

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

YONI CASTRO-LOPEZ, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether this Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), should be overruled.

ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Tex.):

United States v. Castro-Lopez, No. 18-CR-50 (Aug. 24, 2018)

United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):

United States v. Castro-Lopez, No. 18-11191 (June 5, 2019)

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No. 19-5829

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OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A2) is not published in the Federal Reporter but is reprinted at 772 Fed. Appx. 74.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 5, 2019. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 3, 2019. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, petitioner was convicted on one count of illegal reentry after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). Pet. App. B1. He was sentenced to 22 months of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release. Id. at B1-B2. The court of appeals modified the judgment to reflect conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1), and affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A2.

1. Petitioner is a citizen and national of Mexico. Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 7. He was removed from the United States in 2004. PSR ¶ 1.

Petitioner reentered the United States and, in June 2007, he was arrested in Harris County, Texas, for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. PSR ¶ 28. Petitioner subsequently pleaded guilty to that crime and was sentenced to two years of imprisonment. Ibid. In November 2007, petitioner was released from prison on parole and was removed to Mexico. Ibid.

At some point thereafter, petitioner reentered the United States. See PSR ¶ 29. In January 2018, he was arrested in Arlington, Texas, for driving while intoxicated. Ibid. Petitioner pleaded guilty to that offense and was sentenced to 20 days of imprisonment. Ibid.

In March 2018, a grand jury indicted petitioner on one count of illegal reentry after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a)

and (b) (1) and (2). Indictment 1-2. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge without a plea agreement. PSR ¶ 4.

2. Section 1326(a) makes it unlawful for an alien to reenter the United States after having been removed unless he obtains the prior consent of the Attorney General. The maximum punishment for that offense is a term of imprisonment of two years, followed by one year of supervised release. 8 U.S.C. 1326(a); 18 U.S.C. 3559(a) (5), 3583(b) (3). If, however, the alien's removal followed a conviction for a "felony," then the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years, and the maximum term of supervised release is three years. 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) (1); see 18 U.S.C. 3559(a) (3), 3583(b) (2). And if the alien's removal followed a conviction for an "aggravated felony," then the maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years, and the maximum term of supervised release is three years. 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) (2); see 18 U.S.C. 3559(a) (3), 3583(b) (2). As relevant here, an "'aggravated felony'" is defined to include "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year," or a "burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." 8 U.S.C. 1101(a) (43) (F) and (G) (footnotes omitted).

The Probation Office determined that petitioner's Texas burglary conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and that petitioner was therefore subject to the penalty provisions in Section 1326(b) (2). PSR ¶ 2. The Probation Office calculated an

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months of imprisonment and one to three years of supervised release. PSR ¶¶ 54, 57.

Petitioner objected, asserting that because the indictment did not specifically allege that he had a prior felony or aggravated felony conviction, he was subject only to sentencing under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), which provides for a maximum of two years of imprisonment and one year of supervised release. Pet. Objections to PSR (Objections) 1-3. Petitioner acknowledged, however, that his objection was foreclosed by this Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Objections 2. In Almendarez-Torres, this Court held in the context of a similar constitutional claim arising from a Section 1326 prosecution that a defendant's prior conviction may be found by the sentencing court by a preponderance of the evidence as a sentencing factor, rather than charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the offense. See 523 U.S. at 239-247.

The district court overruled petitioner's objection and sentenced petitioner to 22 months of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release. Pet. App. B1-B2; see Sent. Tr. 4.

3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A2. The court first recognized, as petitioner had acknowledged, that his argument that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for his

offense, as charged in the indictment, was foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres, supra. Pet. App. A1-A2.

The court of appeals next considered petitioner's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Texas burglary of a habitation is a felony, but not an aggravated felony, and that the judgment therefore erroneously reflected that he had been subject to sentencing under Section 1326(b)(2), rather than Section 1326(b)(1). Pet. App. A2. Citing then-governing circuit precedent under which Texas burglary of a habitation was deemed broader than generic "burglary,"¹ and locating no other possible basis for classifying petitioner's prior conviction as an "aggravated felony," 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), the court of appeals concluded that the judgment should be modified to reflect sentencing under Section 1326(b)(1) rather than Section 1326(b)(2). Pet. App. A2. The court then affirmed the judgment as modified. Ibid.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 4-9) that this Court should overrule Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).

¹ Following the decision here, the en banc court of appeals determined that burglary of a habitation under Texas law qualifies as generic "burglary" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). United States v. Herrold, 941 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2019). Because 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) similarly defines an "'aggravated felony'" to include a generic "burglary" offense, it is now clear that burglary of a habitation under Texas law qualifies as an "aggravated felony" for purposes of the illegal reentry statute as well.

The Court has repeatedly and recently denied numerous petitions for writs of certiorari raising that issue.² The same result is warranted here.

1. More than two decades ago, this Court held in Almendarez-Torres that, under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b), the fact of a defendant's prior conviction is a sentencing factor rather than an element of an enhanced unlawful-reentry defense. 523 U.S. at 228-239. The Court further held that the statute, as so construed, does not violate the Constitution. Id. at 239-247.

In keeping with Almendarez-Torres, this Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction" to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (or admitted by the defendant) when it increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. Id. at 490. The Court has since repeatedly affirmed that the Sixth

² See, e.g., Rios-Garza v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 278 (2019) (No. 19-5455); Collazo-Gonzalez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 273 (2019) (No. 19-5358); Phillips v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 270 (2019) (No. 19-5150); Esparza-Salazar v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 264 (2019) (No. 19-5279); Capistran v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 237 (2019) (No. 18-9502); Riojas-Ordaz v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 120 (2019) (No. 18-9616); Dolmo-Alvarez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 74 (2019) (No. 18-9321); Betancourt-Carrillo v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 59 (2019) (No. 18-9573); Boles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2659 (2019) (No. 18-9006); Miranda-Manuel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2656 (2019) (No. 18-8964); Aguilera-Alvarez v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2654 (2019) (No. 18-8913); Herrera v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2628 (2019) (No. 18-8900).

Amendment rule announced in Appendi applies only to penalty-enhancing facts “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction.” Ibid.; see United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 n.3 (2019) (plurality opinion); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 269 (2013); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 n.1 (2013); Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 358-360 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 567 n.3 (2010); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 214 n.8 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-275 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-302 (2004).

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 6-8) that Almendarez-Torres is inconsistent with this Court's Appendi line of decisions. That is incorrect. As the Court observed in Almendarez-Torres, recidivism “is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sentence.” 523 U.S. at 243; see id. at 230 (describing recidivism to be “as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine”). “Consistent with this tradition, the Court said long ago that a State need not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the indictment or information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime, even though the conviction was ‘necessary to bring the case within the statute.’” Id. at 243 (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.

616, 624 (1912)) (emphasis omitted). "That conclusion followed, the Court said, from 'the distinct nature of the issue,' and the fact that recidivism 'does not relate to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only.'" Id. at 243-244 (quoting Graham, 224 U.S. at 629) (emphasis omitted).

"The Court has not deviated from this view.'" Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244 (citing Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962), and Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992)). Indeed, Apprendi itself recognized "a vast difference" between "accepting the validity of a prior judgment entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," and allowing a judge rather than a jury to find in the first instance facts that "'relate to the commission of the offense' itself." 530 U.S. at 496 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244); see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (explaining that because a prior conviction "must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees," it is "unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense").

A rule requiring that prior convictions, relevant only to sentencing, be alleged in the indictment or found by a jury would also be "difficult to reconcile" with the Court's "precedents

holding that the sentencing-related circumstances of recidivism are not part of the definition of the offense for double jeopardy purposes.” Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247 (citing Graham, 224 U.S. at 623-624). And such a rule would serve little practical purpose. The fact of a prior conviction is “almost never contested,” id. at 235, and a defendant who has previously undergone the criminal process that resulted in the conviction cannot plausibly claim to be surprised by the conviction’s existence or its use to enhance his sentence for a later crime, cf. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (describing the notice functions served by indictment).

The rule that petitioner advocates also could invite substantial “unfairness.” Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234. “As this Court has long recognized, the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes risks significant prejudice.” Id. at 235; see, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997) (“[T]here can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967) (evidence of prior crimes “is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice”); cf. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 563-565 (Due Process Clause does not require bifurcated proceeding when jury resolves recidivist sentencing issues.).

Petitioner errs in contending (Pet. 8) that this Court's decision in Alleyne, in particular, "seriously undercuts the view * * * that recidivism is different from other sentencing facts." This Court held in Alleyne that "any fact that increase[d] the mandatory minimum is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury." 570 U.S. at 103. But as petitioner recognizes (Pet. 8), the Court in Alleyne also made clear that it was not "revisit[ing]" Almendarez-Torres. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111 n.1. And since Alleyne, the Court has denied numerous petitions for writs of certiorari seeking to overrule Almendarez-Torres. See p. 6 n.2, supra.

3. In any event, as Justice Stevens recognized, even if Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided, "there is no special justification for overruling" it. Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201 (2006) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari). Almendarez-Torres's rule, which applies only to "the narrow issues of fact concerning a defendant's prior conviction history, * * * will seldom create any significant risk of prejudice to the accused." Ibid. Indeed, here, petitioner does not suggest (Pet. 5-9) that the government would have been unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. In these circumstances, "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis provides a sufficient basis for the denial of certiorari." Rangel-Reyes,

547 U.S. at 1201-1202 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

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