

No. --

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

LORENZO HALE,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g) authorizes conviction upon proof that a firearm once crossed state lines at an unspecified prior occasion, when there is no evidence that the defendants' conduct caused such movement, nor that it moved in the recent past?
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. §924(a) provides for criminal penalties to felons who possess firearms in interstate commerce absent proof that they knew of their felon status, or of the firearm's movement in interstate commerce?

PARTIES

Lorenzo Hale is the Petitioner, who was the defendant-appellant below. The United States of America is the Respondent, who was the plaintiff-appellee below.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Lorenzo Hale respectfully petitions for a writ of *certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is captioned as *United States v. Hale*, No. 18-11157, 758 Fed. Appx. 344 (5th Cir. March 18, 2019)(unpublished), and is provided in the Appendix to the Petition. [Appx. A]. The written judgment of conviction and sentence was issued August 17, 2018, and is also provided in the Appendix to the Petition. [Appx. B].

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment and unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit were filed on March 18, 2019. [Appx. A]. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful for any person – (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable for a term of imprisonment exceeding one year... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or effecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition....

18 U.S.C. § 924(a) provides in relevant part:

(2) Whoever knowingly violates subsection...(g)... of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Lorenzo Hale was indicted on one count of possessing a firearm following a prior felony. He moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it transgressed Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, both facially and as applied. Further, he argued that it lacked a necessary allegation of knowledge that the firearm had moved in interstate commerce.

He pleaded guilty and waived appeal. His factual resume admitted that the firearm had been previously shipped and transported in interstate commerce, but contained no information about the circumstances of such movement. Further, it contained no admission that Appellant knew of such movement. He received a sentence of 36 months imprisonment and a term of supervised release.

On appeal, Petitioner contended that the district court erred in accepting his factual resume because it failed to admit an offense. Specifically, he maintained that the factual resume failed to admit his knowledge of his firearm's interstate movement. Further, he contended that it failed to admit a prosecutable offense because it admitted neither that his actions caused the interstate movement of the firearm, nor that the firearm had moved in the recent past. The court of appeals rejected these arguments as foreclosed affirmed. *See* [Appx. A].

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The decision below conflicts with *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that the admissions made by the defendant in connection with a plea establish a prosecutable offense. *See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3)*. In Petitioner’s district, these admissions are called the “factual resume.” Petitioner’s factual resume admitted that the possessed firearm had been transported across state lines. It did not admit that the offense itself caused the movement of the firearm, nor that the movement of the firearm was recent. Nor did it admit any other fact establishing that the offense involved the buying, selling, or movement of any commodity. Petitioner contended below that the factual resume was therefore insufficient to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g).

Section 922(g) of Title 18 authorizes conviction when the defendant possesses a firearm, “in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition....” 18 U.S.C. §922(g). To be sure, the statute may be read to include conduct that has little or nothing to do with the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, such as the possession of a firearm that crossed state lines years ago for entirely innocent purposes. But *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844 (2014), suggests that this is not the proper reading.

Bond was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §229, a statute that criminalized the knowing possession or use of “any chemical weapon.” *Bond*, 572 U.S. at 853; 18 U.S.C. §229(a). She placed toxic chemicals – an arsenic compound and potassium dichromate – on the doorknob of a romantic rival. *See id.* This Court reversed her conviction, holding that any construction of the statute capable of reaching such conduct would compromise the chief role of states and localities in the suppression of crime. *See id.* at 865-866. It instead construed the statute to reach only the kinds of weapons and conduct associated with warfare. *See id.* at 859-862.

Notably, §229 defined the critical term “chemical weapon” broadly as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of

their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” 18 U.S.C. §229F(8)(A). Further, it criminalized the use or possession of “any” such weapon, not of a named subset. 18 U.S.C. §229(a). This Court nonetheless applied a more limited construction of the statute, reasoning that statutes should not be read in a way that sweeps in purely local activity:

The Government’s reading of section 229 would “alter sensitive federal-state relationships,” convert an astonishing amount of “traditionally local criminal conduct” into “a matter for federal enforcement,” and “involve a substantial extension of federal police resources.” [*United States v.]Bass*, 404 U.S. [336] 349-350, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 [(1971)]. It would transform the statute from one whose core concerns are acts of war, assassination, and terrorism into a massive federal anti-poisoning regime that reaches the simplest of assaults. As the Government reads section 229, “hardly” a poisoning “in the land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.” *Jones [v. United States]*, 529 U.S. [848,] 857, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 [(2000)]. Of course Bond’s conduct is serious and unacceptable—and against the laws of Pennsylvania. But the background principle that Congress does not normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal prosecution for a chemical weapons attack.

Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091-2092.

As in *Bond*, it is possible to read §922(g) to reach the conduct admitted here: possession of an object that once moved across state lines, without proof that the defendant’s conduct caused the object to move across state lines, nor even proof that it moved across state lines in the recent past. But to do so would intrude deeply on the traditional state responsibility for crime control. Such a reading would assert the federal government’s power to criminalize virtually any conduct anywhere in the country, with little or no relationship to commerce, or to the interstate movement of commodities.

It is plain that Congress intended the “interstate commerce” requirement to bind §922(g) to federal interests in interstate commerce. This prong of the statute should therefore be read in a way that accomplishes this purpose. The better reading of the phrase “possess in or affecting commerce” – which appears in §922(g) – therefore requires a meaningful connection to interstate commerce. Such a reading would require either: 1) proof that the defendant’s offense caused the firearm to move

in interstate commerce, or, at least, 2) proof that the firearm moved in interstate commerce at a time reasonably near the offense.

The court below rejected these claims. This Court should grant *certiorari* clarify that the federalism presumptions employed in *Bond* are not limited to the treaty power or to statutes closely related to international relations. This Court has long cautioned that federal criminal statutes are presumed to respect the traditional balance of federal and state authority, absent strong indications to the contrary. *See Jones*, 529 U.S. at 858 (“We have cautioned, as well, that ‘unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance’ in the prosecution of crimes.”)(citing *Bass*, 404 U.S. at 349). This presumption applies to all criminal enactments that carry a risk of intrusion into the state domain. It is not limited to statutes like that at issue in *Bond*.

II. There is a reasonable probability of a different result in this case if *Rehaif v. United States*, No. 17-9560, __U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 914 (Jan. 11, 2019), is decided favorably to the Petitioner in that case.

Section 922(g) of Title 18 makes it “unlawful” for certain disfavored populations to possess firearms in interstate commerce. People who have been convicted of a prior felony are one such population. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). Aliens illegally in the United States are another such population. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(5).

Section 924(a) of Title 18 provides for criminal punishment to anyone who “knowingly violates subsection ... (g).” In *Rehaif v. United States*, No. 17-9560, __U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 914 (Jan. 11, 2019), this Court agreed to decide whether an alien “knowingly violates” §922(g) if he or she does not know of his or her illegal status. If the answer to that question is no, it is difficult or impossible to see how one would “knowingly violate” §922(g) without knowing that the possessed firearm has moved in interstate commerce. It is the same phrase – “knowingly violate” – in the same clause, of the same sentence, of the same statute, that imposes the *mens rea* requirement for all of §922(g). The phrase cannot mean “to act with knowledge of all facts that make the conduct criminal”

in some cases, but only “to act with knowledge of the firearm” in others. *See Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).

This Court “regularly hold(s) cases that involve the same issue as a case on which *certiorari* has been granted and plenary review is being conducted in order that (if appropriate) they may be ‘GVR’d’ when the case is decided.” *Lawrence v. Chater*, 516 U.S. 163, 181 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting). Ultimately, a GVR is appropriate where intervening developments reveal a reasonable probability that the outcome below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration. *See Lawrence*, 516 U.S. at 168. Petitioner’s factual resume does not admit that he knew of the firearm’s interstate movement. As such, if the Petitioner prevails in *Rehaif*, the district court will have erred in taking the plea. *See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3)*. The claim has been raised in both the district court and the court of appeals. As such, it is fully preserved, and there is no barrier to relief if there is a favorable result in *Rehaif*.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court should grant *certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Alternatively, he prays for such relief as to which he may justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 2019.

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