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App. No. <u>18A857</u>



In the Supreme Court of the United States

DR. LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,

Petitioner,

Supreme Court, U.S. FILED

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, SAP AMERICA, INC., JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., RICHARD G. ANDREWS, ET AL.

v.

Respondents,


On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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June 26, 2019



QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PREAMBLE # I. Jurisdiction

- 1. Whether due process requires jurisdiction must be proven when challenged, when none existed to begin with.
- 2. Whether adjudicating collateral estoppel from a void order without proving jurisdiction, constitutes bias, RICO and antitrust.
- 3. Whether adjudicating non-issues of collateral estoppel from a void order by willful non-compliance with the Constitution *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) to avoid the issue brought before the courts *the Fletcher Constitutional Challenge* without proving jurisdiction, constitutes bias, RICO and antitrust.
- 4. Whether this Court must act when it sees crime in progress and why it has not acted yet.
- 5. Whether a citizen's right to call in the oaths of office to prove jurisdiction can be abrogated by the courts for the courts and tortfeasors in their malfeasance in their conflicts of interest.
- 6. Whether a judge adjudicating, with no proof of jurisdiction, causing financial harm and physical injury to a citizen and inventor's rights is subject to a notice of liability.
- 7. Whether a court is duty-bound to provide oath of office upon request for demand to validate jurisdiction.
- 8. Whether no proof of jurisdiction by any Judge other than Justice Gorsuch places an inventor as sovereign over all the courts, in view of all courts violating the Court's own decision the law of the land that declares a grant is a contract where *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) constitutes contract.
- 9. Whether no proof of jurisdiction is ground for abatement.
- 10. Whether adjudicating without proof of jurisdiction is antitrust by choking inventors.

- 11. Whether adjudicating without proof of jurisdiction on record is evidence of a crime in progress under color of law to steal property, violating inventors' rights.
- 12. Whether adjudicating without proof of jurisdiction in relation to patent contract grants constitutes an inherent antitrust process, legitimizing antitrust by Corporate Infringers' scheme.
- **13.** Whether adjudicating non-issues to date by all courts constitutes oppression, tort, promoting antitrust objectives.
- 14. Whether a judge adjudicating where he or she offers no proof of jurisdiction upon demand is engaged in acts of treason.
- 15. Whether non-issue adjudication when courts have a duty to adjudicate issues before them is crime in progress to promote Corporate Infringers' misfeasance and antitrust objective.
- 16. Whether the law requires proof of jurisdiction on record upon demand, lack of which shows want of jurisdiction.
- 17. Whether a judge has discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction.
- 18. Whether a judge must prove on the record all jurisdictional facts related to jurisdiction asserted.
- **19.** Whether this Court can confer jurisdiction where none existed and make a void proceeding valid.
- 20. Whether the law of this case want of jurisdiction lacking proof thereof on record is the law of all, harming inventors' rights and causing financial and personal injury in antitrust and RICO violations.
- 21. Whether the lower courts' rulings are bills of attainder or *ex post facto* laws passed or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, violating the Contract Clause, Art. I, §10, clause 1 and Art. I, §§9 & 10, in dismissing the case for a false claim of Collateral Estoppel against the Government and private citizens after the Judge lost jurisdiction, *prima facie* evidence of which is the Judge himself admitted in writing he bought direct stock in a litigant.
- 22. Whether Collateral Estoppel cannot apply from a void Order by a Judge lacking jurisdiction by his own admission of direct stock holding in a litigant during the pendency of the case, of false invalidity of patent claims and false indefiniteness of claim terms without considering Patent Prosecution History,

disparately denying an inventor's protected rights to Federal Circuit's Aqua Products¹ Reversal of all Orders that did not consider "the entirety of the record"- Patent Prosecution History - and to her constitutional rights to the Law of the Land that a Patent Grant is a Contract, comforting Corporate Infringers in violating antitrust laws, denving the inventor access to justice, due process, an impartial tribunal, vacating Hearings, so as not to hear her case, to avoid adjudicating the Constitutional Challenge, induced by the Defendant's Solicitation that failed to furnish the burden of proof of "clear and convincing evidence" of patent invalidity, required by Patent Statute 35 USC § 282, has threatened the security of the nation and created a constitutional emergency requiring this Court to overrule Oil States² to stop the waste, fraud and abuse of Government resources by Corporate infringers who knowingly and intentionally made false claims to and defrauded the United States Government of trillions of dollars — the biggest contract fraud, theft and heist of intellectual property in the history of the United States; that they had ownership of the technology, intellectual property and Web applications, induced the U.S. Government to buy defective goods and procured contracts from every Department of the United States, when in fact it was offered without the permission of the inventor and without paying a license fee to the Petitioner/inventor.

¹ Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, Fed. Cir. Case 15-1177, October 2017 reversed all Orders that failed to consider "the entirety of the record"— Patent Prosecution History.

² Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 16-712 (2018).

PREAMBLE # II. A Patent Grant is A Contract. Oil States failed to consider Fletcher³, Dartmouth College and this Court's precedential rulings⁴.

- 1. Whether this Court's precedential ruling as declared by Chief Justice Marshall in *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) that <u>a Grant is a Contract</u>, governs patent law.
- 2. Whether *Oil States* must be overruled in view of *Fletcher*.
- **3.** Whether this Court's *Oil States'* ruling must be overruled, in view of this Court's precedential rulings establishing the sanctity of legal contracts.
- 4. Whether the lower court rulings must be reversed because the District Court failed to consider that the patent claim terms and claims are unambiguous in view of intrinsic evidence.
- 5. Whether without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct.

³ Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810).

⁴ This Court's rulings in *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) reaffirmed the sanctity of legal contracts that "<u>The law of this case is the</u> <u>law of all</u>... Lower courts ...have nothing to act upon..." "... applicable to contracts of every description... vested in the individual; ...<u>right...of possessing</u> itself of the property of the individual, when necessary for public uses; a right which a magnanimous and just government will never exercise without amply *indemnifying* <u>the individual</u>," Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company, 167 U.S. 224 (1897); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292 (1833); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

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Petitioner, Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, the inventor and sole assignee of the patent(s)-in-suit was the Appellant in the court below. Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam is the sole Petitioner in this Court. Respondents International Business Machines Corporation, SAP America, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Company, and Hon. Judge Richard G. Andrews were the Appellees/Respondents in the court below.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

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Pursuant to this Court's Rule 29.6, Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam is an individual and has no parent company and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THIS ENTIRE CASE REVOLVES AROUND JURISDICTION, OR LACK THEREOF
1. The sanctity of contracts expressly contained in the Constitution is both the "Law of the Case" and "Law of the Land"
2. Courts/USPTO denied Petitioner the protection from Patent Prosecution History, a key contract term between the Inventor and Government. Respondents and Judges concealed material <i>prima facie</i> evidence Dr. Arunachalam's patent claims are not invalid nor indefinite, propagated a false Collateral Estoppel Argument, which fails in light of the Constitution7

3.	Expert testimony on claim construction is
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4. Inventor testimony is helpful to claim construction. District Courts and USPTO/PTAB gagged Dr. Arunachalam/inventor, ignoring the Constitution, a "bulwark against oppression"......7

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This Court must take Judicial Notice that the *sanctity of* contracts as applied to the IP Clause governs granted patents and is not nullified by Oil States and that8

	1.	AIA Reexamination provision, <i>Oil Stat</i> es, and District and Circuit Court rulings are <i>expost facto</i> laws, bills of attainder, violate Separation of Powers, Supremacy and Contract Clauses of the Constitution and are unconstitutional
	2.	This Court erroneously announced a rule contrary to the Constitution in its <i>Oil States</i> ruling and the first opinion of this Court in <i>Fletcher</i> and re-affirmations thereof
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner/inventor Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam ("Dr. Arunachalam") respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entering judgment in Petitioner's Appeal Case No. 2018-2105, which is an Appeal from Case No. 1:16-cv-00281-RGA (D. Del.) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware is reproduced at App. 1a. The Order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware is reproduced at App. 2a. The above Orders are not published.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entered judgment in Petitioner's Appeal on January 28, 2019, (App.1a). Chief Justice Roberts extended the time in which to file a petition for writ of certiorari to and including June 27, 2019. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, JUDICIAL CANONS AND JUDICIAL RULES OF PROCEDURE INVOLVED

U.S. Const.:

<u>The Supremacy Clause</u> of the United States Constitution (Article VI, clause 2) establishes that "the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it...constitute the supreme law of the land."

Separation of Powers Clause, Arts. I, II & III; "The separation of powers ...the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the United States government are kept distinct in order to prevent abuse of power."

<u>Contract Clause</u>, Art. I, §10, clause 1; Art. I, §§9 & 10; "No bill of attainder or *ex* post facto Law shall be passed or law impairing the obligation of contracts."

<u>IP Clause</u>, Art. I, §8, clause 8; "To promote the Progress of Science..., by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

Equal Protection of the Laws Clause, Amend. XIV, §1; "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Due Process Clause, Amends. V & XIV; "Procedural due process is the guarantee of a fair legal process when the government tries to interfere with a person's protected interests in life, liberty, or property." "...the Supreme Court has held that procedural due process requires that, at a minimum, the government provide the person notice, an opportunity to be heard at an oral hearing, and a decision by a neutral decision maker. The Court has also ruled that the Due Process Clause requires judges to recuse themselves in cases where the judge has a conflict of interest. ...Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). Substantive due process is the guarantee that the fundamental rights of citizens will not be encroached on by government..."

Vol. XII, Constitutional Law, Chapter 7. Sec. 140. Erroneous and Fraudulent Decisions. Due Process and Equal Protection of Law: Procedure. Sec. 1. Due Process of Law. Sec. 141. Denying or Hindering Access to the Courts upon the Question of Due Process Itself.

Amend. I; "Right to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances."

42U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Act; JUDICIAL CANONS 2, 2A, 3, 3(A)(4); FRCP Rule 60(b) (1-4 & 6);

18 U.S. Code§ 2382 - Misprision of treason

"Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both."

<u>The Legislature's 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) Re-examination Provision</u> is a bill of attainder that took away Petitioner/inventor's rights and remedies. <u>There</u> <u>can be no rights without a remedy</u>.

Chief Justice Marshall declared in this Court's significant 'First Impression' Constitutional Res Judicata precedential ruling in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) and reaffirmed in numerous Supreme Court rulings¹ thereafter, <u>that a Grant is a</u>

¹ Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company, 167 U.S. 224 (1897); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292 (1833);

<u>Contract</u>, and the <u>Mandated Prohibition from rescinding Government-issued Patent</u> <u>Contract Grants</u> by the most absolute power, in accord with the Constitution. This is the 'Law of the Land.'

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) and other Supreme Court rulings listed *infra* apply the logic of <u>sanctity of contracts</u> and vested rights directly to <u>federal grants of patents under the IP Clause</u>. By entering into public contracts with inventors, the <u>federal government must ensure</u> what Chief Justice Marshall described in *Grant v. Raymond*, 31 U.S. 218 (1832) as a "<u>faithful</u> <u>execution of the solemn promise made by the United States</u>."

In U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company, 167 U.S. 224 (1897), Justice Brewer declared: "the contract basis for intellectual property rights heightens the <u>federal</u> <u>government's obligations to protect those rights</u>. ...give the <u>federal government</u> <u>"higher</u> <u>rights" to cancel land patents than to cancel patents for inventions</u>."

To uphold <u>Patent Prosecution History</u> is a key contract term between the inventor and the Federal Government/USPTO. The claim construction of claim terms agreed to between the inventor and the Original Examiner at the USPTO before the patent was granted is cast in stone and cannot be changed by the USPTO, courts or the patentee. Federal Circuit's Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, Case No. 15-1177, October 4, 2017 has affirmed that Petitioner has been pleading correctly all along and has been rebuffed by collusive adjudications by Courts and USPTO/PTAB, induced by Corporate Infringers' and their attorneys' Solicitations, <u>without considering Patent</u> <u>Prosecution History</u>, in breach of contract with inventors. <u>Federal Circuit ruled in</u> <u>Aqua Products that Orders by Courts and USPTO/PTAB that did not consider the</u> "entirety of the record"— <u>Patent Prosecution History</u> — <u>are void and reversed</u>.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THIS ENTIRE CASE REVOLVES AROUND JURISDICTION, OR LACK THEREOF. District Court Judge Andrews has not proven jurisdiction on the record, to date, even upon demand. Appellees, the Judiciary and lawyers do not refute lack of jurisdiction, nor can they. They are liable² to Dr. Arunachalam for the collusive theft of her intellectual property, patented technology, and patents on the Internet of Things — Web apps displayed on a Web browser, collectively "Infringing Technology." The case is best described in the following video of the grand theft of Petitioner's IP: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-8PeNheFco&feature=youtu.be

Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).

² Mass Action of Liability: <u>https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=NtIYFCjUTSo</u> Notice of Liability: <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gnMyxTAJSac</u>

"<u>There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction</u>." Joyce v. U.S., 474 2D215. See Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S Ct 2020, 451 U.S. 939;

"Court must prove on the record all jurisdictional facts related to jurisdiction asserted." 102 F.2d 188, *Chicago v. N.Y.* 37 F. Supp. 150;

"When a judge acts where he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason." *Cohens v. Virginia*, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); *U.S. v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200 (1980);

"The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." *Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 533; *Sramek v. Sramek*, 17 Kan App. 2d 573 (1992);

"Court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well-established law that a void order can be challenged in any court." 205 U.S. 8, 27 S Ct 236 (1907).

"Jurisdiction of the court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus." U.S. v. Anderson, 60F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Wash. 1945);

"We hold, for the reasons stated below, that the Foreign Agents Registration Act, June 8, 1938, "plainly and unquestionably" requires practitioners, Judges and lawyers to register." *Rabinovitz v. F. Kennedy*, 375 U.S. 605, 84 S.Ct. (1964)/Open Jurist, 84 S. Ct. 919, 11 L. Ed. 2d. 940; 115 U.S. App D, 210, 212; 318 F.2d. 181, 183; 375 U.S. 811, 84 S. Ct. 71, 11 L. Ed. 2d. 47; *Chisholm v. Gilmer*, 299 U.S. 99 (1936); 28 U.S. C. 1691, 62 Stat. 945; *Peaslee v. Haberstro*, 15 Blatchf. 472 Fed Case No. 10,884;

Indiana Code 5-4-1-9: Failure to Comply: "If officer fails to give the bond before the commencement of his term of office, then office is vacant."

Indiana Code 5-4-1-14: "A suit may be brought on a copy, a record or a copy of a record of an official bond legally certified."

"<u>Precedents ought to go for absolutely nothing</u>. The Constitution is a collection of fundamental laws, not to be departed from in practice nor altered by judicial decision... usurpation... the judge who asserts the <u>right of judicial review</u> ought to be prepared to maintain it on the principles of the Constitution."

The Oaths of Office are clear regarding the adherence to the Constitution. Article II, Sec. 1, last clause: The President promises to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution." Article VI, last clause: All other federal and State officers and judges promise to "support" the Constitution. U.S. Constitution, Article III Section 3:

"Treason shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the <u>Testimony of</u> <u>two Witnesses</u> to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."

When Congress makes a law which is outside the scope of its enumerated powers, it is no "law" at all, but is void; and American men and women have no obligation to comply. America Invents Act is one such and is void. Alexander Hamilton says this repeatedly in The Federalist Papers:

"... If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify ... " (Federalist No. 33, 5th para).

"...acts of ... [the federal government] which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers ... will [not] become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such . .. " (Federalist No. 33, 6th para), as in this Court's *Oil States*³ ruling.

"... every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, *is void*. No legislative act ... contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm ... that men ... may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid," as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which is unconstitutional and void. (Federalist No. 78, 10th para).

Judges are oath-bound to defend the Constitution. Repeated violations of the Constitution compound the evil. District and Appellate courts failed to consider the "Law of the Case" and "Law of the Land." Non-compliance by the courts with procedural rules is unlawful command influence. *Oil States* legitimizing corrupt process disorder constitutes prejudice of good order and justice and discredits the Judiciary by advocating treason against the law of the land and promoting

³ Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 16-712 (2018).

obstruction of justice by the District Court *sua sponte* dismissing Petitioner's civil RICO/patent infringement case without a hearing after ordering Respondents not to answer Petitioner's Complaint in unfettered judicial misfeasance to the prejudice of ensuring a fair and proper administration of justice.

The Law of the Case, the Law of the Land, the Constitution and the facts are on Petitioner's side. <u>Judge Andrews ignored the concreteness of this mere fact</u>. Samuel Johnson stated: "<u>the most obdurate incredulity may be shamed or silenced</u> <u>by facts</u>."

An intellectual property patent grant contract is protected by the Constitution of the United States from legislative alteration coloring decades-long unilateral breach of contract by the Agency, legalized by judicial review annulling vested rights to property, and destroying remedies by denying access to the courts.

Court's Oil States ruling legalizing the America Invents Act This Reexamination provision, corruptly usurping the Law of the Land by impairing the obligation of contracts violating the prohibition of the Constitution and failing to consider this Court's mandated prohibition against rescinding Government-issued contract grants by remaining silent thereof, while encroaching upon the Separation of Powers Clause, coloring the USPTO's corrupt decades-long re-examination process of rescinding Government-issued contract granted patents by neglecting to consider Patent Prosecution History, in a unilateral breach of contract by the Agency with the inventor, prior to America Invents Act and continuing thereafter, delineated in the Federal Circuit's Aqua Products opting out reversal — the "Action" — breached the patent contract with the Inventor, expressly contained in the Constitution, affirmed multiple times by this Court⁴ as inviolate, and <u>usurped the Constitutional</u> Amendment Process with all its inherent protections against unlawful search and seizure at least without due compensation. The "Action" imposes a duty to reverse the lower courts' rulings as unconstitutional. It denied Petitioner/inventor equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, constitutionally enumerated rights, violates the rule of law designed by the framers of the Constitution as a bulwark against oppression to limit the exercise of power and to make the agents of the people accountable for revising the Constitution in accordance with their own predilections. It tortuously destroyed Petitioner's/inventor's vested contractually granted rights and remedies, giving superior bargaining power to Respondents (having no reason to tender royalties owed), denying access to an impartial court by making it difficult, expensive, or hazardous.

⁴ Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832); U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company, 167 U.S. 224 (1897).

1. <u>The sanctity of contracts expressly contained in the</u> <u>Constitution is both the "Law of the Case" and "Law of the</u> <u>Land</u>":

Chief Justice Marshall declared: "The law of this case is the law of all... Lower courts ...have nothing to act upon..." "... applicable to contracts of every description... vested in the individual; ...right...of possessing itself of the property of the individual, when necessary for public uses; a right which a magnanimous and just government will never exercise without amply *indemnifying the individual*."

2. <u>Courts/USPTO denied Petitioner the protection from Patent</u> <u>Prosecution History, a key contract term between the Inventor and</u> <u>Government. Respondents and Judges concealed material prima</u> <u>facie evidence Dr. Arunachalam's patent claims are not invalid nor</u> <u>indefinite, propagated a false Collateral Estoppel Argument, which</u> <u>fails in light of the Constitution:</u>

Precedential Rulings long before Aqua Products, see Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., Inc. And Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., Fed. Cir. 02-1551, -1574, 03-1091 (2003), restrain the District Court from disparately failing to consider Patent Prosecution History in Petitioner's patent cases. Lower courts failed to apply Federal Circuit's Aqua Products ruling which reversed all Orders in cases that failed to consider Patent Prosecution History.

3. <u>Expert testimony on claim construction is impermissible. Expert</u> <u>testimony from JPMorgan concealed prima facie evidence of Patent</u> <u>Prosecution History on claim construction</u>:

that the claim terms are <u>not</u> indefinite, falsely alleged by JPMorgan in 12-282-RGA (D.Del.) and collusively adjudicated by District and Appellate courts, without considering Patent Prosecution History, a key contract term between the inventor and the Government, in breach of contract with the inventor. *Bell& Howell Document Management Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys.*, 132 F. 3d 701(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Vitronics extensively and <u>reversing district court because court erred in relying on expert</u> testimony when claims were unambiguous in view of intrinsic evidence.)

4. <u>Inventor testimony is helpful to claim construction. District</u> <u>Courts and USPTO/PTAB gagged inventor Dr. Arunachalam,</u> <u>ignoring the Constitution, a "bulwark against oppression</u>":

Petitioner/inventor was denied access to the courts to give testimony on claim construction. See Perhaps: Voice Technologies Group, Inc. v. VMC Systems, Inc., 164

F.3d 605, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("An inventor is a competent witness to explain the invention and what was intended to be conveyed by the specification and covered by the claims.")

Judges Andrews' Orders are void as repugnant to the Constitution.

I. <u>This Court must take Judicial Notice that Fletcher governs Granted</u> Patents and is *not* nullified by Oil States and that

Chief Justice Marshall declared in this Court's 'First Impression' Constitutional Res Judicata precedential ruling in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) and reaffirmed by this Court in Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company, 167 U.S. 224 (1897); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Justice McLean in Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292 (1833); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870); that <u>a Grant is a Contract</u> and applies to Patent Grants and the <u>Mandated Prohibition from</u> rescinding patent contract grants by the most absolute power, in accord with the Constitution. This is the 'Law of the Land'. The Judiciary, attorneys, USPTO/PTAB, Legislature and Respondents must abide by the Constitution and this Mandated Prohibition or stand to treason in breaching their solemn oaths of office and lose their jurisdiction and immunity. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).⁵

Justice Samuel Miller in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884): "Contracts between the government and inventors are established under federal law." W. E. Simonds, USPTO Commissioner from 1891 to 1892, in the Manual of Patent Law (1874): "A Patent is a Contract between the inventor and the Government representing the public at large." Madison in Federalist No. 44: "Patent rights receive protection pursuant to ...contracts between inventors and the federal government."

1. <u>AIA Reexamination provision</u>, *Oil States*, and District and Circuit <u>Court rulings are *ex-post facto* laws</u>, bills of attainder, violate <u>Separation of Powers</u>, <u>Supremacy and Contract Clauses of the</u> <u>Constitution and are unconstitutional</u>:

AIA Reexamination provision passed under the form of an enactment is not therefore to be considered the "Law of the Land," declared inventors deprived and

⁵ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 180 (1803); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 524 (1859); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 397 (1932) on <u>Government officials non-exempt from absolute judicial immunity</u>: "no avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the...Constitution...when ...<u>exertion of...power</u>... <u>has overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry...against...individuals charged with the transgression."</u>

must be held to be void as being a bill of attainder. *State v. Cummings*, 36 Missouri 263. *People v. Hawker*, 14 App. Div. 188, 43 N.Y. S. 516.

"If this were so, acts of attainder, bill of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another, (without just compensation to citizens under the takings clause of the 5th Amendment and eminent domain), legislative judgments, decrees and forfeitures, in all possible forms would be the law of the land. Such a strange construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance completely inoperative and void. It directly established the union of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for courts to administer or men to live under. The administration of justice would be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees, not to declare the law or administer the justice of the country." Webster's works Vol V., p 487; Dartmouth College (1819).

U.S. Const., Art. I, §§9 and 10, furnish to individual liberty, <u>ample protection</u> <u>against the exercise of arbitrary power</u>, prohibit the enactment of *ex post facto* laws by Congress and by State legislatures. <u>Such deprivations of citizens' property by</u> <u>legislative acts having a retrospective operation are unconstitutional</u>. It was not inserted to secure citizens in their private rights of either property or contracts. The U.S. Constitution prohibits the passing of any law impairing the obligation of contracts and was applied by this Court in 1810 and reaffirmed subsequently to secure private rights. The restriction not to pass any *ex post facto* law was to secure citizens from injury or punishment, in consequence of the law.

2. <u>This Court erroneously announced a rule contrary to the Constitution</u> <u>in its Oil States ruling and contrary to the first opinion of this Court</u> <u>in Fletcher and re-affirmations thereof</u>:

All courts should subsequently follow this Court's *Fletcher* ruling rather than this Court's own new unconstitutional *Oil States* decision, the law of this Court in *Fletcher* being *per se* justice. <u>The *Fletcher* ruling in accord with the</u> <u>Constitution is the controlling authority and reigns supreme as the Law of</u> <u>the Land</u>, not the unconstitutional *Oil States* ruling in violation of the Separation of Powers, Supremacy and Contract Clauses.

II.

BACKGROUND

1. Dr. Arunachalam is the inventor of the Internet of Things (IoT) — Web Applications displayed on a Web browser — her dozen patents have a priority date of 1995, when two-way real-time Web transactions from

Web applications were non-existent.

Respondents and the Government benefited by trillions of dollars from Petitioner's patents — exemplified in Web banking Web apps, Apple's iPhone App Store with 2M+ Web apps (pre-packaged in China and imported into the United States), Google Play, Facebook's social networking Web app. JPMorgan's website states it has over 7000 Web applications in use in just <u>one</u> Business Unit.

2. Proceedings of the District Court and Federal Circuit

The District Court rendered Orders without jurisdiction, dismissed the case without a hearing after ordering the Respondents not to answer Petitioner's Complaint, denying due process to Dr. Arunachalam, in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge Andrews, by his own admission, lacked jurisdiction, to begin with. Judges warred against the Constitution in treasonous breach of their solemn Oaths of Office, not enforcing the Supreme Law(s) of the Land Mandated Prohibition declared by Chief Justice Marshall in *Fletcher* against rescinding Government-Issued Patent Contract Grants by the highest authority, reaffirmed by this Court; lost their jurisdiction and immunity. Respondents and the Federal Circuit have not proven an Exemption from the Mandated Prohibition. The 'Laws of The Land' on Petitioner's side, Judge Andrews dismissed the Constitution without a hearing. Judge Andrews disparately failed to consider Patent Prosecution History and the Federal Circuit's Aqua Products reversal of all Orders that failed to consider Patent Prosecution History. His Orders are void. The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the District Court rulings on January 28, 2019.

This Court declared Government officials non-exempt from absolute judicial immunity. *Sterling v. Constantin*, 287 U. S. 397 (1932).

Dr. Arunachalam has been deprived of her fundamental rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); *Baldwin v. Missouri*, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).

District and Appellate Courts' Order(s) are void, predicated upon fraudulent and erroneous renditions of the case and the law, not consistent with procedural rules and 'Law of the Case' and 'Law of the Land.' Judges are co-conspirators.

"<u>A decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision</u> <u>at all, and never becomes final</u>." *Kenner v. C.I.R.*, 387 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.1968).

The courts failed to consider that the claims of the patents-in-suit falsely alleged as invalid are <u>not</u> invalid, because the JPMorgan Court 12-282-SLR/RGA

(D.Del.) failed to consider Patent Prosecution History, which had already established the claim construction of the terms alleged falsely as "indefinite" by JPMorgan, as <u>not</u> indefinite. Based on this fraudulent and erroneous decision by the JPMorgan Court procured fraudulently by JPMorgan, the Fulton Court 14-490-RGA (D.Del.) and financially conflicted Judge Andrews <u>fraudulently concealed from the Court</u> that Patent Prosecution History was not considered by the JPMorgan Court or the Fulton Court and propagated to all tribunals a false theory of Collateral Estoppel, which is moot because:

- Judge Andrews is financially conflicted, by his own admission of buying direct stock in JPMorgan Chase & Co. during the pendency of the case. His Orders are void. There can be no collateral estoppel from void Orders.
- (ii) Patent Prosecution History estops all other estoppels, as proven prima facie that Petitioner has been right all along by
- (iii) the Federal Circuit's Aqua Products' reversal of Orders that failed to consider "the entirety of the record" —Patent Prosecution History (which the District Court failed to apply in my case); and
- (iv) this Court's precedential 'First Impression' Constitutional Res Judicata Mandated Prohibition from rescinding Government-Issued Contract Patent Grants declared by Chief Justice Marshall himself in Fletcher that <u>a Grant is a Contract</u> and reaffirmed by himself in Dartmouth College (1819), Grant v. Raymond (1832), Ogden v. Saunders (1927), and U.S. v. AT&T (1897).

It is a material fact that the Judiciary, USPTO, PTAB, Respondents, Attorneys and the Legislature (inserting the re-examination provision into the AIA, in breach of contract with the inventor) and this Court (except the dissenting Justices Gorsuch and Roberts, and now Justice Kavanaugh) in its *Oil States* ruling constitutionalizing the AIA re-examination provision and violating the Separation of Powers, Supremacy and Contract Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, <u>warred against the Constitution</u>, breached their solemn oaths of office and have lost their jurisdiction and immunities. *See Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Chief Justice Marshall in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803) has adjudicated that Courts <u>cannot shirk their duty from adjudicating issues</u>, <u>even though they present complex Constitutional challenges</u>, as here. No court can reverse the Constitution — as declared in *Fletcher*, *Dartmouth College*, *Grant v. Raymond*, U.S. v. *AT&T*, upholding the sanctity of contracts.

District and Appellate Courts *collusively* adjudicated in a <u>concerted</u> conspiracy as part of a corrupt enterprise, without considering Patent Prosecution History, *Aqua Products*' reversal, the Constitution or the "*Fletcher* Challenge." The District Court and all the other tribunals failed to give Petitioner Equal Protection of the Laws and access to justice and to the courts.

Judge Andrews failed to enforce the Constitution, he breached his solemn oath of office and lost his jurisdiction and immunity; obstructing justice, avoiding the significant Constitutional issues Judge Andrews failed to address.

Judge Andrews failed to adjudicate consistent with Procedural Rules and 'Law of the Case' and 'Law of the Land' — the '*Fletcher* Challenge.' Why would Judge Andrews deny Petitioner due process — a Hearing?

The Federal Circuit is guilty of the same. It joined the *collusive* conspiracy with the Respondents whose sole object is to deprive Petitioner of her royalties to her significant patents on the <u>Internet of Things</u> — <u>Web apps displayed on a Web</u> <u>browser</u> — which she invented prior to 1995, by breaching their solemn oaths of office and violating the Constitution — the "*Fletcher* Challenge," which must be addressed.

Petitioner continuing to defend the Constitution are not "scurrilous attacks" on the Judiciary.

The Federal Circuit erroneously and fraudulently ruled that Petitioner's jurisdictional challenge was not warranted, <u>ignoring the significant Constitutional</u> <u>challenges raised by Petitioner</u>. The <u>Federal Circuit itself is in treasonous breach of</u> <u>their solemn oaths of office in not enforcing the Laws of the Land — Object</u> — to avoid <u>adjudicating</u> the <u>countervailing</u>: 'Mandated Prohibition' — incidentally — comforting the abusive object of <u>Respondents' (18) requests to reexamine Petitioner's</u> patent contract grant.

1. FALSE CLAIM OF <u>COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL FROM VOID ORDERS</u> BY JUDGE ANDREWS, WHO ADMITTED BUYING DIRECT STOCK IN JPMORGAN DURING THE PENDENCY OF THAT CASE 12-282-RGA (D. DEL.) AND PTAB JUDGES MCNAMARA AND SIU, WHOSE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES EVIDENCE DIRECT STOCK IN MICROSOFT AND IBM, AND REFUSED TO RECUSE, AND RETALIATED AGAINST DR. ARUNACHALAM.

Judge Andrews admitted himself in the Court records three years into Dr. Arunachalam's JPMorgan Case 12-282-RGA (D.Del.) that he bought direct stock in JPMorgan Chase & Co. <u>He lost subject matter jurisdiction in all of Dr.</u> <u>Arunachalam's cases he presided over, yet failed to recuse</u>. His Orders are void in <u>all</u> of Dr. Arunachalam's cases: the *Fulton Financial Corporation* Case No. 14-490-RGA (D.Del.), the *IBM* RICO Case No. 16-281-RGA (D.Del.), *George Pazuniak* Case 15-259-RGA (D.Del.), the *Wells Fargo Bank* and *CitiBank* cases, the Citizens' Financial Case No. 12-355-RGA (D.Del.) and other cases he presided over. PTAB Judges McNamara's direct stock in Microsoft and Stephen Siu's financial conflicts of interest with Microsoft and IBM and failing to recuse makes all Orders void in all the 15 IPR/CBM re-exams and 3 CRU re-exams in Dr. Arunachalam's cases at the USPTO/PTAB. Their Financial Disclosure Statements disclose they owned direct stock in Microsoft and IBM respectively and are material prima facie evidence Judge Andrews and PTAB Judges McNamara and Siu lost jurisdiction; yet failed to recuse and engaged in obstruction of justice and harassed Dr. Arunachalam in Fulton Financial Corporation Case 14-490-RGA (D.Del.) on Dr. Arunachalam's virgin, unadjudicated Patent, her U.S. Patent No. 8,271,339 ("the '339 patent") and in the PTAB IPR/CBM Reviews and CRU re-exams of Dr. Arunachalam's patents. Those Orders are NULLITIES and ANY and ALL Orders DERIVING from those NULL and VOID Orders are themselves NULLITIES. Judges and lawyers repeatedly made False Claims of collateral estoppel from void Orders and made a false propaganda and disseminated the False Claim of *collateral estoppel from void* Orders to every District and Appellate Court. Respondents perpetrated the fraud, started by JPMorgan Chase & Co., carried on to the Fulton Court 14-490-RGA (D.Del.), and thereafter to every District and Circuit Court, and to the lower Courts in this case, precipitating the Constitutional crisis/emergency, described infra.

THIS COURT'S OIL STATES RULING IS AN AFFRONT TO PUBLIC 2. MORALS, TRIGGERING LAWYERS AND JUDGES TO OBSTRUCT ARE RUNNING FROM THE JUSTICE. COURTS FLETCHER **CHALLENGE** EBOLA, WOULD RATHER DENY DR. LIKE ARUNACHALAM DUE PROCESS AND KEEP HER GAGGED, THAN ADJUDICATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE.

Dr. Arunachalam is a constitutional warrior and PATRIOT. This Court must address security concerns raised by victim and witness Dr. Arunachalam who has been threatened by Judges Hixsom, Donato, Laporte, Hamilton, Davila of the Northern District of California and Judge Andrews of the Delaware District Courts and Respondents, as a result of her defending her Constitutional rights. Judges, lawyers and Respondents have abused and harassed Dr. Arunachalam to no end, libeled and defamed her and denied her due process, for defending the Constitution. The Judiciary in the District Courts in California and Delaware and Circuit Courts are adversely dominated by their own corruption and breached their solemn oaths of office in not enforcing the Constitution – the Law of the Land – that a Grant is a Contract that cannot be rescinded by the highest authority (and without compensating the inventor) - as declared in this Court's precedential rulings. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall declared: "The law of this case is the law of all... and applies to contracts of any description ... "); all reaffirming Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) in which Chief Justice Marshall declared: <u>A Grant is a Contract</u>. The entire Judiciary in the Northern District of California; District of Delaware; U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third, Ninth and Federal Circuits and six Supreme Court Justices, [except Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Chief Justice Roberts, the latter two correctly dissented in Oil States], USPTO/PTAB and Legislature's AIA failed to enforce the Law of the Land and adjudicate the constitutional conflict this Court failed to consider in its Oil States ruling over its own precedential rulings in Fletcher v. Peck — "The Constitutional Challenge" — "<u>The Fletcher Challenge</u>."

The District of Delaware is <u>an adverse domination judiciary system</u> <u>that denied due process to Dr. Arunachalam</u>. It aided and abetted the theft of Dr. Arunachalam's significant inventions and intellectual property, from which Respondents benefited by trillions of dollars; the despicable display of judicial fraud, perpetrating anti-trust, in a cover-up of judges' own misconduct. Judges Stark, Hixsom, Donato, Laporte, Hamilton, Davila and Andrews have not complied with the law nor have they served the public interest.

The courts failed to apply TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S. 16-341 (1917), 137 S. Ct. 1514 in which this Court ruled against the Federal Circuit not abiding by this Court's precedential rulings in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222–226 (1957) for almost a century. District and Appellate Courts disparately denied Dr. Arunachalam her protected rights to a neutral judge with no financial conflicts of interest in her opponent, to Patent Prosecution History and the Federal Circuit's Aqua Products' reversal of all Orders that failed to consider "the entirety of the record" - Patent Prosecution History — and failed to apply Patent Statutes. In those courts, Respondents, attorneys and the Judiciary made false claims to the Government of collateral estoppel from Orders that are NULLITIES and VOID, when Judge Andrews admitted himself he bought direct stock in JPMorgan during the pendency of that case 12-282-RGA (D.Del.) and Judge Robinson recused due to her own conflicts of interests along with Jan Horbaly of the Federal Circuit, and furthermore, without those Courts considering prima facie material evidence of Patent Prosecution History. Respondents knowingly and intentionally made false claims to and defrauded the United States Government of trillions of dollars — the biggest contract fraud, theft and heist of intellectual property in the history of the **United States.**

Respondents made false claims that they had ownership of the technology, intellectual property and Web applications, induced the U.S. Government to buy defective goods and procured contracts from every Department of the United States, when in fact it was offered without the permission of the inventor Dr. Arunachalam and without paying a license fee to Dr. Arunachalam. Judges and attorneys in the Delaware District Court were complicit in improperly and illegally promoting, fomenting, and legitimizing the erroneous idea that Respondents had ownership or standing to sell this stolen technology to the U.S. Government.

3. JUDICIARY CREATED A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS/EMERGENCY.

The judiciary and PTAB failed to uphold the Law of the Land. They would rather violate Dr. Arunachalam/inventor's rights than acknowledge *Fletcher* and adjudicate. They denied Dr. Arunachalam access to the court because they refused to acknowledge *Fletcher*. They defamed/libeled Dr. Arunachalam, sanctioned her for false, manufactured reasons, took her money, allowed the theft of Dr. Arunachalam's monies by lawyers held in Client IOLTA account (*See* Dr. Arunachalam's Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Case 18-9115) for 6 years not returned to date and theft of Dr. Arunachalam's patents and inventions and intellectual property by Respondents without paying Dr. Arunachalam royalties, made it expensive, hazardous and burdensome for Dr. Arunachalam to have access to justice.

Dr. Arunachalam is a 71-year old, single, disabled, female inventor of significant inventions. Why would they all do this, when the facts and the Law of the Case and Law of the Land are on her side? They know they are wrong, and they do not want anyone to find out they are wrong. <u>Why this outrageous obstruction of justice in a corrupt judicial organization</u>? They are retaliating against Dr. Arunachalam for being the first to raise the *Fletcher Constitutional challenge*.

4. <u>FALSE CLAIM OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL FROM VOID ORDERS</u> <u>FROM JUDGE WITH NO JURISDICTION</u>, FURTHER WITHOUT CONSIDERING PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY.

All Respondents made a false claim that Dr. Arunachalam's JPMorgan Case 12-282-RGA (D.Del.) rulings on her '500, '492 and '158 patents collaterally estop her Fulton Financial Corporation Case No. 14-490-RGA (D.Del.) on the unadjudicated '339 patent and concealed from the Government that the JPMorgan Court and Fulton Court failed to consider Patent Prosecution History.

5. FALSE CLAIM THAT PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED ONLY IN DR. ARUNACHALAM'S CASES.

Patent Prosecution History is material *prima facie* evidence that Petitioner's patent claims are <u>not</u> invalid and that the claim terms are <u>not</u> indefinite, as *knowingly and intentionally* falsely claimed by Respondents, who defrauded our Courts and the Government. Yet Respondents *disparately* concealed in their Solicitations and the courts failed to consider Patent Prosecution History in Petitioner's cases.

6. FALSE CLAIM THAT FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S AQUA PRODUCTS' REVERSAL OF ALL ORDERS THAT DID NOT CONSIDER "THE ENTIRETY OF THE RECORD"—PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY— DOES NOT APPLY ONLY TO DR. ARUNACHALAM. Judges, lawyers and Respondents disparately denied Petitioner her protected rights to Patent Prosecution History, and the reversal in Aqua Products.

7. FALSE CLAIMS OF PRIOR ART BY RESPONDENTS TO FILE AND INSTITUTE SERIAL 18 IPR/CBM/CRU RE-EXAMS IN USPTO/PTAB.

Respondents knowingly and intentionally made false claims of prior art to defraud the Government and engaged in waste, fraud and abuse of Government resources. IBM, Microsoft and SAP America, Inc. signed NDAs with Dr. Arunachalam in 1995 and 2003. Microsoft's CTO and IBM employees interviewed with Dr. Arunachalam to work for her company in 1995, 1996. They agreed there was **no prior** art then, and that the claim terms were <u>enabled</u>, had full written description and **not** indefinite and that the claims were valid; and offered to buy Dr. Arunachalam's patents in 2003-2006. SAP offered \$100M in 2003. How could there be prior art in 2008-2018, if there was no prior art in 1995?

8. FALSE CLAIM OF INVALIDITY OF PATENT CLAIMS AND INDEFINITENESS BY FAILING TO CONSIDER PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY.

Respondents knowingly and intentionally made false claims of invalidity of patent claims and indefiniteness, knowing full well that the Patent Prosecution History (which this Court must take Judicial Notice of) of Dr. Arunachalam's patents has cast in stone the construction of claim terms in Dr. Arunachalam's granted patents, and that claims and claim terms are not indefinite nor invalid nor *not* enabled.

9. FALSE CLAIMS THAT THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTIAL RULINGS BY CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL THAT A GRANT IS A CONTRACT AND CANNOT BE RESCINDED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY — THE LAW OF THE LAND — DO NOT APPLY.

Respondents, in collusive conspiracy, *knowingly and intentionally* made false claims that the Law of the Land does not apply to Dr. Arunachalam's patents.

10. FALSE CLAIM THAT AIA/REEXAMS DO NOT VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Respondents knowingly and intentionally made false claims that AIA/PTAB rescinding <u>patent contract grants</u> is constitutional, whereas in fact Oil States/AIA/reexams violate the Separation of Powers clause (prima facie evidence is Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts correctly dissented in Oil States) and the Contract clause of the Constitution — hence unconstitutional and void.

11. BIG PICTURE POINTS TO A SERIOUS PROBLEM: OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, OVERT CONSPIRACY, ANTITRUST

Microsoft and SAP America, Inc. filed approximately 18 re-exams and IPR/CBM reviews against Dr. Arunachalam and made false claims to the Government in an egregious waste, fraud and abuse of Government resources. Respondents cannot claim prior art, when they found none in 1995 when they signed NDAs with Dr. Arunachalam. They concealed material prima facie evidence of Patent Prosecution History and defrauded the courts with false claims. Even after the Federal Circuit's Aqua Products' reversal, the courts failed to adjudicate the Fletcher Constitutional challenge. Judges had stock in Respondents, failed to recuse, lost jurisdiction, their Orders are void. Judges and PTAB restricted inventor Dr. Arunachalam and took away her rights, comforting antitrust violations by Respondents. The Judiciary, PTAB and Respondents' overt conspiracy against Dr. Arunachalam's rights has had a devastating effect on the public. Their overt and covert war on the Constitution has killed the entire patent system. Judge Andrews and PTAB Judge McNamara admitted direct stock holdings in JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Microsoft. Lawyers and judges breached their solemn oaths of office in warring against the Constitution. They engaged in taking retaliatory action and going out of the way to discriminate against Dr. Arunachalam for being a **Patriot** defending the Constitution, continuing unabated with no signs of fairness or remedy — and made willful false claims knowingly and intentionally and defrauded the Government, in a collusive conspiracy with USPTO/PTAB, Legislature and Respondents. The Judiciary represented Respondents, comforting them in violating anti-trust laws. The Judiciary warred against the Constitution and denied Dr. Arunachalam access to justice, so as not to hear her case, to avoid adjudicating the Fletcher Constitutional challenge, described supra.

12. JUDICIARY AND PTAB DENIED DR. ARUNACHALAM ACCESS TO THE COURTS.

Judge Andrews represented the Respondents by acting as their attorney and ordered them to not answer Dr. Arunachalam's complaint(s), vacated the Hearing(s), dismissed her cases for false, manufactured reasons and ordered Respondents to move for attorneys' fees and sanctions against Dr. Arunachalam for being a <u>Patriot</u> defending the Constitution, falsely dubbing her a "vexatious litigant" for crimes <u>committed by Respondents</u>, <u>Judges and lawyers</u>. District Court Judges, and USPTO/PTAB Administrative Judges McNamara, Siu and Turner and Respondents *intimidated and harassed* Dr. Arunachalam, *a 71-year old*, *single*, *disabled female*, the genuine inventor of the Internet of Things (IoT) — Web apps displayed on a Web browser.

13. BIAS AGAINST DR. ARUNACHALAM'S RACE

The Judiciary and PTAB denied Dr. Arunachalam even something as basic as electronic filing for no logical reason, or for that matter illogical reason, except for bias against her race. They failed to docket her filings, removed her filings from the docket for moving to recuse Judge Andrews and PTAB Administrative Judge McNamara due to their direct stock holdings in JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Microsoft. PTAB Judge McNamara *disparately* required Dr. Arunachalam to call teleconference meetings with the PTAB and SAP America, Inc. to request that her filings be docketed.

14. **RESPONDENTS VIOLATED 35 USC §282:** which states:

"A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim. ...The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."

Respondents do not argue that the presumption or the assignment of the burden of persuasion on an accused infringer is unconstitutional. See pp. 17-18, Roberta Morris amicus curiae brief in this Court's Case No. 10-290, Microsoft v i4i (This Court must take Judicial Notice of Roberta Morris' brief.):

"... In view of the growing tendency in the recent past for courts to ignore or pay little more than lip service to the doctrine of presumption of validity, it is hoped that this positive declaration by the Congress will be of real value in strengthening the patent system." Paul A. Rose, Washington, D.C., Chairman of the Laws and Rules Committee of the American Patent Law Association (APLA), Statement of the American Patent Law Association on H.R. 3760, PATENT LAW CODIFICATION REVISION. HEARINGS ON H. R. 3760 BEFORE AND SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3 OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., at 46 (1951).

"The often-cited proxy for legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952, Federico's Commentaries (originally included with the printed volume of 35 United States Code Annotated; subsequently reprinted in 75 JPTOS 161 (1993)) explains § 282 as follows:

"...<u>The statement of the presumption in the statute should give it</u> greater dignity and effectiveness."

See p. 17 Footnote: Roberta Morris:

"P. J. Federico ... risen to Examiner-in-Chief by the time the Patent Act was being drafted. He worked on the codification with Congressional staff and ... Giles S. Rich. ...In 1956 Rich was appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and became a member of the Federal Circuit Judge Rich ... wrote articles explaining the origins of the language of the Patent Act of 1952... American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984),"

15. RESPONDENTS <u>FAILED</u> TO FURNISH THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF "<u>CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE</u>" OF PATENT INVALIDITY, REQUIRED BY STATUTE.

The Federal Circuit, like all the other District and Appellate Courts failed to adjudicate "the Fletcher Constitutional Challenge." District and Appellate Court Judges denied Dr. Arunachalam due process and acted as Respondents' attorneys, manufacturing false reasons to dismiss her case in an egregious abuse of judicial power under the color of law and authority. Respondents committed acts of infringement, and falsely argued Patent invalidity "without clear and convincing evidence."

16. BY STATUTE, 35 U.S.C. § 282, A PATENT ISSUED BY THE PATENT OFFICE IS PRESUMED VALID, AND THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING INVALIDITY IS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING IT.

The presumption of validity is in the statute. See Roberta Morris, p. 22-23 "<u>the</u> <u>higher standard of proof should apply to "any issue developed in the</u> <u>prosecution history</u>." "A statutory presumption is a statutory presumption. It needs no justification as long as the presumption itself violates no Constitutional prohibition and the subject matter is within Congress' power..."⁶

17. RESPONDENTS' "INVALIDITY DEFENSE MUST BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE." "STANDARDS OF <u>PROOF</u> <u>ON INVALIDITY</u> ARE PART OF A VERY <u>COMPLICATED CALCULUS</u>." See Roberta Morris: pp. 9, 3:

"This Court stated that in order to invalidate, the proof would have to be "clear, satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt....The Patent Act of 1952 included, for the first time, a statutory presumption of validity and a statement on the burden of proof. 35 USC § 282. (See Part III.A, infra.)." p.6: ("Prosecution history" refers to the record, required

⁶ "... there is a basic problem: the *ex parte* examination of a patent application, resulting in the issuance of a patent, is unlike other agency actions that adversely affected parties ask courts to review. The only analogy ... is the issuance of drivers' or professional licenses. ... the analogy breaks down at the litigation stage. Wrongful issuance of the driver's license is not part of the cause of action for recovery after a car accident. Rightful issuance is not an affirmative defense, either. The parties are reversed, too: the licensed person is the tortfeasor while the patent owner is the tort claimant. In any case, <u>in tort suits nobody cares if a driver's license carries a presumption of validity. It is irrelevant to the suit.</u>"

to be in writing, 37 CFR §1.2, of the exchanges between the applicant and the USPTO. That is, the contents of the prosecution history would govern which of two standards of proof for invalidity should apply to which invalidity argument."

"... STANDARD OF PROOF WILL REQUIRE THE TRIAL JUDGE TO ANALYZE THE PROSECUTION HISTORY. If there are rejections based on prior art, the judge will have to determine the scope and content of that art. Claim language may need to be construed so that the claimed invention can be compared to the examiner's art, and the examiner's art compared to the accused infringer's art. Once the applicable standard of proof is determined, many of those same facts will be sifted again to determine whether invalidity has been proven. The process may seem convoluted and circular. Prior art invalidity is not, of course, the only kind of invalidity as to which the prosecution history may speak. Claims are rejected for failing to meet other requirements...§112: enablement, definiteness. See Part III.B, infra. Depending on how the dividing line is articulated and what the accused infringer argues, the same circular use of facts may occur."

p. 12: "... keep attention on the core issues: a comparison of the claimed invention to the prior art and to the patent's disclosure of how to make and use the invention. <u>Those inquiries would not become</u> <u>stepchildren to a dispute over how well or ill the Patent Office</u> <u>did its job</u>. ...participants in the patent system."

18. FRAUD AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION

<u>This Court should investigate and prosecute this complex white collar</u> <u>crime</u> involving corruption and fraud offenses committed against both the government and private citizens to enforce corruption laws as those laws apply to officials and employees of the United States government, including the USPTO. It is imperative that this Court work jointly with law enforcement task forces designed to proactively detect and deter crimes against the public trust, false claims, government contract fraud. <u>Respondents' and the lower courts' offenses have a national impact</u> <u>including violations of the False Claims Act</u>. They concealed material *prima facie* evidence.

"Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading..." U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (1977), quoting U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032 (1970).

"When circumstances impose duty to speak and one deliberately remains silent, silence is equivalent to false representation." *Fisher Controls International, Inc. v. Gibbons*, 911 S.W. 2d 135 (1995). "When a person sustains to another a position of trust and confidence, his failure to disclose facts that he has a duty to disclose is as much a fraud as an actual misrepresentation." *Blanton v. Sherman Compress Co.*, 256 S.W. 2d 884 (1953).

Aiding and abetting the theft of Petitioner's "The Internet of Things —Web apps displayed on a Web browser," and/or any other Infringing Technology <u>is an</u> <u>act of Treason for those under oath to the United States Constitution</u>.

19. TRESPASS UPON CONTRACT BETWEEN INVENTOR AND USPTO Any collateral attack on this Contract is in bad faith and is a criminal trespass.

20. NATIONAL SECURITY

<u>Respondents' violation of the Constitution and of the False Claims Act</u> threatens our nation's security in killing innovation by bullying and threatening Dr Arunachalam, a key witness and inventor of significant inventions, and allowing infringing products to come into the nation manufactured in foreign countries, hurting the domestic economy.

III.

This Court must review this Case because:

The Federal Circuit decision avoids "the Fletcher challenge" and if followed, will conflict with this Court's precedent with respect to its findings on: (a) the denial of liberty and property without due process of law, and (b) this Court's Oil States ruling that violates the Separation of Powers, Supremacy and Contract Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and failed to consider this Court's precedential 'First Impression' Res Judicata Mandated Prohibition declared by Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher against rescinding Government-Issued Patent Contract Grants by the highest authority, reaffirmed multiple times by this Court - the Supreme Law(s) of the Land.

1. <u>Oil States injured citizens without providing a remedy by leaving</u> them bereft of their vested rights directly to federal grants of patents under the IP Clause, Contract Clause, the Separation of Powers Clause, the Public Interest/Welfare Clause, Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses.

Oil States constitutionalized the America Invents Act reexamination provision, in breach of contract with inventors of their protected rights to enjoy exclusive rights to collect royalties for a time certain — 20 years. It is not a "faithful execution of the solemn promise made by the United States" to inventors.

2. <u>Rights without Remedies</u>:

District and Appellate Court rulings, the Legislature's America Invents Act reexamination provision and this Court's *Oil States* ruling violate the "Law of the Land;" <u>deprived Petitioner/inventor of rights without remedies</u> by denial of substantive and fundamental rights by procedural and substantive unconscionability on discriminating terms, specifically denying Petitioner the equal protection of the *Aqua Products*' reversal itself, still unresolved, not applying prevention of oppression, giving superior bargaining power to Respondents (*having no reason to tender royalties owed*) in violation of Equal Protection of the Law to inventors.

"...it is manifest that <u>the obligation of the contract and the rights of a</u> <u>party</u> under it <u>may in effect be destroyed by denying a remedy</u> <u>altogether</u> ...", *Bronson v. Kinzie*, 42 U.S. 311 (1843), 1 How. 311. See Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1 vol. 55.

"Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement. <u>Without the remedy, the contract may, indeed, in the sense</u> of the law, be said not to exist... <u>The ideas of validity and remedy are</u> inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion. The obligation of a contract "is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement."

...Mr. Justice Swayne: "A right without a remedy is as if it were not. For every beneficial purpose it may be said not to exist." Von Hoffman v City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 552, 554 and 604 (1867).

In the case before us, <u>the conflict of these laws</u>, <u>namely</u>, <u>Oil States and America</u> <u>Invents Act Reexamination provision</u>, with the obligations of the contract is made the more evident by Federal Circuit's Aqua Products' reversal of all Orders where Patent Prosecution History (a contract term between the inventor and the Original Examiner before the patent was granted) was not considered.

CONCLUSION

Respondents and the lower Courts colluded and brazenly devised schemes to evade the Government and the laws of the United States. Respondents engaged in Solicitations to induce the lower Courts to not enforce the Law of the Land.

Respondents, the Judiciary, legislature, USPTO/PTAB, have "some explaining to do — for subjecting the nation to a long, cruel ordeal named 'collusion' and 'obstruction" against Dr. Arunachalam and the Constitution.

Lower Court ruling(s) must be reversed as unconstitutional. This case involves significant constitutional issues, making this case more significant than *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the petition for a writ of certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Lakshmi Arunachalam

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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL/PRO SE PETITIONER

I, Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, petitioner *pro se*, certify that as per the Court rules, this document contains <u>8991 words</u> only, as counted by the tool available in Microsoft WORD, and is well within the 9000 word limit.

Respectfully submitted,

Lakshin Anunachalam

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June 26, 2019

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VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

Lakshmi Anunachalam

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam Pro Se Petitioner

Executed on June 26, 2019

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