EXTENSION OF TIME REQUEST FOR A PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

No. 18A795



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



DOUGLAS WALTER GREENE

Applicant,

v.

INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION; ROBERT TRAVIS, in his capacity as President of the Independent Pilots Association; ERICK GERDES, in his capacity as Vice President of the Independent Pilots Association; THOMAS KALFAS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Independent Pilots Association; BILL CASON, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Independent Pilots Association; HARRY TREFES, in his capacity as At Large Representative of the Independent Pilots Association

Respondents,

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Directed to the Honorable Elena Kagan Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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Douglas Walter Greene, *Pro Se*
304 S. Jones Blvd., Suite 2787
Las Vegas, NV 89107
(907) 231 - 9076 or (248) 987-0711
md11747pilot@gmail.com

To the Honorable Elena Kagan, as Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:

Under 28 USC § 2101(c) and this Court's Rules 13.5, 22, and 30.3, Applicant Douglas Walter Greene, request an extension of sixty (60) days to file Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the identified Sixth Circuit Court case. The Applicant petition will be asking this Court to review judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the cited appeal, that was NOT recommended for publication, a copy of which is attached (App. A). In support of this application, Applicant states:

1. The Sixth Circuit issued its opinion on 4 October 2018, Captain Greene filed a timely Petition for Rehearing En Banc on 17 October 2018 (App. B) which was unlawfully denied by the Sixth Circuit on 26 November 2018 (App. C). Without an extension, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari would be due on 15 February 2019. With the requested extension, the petition would be due on 16 April 2019. In accordance with Supreme Court Rules, this application is being filed more than 10 days prior to the 15 February 2019 due date.
2. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 USC § 1254 (1), 28 USC § 1651(a), and 28 USC § 2403(a) raising a constitutional question.

There are important questions that were determined adversely by the lower courts that are of National importance because a precedent setting Decision has been made based on known perjury & RICO Act fraud ignored by the lower courts with the intent to sequester Applicant First Amendment Rights to Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion and expressions thereof.

This case is directly linked to U.S. Supreme Court case 18-330 that was unlawfully suppressed by both IPA and UPS' Dark Money corporate & political infiltration of our American Democracy while contemporaneously denying Captain Greene access to Equal Justice Under Law to ever even being heard in a trial court. The following *briefly* summarizes the validity of constitutional amendments and statutes involved as the writ of certiorari indeed presents a substantial question of national importance that will identify points of law, actual facts overlooked, false facts manufactured and misapprehended by the lower court. These overlooked and misapprehended points of law and facts demonstrates a circuit split and conflict with the stare decisis precedent Rules of Law established by the United States Supreme Court in which the Appellant's Constitutional Rights have been violated of which these concerns apply here.

First, **the application for certiorari would not be frivolous and it is serious candidate to be reviewed by the Supreme Court** because of multiple grounds to be raised in the application which merit the attention of the Supreme Court as follows:

1. **Captain Douglas Greene has *NEVER* even been afforded an *appearance in front of a trial court* with or *without* a jury** so as in accordance with FRCP Rule 52(a)(6) to be given due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge known perjured witnesses' credibility.

2. **Greene asserted his Rule 38. Right to a Jury Trial Demand** to only be denied. This Constitutional right has been unlawfully denied despite filing a motion for a **Rule 38 Jury Trial Demand** which is a basic Right that has been determined in just one of many United States Supreme Court Decisions as in TEAMSTERS v. TERRY in which JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court stating:

> ***"This case presents the question whether an employee who seeks relief in the form of backpay for a union's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation has a right to trial by jury. We hold that the Seventh Amendment entitles such a plaintiff to a jury trial."***

These proceedings have presented more than a mere *"scintilla"* of sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury verdict for that party showing countless disputes in Material Facts. The District & Appellate Courts violated **FRCP Rule 56 Summary Judgment** by Granting/Affirming Independent Pilots Association (IPA) Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment given the record shows findings of fact in both oral & documentary evidence of material facts in dispute unlawfully set aside by the District/Appellate Courts:

> ***"The right to a jury trial is fundamental in our judicial system, and that the right is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court."*** *(Michael Tomick v. United Parcel Service et al., Superior Court of Connecticut. CV064008944, Decided: October 28, 2010).*

3. **The Appellate Court's panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court** in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"The Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard in reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment. Pp. 477 U. S. 247-257.

(a) Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and Page 477 U. S. 243 determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no such issue unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. In essence, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Pp. 477 U. S. 247-252.

(b) A trial court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a case such as this must be guided by the New York Times "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists, that is, whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Pp. 477 U. S. 252-256."

In *Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,* the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"The finality provision has sufficient force to surmount occasional instances of mistake. But it is quite another matter to suggest that erroneous arbitration decisions must stand even though the employee's representation by the union has been dishonest, in bad faith, or discriminatory; for in that event error and injustice of the grossest sort would multiply. The contractual system would then cease to qualify as an adequate mechanism to secure individual redress for damaging failure of the employer to abide by the contract. Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements provided in collective agreements, but it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery would operate within some minimum levels of integrity. In our view, enforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings. Wrongfully discharged employees would be left without jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an adequate remedy."

4. **Rule 52.(a)(5) & (6): Findings and Conclusion by the Court**

(5) Questioning the Evidentiary Support. A party may later question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings, whether or not the party requested findings, objected to them, or moved for partial findings.

The District Court refused to answer Greene's demands for Evidentiary Support of false findings that were based on known perjury & fraud of which the record proves ***"Beyond Reasonable Doubt,"*** but was unlawfully set aside by the District & Appellate Courts.

(6) Setting Aside the Findings of fact and giving no trial court opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility.

Second, **questions of national importance affecting federal rights to due process and a Duty of Fair Representation (DFR),** include but are not limited to the court not vacating an arbitration decision even though it possesses evidence that the arbitration decision was a product of fraud sustained by perjured & false IPA statements. The lower courts abandoned the rule of law in sanctioning Captain Greene with a gag order for exercising basic Rights to Free Speech and Freedom of Religion for encouraging or inducing known perjured witnesses to come forward with their truthful testimony in accordance with my rights under ***18 USC 1512(e).*** The lower courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to sanction a U.S. Citizen for exercising their First Amendment Right to Freedom of Speech & Freedom of Religion and expressions thereof for communication to another person IAW under ***18 USC 1512(e):***

> ***"In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that <u>the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully</u>."***

If the lower courts had upheld the rule of law they would have found a **BREACH of Duty of Fair Representation** when IPA aided and abetted in a crime assisting and coercing troubled pilots to manufacture false and known perjured statements while allowing more than 6,000 pages of exculpatory evidence to be dumped in less than 24 hours before arbitration in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). This is important not only for IPA pilots working for UPS, but for all union members nationwide.

It is a very dangerous precedent that both the District & Appellate Courts have in their possession enough evidence to determine that IPA in collusion with UPS is forcing pilots with DUI and substance abuse problems to write false statements used to target unwanted pilots attempting to do their job in enforcing the Safety & Security of the airline industry by something as simple as calling in sick or fatigued.

(1) If allowed to stand, this case will encourage other unions to violate stare decisis precedent of the Supreme Court - Union owes ***"duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it on . . . without hostile discrimination"*** against bargaining unit members (Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944))

(2) The cited case afford an opportunity to properly distinguish bad faith representation from arbitrary representation. The latter, by definition, requires a final product of bargaining to prove breach of DFR. DFR obligation **"applies to all union activity"** involving all duties as exclusive collective bargaining:

- contract negotiations/settlement.
- contract administration.
- processing/handling/settlement of grievances (not violating the CBA by unlawfully putting grievances at abeyance).
- all other activities involving IPA's representative role.

ALPA v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). The former does not. *Amalgamated Motor Coach Emp. v. Lockridge*, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1974).

Third, **it is the Supreme Court's job to resolve questions of significant national importance and to make sure that the law is interpreted and applied consistently throughout the nation to include Standards of Review.** The District & Appellate Courts discriminated against a *Pro Se* litigant blatantly ignoring the Rule of Law in both Federal Rules of Civil/Appellant Procedures and not complying with a *De Novo Standard of Review* while giving complete deference to the District Court. The Appellate Court's Decisions of overwhelming Appellant denial show Appellant pleadings were not read and all of Applicant's countless findings of fact in both oral & documentary evidence submitted in the record were unlawfully set aside falsely alleging no substantive evidence that a jury would overwhelmingly rule in favor of Captain Greene

The Applicant has been an outgunned law firm of one forced overseas to mitigate my damages traveling to different cities across the world continuing to enforce the safety and security of the airline industry. My profession demands training over the next month in my field of expertise as an aviator to stay current & proficient between now and the current petition deadline of 15 February 2019.

The IPA Respondents are a United Parcel Service (UPS) Company controlled Union of which evidence beyond reasonable doubt establishes their collusion with UPS & the UPS contracted law firm Frost Brown Todd (FBT). This collusion has placed Captain Greene at a gross disadvantage, plain and simply mandating that more time is necessary. As stated by Sixth Circuit Court Judge, Griffin:

> **Indeed, "[t]he Framers [n]ever doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that this right might be considered inferior [emphasis added] to right of assistance counsel." *Faretta v. Callifornia,* 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975).**

In comparison, IPA acting as UPS' Company controlled Union, has access to ***BILLIONS*** of dollars & have used their undue influence to ensure Captain Greene has been disadvantaged without the ability to retain uncompromised professional legal counsel.

> ***"[T]he ability to deny one's opponent the services of capable counsel is a potent weapon."*** *Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1988)*

In addition, IPA has been embezzling pilot membership dues hiring outside counsel barraging the Applicant with this additional vexatious litigation now before this Court. Between IPA, UPS, & FBT, they have retained countless attorneys from multiple firms that are working full time around the clock while at the same time making it impossible for the Applicant to retain legal counsel. The ill health of the Applicant's partner and now a resulting death in our family due to IPA & UPS imposed financial devastation to access proper healthcare causing further collateral damages from this assault on my family which has weighted heavily on demanding time and attention to the aforementioned thereby mandating the need for the sixty (60) day extension until 16 April 2019.

All Courts have a duty and obligation to follow the *Rule of Law* ascertaining truth and securing a just determination. A judge must render Decisions grounded in principle and reasoned argument, not in power, manipulating and ignoring rules in order to advance political agendas. Declaration of Independence clearly describes epidemic dishonesty evincing a ***design*** of McConnellism reducing the people under absolute Despotism spreading like cancer compromising our Government agencies and sacred judicial institutions:

> ***"When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. "***

It's time to right this wrong by taking affirmative action in **GRANTING** this Extension of Time Request for a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, while finally upholding the sacred United States Supreme Court façade by giving Captain Greene his Right to access Equal * Justice * Under * Law that has been unlawfully and indignantly **DENIED.**

Respectfully submitted,



Dated: 1/30/, 2019

/s/ Douglas W. Greene
304 S. Jones Blvd., Suite 2787
Las Vegas, NV 89107

"INJUSTICE anywhere is a threat to JUSTICE everywhere."

Martin Luther King

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing will be served via FEDEX on this 30th day of January, 2019 to the following:

PRIDDY, CUTLER, NAAKE, MEADE, PLLC
Irwin H. Cutler, Jr.
Spring River Office Park
2303 River Road, Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40206
cutler@pcnmlaw.com

Counsel for Independent Pilots Association (*Exclusively, IPA General Counsel William C. Trent and the IPA Executive Board Only)*

/s/ Douglas W. Greene

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

No. 18-5296

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS WALTER GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.	)	ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

ORDER

Before: NORRIS, SILER, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

Douglas Walter Greene, a pro se plaintiff, appeals the district court's order imposing monetary sanctions against him and denying his cross-motion for sanctions against the Independent Pilots Association (IPA). This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

Greene was a pilot for United Parcel Service (UPS) and a member of the IPA, the collective bargaining unit for UPS's pilots. UPS terminated Greene in 2013 after he refused to undergo a medical examination to determine whether he was fit to safely function as a crewmember. An arbitrator upheld Greene's termination, concluding that Greene's erratic behavior provided sufficient grounds under the collective bargaining agreement for UPS to order Greene to undergo a non-routine medical evaluation, and that Greene's refusal to submit to the examination provided just cause for UPS to terminate him for insubordination. *See Greene v. Frost Brown Todd, LLC*, Nos. 16-6761/6763/6772, 2017 WL 6210784, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 4,

2017). Greene sued the IPA under the Railway Labor Act, for allegedly violating its duty of fair representation to him, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, for allegedly retaliating against him because he had supported an opposition candidate for union president. The district court granted summary judgment to the IPA on both claims, and we affirmed. *See id.* at *2-3.

The district court granted Greene's attorney leave to withdraw in December 2015, and Greene represented himself from then on. In August 2016, the IPA moved for a restraining order and for sanctions against Greene, claiming that he had threatened and tried to intimidate a witness who provided a declaration in support of its motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Greene's conduct in litigating the case was "unacceptable," but it declined to grant the motion for sanctions because it had concluded that the IPA was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Greene's claims. The district court, however, "caution[ed] Greene that by denying the IPA's motion, the Court is not condoning his behavior" and it "warned [Greene] that in any future litigation, the Court will not hesitate to impose appropriate sanctions."

The IPA filed another motion for sanctions against Greene while his appeal of the district court's summary judgment order was pending in this court. The first basis for this motion was an email that Greene sent to UPS pilot Michael Starnes in August 2017. Starnes testified in Greene's arbitration hearing about a flight from Anchorage, Alaska to Louisville, Kentucky, during which Greene talked at length about his problems with UPS, UPS's assistant chief pilot, and the Kentucky Department of Revenue. Starnes thought that Greene's excessive focus on these issues distracted him from flying the aircraft and created a safety risk.

In his email to Starnes, under the subject line "Truthful Testimony," Greene claimed that UPS was leveraging an undisclosed drunk driving incident to coerce Starnes into helping it "target" other pilots, and he told Starnes that Starnes needed to come forward with the truth. Greene reminded Starnes that Starnes needed to demonstrate good moral character to maintain an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate, *see* 14 C.F.R. § 61.153(c), and pointed out that

falsification of documents and acting in a malicious manner towards others were grounds to revoke an ATP certificate. Greene claimed that UPS and the IPA were violating federal criminal law by "protecting" Starnes, and he suggested that under the collective bargaining agreement UPS would not be required to reimburse Starnes if he were fined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Greene urged Starnes to "set yourself free from the bondage that UPS has shackled you with by reaching out to me as soon as possible." Starnes felt that Greene's email was a threat to initiate legal proceedings against him unless he contacted Greene. Greene sent a similar letter to Starnes in 2015, as well as to two other witnesses in the case.

The second basis for the sanctions motion was a July 2017 email that Greene sent to the IPA's attorney when Greene served his appellate brief on the IPA. In the email, Greene demanded a monetary settlement from "**ALL** the complicit players" in order to "alleviate the necessity to pursue criminal charges of **ALL** those involved and exposing this criminal endeavor to the Court of Public Opinion next."

The IPA argued that the district court had inherent authority to sanction Greene for attempting to influence a witness's testimony, harassing witnesses and potential witnesses, and threatening to initiate baseless criminal and bar disciplinary proceedings. The IPA asked the district court to enjoin Greene from threatening witnesses and opposing counsel with criminal prosecution and engaging in threatening, abusive, or intimidating communications, and to award it the attorney's fees and costs it incurred in bringing the motion.

Greene responded and filed a cross-motion for sanctions against the IPA. Much of Greene's response was devoted to relitigating the merits of his termination, and he continued to assert that UPS, the IPA, opposing counsel, and others were involved in a criminal conspiracy against him and that the district judge was biased against him. Greene, however, did argue that the district court lost jurisdiction to sanction him once he filed his notice of appeal and that his actions in contacting witnesses were protected by 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e), which provides an affirmative defense to a charge of witness tampering if "the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully." Greene claimed that counsel

for the IPA made false statements about him and defamed him in its motion for sanctions and engaged in other alleged fraudulent activities before the district court. Greene asserted counter-charges of witness tampering by counsel, and he sought sanctions of his own against the IPA in the amount of $50 million.

After we affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the IPA, the district court issued an order granting the IPA's motion for sanctions and denying Greene's motion for sanctions. The district court found that Greene acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, and for oppressive reasons throughout the case, and that as a result it had authority to sanction Greene for his misconduct pursuant to its inherent authority to protect the integrity of the proceedings. The district court first revisited Greene's misbehavior that generated the IPA's first motion for sanctions and its decision to caution Greene about his conduct, which included Greene's use of foul language, his derogatory comments about individuals involved in or associated with the case, and his inappropriate contacts with witnesses in the case. The court then found that despite its warning, Greene continued to engage in misconduct with his inappropriate and threatening emails to Starnes and opposing counsel. And sealing the district court's decision to sanction Greene was his response to the IPA's motion for sanctions, which the court found was replete with insults and baseless accusations of conspiratorial and other criminal conduct by UPS, the IPA, opposing counsel, and the court itself. The district court concluded that "Greene's conduct, both with respect to his contacting individuals via email with thinly-veiled, and sometimes outright, threats of criminal prosecution, coupled with his insistence that witnesses change their statements" fell squarely within its inherent authority to sanction him. The court therefore awarded the IPA the attorney's fees and costs it incurred in bringing its sanctions motion, which was approximately $9300. In light of its decision to grant the IPA's motion for sanctions, the court denied Greene's cross-motion for sanctions, concluding that his allegations of misconduct against opposing counsel were unfounded.

We review a district court's decision to sanction a party pursuant to its inherent authority for an abuse of discretion. *See Metz v. Unizan Bank*, 655 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2011). A

district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. *See United States v. Llanez-Garcia*, 735 F.3d 483, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2013); *First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.*, 307 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2002). A district court may assess an award of attorney's fees under its inherent powers if a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. *See Metz*, 655 F.3d at 491-92. "Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion." *Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper*, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).

First, the district court retained ancillary jurisdiction to sanction Greene for misconduct even though his appeal was pending in this court because the IPA's sanctions motion was a collateral matter that was not related to the merits of the case. *See Kallok v. Boardman Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 24 F. App'x 496, 498 (6th Cir. 2001); *see also Mitan v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co.*, 23 F. App'x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The federal courts' inherent power to protect the orderly administration of justice and to maintain the authority and dignity of the court extends to a full range of litigation abuses.").

Second, the district court reasonably interpreted Greene's emails to Starnes and the IPA's counsel as threats to initiate unfounded legal proceedings against them if they did not comply with his demands. And the district court was rightfully concerned that Greene's email to Starnes was an attempt to intimidate Starnes into providing testimony that complied with Greene's view of UPS's decision to terminate his employment. Indeed, Greene's email insinuated that he would see that the FAA would revoke Starnes's pilot's license if Starnes did not "reach out" to him. The district court therefore did not clearly err in finding that Greene's correspondence with Starnes and opposing counsel was not sent in good faith, particularly in view of its previous admonition to Greene to cease this behavior. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Greene for his misconduct. *Cf. Kelly v. Panama Canal Comm'n*, 26 F.3d 597, 603 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's award of monetary sanctions against an attorney who threatened a witness with criminal sanctions if he testified).

Third, Greene's motion for sanctions against the IPA's counsel and his demand for $50 million dollars in damages were patently frivolous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it. *Cf. Runfola & Assocs., Inc. v. Spectrum Reporting II, Inc.*, 88 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that a district court is not required to explain its reasons for denying sanctions).

Accordingly, we **AFFIRM** the district court's order granting the IPA's motion for sanctions and denying Greene's motion for sanctions.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

No. 18-5296

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS WALTER GREENE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

BEFORE: NORRIS, SILER, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. The petition then was circulated to the full court. No judge has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.