

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

LILLIAN PELLEGRINI,

CASE NO: 1:16-CV-01292-LJO-BAM
v.

FRESNO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,

XX -- Decision by the Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

THAT JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COURT'S ORDER FILED ON 8/10/2018

Marianne Matherly
Clerk of Court

ENTERED: August 10, 2018

by: /s/ A. Jessen
Deputy Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LILLIAN PELLEGRINI,

Plaintiff,

V.

FRESNO COUNTY, *et al.*

Defendants.

1:16-cv-01292 LJO BAM

**ORDER FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE**

**ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF
COURT TO CLOSE THIS CASE**

Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's mandate, issued on August 8, 2018, this case has been remanded.

for judgment of dismissal without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Docs. 110, 111.)

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: August 10, 2018

/s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill
UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

AUG 08 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

LILLIAN PELLEGRINI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

FRESNO COUNTY; et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 17-15735

D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01292-LJO-BAM
U.S. District Court for Eastern
California, Fresno

MANDATE

The judgment of this Court, entered July 17, 2018, takes effect this date.

This constitutes the formal mandate of this Court issued pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Costs are taxed against the appellant in the amount of \$322.00.

FOR THE COURT:

MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT

By: Rhonda Roberts
Deputy Clerk
Ninth Circuit Rule 27-7

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

JUL 27 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

LILLIAN PELLEGRINI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FRESNO COUNTY; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15735

D.C. No.
1:16-cv-01292-LJO-BAM
Eastern District of California,
Fresno

ORDER

Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

The motion to stay the mandate, Dkt. 82, is **DENIED**.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUL 17 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

LILLIAN PELLEGRINI,

No. 17-15735

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.
1:16-cv-01292-LJO-BAM

v.

FRESNO COUNTY; et al.,

MEMORANDUM*

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O'Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 11, 2018**
San Francisco, California

Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

After the Fresno County Superior Court ordered Plaintiff Lillian Pellegrini to transfer assets to a family trust and pay damages, she filed this federal action against the court, Fresno County, three banks, and the law firm that had prosecuted the state court proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

of subject-matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction over Pellegrini's timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we vacate and remand.

1. The Eleventh Amendment barred district court jurisdiction over Pellegrini's claims against the Superior Court. *See Franceschi v. Schwartz*, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, an arm of the state, its instrumentalities, or its agencies." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The claims are also barred under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *See Noel v. Hall*, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the doctrine bars review of a "legal injury caused by a state court judgment, based on an allegedly erroneous legal ruling").

2. Pellegrini failed to "specifically and distinctly" argue on appeal why the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the fraud and conversion claims against the other defendants, so the issue is forfeited. *See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc.*, 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing forfeiture of issues). In any case, Pellegrini's claims directly contravene the Superior Court's holding that these assets belonged to the trust. The district court lacked jurisdiction over these "inextricably intertwined" claims, as the "the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling." *Cooper v. Ramos*, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

3. Pellegrini's arguments of extrinsic fraud fail. She asserts that "[t]he

defendants acted in concert to misrepresent property title and interest for purposes of stealing” her property, but does not contend that she was deprived of the ability to present her case in state court. *See Green v. Ancora-Citronelle Corp.*, 577 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978) (defining extrinsic fraud as conduct that “prevents a party from having an opportunity to present his claim or defense in court or deprives a party of his right to a day in court,” not “misrepresentations” that go “to the very heart of the issues contested in the state court action” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of documents and orders filed in the state proceedings. “[A] court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’” *Lee v. City of Los Angeles*, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The district judge made clear that he took judicial notice of “the existence of the document or order,” not “[t]he truth or the correctness of the factual content.” *See id.* at 690 (holding that “when a court takes judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may do so not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Pellegrini also asserts that she had no opportunity below to oppose judicial notice. To the contrary, the district court expressly considered, and rejected, Pellegrini’s objections to judicial notice.

5. The district court dismissed Pellegrini's complaint with prejudice. But "a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert [her] claims in a competent court." *Frigard v. United States*, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988). We therefore vacate the dismissal with prejudice and remand with directions that the dismissal be without prejudice.

VACATED and REMANDED; costs shall be taxed against Pellegrini.