(Appendix A)

FILED: June 25, 2019

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-7539
(5:18-hc-02257-D)

TRAVIS LAVOY JENKINS

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent - Appellee

ORDER

The court denies the petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Niemeyer, Judge Harris, and Senior Judge Shedd.

For the Court

/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

(Appendix-A.A)

FILED: April 10, 2019

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-7539
(5:18-hc-02257-D)

TRAVIS LAVOY JENKINS

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent - Appellee

J U D G M E N T

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

(Appendix B.)

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-7539

TRAVIS LAVOY JENKINS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:18-hc-02257-D)

Submitted: April 4, 2019 Decided: April 10, 2019

Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Travis Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

(Appendix B)

PER CURIAM:

Travis Lavoy Jenkins appeals the district court's orders transferring his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia and denying reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant Jenkins leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Jenkins v. United States*, No. 5:18-hc-02257-D (E.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2018 & Dec. 12, 2018). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

(Appendix C)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:18-HC-2257-D

TRAVIS LAVOY JENKINS,	)	
Petitioner,	)	
v.	)	ORDER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	
Respondent.	)	

On October 17, 2018, Travis Lavoy Jenkins ("Jenkins" or "petitioner"), a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [D.E. 1]. Jenkins is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, which is located in the Southern District of Georgia. See BOP Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search by inmate number) (last visited Dec. 12, 2018). On November 14, 2018, the court transferred the petition to the Southern District of Georgia [D.E. 4]. On November 29, 2018, Jenkins filed a "motion to clarify and object to transferring of case" [D.E. 6]. Jenkins seeks to "clarify the transferring of" his case because he "filed a 3582(c)(2) motion, a 2241(d) Habeas Corpus and an amended 2241(d) Habeas Corpus." Id. at 1.

Jenkins's motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) remains pending in his criminal case. See Motion, United States v. Jenkins, No. 5:13-CR-168-BO-1, [D.E. 100] (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2018). To the extent that Jenkins objects to the transfer of his section 2241 petition, the court DENIES the motion [D.E. 6]. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004); Kanai v. McHugh, 638 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 2011).

(Appendix D)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:18-HC-2257-D

TRAVIS LAVOY JENKINS,	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	
v.	)	**ORDER**
	)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	

On October 17, 2018, Travis Lavoy Jenkins ("Jenkins" or "petitioner"), a federal inmate proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [D.E. 1]. Jenkins is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, in the Southern District of Georgia. See BOP Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search by inmate name) (last visited July 16, 2019). On November 14, 2018, the court transferred the petition to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia [D.E. 4]. On November 29, 2018, Jenkins filed a motion for reconsideration [D.E. 6], which the court denied on December 12, 2018 [D.E. 9]. Jenkins appealed [D.E. 10]. On April 10, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed [D.E. 16]. On July 3, 2019, the Fourth Circuit issued its mandate [D.E. 21].

Jenkins has filed additional motions for reconsideration, "to clarify and/or consolidate cases into the same court[,]" and "to release on own recognizance pending 2241 habeas corpus relief[.]" See [D.E. 12, 14–15]. The motions lack merit and are DENIED. The clerk is directed not to accept any further filings in this case.

(Appendix E)

In The United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Travis LaRoy Jenkins
v.
United States of America

Case No#: 5:18-hc-02257-D

Motion To Reconsider Order
Denial of Objection to Transfer Order

Comes now, Travis LaRoy Jenkins, (herein known as petitioner), on this 21st day of December, 2018, Pro-se, Respectfully moving this honorable Court to reconsider transferring and or denial of objection to transfer the instant case from the North Carolina district to the Southern District of Georgia, the district in which petitioner is housed. In support petitioner state as follows:

This honorable court Reliance on Rumsfeld v. Padilla 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004), is misplaced where as petitioner is not a terrorist, nor in military custody. While Congress had authorized state prisoners, in filing federal habeas corpus petitions under 28 USCS 2254 to challenge present physical custody, to name either the Warden or State penal officer as a respondent, Congress had made no such provisions for 2241 petitions such as the one in question. Congress also has legislated against background of the district-of-confinement rule by fashioning, in provisions such as 28 USCS 2241(d), explicit exceptions to the rule in certain circumstances. (See also 28 USCS 2241(c)(2)(3)(5)). Habeas Corpus relief is not limited to petitioners who are physically confined, the reach of the writ have been construed liberally. Federal district court may issue the writ of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdiction," however, while the Supreme Court has not made exceptions to the immediate-custodian-and district-of-confinement rules, the supreme court has deviated from the two rules in cases involving challenges to something other than present physical custody, and in the instant case petitioner is not challenging present physical confinement that limits jurisdiction to one district, petitioner is challenging a constitutional right and procedure that is guaranteed by the Constitution that governs the country, the 6th amendment right to a trial and the 14th amendment right to be free.

The instant case is easily distinguished from Rumsfeld as the instant circumstances has no terroristic inclinations requiring interceding by the secretary of defense or the president of the United States. Because a trial is warranted in this case, only the sentencing court can correct the denial of a trial that can prove petitioners' innocence, having been misinformed by a court appointed attorney and deceived by the court.

In McNally v Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S. Ct. 24, it's holding sanctioned a liberal interpretation of 2241(d) to the end that appropriate remedial order may issue, without unnecessary delay whenever a constitutional claim is established with a resultant effect upon the nature or duration of the prisoners' custody. (Word, 406 F 2d 352 (1/15/59)).

In the instant case, like Word, the custody of Jesup Warden under the authority of the conviction is North

Carolina. Jesups' Warden holds petitioner for North Carolina, not for Georgia. It is North Carolina's judgement and conviction that is under attack and North Carolinas' attorney general must defend it, not Georgia's. An invalid conviction is not entitled to be given effect in another state any more than where it was obtained.

Conclusion

North Carolina, the sentencing state, has jurisdiction to grant relief, in the instant case a trial to prove petitioners innocence. The relegation of the jurisdiction of a district Court in the confining state to a secondary status, one that will be "infrequently preferable" to the jurisdiction of a district court in the sentencing state, creates an obstacle to the exercise of habeas jurisdiction in the confining state impermissible, particularly in view of adverse effects the detainers presently inflict upon prisoners, especially outside of jurisdiction.

If Georgia, the confining state, relies on North Carolinas' conviction/detainer to justify the imposition of increased harshness upon its prisoner, a federal Court in North Carolina has the duty to consider habeas corpus whether the judgement underlying the detention/detainer is constitutionally valid.

Paradoxically, to transfer jurisdiction to the Southern District of Georgia, from the sentencing court in North Carolina, in so doing, the Court not merely declines to entertain a challenge to the future services of the North Carolina sentence in due course, but in addition denies petitioner the very remedy and right the Court acknowledges petitioner would be entitled to seek if relief of Georgia's consequences were the only objective instead of Constitutional Violations.

Petitioner asserts his innocence of the charge convicted of, having been misled by a court appointed Counsel to plead guilty, depriving petitioner not only of the constitutional right to a trial also misleading petitioner to give up his 14th amendment right to be free, as a liberty issue is at stake, petitioner being innocent of the crime 924 (c)(1)(A), and the Conpiracy Conviction.

Wherefore, petitioner prays this honorable court grant this motion to reconsider, taking into consideration all points and constitational law along with the simple knowledge that the evidence that can prove petitioners innocence, the Southern District of Georgia is not privileged to, and only this honorable court can correct the denial of constitutional rights and the miscarriage of justice necessary to resolve this and afford the petitioner his day in court.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Travis LaVoy Jenkins
Travis LaVoy Jenkins - 03527-104

UN-NOTORIZED OATH

Comes now, Travis L. Jenkins, on this 21st day of December, 2018, under the penalties of pejury, do hereby declare the information herein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Travis LaVoy Jenkins
Travis LaVoy Jenkins - 03527-104
FSL Jesup
2680 Hwy 301 South
Jesup, Ga. 31599

Personal Copy (Appendix F)

In The United States District Court
For The Eastern District of North Carolina

Travis Lavoy Jenkins
v
United States of America

case NO: 5:13-CR-168-FL

Motion For Appropriate Relief Pursuant to 2241 Based on Actual Innocence of Charge Convicted of

Comes now, Travis Lavoy Jenkins, pro-se, (herein known as petitioner), on this 15th day of October, 2018, moving this honorable court for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241(d) petitioner invoking the saving clause being actually innocent of the convicted charge(s) 924(c)(2)(A). In light of the supreme courts holding in McQuiggins v Perkins, U.S. 133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013) it is under the actual innocence doctrine a claim can be challenged. (a defendant's claim of actual innocence if proven can defeat procedural bars and time limitations).

Petitioner reminds this honorable court of the "less stringent" standard accorded pro se litigants, and asks that this court construe petitioners' motion liberally and consider all facts and points of law, even those that may not be mentioned by petitioner. (Haines v Kerner 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972))

It is petitioners' contention of having always being innocent of the charge of Use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Having exhausted procedural remedy in accordance to 2255 petitioner is unable to meet the gate keeping provisions of section 2255(h), (2) for second or succesive motions but now able to pass the saving clause. (Burrage v U.S. 571 U.S. 204 (2014)); (See also Herring v Ormond NO: 17-6224).

Furthurmore, the 4th circuit has held that the savings clause also applies, in pertinent part, when challenging the legality of a sentence under 2241, (868 F. 3d 415, 428, id at 429 (4th Cir. 2018); (See also Persaud 134 S. Ct. 1023 (2014). When a prisoner uses the savings

clause to bring a claim that is cognizable in a motion to vacate, he bypasses his statue of limitations and gains limitless time to press claims that prisoners who meet the requirements of Section 2255 do not receive. (McCarthan v Coleman 851 F.3d 1076; 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 4485; no: 12-14989 (3/17)).
Petitioner is actually innocent of the statutory provisions 924(c)(1)(A) under which he was convicted and it must be held invalid and conviction must be set aside and/or vacated. In support of petitioner states as follows:

Statement of Facts

On June 11, 2013, petitioner was indicted on 5 charges and pleaded guilty on September 3, 2013, without a plea agreement, to counts 1-5, answering all rule 11 plea colloquy questions as told by appointed defense counsel having assured petitioner of receiving no more than a total of 5 years imprisonment due to a 5K1 motion and the substantial assistance provided by petitioner in the prosecution and convictions of others that was substantial, while at the same time petitioner preserving all appellate rights, the record being silent on petitioners hesitation about 924(c)(1)(A), the reason for pleading guilty without a plea agreement.

On/or about April 1st 2014, the evening before sentencing, the assistant U.S. attorneys' decided not to file the 5K motion, having assured defense counsel without a plea agreement it would not influence the decision to file the 5K motion. Counsel requested a 30 day delay on sentencing to inquire of the governments' change of mind, (their reasoning being because petitioner did not have a binding plea agreement & was arrested with a gun in Florida), and was ultimately sentenced on April 30, 2014 to 71 months imprisonment for count 1, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 28grms or more of cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(c); Count 2, 3 and 4, distribution of a quantity of cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(c); Count 5, use and carry of a firearm in futhurance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A).

Let the statement of facts reflect that the record is clear at no time did the agents and informant see a gun and it was not until petitioner retrieved the weapon from behind the drivers job after the agents lost sight of petitioner. Petitioner having made the agents aware of having the weapon after being searched and handcuffed. Consequently, petitioners sentence was reduced to 105 months pursuant to rule 35 by the government on April 3rd 2015.

Statement of the Case

It is the holding in Bailey v United States, 516 U.S. 137 that offers clarity to petitioners actual innocence having reasoned a need to appeal the 924(c)(1)(A) conviction preserving all appellate rights by not entering into a binding contract/plea agreement with the United States government, having never been in possession of a firearm during and in relatio to any of the drug sales between petitioner and the agent/confidential informant.

Even if petitioner was in possession of said weapon/firearm during **the** offense, without conceeding to actually possesing the weapon, the holding is clear of congress' intent, using 2 terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning where as under congress' interpretation the supreme court clearly announced a firearm can be used without being carried, e.g. when an offender has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters with a firearm without holding it; and a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g. when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug transaction. Because a firearm was never seen or mentioned petitioner had never been perceived to possess a weapon to the point of agents actually not finding a weapon after searching and handcuffing and petitioner actually having to make the agents aware petitioner indeed had a weapon on **him**, after the fact.

In 924(c)(1), liability attaches only to cases of **actual use, not intended** use, as when an offender places a firearm with the intent to use it later if necessary. The difference between the 2 provisions demonstrates that had congress meant to broaden application of the statue beyond actual "**use**", congress could and would have so specified, as it did in 924(d)(1).

The **inert** presence of a firearm, without more, is not enough to trigger 924(c)(1). **If the gun is not disclosed or mentioned, it is not actively employed**, and "**it is not used.**" Congress knew how to draft a statue to reach a firearm that was "**intended to be used.**" In 924(c)(1), it chose not to include the term, but instead established the 5-year mandatory minimum only for those defendants' **who actually "use"** the firearm. (516 U.S. 137).

Petitioner pleading is furthur compounded due to counsels' misinforming petitioner of not having a defense to the 924(c)(1)(A) charge and take it up on appeal and the conspiracy charge convicted of, too, was questionable as well, needing more than an agent, who cannot be part of a conspiracy, to support conspiracy.

None-the-less, petitioners' plea becomes involutarily and unknowingly unintelligent having been misinformed by appointed counsel at side bar having hesitated when questioned, at both arrainment/change of plea hearing & sentencing, to understanding the 924(c)(1)(A) charge petitioner was pleading to, the judge ordering counsel to make sure petitioner understood what he was pleading to and counsel telling petitioner he had no defense against the 924(c)(1)(A) charge, when in fact petitioners' concern was justified as case law is clear when petitioner was advised by his attorney that his having the firearm when arrested, (mere possession), did support the conviction under 924(c)(1)(A) was critically incorrect. (523 U.S. 614 Bousley v U.S. (1998)). It's consequences for petitioner were just as severe and just as unfair, as if the court and counsel had knowingly conspired to decieve petitioner in order to induce him to plead guilty to crimes that petitioner did not commit. (Please see arrainment/change of plea transcripts of September 3, 2013)

Having relied on counsels' guarantee of the governments filing a 5K motion, petitioner answered at the arrainment/change of plea hearing on Sept 3, 2013 all questions to the rule 11 plea colloquy as told by counsel, (A F.R.C.P. 11 is per se prejudicial and thus must be a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice); (U.S v Timmreck 441 U.S. 780; 60 L.Ed 2d 634), dependant on counsels' advice of receiving no more than 5 years due to the 5K1 motion to be filed by the government for petitioners' substantial assistance in the arrest and prosecution of others. Based on the governments decision not to file the 5K1 motion, after petitioner pled and the court accepted petitioners' plea, it is clearly established by the record petitioners' guilty plea to the charges convicted of, specifically 924(c)(1)(A) charge is constitutionally invalid and petitioner presumptively innocent of that offense, and the government has the burden to prove petitioners unlawful use of the firearm, which, in the instant case is impossible, it requiring more than a showing of <u>mere possession</u> by a person who commits a drug offense, where as, once again, if congress had intended possession alone to trigger liability under 924(c)(1)(A), then congress easily could have so provided, as it did in the frequent use term, "**posses in the gun crime statues**" to describe prohibited gun related conduct; the application of an "**active employment**" standard (1) is supported by the language of the statue, the context of the word "**use**" within 924(c)(1), the context of 924(c)(1) within the statue and legislative history of 924(c)(1), all of which indicate that the government **must show** active employment of the firearm, and (2) is not consistent with United States supreme court precedence which found a particular use to be within the meaning of 924(c)(1); under this analysis a conviction under 924(c)(1) is not supported when there never was a gun seen or mentioned at no time during any of the 3 drug transactions, the agents being clear, with video proof, having petitioner always in sight, with the exception of one ten minute period having lost sight of petitioner when they pulled into the drivers job and they got out of the vehicle, one (the driver), to report into work and petitioner to retrieve his firearm and/or relieve himself. Afterwards, petitioners' arrest and directing the agents to the weapon/firearm on petitioners' person, missed by the agents after searching and handcuffing petitioner.

In Conclusion

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a "**narrow exception**" to the procedural-default rule for cases in which a constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of a defendant who is "**actually innocent** of the substantive offense, in this case 924(c)(1)(A). (Murray v Carrier, 477 U.S. 478

(1986)) Petitioner was denied his 1st amendment right to appeal when defense counsel refused to file notice to appeal after sentencing, petitioner having pled guilty without a signed written plea agreement to preserve his appellate rights, and petitioners claim of actual innocence of 924(c)(1)(A) overcoming procedural hurdles held by the supreme court in McQuiggins, 569 U.S. 383, 386, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013). Defense Counsel admitting under oath at an evidentiary hearing when questioned by newly appointed defense counsel Ms. Darrow, (Please see Motion hearing transcripts, March 22, 2016, Pages 99 Lines 23, 24, 25 — Page 100 Lines 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8), is clear evidence of his either being in conspiracy with the government or unaware of case law when he stated, "... he reviewed the written police reports... and petitioner not brandishing or overtly use any weapon during those transactions or any knowledge of using a weapon at all" as the holding in Bailey and Bousley is clear what is required for a 924(c)(1)(A) conviction, counsel having misinformed petitioner he had no defense to the charge and convicted 924(c)(1)(A) offense that the supreme courts' holding in both cases convincingly supports petitioners actual innocence, that the record proves. The minute the government decided not to file the 5K motion, counsel should have withdrawn petitioners plea and followed the counsel clause of the 6th amendment advocating for his client. To ask the court for a consecutive sentence for his client is not acting in his clients best interest.

Petitioners actual innocence claim actually constitutes a claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict petitioner for the offense of 924(c)(1)(A) and petitioner is factually innocent as well as actually innocent. It is important to note in this regard (in the instant case), that "**Actual Innocence**" means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. (Bousley v U.S. 523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed 2d 828 (1998))

The united states court of appeals for the 4th circuit (1) reversed the judgement of the District Court, holding that an act or ommission by counsel which shows ignorance or oversight may satisfy the "cause" requirement of Wainwright v Sykes; and (2) remanded for a determination as to whether the procedural default in this case was the result of such attorney error or reflected a deliberate appellate strategy (774 F. 2d 396 adhered to 754 F. 2d 520).

Petitioner pled guilty after hesitating when questioned about pleading to 924(c) at the arraignment/change of plea hearing only because defense counsel assured defendant government would file a 5K motion and petitioner would receive only 5 years total, and no signed plea agreement would not influence the goverment filing of a 5K motion for petitioners' substantial assistance. When the government decided not to file the 5K motion because of that very reason and agents finding a gun when petitioner was arrested but not charged with in Florida, petitioners' decision to preserve appeals rights were justified and counsel's obligation should have been to be an advocate and render the assistance necessary to assure petitioners' plea was knowingly and intelligently entered inaccordance to the constitution and federal rules of criminal procedure, or at the very least file a notice to appeal.

The evidence and record is clear and convincing as is petitioners' actual innocence, where as the video clearly shows no weapon seen or no active employment and no mention of a fire-arm during any of the drug offenses, as required by the holding in Bailey 516 U.S. 137, restricting the scope of 924(c)(1)(A) ruling to sustain a conviction under the statue, the government required to prove a firearm was actively employed during the offenses. (U.S. v Cooke 76 F. 3d 596 12/8/95). The record and the governments evidence (video recordings) proves just the opposite.

The 4th Circuit has held that the savings clause only pre-serves claims in which a petitioner alleges "actual innocence" of the conviction as in the instant case. (Rice v Rivera 617 F. 3d 802, 807 (4th Cir 2010)). A change of that character will "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal." Bousley v U.S 523 U.S. 614, 620; 118 S. Ct. 1604; 140 L Ed. 2d 828 (1998)

Wherefore, petitioner prays this honorable court grant habeas relief issuing an order to vacate or set aside petitioners conviction or whatever relief the court deems appropriate to ensure petitioners immediate release, petitioner serving time for an offense petitioner is actually innocent of.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Travis L. Jenkins
Travis Lavoy Jenkins 03527-104

Un-Notarized Oath

I, Travis Lavoy Jenkins, on this 15th day of October, do hereby declare, under the penalties of perjury that the information herein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Travis L. Jenkins
Travis Lavoy Jenkins 03527-104

Certificate of Service

I, Travis Lavoy Jenkins on this 15th day of October, 2018, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing motion has been sent by institutional mail to the assistant United States attorneys office at: 310 New Bern Ave., Suite 800 Federal Building, Raleigh, North Carolina, 27601-1461

/s/ Travis L. Jenkins
Travis Lavoy Jenkins 03527-104
FSL Jessup
2680 HWY 301 South
Jesup, Ga. 31599

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.