fraud on the Court), 42(a)(1) and Recusal Motion" in which Petitioner brought before the Sixth Circuit the fact that Polster conspired with this former employee/colleagues to aid and abet the continued fraud by shielding them from appearing in open court to defend against the suppression of exculpatory evidence, in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights and totally disregarding the judicial foundation of the court in enforcing its orders, via Rule 42(a)(1), obstructing justice and committing fraud on the federal courts, the public harming the very administration of justice he swore to uphold.

In its ruling the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously ruled "there were no matters pending before the District Court when Brown filed the Motion of Recusal, consequently there was no "proceeding" before the District Court as required by the Recusal Statute. See, 28 U.S. C. § 455(a)(d)(1) and therefore the

District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to Rule on Brown's Motion to Recuse."

Here the matter of facts are that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals completely ignored the Motion which is being appealed (Exhibit C4) (Fraud on the Court, 42(a)(1) and Recusal Motion) and also the judge's order of Denial (Exhibit C1) in which he (Judge Polster openly acknowledged on the records Presently pending is the second fraud on the court...42(a)(1) Petitioner filed the motions simultaneously in one package, and requesting recusal as the Sixth Circuit suggested." See, Mandamus Order, Exhibit C3.

Polster also misstated the facts and erroneously ruled denying the fraud on the court 42(a)(1) and recusal motion opining that Petitioner requested he conduct a 42(a)(1) contempt hearing into himself, conflating the facts as presented unto the district court in the 42(a)(1) Motion/Recusal/Fraud on the Court, See, Exhibit C4.

FACTS

In the Motion filed in the District Court titled "Re: Defendant's Fraud on the Court, Recusal, and Rue 42(a)(1) Contempt Motion" on page 2, after Petitioner established subject-matter jurisdiction, in line 2 Petitioner stated: "Therefore, the District Court was subject matter Jurisdiction to conduct this Fraud on the Court and Rule 42(a)(1) Contempt "Proceeding". Petitioner went on and put forth the law and statute governing the issues that were presented in the 42(a)(1) claims.

On pages 10-12 the Fraud on the Court claims were outlined by Petitioner. See (Dkt. 226).

On pages 12-13 Petitioner outlined the Recusal Claims-declaring, among other things, the factual significant that Polster, who was named as adverse party opponent was "automatically disqualified from any and all judicial involvement in the proceedings. Statutorily and Constitutionally, recusal was automatically required.

On page 13-14, Petitioner outlined his 42(a)(1) claim, referencing Dkt. #222 and 226 of the Original Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 42(a)(1) Motion, seeking enforcement of Discovery Order also including Polster as aiding and abetting, who entered into a conspiratorial relationship with his former boss, employer to suppress the discoveries by resisting the Court's Order. They devised an illegal plan and n scheme designed to impede, defile, and defraud the court, the judicial process and destruction to the due administration of justice. See, Exhibit C4, Re: Defendant's Fraud on the Court, Recusal, 42(a)(1) Motion.

On page 14 of the Motion subtitled: "IV (A) Relief Requested from the court" petitioner is requesting the District Court grant him relief by entry of an order to respondent, jointly severally, and individually order to respondents, jointly severally, and individually order the following relief, to wit:

(1) Order Dan Polster immediately nuc pro tunc, recused as of 02/13/2017, from all judicial functions in the District Court's adjudication of this and

any other matter Petitioner might bring upon discovery of additional facts regarding the claims raised herein:

(2) Enter a Rule 42(a)(1) show ause order to each respondent, jointly and severally in their individual and official capacities to show cause in writing and in open court no later than October 27, 2017 why each shall not be jointly and severally adjudged in criminal and civil contempt of the Discovery Order (Dkt. #24-1), fined at the rate of $1.0 million dollars per day since 05/24/1995, accruing daily until full compliance is made by the respondents regarding their discovery obligations.

(3) Order each respondent civilly incarcerated on October 27, 2017, and posting of a case or corporate surely bond with the District Clerk by each respondent, in the amount of $5 million, each, individually naming Petitioner as the beneficiary to cover all remedies, aware of damages, costs, expenses, and wasted resources imposed by the district court on each respondent for the continuing civil contempt of the Discovery Order;

(4) Order the District Court to certify the complete record to the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division and Division of Public Integrity and request that the Department of Justice direct the Director of the F.B. I. to pen a criminal investigation into Dan A. Polster, Kathleen O'Malley, Samuel Yannucci, Levester Johnson, the Office if the U.S. Attorney (N.D.O.H.), Larry Zuckerman, Bernard Smith, James S. Gallas, and others known and unknown, with respect to James Hummell's known

fabrication of evidence, fabrication of an affidavit of probable cause, and manufacture and fabrication of Levester Johnson's known perjured testimony. Dan A. Polster, aiding and abbeting by entry of three court orders, Dkt. #223, 225 and 227 which violated the requirement of 42(a)(1), Kathleen O"Malley's deliberate and knowing obstruction of justice, collusion, conspiracy and frauds on the court to impede the due administration of justice, and resist petitioner's due process rights to have the government disclose all materials, exculpatory and impeachment evidence before trial, Sam Yannucci's prosecutorial corruption and misconduct in fabricating a federal indictment while conspiring and colluding with James Hummell and others the knowing use of perjured trial testimony orchestrated by Yannucci to defile the judicial machinery and prevent Petitioner from receiving a fair trial.

Having now only outlined the facts with the record supporting, it is clear that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously applied facts which are not indicative of Petitioner's. The facts on the record clearly shows Petitioner's primary focus is the proper execution of the 42(a)(1) claim, as required by law, and the Fraud on Court Claim, both colorable claims that were properly brought before the Court while requiring Polster's recusal and the matters adjudicated before an impartial judge.

Judge Polster also erroneously applied the facts as the record shows. At no point did Petitioner ask Polster to conduct a contempt inquiry into

himself (not supported by the record). Petitioner specially requested Polster, who is a "Party to the Proceedings" to recuse himself as required by the law, the statute, and the constitution.

STRUCTURAL ERROR

Polster also committed a structural error by failing to recuse himself when his is also a "party to the Proceedings" (adverse Party Opponent).

ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In United States v. Daniel Sanchez-Martinez, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24372, No. 17-50375 (9th Cir.) the Court stated: "A court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider all facts relevant to the choice and the factors it relies on were unsupported by factual findings or evidence on the record (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 344). A district court abuses its discretion if its conclusion is guided by erroneous legal principles. See, Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 135 L. Ed 2d 392, 116 s Ct. 2035 (1996). Or rests upon clearly erroneous factfinding See, United States v. Barber, 119 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir). (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 988, 139 L. Ed 2d 391, 118 S. Ct. 457 (1997).

In Green v. Independent Pilots Association, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28271, No. 18-5296 (6th Cir.) the Sixth Circuit stated: "a district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or clearly erroneous factfinding." See also, Glen v. Commer's of Soc. Sec., 763 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stougsh v. Mayville Cmty. Schs., 138 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. ____).

In States v. Munox, 812 F.3d 809, 817 (10th Cir. 2016) the Tenth Circuit stated: "the district court abuses its discretion when a ruling is based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or a clear error of judgment. See Liteky v. United states v. Hattmarx Corp., 496 U.S> 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 116 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990).

RECUSAL

In New York ex rel. Elliot Spitzer Att. General of N.Y., et al, Petitioner v. Microsoft Corporation, 536 U.S. 1301, 121 S. Ct. 25 ( ) the Supreme Court stated: section 445(a) contains the more general declaration that a justices "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned." As this Court has stated, what matters under 455(a) "is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548, 127 L. Ed 2d, 474, 114 S. Ct 1147 (1994). This inquiry is an objective one, made from the prospective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances." See, Ibid; In re: David Burnham Lambert, Inc., 84 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1988).

§ 144. bias or prejudice of judge

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely sufficient affidavit that the judge before him who the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in favor of an adverse part, such judge shall proceed no further therein but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceedings. The affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the belief such bias or prejudice exits and shall be filed no less than 10 days before the proceeding is heard."

Exhibit C7 shows the affidavit, judicial complaint and tort claims filed in the Sixth Circuit by Petitioner against Dan Polster. The Fraud on the Court Claim also

had a signed declaration of materials facts, subject to penalty of perjury, outlining Polster's egregious violations and criminal conduct.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)

Notice must be given "in open Court in order to show cause, or in an arrest order" and "must (A) state the time and place of the trial; (B) allow defendant reasonable time to prepare a defense; and (C) state the essential facts constituting the charged criminal contempt and describe it as such." Fed R. Crim. P 42(a)(1).

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

This much is clear: due process demands that the judge be unbiased, In re Murchison, 340 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 945 (1955). A fair trial in a fair tribunal and a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of the case (emphasis added). Furthermore, a judge can and shall be disqualified for bias, a likelihood of bias or (even) an appearance of bias. 540 F2d 400. See, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 578, 94 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1964). Also see, Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Over system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. Accord, Anderson,. Sheppard, 856 F.2d 741 – 746 (6th Cir.) opining that due process "require(s) not only the absence of actual bias, but the absence of even the appearance of judicial bias."

But it is also clear that judicial disqualification based on a likelihood or an appearance of bias is not always of constitutional significance; indeed "most matters relating to judicial disqualification d(o) not rise to constitutional level." Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S. Ct. 793, 92 L. ed. 1010, 44 FTC 1460 (1948) (citing Turney v. Ohio, 793 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L Ed. 749, 5 Ohio Law Abs. 159, 5 Ohio Law Abs. 185, 25 Ohio L. Rep. 236 (1927) ("All questions of judicial disqualification may not invade constitutional validity"). See also, Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S> 899, 904, 117 S. Ct. 1973, 138 L. Ed 2D 97 (1997) ("of course most questions concerning a judge's qualification to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the due process clause establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard instead. These questions are in most cases, answered by common law, statutes or the professional standards of the bench and bar").

In only two types of cases has the Supreme Court held that something less than actual bias violates the Constitution's Due Process (1) these cases in which the judge has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion." Turney, 273 U.S> at 532 (subsequently expanded to include even indirect pecuniary interest). And (2) certain contempt cases, such as those in which the "judge becomes personally embroiled with the contemnor." Murchison, 349, U.S. at 141 (subsequently clarified to involve cases in which the judge suffers a severe personal insult or attack from contemnor).

The Court has also acknowledged four types of cases that, although they present prudent grounds for disqualification as a matter of common sense, ethics, or

"legislative discretion" generally do not rise to a constitutional level (1) matters of kinship, (2) personal bias, (3) state policy, and (4) remoteness of interest. Turney, 273 U.S> at 523. Accord, Aetna Life Ins. Co. V. Lavon, 475 U.S. 813, 820, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 89 L Ed. 2d 823 (1986). But in the 81 years since Turney, the Court has yet to expound upon this general statement regarding the presumptive constitutional indifference to these types of issues.

ISSUE I-FAILURE TO RECUSE

Polster's failure to recuse himself from a case in which he is named a defendant-adverse partner opponent is clearly an abuse of discretion. See, § 455(a) and In re Murchison. "No man can be a judge in his own case." Which is refusing to recuse, Polster not only committed a due process violation but also a structural error. See, Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S> 278, 306-12 (1991).

(1) Polster used erroneous facts in presiding over his own case. Nothing on the record supports Polster's finding that Petitioner demanded that he conduct a criminal contempt into himself. Petitioner filed a motion titled "Fraud on the Court, Recusal, 42(a)(1) Contempt" motion, explicitly seeking Polster's recusal:

(2) Polster, in his Court Order denying Petitioner's motion, openly admitted that he is clearly subject of attach of the contempt motion ("clearly directed at me). Also, he is

JURISDICTION

This Supreme Court of the United States in Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991) recognized that 18 U.S.C. §401 authorizes the District Court, via its inherent and statutory authority to punish for the willful contempt of its lawful orders, judgements, processes, decrees, commands, and instruments, all those who (1) disobey or (2) resist full and complete compliance with the District Court.

A federal court is authorized by tis inherent power and authority to conduct all necessary proceedings, and issue an order or process to determine whether or not any of its judgments, orders, and decrees, were procured via Fraud on the Court which prevented a party from full presenting his claims to the court. Hazel Atlas Glass Co. V. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240-50 (1942). See also, Universal Oil Pro. Co., 328 U.S. at 580 (corruption of the Court itself, via undisclosed associations and relationships constituted a fraud on the court); Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 339, (6th Cir. 2010) (same). Therefore, the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to conduct thesis Fraud on the Court and 42(a)(1) Contempt proceedings.

Fraud on the Court has not statute of limitations pursuant to Hazel Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 40-50 and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(d)(3).

Univ. Oil Products, 328 U.S. at 580 (Fraud on the Court can be initiated at any time the judicial process has been corrupted or defiled by judicial, prosecutorial, or other "tampering with the administration justice").

The Fraud on the Court, Recusal 42(a)(1) Contempt motion was properly brought before the District Court. Polster, who was ambiguous in his order, see Petitioner's Appellate Reply Brief, Exhibit B, erroneously presided over the "proceeding" to which he a was named party.

The District Court also failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 42(a)(1) which is also an abuse of discretion. See, Petitioner's appellate Brief and Appellate Reply Brief. Exhibit B.

The Sixth Circuit court of appeals made an erroneous ruling based on an erroneous conclusion that the recusal was the only motion before the court. This also constitutes an abuse of discretion according to the laws and precedents of this United States Supreme Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

By presiding over the proceedings, to which he himself is a party, District Court Judge Polster has not only caused the court to depart from the usual and acceptable course of conduct within judicial proceedings. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, as a by-product of clear.ly erroneous factfinding, instructed the District Court to dismiss Petitioner 's Fraud on the Court Claim, thereby sanctioning such conduct that are prohibited by this Supreme Court in judicial proceedings to the extent that they are classified as structural error which infects the proceedings warranting automatic reversal (not subject to harmlee-error review).

Petitioner humbly requests this Supreme Court of the United States of America exercise its supervisory authority by means of granting this Writ of Certiorari to establish uniformity in the adherence of established Supreme Court precedents and principles in "judicial proceedings" enforcing and ensuring each human being is afforded Due Process of Law under the Constitution of the United States of America.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis Brown

Date: 3/31/2018

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis Brown

Date: 3/31/2018