18-9663 ORIGINAL

No. _____

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

In re LORCAN KILROY,

Petitioner,

v.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCTION et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Extraordinary Writ Of Mandamus To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit 28 U. S. C. §1651(a)

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDAMUS

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RELIEF REQUESTED

Having previously submitted this pleading as a Rule 22 Application , which the Clerk rejected , Petitioner re-submits. Former schoolteacher Petitioner requests extraordinary relief from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' infection by Democratic political bias, as this infection constitutes absence of a rational basis and improper personal motives and thus violates the Constitution's equal protection clause when compared to other Circuits. He requests extraordinary order for investigation as described herein and that his case be reheard in a different circuit, and that the Ninth Circuit reasonably pay the bill for re-location of discovery and trial. Applicant additionally requests consideration of the following:

1. Whether the retaliation protection provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in regard to it's current application to §504 protected complaints lodged by non-disabled individuals but on behalf of disabled individuals, should continue to require those non-disabled Plaintiffs to prove the heightened

standard that their employers would not have taken any adverse action against them *"but for"* the existence of an improper retaliatory motive, (the "Nassar test"); or should the Court reconsider *University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,* 570 U.S. 338 (2013) , and the requirement be changed to only require proof that the employer had mixed motives for taking adverse action.

2. Whether the past ten years show that the Court's prohibition on claims for equal protection under the 14th amendment by *"class of one"* public employees, established by the holding in *Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric.*, 553 U.S. 591 (2008), falls in line with the Constitution.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWERS, AND ADEQUATE RELIEF CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN ANY OTHER FORM OR FROM ANY OTHER COURT

In this case, an innocent public employee high school Art teacher, (Petitioner), despite six years of struggle as a Pro Se in the Ninth Circuit, has had his

whole career and personal reputation viciously permanently destroyed by California state officials aided by Ninth Circuit Federal jurists, and his professional license revoked, without rational basis and because of improper personal motives. The improper motive was to protect figurehead Democrat politician and now presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris from exposure for aiding and abetting corrupt plain alteration of a date in, and plain suppression of witness statements from, LAPD detectives report No. 12-09-11015 at Petitioner's high school, (the "detective's report".) This occurred during Harris' final days as California's Attny. General, (see Petitioner's uncontroverted affidavit re. Harris' acts related to the detective's report in this case as Exhibit to his initial brief in the Ninth Cir. Appeal No. 16-56484, Dkt. Entry 9, pg. 47 of 63, and also attached to this petition as app'x 2). When Petitioner went to the Hill Street USDC Courthouse manual filing window in Los Angeles to attempt to manually file a proposed

redlined amended complaint in the instant case, adding Kamala Harris as a defendant, an unusual clerk came out from a back office, or was summoned from a back office, a middle aged African American woman who appeared to be a supervisor. She told Petitioner that she would "*give all of this*" to Judge Dolly M. Gee, the district judge in this case. (Petitioner inadvertently did not have a face page of the required redlined version to stamp). Judge Dolly M. Gee thereafter entered untruthful statement in the docket that Petitioner never filed the red lined version, as her justification for rejecting amendment and thus rejecting Harris as a defendant.

LIST OF PARTIES

Pursuant to Rule 14.1(b), Petitioner states that the parties include:

1. Lorcan Kilroy, Plaintiff and Petitioner;

2. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Nury Martinez in her individual capacity, Richard Vladovic in his individual capacity, Monica Garcia in her individual capacity, Tamar Galatzan in her individual capacity, Steve Zimmer in his individual capacity, John Deasy in his individual capacity, Bennett Kayser in his individual capacity, John Brasfield in his individual capacity, Judith Vanderbok in her individual capacity Marc Strassner in his individual capacity, Janet Kiddoo in her individual capacity

Defendants and Respondents

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The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was issued on March 29, 2019. App. 1. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued on Sept 28, 2016, document number 307 in the District Court's docketed matter number 1:13-CV-06373-DMG (C.D. Ca.). The United States District Court adopted in its entirety the Final Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge issued on August 8, 2016, document number 294 in the District Court's docket.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion affirming the decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California on March 29, 2019, App. 1. The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, (2) Title II of the ADA, (3) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (for defendants' retaliation against Petitioner for "whistleblowing" about their treatment of disabled students); (3) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (hostile work environment); and (4) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed dismissal of Petitioner Art teacher Lorcan Kilroy's case by ratifying the District Court's politically biased decisions, discovery abuse and erroneous exclusion of evidence, and by relying on precedents, which continue to infringe on Constitutional rights. These decisions include the heightened standard to prove causation established in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013), and the prohibition on class of one equal protection claims by public employees established by Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008). This Court must grant relief to reverse and correct, and issue extraordinary relief to cure the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals infection by political bias.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Lorcan Kilroy M.F.A. began working as an Art teacher at Van Nuys High School in the Los Angeles Unified School District in January 2003. For ten years, he advocated passionately for the interests of his teenaged Art students, including those designated as special needs and those at risk. He received favorable performance evaluations.

When a new Principal, (JUDITH VANDERBOK), arrived, with a new assistant Principal, (Phyllis Baer), troubles started. Petitioner was getting complaints from students that they did not choose his elective, (like other students), but were forced to take it. He noticed many or almost all of these upset youngsters were Hispanic, from impoverished neighborhoods, and were marked as "SDC" or "Special Day Class", a designation for Special Education services at the time in LAUSD. He complained on these students' behalf, first to the Department of Education, but, (as the R&R omits in distortion which rigs timeline and rigs the Nassar causation test), it was not until Fall 2011,

after he had complained to the LAUSD headquarters in downtown Los Angeles, that the retaliation started. His classes because more disturbed and contentious and became an offensive environment with students being unusually hostile, hurling slurs and threats at the teacher. Amazingly, when he referred offenses to the Dean, there was no response as there had been in years past. Later in discovery he unearthed official, (self authenticating), LAUSD records of scores of serious juvenile records of individuals transferred and placed into his classes almost immediately after the complaint to downtown HQ, in Fall 2011. The District court erred in excluding these official records, which obscured causation.

There were multiple instance of hostility. When an 18-year-old student initials J.C. yelled "FAGGOT" at Plaintiff in class in Fall 2011 and the school Dean, (Maurice Mascari), did not consequence him, Petitioner knew he had been abandoned by school administration in retaliation.

The adopted R&R implicitly falsifies that Petitioner, before he in desperation wrote a letter, (the harsh letter), to two parents, (letter recited within the R&R), Kilroy somehow knew that Principal JUDITH VANDERBOK had apparently ordered the student J.C. to apologize for the "FAGGOT" slur as Defendants', (albeit useless), "consequence." In truth VANDERBOK declared so only years later in the litigation. Petitioner's Disputed Material Facts and declarations, (and an NBC news spot which discussed the letter), make clear Petitioner had no inkling of any consequence. (This is the lawyerly tact, the particular character of this biased R&R, which subverts justice and hides Defendants' causation of the hostile work environment and in actuality causation of the harsh letter they later used as pretext.)

In desperation and under duress, Petitioner responded by writing the letter to parents of two teens to try to control the abuse. Defendants thus "set Petitioner up" to fail Nassar's test by rigging a hostile classroom and abandoning Dean referral discipline of Petitioner's referrals, so that something would happen to give rise to a pretext they could use to issue retaliatory discipline.

Supposedly because the ethical but harshly worded letter was their "rational basis" under Nassar, Defendants told Petitioner he was being referred for termination, and being referred to the State's teacher licensing for possible license revocation by prosecutor Kamala Harris, (who eventually began to move and prosecuted Petitioner's license which was hideously eventually revoked, supposedly all because of this harsh letter.)

B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS DECISION TO ADOPT THE MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DISMISSING MR. KILROY'S CASE

Upon analysis and when compared to Petitioner's MSJ pleadings, when compared to the operative complaint, and when compared to Petitioner's entered disputes of material fact backed by admissible documentary evidence and uncontroverted declarations, the District Court's adopted Report and Recommendation, (R&R USDC Dkt. 294), is truly flabbergasting document, as if written by a lawyer for Defendants. To obviate any issues for trial, it leaves out almost all of Petitioner Kilroy's disputed material facts (SDMF Dkt. 276), which were supported by declarations and supported by either declared or self authenticating documentary evidence including police and school district official records. It distorts and falsifies facts including facts of timelines, facts regarding proximity relative to causation proof, and facts of what was in the operative complaint, (Dkt. 129). It even falsifies that Petitioner was gay, (Dkt.

294 at 7:14), and falsifies that his complaint was of discrimination based on his "sexual orientation". It puts Defendants' asserted "undisputed" material facts, (UMF's), forefront in prejudicial manner as established "facts" without acknowledging real remaining dispute between Defendants' UMF's and Plaintiff's Disputed Material Facts, (Dkt. 276). Petitioner's objections to this politically biased "smokescreen" R&R were summarily ignored.

C. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR, 570 U.S. 338 (2013), IN REGARD TO RESTRICTING RETALIATION CASES TO A STRICTER STANDARD TO PROVE CAUSATION, CONTINUES TO VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In Nassar the Supreme Court's dissent argued correctly that the majority's decision created an unnecessary dichotomy between discrimination cases and retaliation cases by restricting retaliation cases to a stricter standard of proof, the "but for" causation test. In doing so, the majority's opinion ignored extensive judicial precedent that supports the close

connection between anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions.

Additionally, there is no evidence that Congress intended to provide less protection from retaliation than from discrimination, yet that un-constitutional outcome of Nassar's "but for" standard has been perfectly illustrated by the ghastly instant case from the Ninth Circuit. In the instant case Los Angeles Unified School District, (LAUSD), Defendants actually diabolically set in motion events that would create an, (albeit absurd), pretext, and cause Petitioner/Plaintiff to technically fail the "but-for" test if that pretext was erroneously accepted by jurists as legitimate. Defendants planted and transferred scores of students with juvenile criminal records into Petitioner Kilroy's high school

Art classes in the troubled low income crime ridden and gang infested Los Angeles neighborhood of Van Nuys California, and then refused to consequence those students' harassment and threats against Art teacher Petitioner, knowing trouble would start. (See

e.g. Plaintiff's Statement of disputed material facts at MSJ in the District court docket 276.) Petitioner/Plaintiff was then of course under extreme duress as a classroom teacher, including as a result of no consequence being imposed after the Dean referral for the 18 year old yelling "FAGGOT" at him in front of the class. Another recalcitrant teen wrote "IMMA SLAP THE SHIT OUTTA YOU" on an Art final exam project in attempt to intimidate for a better grade. Petitioner was of course forced to come up with some desperate recourse on his own. He thus wrote the ethical, (but harshly worded under duress), parent letter used later as absurd pretext to obliterate his career and license. NBC media coverage also enraged Defendants:

https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Teacher-Fights-LAUSD-After-Suspension-218073391.html

Discovery in the instant case, (before the Democrat appointed District Court slyly put the brakes on), began to show a huge can of LAUSD worms, that other comparator LAUSD teachers

criminally secretly threatened students and physically assaulted them behind closed doors, and that some of those comparator teachers had secret criminal records, including disturbing drug offense records, hidden from parents and the public by LAUSD and the State's commission on teacher credentialing. Those comparator teachers received no consequence whatsoever or received just referral for "anger management."

Thus, in analysis of Nassar's effects over the years since 2013, it is undeniable that a malicious employer can easily invent, or set the stage for, a pre-textual reason to be used for adverse action, thus causing their victim employee to fail Nassar's test.

The Nassar dissent also correctly argued that the "but-for" causation test is particularly difficult to implement in employment cases as it requires trial courts to reach conclusions as to what would have happened had the employer's thoughts been different.

The brief Ninth Circuit opinion in question here has been disturbingly crafted in a manner so that the

Supreme Court will not really look at, or look into, or see, all of the legal facts of how the lower court case was disposed of. In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit is positing the pretext of the letter Petitioner wrote to adult grown up parents of two students, as rational basis for destruction of his property rights by both termination and revocation of teaching license, while ratifying the lower court's sly blocking of discovery of comparator teachers who physically assaulted students and criminally threatened them, and sly exclusion of self authenticating police and LAUSD official documentation as evidence. This all does not hold water.

D. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ENGQUIST V. OREGON DEP'T OF AGRIC., 553 U.S. 591 (2008), IN REGARD TO IT'S PROHIBITION ON 'CLASS OF ONE' CLAIMS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, CONTINUES TO VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In regard to Circuit uncertainty about class of one equal protection claims, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), a zoning case

originating in the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court held that an equal protection claim can be based on arbitrary and capricious discrimination against an individual. Thereafter, with concerns about opening floodgates for frivolous class of one claims, in Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008), the Court excluded public employees from such class-of-one equal protection coverage.

Unfortunately, the Court in Olech did little to explain what the elements of such a claim are and whether such a plaintiff must allege and prove some sort of impermissible motive in order to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. This has created uncertainty in the circuits.

In Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012)(en banc), affirming dismissal of the complaint by an equally divided court, the Plaintiff sued law enforcement officers alleging that they failed to respond to his complaints that gangs were harassing him and his wife, thus forcing them to

sell their home and move to another village "with the gangs in hot pursuit."

Judge Posner proposing the following standard for class of one cases: the plaintiff must show that "he was the victim of discrimination intentionally visited on him by state actors who knew or should have known that they had no justification, based on their public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treatment—who acted in other words for personal reasons, with discriminatory intent and effect." 680 F.3d at 889 (emphasis added and in original). Here in the instant case, Petitioner satisfies these rigorous requirements, including subjective ill will. In passing, Judge Posner wondered why the Court in Olech did not adopt this approach. He went on to emphasize that a plaintiff must prove both the absence of a rational basis and some improper personal motive. Judge Easterbrook concurred in the judgment, 680 F.3d at 900, arguing that motive should play no role. Judges Flaum, Rovner, Williams, and Hamilton joined in an equally thoughtful opinion by Judge Wood. They

argued for the following standard: a class-of-one plaintiff must plausibly plead that he or she was the victim of intentional discrimination at the hands of a state actor who lacked a rational basis for so singling out the plaintiff, thereby causing harm. This is exactly petitioner Kilroy's situation in the instant case involving LAUSD, State police and AG Kamala Harris. They all used the pretext of Petitioner's ethical, (but harshly worded under duress that was deliberately inflicted), letter to parents as their pretext to annihilate public schoolteacher Petitioner.

Other factors such as ill will and illegitimate motives are illustrative of the lack of a rational basis. In the instant case, the Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. Engquist needs to be reconsidered as this case shows it has become a distorted restriction that suffocates and defies constitutional protections.

ADDRESSING THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INFECTION WITH POLITICAL BIAS WILL AID THIS COURT'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit opinion, when legally scrutinized and held up in comparison to the Motion for Summary Judgment related pleadings and uncontroverted facts in the District Court, and when held up in comparison to the issues for trial that remained after the briefing of Defendants' motion for summary judgment in the District court, is too brief, omits issues, and shows infection with political bias to protect Democratic interests.

The most political gravity in the lower court instant case involved accidental discovery of the corrupted Los Angeles Police Department, (LAPD), police detective's report, (# 12-09-11015), documenting an incident of teacher on student simple misdemeanor battery, and misdemeanor, (or felony), criminal threats, at Petitioner/Plaintiff's high school in Van Nuys California. Initially, the school, and LAUSD school police, waited for a "cool off" period before

coercing the parent to drop charges, and changed the date of incident to camouflage this "cool off" period.

School police and LAUSD then suppressed the dozens of student and adult witness statements from the LAPD detectives report, so that the city attorney could dismiss the case for reasons of "no witnesses" and save the teacher's career. After Petitioner/Plaintiff made noise about it to LAUSD, police command staff, and the Los Angeles city police commission, that corrupt detective's report was ratified in a snowballing up though LAUSD, then LAPD, then a police commission oversight review, and then eventually Kamala Harris who was A.G. and who Petitioner had enraged by serving her in individual capacity with information about the detectives report via a registered process server in San Francisco (see Petitioner's uncontroverted affidavit re. Harris' acts related to the case as Ninth Cir. No. 16-56484, Dkt. Entry 9, pg. 47 of 63, and attached to this petition as App'x 2). When it came to that key LAPD detective's report, the 'buck stopped'

with Kamala Harris.

As result of this, the Ninth Circuit opinion in question here appears slyly crafted as if authored by lawyers for Defendants, Los Angeles Police, and former Atty. General Kamala Harris, not by an impartial judicial reviewing body. Petitioner moves this court for consideration of extraordinary relief, and to consider an extraordinary order appointing a special independent prosecutor from another Circuit to investigate LAPD detective's report # 12-09-11015, and to convene a grand jury if need be.

Petitioner/Plaintiff cannot discern whether the two republican appointed judges whose names appear on the opinion could not see the bias, or if, to throw off potential Supreme Court backlash for Democratic political bias, (and after stalling for three years since petitioner Kilroy filed the Ninth Circuit appeal in 2016), staff fabricated the names of the two republican appointed judges, judges Wallace and Trott, as having authored the unpublished circuit opinion in this pro se case.

Its also a possibility that those republican Judges never actually saw the case documents, or were given prejudicially edited documents by biased staff, or were given a prejudicially prepared legal synopsis, (minus petitioner's exhibit of the uncontroverted affidavit regarding the LAPD detective's report for example). If so, this move by Ninth Circuit staff was intended to throw off suspicion of Democratic bias and unlawful activity and protect Kamala Harris from exposure for aiding and abetting police corruption. If so, this corrosive un American activity must be exposed and addressed. Petitioner moves this court for consideration of extraordinary relief, and consideration of an order appointing a special independent prosecutor from another Circuit to investigate clerical and legal staff and political partiality in how the internal Ninth Circuit court staff do court business, and to investigate political coercion and political pressures that may be put upon those staff, and to convene a grand jury if need be.

Normally, a lower court's, (as in the extraordinary instant case):

i. ratification of discovery abuse and refusal to compel any substantive discovery,

ii. physical returning, (via U.S. Mail), of incriminating self-authenticating police official evidence to Plaintiff/Petitioner after the court refusing to file it under seal, effectively hiding evidence from any appeal proceedings,

iii. untruthfully stating in the record, (as reason for denial of amended complaint), that Plaintiff/Petitioner did not file a required red-lined version of his proposed amended complaint adding political figure Kamala Harris as a defendant,

iv. ignoring that Plaintiff/Petitioner had indeed entered uncontroverted declarations establishing demonstrable causal, (including proximity), links between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged,

v. and other prejudicial decisions evident upon inspection of the MSJ related pleadings and by referencing from the statement of uncontroverted material facts entered by Plaintiff /Petitioner in the district court,

would all fall outside the parameters of the Supreme Court's review.

However, in this case, because Petitioner is not the first to have raised the issue of Democratic political bias in this Ninth Circuit, and because the only possible motive for such errors and omissions was and is to protect former A.G. and now Democratic Presidential Contender Kamala Harris from exposure for aiding and abetting corruption of a Los Angeles police detectives' report in her final days as State Attny. General, it is the business of this Supreme Court.

It is obvious that Democrats' political bias infecting the Ninth circuit violates the 14th Amendment. If one's case threatens to politically damage Democrats or their interests, there is not

going to be fair and equal jurisprudence in the Ninth circuit. (For the record the high school Art teacher Petitioner is not party affiliated.) This corrosive un American activity must be exposed and addressed. Petitioner thus moves this court for consideration of extraordinary relief, and consideration of an order that his case be re-assigned to a different Circuit and start over from square one, including an impartial discovery master, and that the Ninth Circuit foot the bill for the extraordinary re-assignment and master's expenses in an un biased fair Circuit where Petitioner can receive equal treatment under law.

The lower court's decisions, including discovery decisions, and the Ninth Circuit Appeal court's opinion affirming, are extraordinary in their bias, ignoring entered and uncontroverted evidence and ignoring remaining issues for trial.

The District Court's reticence to truth find, and refusal to lay bare (via orders to compel), the unlawful ratifications of date alteration and witness statement suppression within Los Angeles Police Detective's report No. 12-09-11015, (*see* Affidavit App. 2), has resulted in murder, maiming, and crippling, but not physical. Instead, schoolteacher Petitioner's career, reputation, property rights and liberty rights have been murdered, maimed and crippled. He has been finished off by this corruption. Petitioner is thus forced to move for issuance of an extraordinary writ.

The decisions in Petitioners District Court and Ninth Circuit case were carefully enacted to hide police corruption and hide Democratic sitting Senator Kamala Harris' involvement in ratifying that corruption, (see again Petitioner's uncontroverted affidavit re. Harris' acts related to the case as Ninth Cir. No. 16-56484, Dkt. Entry 9, pg. 47 of 63, and attached to this petition as App. 2)

The Ninth Circuit's published opinion sidesteps any mention of the equal protection claim that was a

major part of the litigation, but the lower District court's erroneous rejection of self-authenticating official police and school district evidence of comparator teachers un consequenced misconduct and even secret criminal abusive activity goes not just to equal protection, but goes to illuminating that the more than 10 day suspension Kilroy got, (triggering referral to the CA. state agency on teacher credentialing for possible license revocation), was retaliatory and used pretext of Kilroy's ethical letter written to adult parents of just two recalcitrant teens.

In the interests of the public, Petitioner Lorcan Kilroy hereby moves for issuance of the extraordinary relief, necessary and appropriate in aid of the respective jurisdiction of the whole United States, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. Petitioner and others are being treated illegally in the Ninth Circuit, because of Democratic political interests, in violation of the Equal Protections of the Constitution. This politically biased treatment conflicts with other Circuits and is unequal treatment

under the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

For these reasons and those set forth below, this Court should grant relief in this case.

POLITICALLY INFECTED DEFENDANTS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, (A LA THEIR JUSTICE BRETT KAVANAUGH DEBAUCLE), HAVE NOW IN DESPERATION NO LESS THAN FABRICATED MID-CASE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST PETITIONER FOR POLITICAL ENDS, TO STYMIE AND SMEAR THIS LITIGATION, AND TO CAMOFLAGE THE ILLEGAL ACTS OF KAMALA HARRIS- CIRCUIT JURISTS HAVE RATIFIED THIS, DESPITE UNCONTROVERTED FILED STUDENT WITNESS DECLARATIONS ESTABLISHING PETITIONER'S INNOCENCE

The sleaze and guttersnipe behavior of involved parties in this case know no bounds. To top it all off in even more outrageous conduct, State Defendants, realizing their folly in the midst of petitioner's District Court litigation forming the basis of this petition, and realizing the fact that their vehement destruction of Plaintiff looks suspect, went ahead and fabricated sexual misconduct against him, (no less sexual misconduct with children), to effect his firing from the Los Angeles Unified School District, smear him, and

cover up their ratification of police misconduct involving Kamala Harris.

This fabrication has now become separate but related case USDC cv16-09068, which currently working it's way up through the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as No. 19-55357 – (see also uncontroverted evidence and uncontroverted student declarations of Plaintiff's innocence in the USDC docket-cv16-09068 DMG (JDE.)) Destroyed schoolteacher Petitioner is drowned in litigation by officials and jurists in a corrupt circuit, a disgrace.

For the record, Petitioner is not party affiliated, but here is a Ninth Circuit within which jurists truly run amok with Democratic Political taint and vengeance. This un-American and corrosive conduct only does harm to the United States and needs this Court's correction. Extraordinary relief leading to order for investigation and correction is of public value.

CONCLUSION

In the interests of the public, Petitioner Lorcan Kilroy hereby moves for issuance of the extraordinary writ, necessary and appropriate in the aid of the respective jurisdiction of the whole United States, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. Petitioner and others are being treated illegally in the Ninth Circuit. This politically biased treatment conflicts with other Circuits and is unequal treatment under the law, and is in violation of the equal protection clause.

Respectfully submitted,

By:_____
LORCAN KILROY
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Dated June 7 2019

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