

APPENDIX

No. 20-_____

U.S. SUPREME COURT

CLERK OF COURT

Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr.

Chief Justice

NAKISHA JACKSON,

PETITIONER

V.

ROY L. BRUN, Judge; MIKE SPENCE, Caddo Parish Clerk of Court;
1ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; STATE OF LOUISIANA

AND

KRISTY WILSON, ET AL

RESPONDENTS

No. 19-cv-1006

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,
HONORABLE JUDGE ELIZABETH FOOTE

CASE No. 19-30828
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NO. 20-00238
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
---NAKISHA JACKSON/ PRO SE
PO BOX 202967
ARLINGTON, TX 76006
817-240-1571

APPENDIX

I

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT—JUDGE ELIZABETH FOOTE

FINAL JUDGMENT—JUDGE FOOTE

ORDER DENYING BRIEF WITHOUT RECORD EXCERPTS---JUDGE ANDREW OLHAM

CORRESPONDENCE TO WESTERN DISTRICT /JUDGMENT AS A MANDATE—MARY STEWART

CLERK'S ORDER CLOSING THE CASE---MARY STEWART

ORDER TO DENY REOPENING—JUDGE ANDREW OLDHAM

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION—NAKISHA JACKSON

JUDGMENT---JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION----NAKISHA JACKSON

JUDGMENT-----S. MARUICE HICKS

REPORT AND REC--- MAGISTRATE HORNSBY --- 19-CV-1006

OBJECTION----DR. NAKISHA JACKSON---19-CV-1006

REPORT AND REC---MAGISTRATE HORNSBY----20-CV—00238

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DISQUALIFY----DR. NAKISHA JACKSON--20—CV—00238

II

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

STATE JUDGMENTS w/ explanation of writ necessity for 621400-C, 621424-C, 621423-A, 617188-B

III

CONFESSION BY A PARTICIPANT IN THE CHARITY FRAUD RING

PACER COVER SHEET NO 20-00238

I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

NAKISHA JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 19-CV-01006

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH FOOTE

ROY L. BRUN, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff NaKisha Jackson ("Plaintiff") filed the instant lawsuit on July 31, 2019. [Record Document 1]. On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Record Document 3]. There is no proof of service in the record to date and no defendant has filed an answer. Accordingly,

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Record Document 3] is hereby **DENIED AS PREMATURE.**

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this 23rd day of August, 2019.



ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

NAKISHA JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-cv-1006

VERSUS

JUDGE FOOTE

ROY L. BRUN, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

J U D G M E N T

For the reasons assigned in the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge previously filed herein, and having thoroughly reviewed the record, including the written objections filed, and concurring with the findings of the Magistrate Judge under the applicable law;

It is ordered that Plaintiff's claims against the State of Louisiana are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is further recommended that all other claims against all other defendants are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 9th day
of September, 2019.

ELIZABETH E. FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30828

NAKISHA JACKSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ROY L. BRUN, Judge; MIKE SPENCE, Caddo Parish Clerk of Court; 1ST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

O R D E R :

IT IS ORDERED that the appellant's motion to file her brief in present form is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellant's motion to waive requirement to file record excerpts is DENIED.



ANDREW S. OLDHAM
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,
Suite 115
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

March 20, 2020

Mr. Tony R. Moore
Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport
United States District Court
300 Fannin Street
Suite 1167
Shreveport, LA 71101-0000

No. 19-30828 NaKisha Jackson v. Roy Brun, et al
USDC No. 5:19-CV-1006

Dear Mr. Moore,

Enclosed is a copy of the judgment issued as the mandate.

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

Mary Stewart

By: _____
Mary C. Stewart, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7694

cc w/encl:
Ms. NaKisha Jackson

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30828



NAKISHA JACKSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

A True Copy
Certified order issued Mar 20, 2020

Styl W. Cuyca
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

v.

ROY L. BRUN, Judge; MIKE SPENCE, Caddo Parish Clerk of Court; 1ST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana

CLERK'S OFFICE:

Under 5TH CIR. R. 42.3, the appeal is dismissed as of March 20, 2020, for want of prosecution. The appellant failed to timely file record excerpts.

The brief also remains insufficient as noted in this court's letter dated November 27, 2019. If appellant moves to reopen the appeal, both record excerpts and a sufficient brief must accompany any motion to reopen this appeal.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30828

NAKISHA JACKSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ROY L. BRUN, Judge; MIKE SPENCE, Caddo Parish Clerk of Court; 1ST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

O R D E R :

On April 13, 2020, the clerk denied Appellant's motion to reopen case. Upon consideration of Appellant's motion for a judge panel to reverse clerk orders due to admittance of partiality and award all stated relief from complaint and all motions, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.



ANDREW S. OLDHAM
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

RECEIVED

MAR - 2 2020

TONY R. MOORE, CLERK
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA
BY

CASE 5:20-cv-00238-SMH-MLH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

NAKISHA JACKSON,

PLAINTIFF

V.

KRISTY COLVIN WILSON, EARSEL DEVERS,

DITA WALKER, KENNEDI BAYLOR,

DEFENDANTS

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

---NAKISHA JACKSON/ PRO SE

Jackson, NaKisha 5:20-cv-00238-SMH-MLH
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a clear case of malicious prosecution that the court should not allow to be clouded by a voided judgment and fraud by the defendants listed here to obtain the judgments. The defendants sought out protective orders against me to mimic victims of harassment instead of criminals who were questioned about their involvement in forming an illegal charity and using aliases to solicit funds from the public using social media that was not private or secure. Later in the development of the case one of the defendants confessed to starting the fake charity. I am not intimidated by criminals or anyone with power who chooses to assist them. I will not be silenced because the subject is not politically correct. The law is enforced with the help of witnesses. People are encouraged by law enforcement to say something if you see something. I speak up for myself and maintain control of my right to free speech. I will not be railroaded for someone else to avoid prosecution.

This cases identifies the major players in the illegal charity and enclosed, in the supporting documents, you will find a confession from one of the participants that tells you about their version of SCORE, Kennedy Baylor (initials KB on para 7 of her form). The name SCORE, trademarked by the United States Government, is only used to describe the affiliate of the Small Business Administration. It is a service I personally used in the past and Kristy Wilson is aware of that. The defendants have no formal charity formation and no legal right to fundraise on behalf of SCORE or as themselves. They are liars. This confession was used to pursue a protective order against me. Four (4) protective orders have been filed against me between December 23 and 26 of 2019, knowingly in the wrong jurisdiction, all in conjunction with my awareness of SCORE. It is now clear that a fraud ring, consisting of Dita Bethune Walker,

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Kristy Baylor/Wilson, Earsel Devers, and Kennedi Baylor, has come together to use protective orders, designed to stop harmful stalking or physical bodily injury, to prevent me from being a credible witness to United States Government. They are aware I reported them to the lower court, the Shreveport fraud department, and the Internal Revenue Service, tax exempt department. They are aware of SCORE's legal identity, have given reasons for their personal motives to start a fake charity and personal motives to attack me now that they are notified that their scam was revealed to the public and the above mentioned government entities.

Judge Roy Brun originally granted Kristy Wilson a temporary protective against me on July 10, 2019. In open court, I disclosed the above information about SCORE. There is also evidence missing from this original case. Kristy entered into evidence a document to prove that she could speak on behalf of someone else, not formally named in the previous proceedings, to represent SCORE. That document has yet to surface. Kristy Wilson had no authority to ask the public for money on behalf of SCORE. She entered falsified statements and evidence from third parties in those proceedings. That ruling has been appealed due to fraud. Protective orders require the correspondence to be given directly to the person. It also requires mention of intent to do harm. Asking someone if they are really a charity and then telling them you will notify the authorities if they are not, is not intent to do harm. It is intent to report a crime. The first request for transactions as SCORE was made from Dec 2018-January 2019. Kristy publicly requested money in the amounts of 10-15 dollars to take 125 children to an R rated movie, which she has not done, Thank GOD, but this is now misappropriation of funds, if they still want to be a charity. Kristy was also selling T-shirts in the name of SCORE, with an unapproved logo. This

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

fraud ring has been operating for over a year. At that July 2019, court date she was again made aware of who SCORE belongs to. Since that court date she has made other transactions and publicly thanked people for their donations in the name of SCORE INC AND SCORE LLC and continued to sell T-shirts. Subsequently, the defendants' description of SCORE's intent does not match the mission statement of the legal entity SCORE. The defendants ask for monetary donations for children and claim to feed the homeless. The legal version of SCORE, is funded in part by the United States Government, offers business education to small business owners, and asks for volunteers from the retired CEO community. I have documentation to support that I took business start-up classes from this government agency in 2009. I used these services from SCORE, INC. TO BETTER MYSELF. Kristy, Dita, Earsel, and Kennedy are defiling a good cause and using incompetent people and the court system to help them do it.

Judge Roy Brun, on February 6, 2020, granted Kristy Wilson, the ring-leader of the charity fraud, a permanent protective order against me. THERE WAS NO NEW EVIDENCE, NO COMMUNICATION WITH KRISTY, AND NO VIOLATION OF THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT. Kristy filed a motion to modify her judgment to include her adult mother, Earsel Devers. Her mother also filed a separate protective order to cover herself. Kristy's original order expired on January 7, 2020. The filing date was January 9, 2020, 2 days after expiration, and the Louisiana State Court date was set for February 6, 2020, without merit or official notice to me. The minutes of the court read that Judge Brun said I did not give any evidence and did not appear in court to defend myself. It also reads that I have a motion to dismiss and change venue, filed on January 17, 2020, due no jurisdiction over me or the subject matter, illegal

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service, and no merit, well ahead of time, that was ordered to be filed without signature. That is my presence and my evidence. I also have a motion to vacate the incorrectly entered judgment on February 14, 2020. The minutes from July 10, 2019, **DO NOT** reflect Kristy Wilson's statement under oath that I was ordered to refrain from contacting her family. I have enclosed Kristy's statement where she says that and a copy of the minutes to confirm in the supporting documents. The intent to modify the original voided judgment was based upon the fact that I allegedly illegally contacted her mother. Her family members **were not** identified in the original judgment by her or Judge Roy Brun. This "contact" I was accused of **is the basis for Judge Brun's second judgment against me that kindly asks me to accept a permanent criminal record for Kristy's involvement in a charity fraud ring.** I do not know who her "family" is according to Brun. The paperwork from the voided judgement states no other names and only acknowledges minor children. To my knowledge, Kristy has no minor children.

Kristy entered **no substantial** evidence to make her plea. She only incriminated her mother with the information she gave the court. This is appalling that the legal system is being used this way and common criminals think they can get away with it. On that same day, Judge Brun granted her mother, Earsel Devers, one as well. This is a woman I communicated with very briefly and respectfully to notify of her my awareness of her daughter's, Kristy Baylor/ Wilson, involvement in the crimes. She confirmed involvement to me, admitted awareness to the court, and acknowledged her involvement. Judge Brun has had knowledge of all that we discuss here for greater than 7 months. Kristy and Earsel did not pay for their filings, but Kristy and Earsel advertise to have a successful hair salon, certified retailer of high-end hair products, and Kristy

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

claims to be the CEO of a local cleaning company, as well as the head of fundraising for SCORE. Kristy and Earsel lied about their ability to pay for her filings, they committed perjury that is proven, and are working the system to keep their money and scam the public, as criminals tend to do. Do not be swayed in your decision in the case because of the judgment in error in the lower court. It is unjust, illegal, and it will not stay. Motions to vacate have been filed on February 14, 2020, and an appeal to follow, if necessary.

Prior to this last hearing, I, NaKisha Jackson, paid to file a motion, on January 17, 2020, to request a change of venue to the Western District Court of Louisiana, a court that can legally preside over me, because I am a Texas resident. I filed one for the case against Kristy and paid for a separate one for her mother. I asked the lower to dismiss these cases based upon no jurisdiction from the First Judicial District Court, no merit, and no violation of the judgement passed down by Judge Brun on July 10, 2019. I am aware that Kristy Baylor, also known as, Kristy Colvin Wilson, is attempting to hide crimes behind a protective order and has assistance doing it. I am able to testify against her on multiple counts of fraud, and she wants to silence me. Kristy appears mentally unstable, and she is stalking my every move. She is now convincing other people to help her. Due to the stalking from Kristy, she learned about my involvement in the real SCORE. I also requested an emergency protective order, and later a permanent restraining, against Kristy et. al from your court via the motion I filed in the lower court to protect myself and my ability testify on behalf of the Small Business Administration and the IRS.

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I am aware that Earsel Devers is co-owner of Phazes Healthy Hair Salon, with Kristy Baylor, also known as, Kristy Colvin Wilson. Besides being Kristy's mother and responsible for her upbringing, this lends insight into her involvement in covering Kristy's crimes and pretending to be harassed by me. Phazes' publicly consumed social media was used to advertise for the fake charity. Earsel has proof that Kristy did it in the name of their business. In November, I warned and informed Earsel that her business had been used to solicit the public for money and other donations, as the entity of the United States government. Earsel notified me that this was all fake news. According to Kristy's written testimony, Earsel discussed this with Kristy and decided a protective order was a good idea for her too.

Kristy has history of fraudulent activity. Kristy impersonated the clerk of court of Caddo Parish on at least 1 occasion, on July 8, 2019, by mailing me the original documents for the original protective order to my place of business. She wanted me to think it was from the clerk. My front office manager signed for it, in her personal signature, thinking it was office mail from the United States Postal Service for my business because it was sent to my business address. It had Mike Spence's return address, and those envelopes were turned in to the authorities. At the time of court, no one had proof of service. If the clerk mailed it, they would have the signature confirmation on file. One day after court, I called the clerk and they still had no proof of service, and it was done by electronic signature 72 hrs earlier. Kristy is also suspected of an illegal name change, she has impersonated SCORE, the Small Business Administration's non-profit organization on multiple accounts, online as herself, as Phazes Hair Salon, and another alias. She has had transactions publicly made in SCORE'S name. I answered questions asked by the

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IRS tax exempt department in conjunction with this crime. I did not have them contact her or send her any messages for me. I also asked the other defendants, who I now believe are involved in the crime ring, if they were led under false pretenses to believe that Kristy ran this charity. It now appears all those people, who wasted the court's time making these claims, are working with Kristy. They all are intentionally misinterpreting themselves as victims to deflect their involvement, as criminals. They are exhibiting malicious prosecution by using civil proceedings that can turn criminal, without probable cause, to ineffectively hide their crimes and avoid prosecution. It is legal, not stalking, to ask people if they are a part of an illegal charity. It is legal to warn an innocent person that their time and money are being donated to a fraudulent charity. An innocent person would say thank you. The IRS and the FBI encourage donors to check the validity of a charity before the public donates. The defendants voluntarily consort with and defend someone who they know for a fact has declared themselves as a different version of SCORE and represent this charity without proof of legal entity.

Dita Walker and Kennedy Baylor do not have judgements against me at the time of mailing of the filed complaint. I have not been notified of the current status by the lower court; however, I have also paid for and filed motions to change venue and dismiss for both of those cases as well. For Dita on January 17, 2020, and for Kennedy February 14, 2020. Dita's original summons had no court date and should have been thrown out for error by the Clerk, as well as everything else I stated in the motion. However, it was recreated and sent back to me after my original motion to dismiss was filed. Dita and her immediate family have been posted on the public social media accounts for the fake charity and named SCORE helpers AND SCORE

Jackson, NaKisha 5:20-cv-00238-SMH-MLH
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family by Kristy Wilson. Dita Walker has never denounced her involvement with the fake charity or Kristy. She calls Kristy a friend in her statement to warrant a protective order against me. Dita was not stalked or harassed. Dita was informed. Dita was ok with being informed until Kristy took it too far, and they couldn't get out. Dita was not threatened. Dita had opportunity to turn Kristy in or stop her if she did not believe Kristy ran this charity. Dita chose a protective order against me.


Kennedi claims, using urban vernacular, I told her I would come to her house, and she has absolutely no proof that I told her that at any point, in person, or in any form of communication she says she personally received from me. Prior to her filing, that disclosed her address, I did not know where Kennedy lived. For your reference, I have Kennedy's statement in the supporting documents. She clearly explains what SCORE is to her. She states what the "recently started" SCORE is intended to do. She claims to be a college student and negatively affected by her awareness of the real version of SCORE. Kennedy reports the last contact from me to her was in May 2019. December 2019, is when Kennedy filed the false protective order with no mention of continued contact since May. This was around Christmas, which is the main time of giving for her charity. The court date on July 10, 2019, is a definite date that Kennedy should have been aware that her mother is a fraud. I did not contact her to confirm. The last mention of Kennedy, by me, was to a federal Judge in the Western District Court about Kristy harassing my family. She was pleading with my mother to keep Kennedy from being found out as assisting with the charity. Kristy called my parents' home, where I do not reside, more than once, to ask my mother to help convince me to stop telling the public that she did not own

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SCORE. The text messages Kristy sent my mother pleading for Kennedy's anonymity are now better explained. Kennedy is Kristy's 22 y.o daughter. Those messages are on file in the Western District Court of Louisiana. At this point, I had not reached out to Kristy's mother to warn her so that could not have been the motivation for the Kristy's contact to my mother, an eye for eye. At the time, Kristy had already learned that her charity could not be SCORE because that name is in use by someone else. Kristy has SCORE activity from Dec 2018 until January 2020. A protective request at this point, coming from Kennedy or anyone involved, in lieu of her admission of guilt is absurd. The fact that someone read this and decided not to arrest her and her mother, but instead issue a summons to me is questionable activity.

In conclusion, I am concerned that these bogus claims could go so far in a court of law with the information we all have now. I will clear my name, and would like to see those involved tried for their crimes. I ask that the court grant all stated relief on my complaint and add to it:

1. A deadline for the liens to progress to forced sale, and a date for court credit reporting for unpaid judgments.
2. A suppression order for each defendant to refrain from using my name or likeness in any form of communication outside of these proceedings.
3. The original permanent restraining order that I asked the lower court to transfer to your jurisdiction to thwart the defendants from finding another way to stop me from testifying, since this fake legal version failed.


Dr. NaKisha Jackson, PT, DPT, WCS 02/27/2020

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION**

NAKISHA JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-cv-0238

VERSUS

CHIEF JUDGE HICKS

KRISTY COLVIN WILSON ET AL


MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

J U D G M E N T

For the reasons assigned in the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge previously filed herein, and having thoroughly reviewed the record, including the written objections filed, and concurring with the findings of the Magistrate Judge under the applicable law;

It is ordered that this civil action be **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 12th day of May, 2020.


S. MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-0238
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

Hon. S. Maurice Hicks

NAKISHA JACKSON,
PLAINTIFF

V.

KRISTY WILSON, EARSEL DEVERS, KENNEDI BAYLOR, and DITA
WALKER
DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

---NAKISHA JACKSON/ PRO SE

This motion is to reconsider the judgment entered on May 12, 2020, based on the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge Hornsby, previously filed, but after filing my summary judgment. This request is for you to base your decision on my timely summary judgment. A reversal in your decision demonstrates your concern for the public interest. It corroborates that Kristy Wilson, and the above-mentioned defendants, formed an illegal entity, solicited funds from the public under false pretenses, were uncovered, and pursued the misuse of prosecution for the intent to delude the court about the crimes they committed. I am a viable witness for the IRS and SCORE, of the Small Business Administration. I have reported the allegations to the Shreveport and New Orleans fraud departments, and the Atty General, Jeff Landry. The FBI and the IRS tax-exempt dept have formal complaints about everyone involved and investigation is under way. When the audit is complete and money traced, I will retry any case dismissed based upon the new evidence continuing to prove Kristy et al to be a false entity. There is currently no record of their formation in the Louisiana SOS. In the lower court, Kristy Wilson reported to maintain a 501 3c. However, in my summary judgment I reported they did not operate a legal entity, based on the Louisiana SOS, and the defendants did not disagree. This crime was committed in your state and malicious prosecution proven but dismissed in your court. The First Judicial ruled against me instead of dismissing for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Louisiana now holds the primary rights to the judgments from the fraudulent gains of Kristy Wilson, et al, and should be afforded the opportunity to course correct. The Western District is the correct jurisdiction because I am a Texas resident, with Louisiana judgments, and the defendants are residents of Shreveport, LA. The alleged harassment, which led to malicious prosecution, was said to be done via the federal internet because of my awareness of the impersonation of federal entity, and the monetary relief met the threshold.

That is the subject. The Western district reports no jurisdiction over the federal subject. With that as the consensus, your lower court definitely has no subject matter jurisdiction to pass judgment, which in turn defaults the Western District with subject matter jurisdiction to undo the voided judgments of the lower court in the State of Louisiana. As they do not have jurisdiction over my person, requesting to start over in the lower court, with me as the defendant, is not a legal proceeding. It would be in my best interest to ask the lower court for a change of venue with Kristy et al being residents of Louisiana and myself residing in Texas with the assumption of federal modes of communication. There was definitely no physical contact in either state. I did not have just cause to transfer to Texas at the time. You hold jurisdiction of the persons (above-mentioned defendants in this case) and lord over the judgment. Texas confirming jurisdiction to expunge voided Louisiana State judgments is unheard of with the simplicity of the rationale to have the Louisiana Courts undo it themselves.

Fraud is primarily based on testimony from Kristy, Kennedy, Dita and Earsel that they maintain a charity named SCORE that does not give free business education but helps children and the homeless. They have no record of taking 125 high school students to an R rated movie, for which monetary donations were publicly solicited for in 2018 and 2019. This can all be resolved with receipts and sealed business formation paperwork with their names designated as the owner, director of fundraising, COO, or social medial director, or any position reserving the right to fundraise. There is no proof Kristy got permission slips from the under-aged children's parents that allowed Kristy to take their children to an R rated movie in the dead of winter. Since there is not, we can move on misappropriation of funds for her fake charity, and assist the Attorney General in his stated plight to protect the children of Louisiana. "General Landry: My office and I are committed to doing all we legally can to protect Louisiana's children from those

who seek to exploit and abuse them.” He has a whole Cyber Crime Unit at 800-256-4506 ready to fight the good fight.

You stated in your judgment that you thoroughly reviewed the record, including the written objections filed, but there were no objections filed by either party. The clerk of court mislabeled motions and chambers refused to correct it after I notified them of the error. I filed a motion to disqualify. I did not respond directly or specifically to Judge Hornsby’s R&R. He and I did not engage in conduct. Under the law, Judge Hornsby has already exhibited partiality towards me in this case and a previous case in your court. He has proven to be unsound in judgment with blatant lies in his previous R&R and erroneous interpretation and application of the law. He meets the requirements for disqualification. His R&R stated no law applicable to cast doubt on the subject matter of malicious prosecution with fraud. In a matter of conflicting decisions based upon subject matter jurisdiction, your court is the most equipped for this matter. First Judicial state court had no jurisdiction over me as a non-resident, with no subject matter, no service, no merit to pass 4 illegal voided judgments for these defendants, and over 2 months with no response to my motions or appeal notifications. Now, the LAWD court is telling me they have no jurisdiction with ALL CRITERIA met when I try the defendants in this heading for malicious prosecution based on fraud from that original state case previously mentioned. The defendants live in your jurisdiction. I was unable to move it because my timely motion to change venue from the lower court was unanswered, and the First Judicial ruled on the subject matter. Judge Brun is not the subject, as Judge Hornsby would like you to believe based on his R&R. If Judge Brun becomes the subject of a fraudulent charity, the police and IRS can determine that. I did not accuse him of such in this case. The judgments obtained through fraudulent activity, illegal and manufactured evidence, perjury, obstruction of justice, and fraud

on the court happened in your state and proven in your court by my summary judgment, the confession you have on file, and the lack of answer or rebuttal from the defendants.

I filed everything in a timely fashion without error but delayed by your clerk of court. When I shared with you courtesy copies, the clerk filed a motion to expedite when I entitled it motion to rule based on errors I described in the motion. A motion to expedite consideration asks the judge for special dispensation so you do not have to wait as long as it might ordinarily take to get into court. We were already behind the time to schedule my hearing for an unanswered summary judgment, not ahead of schedule. I did not ask for anything special to go ahead of the line. I asked Judge Hicks to rule based on the law, the truth, and the errors without going to appeal. The clerk of court, Tony Moore, who exhibits partiality, obstruction of justice, and is denying me a right to a fair trial, cannot be avoided if I were to go to any other Western District location.

This case is in reference to criminals hiding behind the use of protective orders to stop the public from questioning them and reporting them to the federal authorities about SCORE. The Western District is considered a federal authority. The crime was committed in the State of Louisiana, against an affiliate financially backed by the United States Federal Government. I was subsequently prosecuted for notifying the authorities of this fact. Hornbsy refused to recuse himself. He is biased, prejudiced, and interested in the cause and its outcome and is biased and prejudiced towards and against NaKisha Jackson because I reported a crime to him, and he did not report it to the police at all. He has tried to stop me in the past, and he is trying to do it again with multiple statues that do not apply. Judge Hornsby is unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings with the awareness of laws broken since he wrote his very first R&R against me. He has direct correspondence from me since then about all the illegal activity, and that

correspondence shared on the record in another court. **Felonies have already been committed and mandated reporting is required.** **18 U.S. Code § 4. Misprision of felony** is activated. Judge Hornsby is in violation of **28 U.S. Code § 455 (a) and (b) (1)** under the section that states **“shall disqualify himself”** solidifying that once a valid ground for disqualifying a magistrate judge or any judge in any proceeding has been set forth under this statute, the challenged judge generally has no option but to recuse himself. I have the legal right to dismiss a magistrate judge from contributing to my case in anyway, and object to a federal judge basing his ruling on the magistrate, if I do it in a timely fashion. The clerk of court was aware prior to enlisting the assistance of Magistrate Hornsby that we had a history of partiality, and I previously removed Hornsby from a case. In this case, I formally and timely dismissed him again. The clerk is also aware I submitted a summary judgment to Judge Hicks prior to the filing of Hornsby’s R&R. I chose my judge. If the use of a magistrate is so necessary then he should have referred to another one. However, since you ruled, that demonstrates the magistrate unnecessary. **I DO NOT CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE RULING IN THIS CASE, HAVING A DISQUALIFIED JUDGE HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE RULING IN THIS CASE, OR HAVING A JUDGE WHO IS DISQUALIFIED IN THE LOWER COURT HAVE AN EFFECT ON THIS CASE.**

These defendants, Kristy Wilson et al., confessed to creating and participating in the fraudulent charity, which was the basis for a complaint of malicious prosecution of me, NaKisha Jackson. **NONE OF THESE Defendants SHOWED GROUNDS FOR PERMANENT PROTECTIVE ORDERS.** They were not harassed, threatened, or anything else that qualifies for a protective order. They were not in a discovery period at the time of their filings. They also knowingly filed in the wrong jurisdiction for me as the defendant and the subject matter. Kristy

Wilson et al, presented themselves as a collective to the court and to me as a business entity that is not real and was notified that I, a part of the general public, was aware they were fraudulent. I ask you to reconsider your decision in this court.

Electronic signature authorized 05/15/2020

Dr. NaKisha Jackson, PT, DPT, WCS

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION**

NAKISHA JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-00238

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

KRISTY COLVIN WILSON, ET. AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HORNSBY


ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff NaKisha Jackson's Motion for Reconsideration (Record Document 10) of this Court's judgment adopting Magistrate Judge Hornsby's recommendation, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Record Document 9). The Motion for Reconsideration is merely a restatement of Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation that this Court thoroughly reviewed. Thus, based on the showing made, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby **DENIED**.

Accordingly;

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff NaKisha Jackson's Motion for Reconsideration (Record Document 10) shall be **DENIED**.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 21st day of May, 2020.


S. MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

NAKISHA JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-cv-1006

VERSUS

JUDGE FOOTE

ROY L. BRUN, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

NaKisha Jackson (“Plaintiff”) who is self-represented, filed this civil action against the State of Louisiana, Judge Roy Brun, and Clerk of Court Mike Spence to seek relief in connection with a state court proceeding that resulted in a protective order being issued against Plaintiff. She asks that the federal court overturn the state court judgment, grant her \$4 million in damages, and discipline the individuals responsible. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this civil action be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Relevant Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that she is a physical therapist with a private practice in Texas. Her office coordinator signed for mail from the Caddo Parish Clerk of Court on July 8, 2019. Plaintiff learned on July 9th that the documents related to a hearing scheduled in Shreveport for July 10. Plaintiff alleges that she called the Clerk of Court’s office to learn more about the matter and ask if it could be postponed because she had not been properly served and needed more time to arrange her practice/patient schedule. She also wanted more time to

find a Louisiana attorney. Plaintiff was told to write a letter and explain her situation, and she faxed one that day.

Plaintiff later called the Clerk of Court's office again and spoke to a different person, who said that, as far as she knew, no changes had been made to the court schedule, and Plaintiff should report to court on the next day. Plaintiff did attend the hearing.

The person who requested the protective order was the wife of a man with whom Plaintiff alleges she had been friends for 20 years. Plaintiff contacted the woman by social media to complain of what Plaintiff alleged was a fake charity run by the woman. The complaint implies that the woman asked for an order that would direct Plaintiff not to contact her.

Judge Brun presided over the hearing. Plaintiff complains that Judge Brun badgered her about her long friendship with the woman's husband. Plaintiff questioned whether the marriage between the woman and her friend was valid, and she maintained her right as a member of the public to complain about a fake charity and present evidence to back up her claim. Plaintiff states, "It all ended with a judgment against me." She then filed a formal complaint against Judge Brun with the Clerk of Court.

Plaintiff complains that she received insufficient notice of the action against her and the grounds for the requested protective order. She also complains that she was not given a proper opportunity to call witnesses, retain an attorney, and otherwise respond to the request for a protective order. She describes the protective order as forbidding cyber communication, limiting third-party conversations, and requiring her to stay 100 yards from the protected person without just cause. Her complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State of Louisiana

Plaintiff's complaint names the State of Louisiana as the first defendant. "The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private citizens against a state in federal court." K. P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010). Congress has abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by the enactment of some federal statutes, but 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not one of them. Quern v. Jordan, 99 S.Ct. 1139 (1979). State law claims are also barred by the immunity. Richardson v. Southern University, 118 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1997). The claims against the State of Louisiana must, therefore, be dismissed. The dismissal of the State is for lack of jurisdiction, so it must be without prejudice. Anderson v. Jackson State Univ., 675 Fed. Appx. 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2017), citing United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 286 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999).

Judge Roy Brun

Plaintiff's complaint names Judge Roy Brun as the second defendant. Judges enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages arising out of performance of their judicial duties. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288 (1991). The "immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly." Pierson v. Ray, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218 (1967). "It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants." Id. "His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption." Id. "Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation." Id.

Whether an act by a judge is a judicial one to which immunity applies relates to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in her judicial capacity. Mireles, 112 S.Ct. at 288. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining whether a judge's actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Davis v. Tarrant County, 565 F.3rd 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009). These factors are broadly construed in favor of immunity. Id.

The judicial conduct about which Plaintiff complains was unequivocally undertaken in the ordinary exercise of judicial duties and was squarely within Judge Brun's authority as a judicial officer of the court. Conducting a courtroom hearing on a motion for protective order and issuing a decision on that motion are at the heart of judicial duties. All four of the relevant factors support immunity. Judge Brun is absolutely immune from the claim for damages asserted by Plaintiff in connection with those proceedings.

Clerk of Court Mike Spence

The final defendant named in the complaint is Mike Spence, the Clerk of Court for the First Judicial District Court. A clerk of court has absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's direction. They have qualified immunity for routine duties not explicitly

commanded by a court decree or by a judge's instructions. Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Mr. Spence influenced her to appear in court without proper service and did not engage in proper diligence to ensure proper service. She also complains that he obstructed discovery. The facts alleged in support of these claims regard Plaintiff speaking on the phone with members of Mr. Spence's staff and Plaintiff filing a complaint about Judge Brun with the Clerk of Court. These appear to be the sort of routine duties for which Spence is entitled to qualified immunity, and there are no allegations that would deprive him of that immunity.

Furthermore, a claim under Section 1983 requires an allegation that the named defendant was personally involved in the acts that deprived the plaintiff of her constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not allege that Spence, personally, did or did not do anything in connection with her proceeding. "Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability." Leal v. Wiles, 734 Fed. Appx. 905, 907 (5th Cir. 2018), quoting Thompson v. Upshur City, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). To the extent Plaintiff asks this court to order Mr. Spence to perform his job in a certain way, the federal court lacks the general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties. Moye v. Clerk DeKalb County Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).

Attack on State Court Judgment

The first form of relief that Plaintiff seeks is to have the state court judgment overturned. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, and they lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on final state court judgments. This rule is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005) (doctrine bars cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal proceedings commenced and inviting federal district court review and rejection of those judgments). See also Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1984) (“A plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.”). If a state court errs, the judgment is to be reviewed and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Recourse through the federal level is then limited to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s effort to attack the state court judgment by alleging a civil rights injury is prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Sua Sponte Dismissal

Plaintiff has not yet served her complaint, so no motion has been filed by any defendant. Dismissal is nonetheless appropriate because the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. “A district court may dismiss an action on its own motion under Rule 12(b)(6) as long as the procedure employed is fair.” Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). This procedure is fair, because this Report and Recommendation provides Plaintiff with sufficient notice of and opportunity to respond to

the possible dismissal of her case. Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998) Such a sua sponte dismissal is permissible even if done prior to a defendant being served. Alexander v. Trump, 753 Fed. Appx. 201, 208 (5th Cir. 2018).

Accordingly,


It is recommended that Plaintiff's claims against the State of Louisiana be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is further recommended that all other claims against all other defendants be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Objections

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.


A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 28th day of August,
2019.



Mark L. Hornsby
U.S. Magistrate Judge

SEP 09 2019

TONY R. MOORE CLERK
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BY 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Honorable Judge Elizabeth E. Foote
U.S. Magistrate Judge Mark L. Hornsby

Case No. 5:19-cv-01006-EEF-MLH

NaKisha Jackson

Plaintiff,

v.

Roy Brun, et al.

Defendants.

OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

I am unsure of the intent of your recommendation, but I respectfully disagree with your rationale and the application of your stated authorities. Your statements disregard the facts of this case. The complaint was filed weeks ago. You have substantial evidence. Also, I received your R & R via regular mail in my post office box on 9/4/2019. Your document says "fourteen (14) days from service." I do not get 14 days if I do not check my mailbox within the timeframe and have certified or registered mail to prove to you when I received it. You have no time stamp to help me verify my receipt. Lack of service seems to be a theme in these proceedings.

I understand a summary judgment cannot be granted if there is no service; a ruling that has been acknowledged. However, no complete service can be done if ALL summons is not really ALL summons. I am the only one subject to the law in this case. I do not get service, but I get

penalized. In my first case the judgment was the penalty. In this one, I do not get the full amount of time to respond to your abstract claims. This is an example of how important service is. I get my case recommended for dismissal after all information is recorded and verifiable, but

I also get the privilege of going to a hearing for a protective order against me with no substantial evidence or a judge to thoroughly examine the case for merit, as you have done in the recommendation warranting a response. The three-page statement of facts in the complaint gives a detailed account of what happened and what laws were broken that should warrant my request for relief, highlight judicial misconduct, question immunity, and open the discussion for how much for punitive damages when the intent became malicious. In the summary judgment that was ruled on, it further discussed the escalation of this situation and gave supporting documents to my claims.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS

State of Louisiana

Having appeared in state court without due process and jurisdiction over me or the subject matter is the matter in violation of the 14th amendment section 1, protected by the federal government. Your citing of K.P v LeBlanc is based upon intricate dealings and financial transactions with a department of the state of Louisiana. I am a Texas resident with a judgment from the state of Louisiana. State laws were not broken by me, I had no interaction in your state, and I was not served. There was also lack of substantial evidence; Evidence was not reasonable in nature, credible, or of solid value to warrant a judgment or show just cause for a protective order. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). The nature of the filing did not

meet the minimum contact requirements for the Louisiana Long-Arm Statute La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201, to have me summoned across state lines as seen in Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092.---One which from its inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or enforcement in any manner or to any degree. Judgment is a "void judgment" if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.

Judge Roy Brun

In this instance, official capacity and job duties for Judge Brun based on jurisdiction were never instated by the law. In the hearing, I reported an alleged crime and explained that I was requesting information via the internet about a fake charity that had questionable activity. Since jurisdiction activates his authority over me, and he was aware of the lack of service, and the nature of the complaint after dismissing the service, he should have quickly realized the original plaintiff may have had an option to file in a more appropriate venue.

Judge Brun's actions after the hearing are unlawful. There is no way for the clerk to reroute me from the transcriber to the Judge and his "Sharon" without discussing this amongst themselves. If she is the transcriber, there is no reason for the Judge to be mentioned, especially when I had already had direct correspondence from someone else in the transcribers' office. In the emails, she is indicated to be a close employee of Judge Brun's office. When I called the transcriber's

line, I do not remember Sharon as an option. It is reasonable to question if conspiracy to tamper with evidence between the Judge and the clerk's office is valid in this case. The Supreme Court made a ruling that state judges can be named in civil rights lawsuits and be ordered to pay lawyer's fees if the plaintiff successfully sues. The history of judicial immunity in the United States is fully consistent with the common law experience. There never has been a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has had a chilling effect on judicial independence. Limitations on obtaining equitable relief serve to curtail or prevent harassment of judges through suits against them by disgruntled litigants. Collateral injunctive relief against a judge, particularly when that relief is available through § 1983, also raises a concern relating to the proper functioning of federal-state relations, but that concern has been addressed directly as a matter of comity and federalism, independent of principles of judicial immunity. While there is a need for restraint by federal courts called upon to enjoin actions of state judicial officers, there is no support for a conclusion that Congress intended to limit the injunctive relief available under § 1983 in a way that would prevent federal injunctive relief against a state judge. Rather, Congress intended § 1983 to be an independent protection for federal rights, and there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended to expand the common law doctrine of judicial immunity to insulate state judges completely from federal collateral review. Judicial immunity is no bar to the award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. Congress has made clear in the Act its intent that attorney's fees be available in any action to enforce § 1983. The legislative history confirms Congress' intent that an attorney's fee award be made available even when damages would be barred or limited by immunity doctrines.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.

Furthermore, Judge Brun decided to withhold evidence from me, the previous defendant, after the hearing. He also participated in denying me, as the previous defendant, the right to go directly to the transcriber to purchase a copy of the transcript from my hearing. He transferred from potential judicial duties to intentional misconduct.

CLERK OF COURT Mike Spence

The "civil filings" signature in the emails suggests a ghost writer under Mike Spence's authority.

I also had 5 conversations with at least 4 different people and the additional presence of R. Gallion in the court room to warrant awareness of systematic corruption or ignorance. You choose. As a business owner, I understand that upper echelon theory suggests the success of a business can be predicted by the effectiveness of the CEO or upper management. If Mr. Spence can prove that he had absolutely no involvement and chooses to implicate each individual party involved in this debacle, he can do so, when he is given the opportunity by the court to defend himself. He is responsible for the gross undoing of his whole department. If the judge's order requires a subordinate, operating in his official capacity, to cooperate with the superior in questionable activity, it is the duty of the subordinate to refuse, and if warranted report the superior for abuse of power. In this instance, the employees are operating in their official hired capacities to represent the Clerk of Court and not required to identify themselves in emails or

telephone correspondence. There is no undeniable proof that Mr. Spence did not respond to the emails or consult his employees in answering my questions. There was a delay in the response and then an abrupt shift in directing me through the proper procedure for obtaining a transcript, from direct contact to third party interference. Someone with authority may have authorized the change in procedure. Your claim of absolute immunity is not covered by the LA Rev Stat § 14:130.1 and 18 U.S.C § 1503 which prohibits obstruction of justice and tampering with evidence. In U.S.C § 1519 it states whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Attack on State Court Judgment

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a jurisdictional doctrine preventing state-court losers from challenging state-court judgments in the lower federal courts, is not totally relevant in this case. It is, after all, a matter of federal subject matter jurisdiction, which is usually determined in a fairly mechanical manner: the district court either has jurisdiction or it does not. Judgment by the state court is not warranted with no due process and no jurisdiction. Again, the 14th amendment was violated. There is no proof of service. I was denied a complete file of the

evidence that was entered into the record to be used against me and denied access to the transcript. As of September 4, 2019, at the time of writing this, I still do not have anything I requested. Gathering this information is a staple in successfully arguing a case in the appellate court. Subpoena is not required when I am the defendant. I also do not have to communicate my intent to receive the information. I was denied access after requesting nicely, multiple times, so I moved up to the next court that does not require that evidence to prove my case, but on contrary the lack of it should assist with judgment. Also, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit—have determined that Rooker-Feldman does not prevent the lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments that were allegedly procured through fraud. According to this understanding, when a “state-court loser” complains that the winner owes his triumph not to sound legal principles—or even unsound ones—but to fraud, then the loser is not really complaining of an injury caused by a state-court judgment, but of an injury caused by the winner’s chicanery. Baker, S. “The Fraud Exception to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: How It Almost Wasn’t (and Probably Shouldn’t Be)” THE FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW Volume 5, Issue 2 2011. The plaintiff in the previous case entered false evidence and acknowledged it in the hearing. Fraudulent activity was the basis of the limited cyber contact. The previous plaintiff was accused, by me, of falsifying her marital status, legal name, and charity formation. I testified to this in Judge Brun’s court, once he allowed the matter to proceed after being made aware by me there was no service, and allegedly by Mike Spence’s employees, prior to the hearing, that there was a timing issue, and I had reported to them no service. Judgment is a “void judgment” if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. All of which occurred. Also,

with no priors, no understanding am I, of the court's basis for judgment without bias. In my opinion, you have subject matter jurisdiction.

Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Federal Clerk only issued partial summons on August 6, 2019, with questionable intent. The SOS website states AND the department. The Attorney general is mentioned first in terms of service on the state. Even if I had served, I would not have completed service because ALL summons was not ALL summons. I had to call the Federal Clerk's office and ask for a summons to be generated for the Attorney General. I told the fed clerk employee that I needed to serve the Attorney general, and she reported that he was not named so a summons was not generated for him. I replied, "He is the State." I was told that request needed to be checked on and someone would get back to me. The summons for the Attorney General was then issued separately and later than the initial summons. Once generated, I initiated proper service of ALL summons for this civil rights complaint against the State of Louisiana and its departments involved.

I maintain proof of service on the Attorney General of Louisiana on August 28th, 2019. I faxed an electronic copy to the clerk's office on that next day. I also have delivery confirmation from Fedex and emails to a local process server in Caddo Parish of the intent to initiate service on those located in the parish on August 28, 2019. Additionally, I stated the claims on which relief may be granted. My rights as a citizen, personal time, and reputation are worth more to me than can be calculated. In medical practices, malpractice can be exhibited as patient

abandonment. Once a patient-clinician relationship has begun, a clinician is said to "abandon" a patient who still needs medical attention when the clinician refuses to continue treating the patient (i.e., severs the clinician-patient relationship) without giving the patient proper notice and an adequate amount of time to find another clinician who can take over the patient's care. Medical abandonment can form the basis of a medical malpractice case. I am a certified specialist with limited ability to attain coverage of another equally qualified professional. In my area, there are few people with my certification. I reached out to my PRN staff, and she was unavailable on such short notice. A patient could claim that I did not handle their care properly because I did not give a reason for the "emergency" cancellation due to maintaining my personal privacy and not believing in my heart or my mind that I was cancelling for emergency. In this circumstance, there were other options on the court's part. My liability insurance covers 1 million per claim and aggregate of 3 million per coverage term. I want to be prepared. There are patients that have not returned since the abrupt cancellation, and when attempted to be rescheduled were unable to be reached or did not return the call. Their current functional status is unknown to me.

CONCLUSION

I am requesting that the summary judgment be reconsidered now that service has been made. I ask Honorable Judge Foote to allow this information, along with the initial motion for summary judgment, statement of facts, and supporting documents to be served to all defendants via your clerk's email notice of entry of all documents, since it is now a part of the record, and each defendant has access to the record. I have attempted to also sign up for the service, but I cannot obtain e-filing approval as pro se in the Louisiana Western District Court. I am aware

that Honorable Judge Foote can grant the defendants extended time for discovery if the summary judgement is requested prior to answering or the end of discovery period. I ask that in addition to reconsideration, denial of extended time be the ruling if requested by the defendants. There is no substantial evidence available to debunk my claims. Extra time would only delay my licensure renewal. I would also like to decline the involvement of Magistrate Judge Mark L. Hornsby in future pre-trial proceedings and in trial, if reconsideration is denied or resubmission of the summary judgment is not allowed. I **DO NOT** consent to a Magistrate Judge handling the final ruling in my case. I was wrongfully accused, wrongfully judged, and someone who allegedly committed a crime and placed evidence of the crime into the record was free to enjoy the success of her manipulation of the legal system, while we waste time on semantics and loose interpretations of law. I am not represented by a lawyer, not for lack of trying, and I am aware that I am prone to making clerical errors. I realize that can be deemed as a disadvantage, but in this specific case I am equipped with a basic understanding of civics, use of the pro se handbook, the law library, the internet, and the truth.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dr. NaKisha Jackson, PT, WCS", with a large, sweeping flourish underneath.

Dr. NaKisha Jackson, PT, WCS

September 4, 2019 8:16 pm

Date/Time

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

NAKISHA JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-cv-0238

VERSUS

CHIEF JUDGE HICKS

KRISTY COLVIN WILSON, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

NaKisha Jackson (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, filed an earlier civil action that complained about a state court protective order that was issued against her. The person who requested the protective order was the wife of a man with whom Plaintiff alleged she had been friends for 20 years. Plaintiff contacted the woman by social media to complain of what Plaintiff alleged was a fake charity run by the woman. The woman then asked the state court for an order that would direct Plaintiff not to contact her.

Plaintiff responded by filing suit in this federal court against the State of Louisiana, Judge Roy Brun, and Clerk of Court Mike Spence. This court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with respect to the state for lack of jurisdiction; the claims against the judge and clerk were dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. NaKisha Jackson v. Roy Brun, et al, 19-cv-1006 (W.D. La.).

Plaintiff has now commenced this civil action against four individuals who she alleges requested or obtained protective orders against her in state court. She asserts claims of malicious prosecution. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this civil

action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The court has a duty to examine the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1997). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Id. There is a presumption that a suit lies outside that limited jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden of establishing grounds for jurisdiction rests on the party who seeks the federal forum. Settlement Funding, LLC v. Rapid Settlements, Limited, 851 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff’s complaint invokes diversity jurisdiction, which is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For diversity jurisdiction to exist, the amount in controversy must exceed \$75,000, and there must be complete diversity of citizenship. Bynane v. Bank of New York Mellon, 866 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2017). The party seeking the federal forum, in this case Plaintiff, has the burden of establishing a factual basis for jurisdiction. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that she is a citizen of Texas and that all four defendants are citizens of Louisiana. This meets the complete diversity of citizenship requirement. Relevant to the amount in controversy, Plaintiff alleges that the four defendants pursued separate legal actions against her, falsely accused her of crimes, and harassed her. In the portion of the complaint in which Plaintiff was directed to specify the relief that she seeks, Plaintiff wrote that she wanted separate awards of \$50,000 in damages against Kristy Wilson, Earsel

Devers, and Dita Walker. She asked for an award of \$2,500 in damages against Kennedy Baylor. That is not sufficient to establish the required amount in controversy.

Generally, the amount in controversy threshold must be met as to a plaintiff's claims against each defendant. Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961). Where a plaintiff pleads separate and distinct claims against more than one defendant, "the test of jurisdiction is the amount of each claim, and not their aggregate." Id. Claims by a single plaintiff against multiple defendants can be aggregated only if the defendants are jointly liable to the plaintiff, such as two insurers who separately insured against the same risk. Id. If the defendants are severally or separately liable, the plaintiff must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement against each individual defendant. Costello v. Capital One NA, 2008 WL 1766983, *2 (W.D. La. 2008).

Plaintiff's complaint contains few facts, but her recent motion for summary judgment provides some additional information. Plaintiff alleges in the motion that the four defendants separately pursued protective orders against her. She alleges that Judge Brun granted Kristy Wilson a temporary protective order, which Plaintiff states she has appealed due to fraud. Plaintiff alleges that Kristy's mother, Earsel Devers, "also filed a separate protective order to cover herself." Plaintiff states that she recently filed motions to vacate that order, with an appeal to follow if necessary. Plaintiff alleges that Dita Walker and Kennedy Baylor "do not have judgments against me at the time of mailing of the filed complaint," but Plaintiff appears to allege that there are pending state court proceedings involving those two defendants.

Plaintiff invokes the tort of malicious prosecution. She has alleged separate tort claims against each of the four defendants, so at least one of those separate claims must have an amount in controversy exceeding \$75,000 before the federal court may exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not made a good faith prayer for such an amount with respect to any particular claim, so the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her complaint.

Even if the four defendants were alleged to be joint tortfeasors by virtue of a conspiracy or otherwise, Louisiana law provides that a joint tortfeasor is not liable for more than his degree of fault and is not solidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of that other person. Dumas v. State ex rel Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism, 828 So.2d 530, 537 (La. 2002). Plaintiff has not met her burden with respect to the required amount in controversy, so her complaint should be dismissed for failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

Lack of Merit

Plaintiff's complaint does not invoke a specific theory or cause of action, but her motion for summary judgment asserts that this "is a clear case of malicious prosecution" because the defendants sought protective orders against Plaintiff in state court. Plaintiff complains that the four requests for protective orders were filed in the wrong jurisdiction, are based on fraud, and are otherwise improper.

Louisiana recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution based on the filing of a civil suit, but "[a]ctions of this sort have never been favored, and, in order to sustain them, a clear case must be established where the forms of justice have been perverted to the gratification of private malice and the willful oppression of the innocent." Johnson v. Pearce, 313 So.2d

812, 816 (La. 1975). In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove the following elements:

- (1) The commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding.
- (2) Its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding.
- (3) Its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff.
- (4) The absence of probable cause for such proceeding.
- (5) The presence of malice therein.
- (6) Damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.

Ferrant v. Parish of Tangipahoa ex rel Coroner's Office, 822 So.2d 118, 120 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002). A claim of malicious prosecution is actionable only where there has been strict compliance with all essential elements. The lack of any one of these elements is fatal to the claim. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 82 So.3d 530, 534 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff has not alleged a bona fide termination of the state court proceedings in her favor with respect to any of the protective order proceedings. She alleges that Kristy Wilson was granted an order, and Plaintiff states that she has appealed it. Similar allegations are made with respect to the protective order obtained by Earsel Devers. Plaintiff does not even allege that the proceedings initiated by Dita Walker or Kennedy Baylor have been completed. There is no allegation that any of the four proceedings have resulted in a termination in favor of Plaintiff. Absent that critical element, Plaintiff may not state an actionable claim for malicious prosecution under Louisiana law. Thus, even if

the court were to find that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, the complaint would have to be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Accordingly,


It is recommended that this civil action be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Objections

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 5th day of March,
2020.


Mark L. Hornsby
U.S. Magistrate Judge

RECEIVED

MAR 16 2020

TONY R. MOORE, CLERK
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA
BY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-0238
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

NAKISHA JACKSON,
PLAINTIFF

V.

KRISTY WILSON, EARSEL DEVERS, KENNEDI BAYLOR, and DITA
WALKER
DEFENDANTS

MOTION TO DISMISS MAGISTRATE'S R&R DUE TO
DISQUALIFICATION

---NAKISHA JACKSON/ PRO SE

This motion is to disqualify Magistrate Mark Hornsby and dismiss his R &R without specific written objection because of his inherent disqualification. This case is in reference to criminals hiding behind the use of protective orders to stop the public from questioning them and reporting them to the federal authorities about SCORE. The Western District is considered a federal authority. The crime was committed against an affiliate that is financially backed by the United States Federal Government. Hornbsy refused to recuse himself. He is biased, prejudiced, and interested in the cause and its outcome and is biased and prejudiced towards and against NaKisha Jackson because I reported a crime to him, and he did not report it to the police at all. He has tried to stop me in the past, and he is trying to do it again with multiple statutes that do not apply. Again, he loosely uses the law to make his point and veers from the obvious laws that state my case and make my claims valid. His opinion of what happened in the lower court with no facts attached is invalid. We follow the law in this land, not delusion. He wrote a previous R&R in the case he references against the state of Louisiana, Judge Roy Brun, and Mike Spence. That case is still open, and I declined his involvement then by effectively and specifically objecting to each of his claims in that previous R&R. Judge Hornsby lied in the previous R&R to protect Judge Roy Brun and Mike Spence and is now retaliating as I attempt to hold the other parties in this lynching against me accountable for wasting my time and resources and the time and resources of your great State of Louisiana. Judge Hornsby is aware of the legal proceedings that continue between myself and the state and is hiding behind these defendants to smoke screen his help for Judge Brun. He is also aware that by legal definition, blatantly lying in R&R, can be considered a form a treason. Everyone that I have filed a complaint with in this matter has jurisdiction except Judge Roy Brun, who Judge Mark Hornsby defends and protects. His R&R has nothing to do with the listed defendants in this case. It is also entered and filed after my

request for summary judgment. The defendants in this federal case have a written confession on file in your court and in the lower. The more logical reasoning for Judge Hornsby's objection is involvement in the crime himself. Judge Hornsby has greater than 6 months knowledge of the crimes committed with no police report by him. He knows I am a viable witness for the IRS, SCORE, and have reported the allegations to the Shreveport fraud department and multiple courts in Louisiana. He is unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings with the awareness of legal action against his friend, Judge Roy Brun. Judge Hornsby is aware that I have filed motions to dismiss and change venue that were ordered by Judge Brun to be filed without signature, which is illegal, and I also filed motions to vacate his voided judgments with no response from Judge Brun. I currently have a new motion on file to change the judge in the lower court for these same reasons. **Felonies have already been committed and mandated reporting is required. 18 U.S. Code § 4. Misprision of felony** is activated. Judge Hornsby is in violation of **28 U.S. Code § 455 (a) and (b) (1)** under the section that states "**shall disqualify himself**" solidifying that once a valid ground for disqualifying a magistrate judge or any judge in any proceeding has been set forth under this statute, the challenged judge generally has no option but to recuse himself. I also **DO NOT CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE RULING IN THIS CASE, HAVING A DISQUALIFIED JUDGE HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE RULING IN THIS CASE, OR HAVING A JUDGE WHO IS DISQUALIFIED IN THE LOWER COURT HAVE AN EFFECT ON THIS CASE.**

These defendants, Kristy Wilson et al., confessed to creating and participating in the fraudulent charity I reported to Judge Brun on July 10, 2019, which was the basis of the request for malicious prosecution of me, NaKisha Jackson. I am aware now that none of them wanted to be notified that they WERE caught. Since then, the Shreveport Fraud dept has been notified

again, as well as the IRS tax-exempt department, the Western District Court, and the Office of the Atty General of Louisiana. My next notification is directly to the FBI. NONE OF THESE Defendants SHOWED GROUNDS FOR PERMANENT ANYTHING, except prison. They were not harassed or threatened or anything else that qualifies for a protective order. They were also not in a discovery period at the time of their filings. They presented themselves as a collective to the court and to me as a business entity that is not real and was notified that I, a part of the general public, was aware they were fraudulent. I now believe that Judge Brun AND Judge Hornsby are helping to cover it up. At this point, multiple levels of government officials are involved. The defendants entered all evidence the Caddo Clerk's office maintains in the lower case, and my claims demolished the authenticity and merit of it all. Judge Brun decided to forgo my requests to change venue to Western District Court even with clear lack of jurisdiction. The Western District Court currently has **NO strong** grounds for questionable jurisdiction. The defendants live in your state, and I do not. A Louisiana state court has no jurisdiction over my person or the subject matter. The "contact" they accused me of was **federal internet** communication. I must go to the court in the state where the crimes were committed OR where the defendants live. The crimes were committed in the First Judicial Court of Louisiana, and the defendants are proud citizens of Shreveport, Louisiana. The evidence that Kennedi Baylor submitted, in her handwriting, under oath says this crime ring is unlawfully using the name reserved for the affiliate of the US Small business administration, SCORE, and is representing it differently despite the name designation and trademark granted to the legal entity of SCORE. They did not prove their need for permanent protective orders that were issued to protect them by Judge Brun. I request legal and fair treatment, as a Texas resident and a US

natural born citizen, in this federal court. Judge Hornsby is incapable of that as long as he continues to attempt to protect Judge Brun et al. He is reporting and recommending about the wrong case.


PT DPT WCS
03/10/2020

Dr. NaKisha Jackson, PT, DPT, WCS

II

Constitutional Provisions Involved

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within the its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

United States Constitution Article III; Section 2: The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

STATE JUDGMENTS

I filed a timely notice of appeal for all four judgments given in the First Judicial District Court, Shreveport, LA on FEBRUARY 28, 2020. On JUNE 15, 2020, the Caddo Clerk notified me that the presiding Judge has not given orders to grant an appeal. The email is enclosed.

DITA WALKER

NUMBER 621,400 SEC. C

VERSUS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

NAKISHA JACKSON

CADDO PARISH, LOUISIANA

ORDER

THIS MATTER having come on for a hearing on the request for A
PROTECTIVE ORDER filed by the Plaintiff above.

IT IS ORDERED That Court Costs herein are taxed as follows:

*Order granted,
costs to Nakisha
Jackson*



The party or parties assessed Court Costs herein above are ordered to
appear on the **23RD DAY OF APRIL, 2020 at 2:00 pm** with proof of payment
under penalty of contempt.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 20TH day of February, 2020 in

Shreveport, Caddo Parish, Louisiana

R. L. Brun
Roy L. Brun, Judge Pro Tem

CLERK:
PLEASE MAIL RESPONSIBLE PARTY/PARTIES



KENNEDI BAYLOR

NUMBER 621,424 SEC. C

VERSUS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

NAKISHA JACKSON

CADDO PARISH, LOUISIANA

ORDER

THIS MATTER having come on for a hearing on the request for A
PROTECTIVE ORDER filed by the Plaintiff above.

IT IS ORDERED That Court Costs herein are taxed as follows:

*Order granted,
costs to NAKISHA
Robertson (Jackson)*




The party or parties assessed Court Costs herein above are ordered to
appear on the 23RD DAY OF APRIL, 2020 at 2:00 pm with proof of payment
under penalty of contempt.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 20TH day of February, 2020 in
Shreveport, Caddo Parish, Louisiana

[Signature]
Roy L. Brun, Judge Pro Tem

PR

CLERK:
PLEASE MAIL RESPONSIBLE PARTY/PARTIES




Docket No. 621423

☐ 24 THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO appear at hearing(s) on.

1) _____ (month/day/year) at _____ o'clock _____ M. In Courtroom No. _____ of the _____ Court, located at _____, La., to review _____

AND

2) _____ (month/day/year) at _____ o'clock _____ M. In Courtroom No. _____ of the _____ Court, located at _____, La., to review _____

Date of Order <u>2-6-20</u> month/day/year	Order effective through 11:59 PM on <u>2-6-20</u> month/day/year Some provisions of this order MAY NOT EXPIRE See paragraphs 1-5.	SIGNATURE OF JUDGE  PRINT OR STAMP JUDGE'S NAME <u>R. L. Brown</u>
--	---	---

NOTICE: C.C.P. Article 3603.1 - Any person against whom such an order is issued shall be entitled to a court-appointed attorney if the applicant has likewise been afforded a court-appointed attorney.

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT - VIOLATION OF ORDER:

PURSUANT TO LA. R.S. 14:79, A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE ARRESTED, JAILED, AND PROSECUTED.

PURSUANT TO LA. R.S. 13:4611 AND LA. CH.C. ARTICLE 1571, A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE PUNISHED FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT BY A FINE OF NOT MORE THAN \$1,000 OR BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS 6 MONTHS, OR BOTH, AND MAY BE FURTHER PUNISHED UNDER CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA. THIS ORDER SHALL BE ENFORCED BY ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND COURTS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.


NOTICE TO DEFENDANT - FIREARM POSSESSION (Domestic abuse or dating violence ONLY):

AS A RESULT OF THIS ORDER, IT MAY BE UNLAWFUL FOR YOU TO POSSESS, RECEIVE, SHIP, TRANSPORT OR PURCHASE A FIREARM, INCLUDING A RIFLE, PISTOL, OR REVOLVER, OR AMMUNITION, FOR THE DURATION OF THIS ORDER PURSUANT TO STATE AND/OR FEDERAL LAWS. See below.

If you have any questions whether these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm or ammunition, consult an attorney.

Federal law, 18 U.S.C. 922 (a)(1) prohibits a defendant from purchasing, possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition for the duration of this order if the following conditions apply:

- Protected person(s) relationship to defendant is checked in Box A on page 2 of this order
- AND
- Notice and opportunity for a hearing provided (Box D on page 2 of this order).
- AND
- EITHER Judicial finding of credible threat (Box E on page 2 of this order is initiated), OR
- Certain behaviors are prohibited (item 1 on page 2 of this order is initiated)

TRUE COPY - ATTEST

DEPUTY CLERK, FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, CADDO PARISH, LA


Docket No. 677188

☐ 24. THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO appear at hearing(s) on:

1) _____ (month/day/year) at _____ o'clock _____ M. in Courtroom No. _____ of the
_____ Court, located at _____ in
_____, La., to review _____


AND

2) _____ (month/day/year) at _____ o'clock _____ M. in Courtroom No. _____ of the
_____ Court, located at _____ in
_____, La., to review _____

Date of Order <u>2-6-20</u> month/day/year	Order effective through 11:59 PM on <u>ones and expires</u> month/day/year Some provisions of this order MAY NOT EXPIRE See paragraphs 1-5.	 SIGNATURE OF JUDGE <u>Roy L. Ruv</u> PRINT OR STAMP JUDGE'S NAME
--	--	--

NOTICE: C.C.P. Article 3603.1 - Any person against whom such an order is issued shall be entitled to a court-appointed attorney if the applicant has likewise been afforded a court-appointed attorney.

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT - VIOLATION OF ORDER:
PURSUANT TO LA. R.S. 14:79, A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE ARRESTED, JAILED, AND PROSECUTED.
PURSUANT TO LA. R.S. 13:4611 AND LA. CH.C. ARTICLE 1571, A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE PUNISHED FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT BY A FINE OF NOT MORE THAN \$1,000 OR BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS 6 MONTHS, OR BOTH, AND MAY BE FURTHER PUNISHED UNDER CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA. THIS ORDER SHALL BE ENFORCED BY ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND COURTS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT - FIREARM POSSESSION (Domestic abuse or dating violence ONLY):
AS A RESULT OF THIS ORDER, IT MAY BE UNLAWFUL FOR YOU TO POSSESS, RECEIVE, SHIP, TRANSPORT OR PURCHASE A FIREARM, INCLUDING A RIFLE, PISTOL, OR REVOLVER, OR AMMUNITION, FOR THE DURATION OF THIS ORDER PURSUANT TO STATE AND/OR FEDERAL LAWS. See below.
<i>If you have any questions whether these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm or ammunition, consult an attorney.</i>
<u>Federal law: 18 U.S.C. 922 (g)(8)</u> prohibits a defendant from purchasing, possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition* for the duration of this order if the following conditions apply: - Protected person(s) relationship to defendant is checked in Box A on page 2 of this order AND - Notice and opportunity for a hearing provided (Box D on page 2 of this order). AND - EITHER Judicial finding of credible threat (Box E on page 2 of this order is Initialed), OR Certain behaviors are prohibited (item 1 on page 2 of this order is Initialed)

TRUE COPY - ATTEST

DEPUTY CLERK, FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, CADDO PARISH, LA

KRISTY WILSON

NUMBER 617,188 SEC. B

VERSUS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

NAKISHA ROBERTSON

CADDO PARISH, LOUISIANA

ORDER

THIS MATTER having come on for a hearing on the request for A
PROTECTIVE ORDER filed by the Plaintiff above.

IT IS ORDERED That Court Costs herein are taxed as follows:


Order granted
costs to Defendant
Nakisha Robertson

The party or parties assessed Court Costs herein above are ordered to
appear on the **4TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2019 at 1:30 pm** with proof of
payment under penalty of contempt.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 8TH day of July, 2019 in
Shreveport, Caddo Parish, Louisiana


Roy L. Brun, Judge Pro Tem

CLERK:
PLEASE MAIL RESPONSIBLE PARTY/PARTIES



RE: Notice of appeal

From: Mike Spence (mike.spence@caddoclerk.com)

To: nrobertson66@yahoo.com

Date: Monday, June 15, 2020, 9:52 AM CDT

Good morning,

I hope all is well with you. In response to your email, appeals from our court are to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal located on Fannin Street. An order is presented to the Judge that hears your case which will allow or disallow your appeal depending on the amount of days it has been since the Judgment has been rendered and other legal matters as decided by the District Court Judge. If allowed, our office is ordered by the Judge to obtain the cost of the appeal along with the court reporter transcripts from the court reporter for the appellant court to review. That is when a letter is generated from our office giving your cost of appeal. These are ministerial duties that the clerks office has when ordered by the court.

I have attached a listing of suits along with the court minutes for each case above with the last names Jackson and Robertson. I hope this helps you in your request for any copies we may have.

Please let me know exactly what you need and I will be glad to provide. Please note that court orders are needed to set court matters and to receive appeals. The office of the clerk then follow the orders of the Judge.

Again, let me know what you need and I will mail or email it to you.


Mike Spence

Caddo Parish Clerk of Court

First Judicial District Court

Mike.spence@caddoclerk.com

318-226-6776



From: Civil <civil@caddoclerk.com>
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 9:03 AM
To: Mike Spence <Mike.Spence@caddoclerk.com>
Subject: Fw: Notice of appeal

III

The facts and circumstances of stalking or sexual assault are as follows:

The most recent incident of stalking or sexual assault which caused petitioner to file this petition happened on or about

(date) at which time the defendant did:

I received unwanted contact from Ms. Nakisha Robertson. I asked her multiple times not to contact me or my family. Ms. Nak Robertson threaten to roll ~~up~~ on ~~me~~ Me, and my Mom, and unload on us. Even saying she would come to our house. I am in my clinical of Nursing. I don't have mind space for Ms. Nakisha Robertson mental instability. Stage

Again we don't know or have ever met Ms. Nakisha Robertson. My mom and Bonus dad are very active in community work from feeding the homeless, less fortunate youth, and public speaking. She recently started the nonprofit S.C.O.R.E. Setting Children on the road to excellence.

The vision is to develop a much program for the youth. The fact that Ms. Robertson made it her mission to try and destroy S.C.O.R.E.'s Name is ridiculous. Past incidents: I just want

this nightmare to end so me and my family can continue on with our lives.

Thank you for your time.

A plea for help!

Paragraph 7

Because of the immediate and present danger of stalking, or sexual assault, petitioner requests that an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order be issued immediately without bond:

- ☒ a. prohibiting defendant from abusing, harassing, assaulting, stalking, following, tracking, monitoring or threatening the protected person(s) in any manner whatsoever. This prohibition includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.
- ☒ b. prohibiting the defendant from contacting the protected person(s) personally, through a third party, or via public posting, by any means, including verbal, written, telephone, or electronic (text, email, messaging, or social media) communication, or sending gifts to the protected person(s)
- ☒ c. prohibiting defendant from going within one hundred (100) yards of the residence, apartment complex, or multiple family dwelling of the protected person(s).

[Query](#) [Reports](#) [Utilities](#) [Help](#) [Log Out](#)

5:20-cv-00238-SMH-MLH Jackson v. Wilson et al

S Maurice Hicks, Jr, presiding

Mark L Hornsby, referral

Date filed: 02/21/2020

Date terminated: 05/12/2020

Date of last filing: 05/21/2020

History

Doc. No.	Dates	Description
	<i>Filed:</i> 02/21/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 02/26/2020	Case Assigned/Reassigned
<u>1</u>	<i>Filed:</i> 02/21/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 02/24/2020	Complaint
<u>2</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 02/26/2020	Summons Issued - All
<u>3</u>	<i>Filed:</i> 03/02/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 03/04/2020 <i>Terminated:</i> 05/12/2020	Motion for Summary Judgment
<u>4</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 03/04/2020	Notice of Motion Setting
<u>5</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 03/05/2020 <i>Terminated:</i> 05/12/2020	Report and Recommendations
<u>6</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 03/16/2020	Objection to Report and Recommendations
<u>7</u>	<i>Filed:</i> 03/19/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 03/20/2020	Objection to Report and Recommendations
	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 05/04/2020	Motions Transferred
<u>8</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 05/04/2020 <i>Terminated:</i> 05/12/2020	Motion to Expedite
<u>9</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 05/12/2020	Judgment re Report and Recommendations
	<i>Filed:</i> 05/18/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 05/20/2020	Motions Transferred
	<i>Filed:</i> 05/18/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 05/20/2020	Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings
<u>10</u>	<i>Filed:</i> 05/18/2020 <i>Entered:</i> 05/20/2020 <i>Terminated:</i> 05/21/2020	Motion for Reconsideration
<u>11</u>	<i>Filed & Entered:</i> 05/21/2020	Order on Motion for Reconsideration

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