

No. --

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CODY SHANE SORRELS,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

KEVIN JOEL PAGE
Counsel of Record
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
525 GRIFFIN STREET, SUITE 629
DALLAS, TEXAS 75202
(214) 767-2746

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether district courts may determine without the aid of a jury that a sentence above the statutory minimum is “not greater than necessary” to achieve the goals enumerated at 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)?

PARTIES

Cody Shane Sorrels is the Petitioner, who was the defendant-appellant below. The United States of America is the Respondent, who was the plaintiff-appellee below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented.....	ii
Parties.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
Index to Appendices.....	v
Table of Authorities.....	vi
Opinion Below.....	1
Jurisdictional Statement.....	1
Rules and Statutory Provisions.....	1
Statement of the Case.....	2
Reasons for Granting the Writ.....	3
The decision below conflicts with this Court's opinion in <i>Hurst v. Florida</i> , __ U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016).....	3
Conclusion.....	6

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A Judgment and Opinion of Fifth Circuit

Appendix B Judgment and Sentence of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Page No.

<u>Alleyne v. United States</u> , __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).....	3
<u>Apprendi v. New Jersey</u> , 530 U.S. 466 (2001).	3, 4
<u>Blakely v. Washington</u> , 542 U.S. 296 (2004).	4
<u>Gall v. United States</u> , 552 U.S. 38 (2007).	3, 5
<u>Hurst v. Florida</u> , __ U.S. __, __ S.Ct. __, 2016 WL 112683 (Jan. 12, 2016).	2, 3, 4, 5
<u>United States v. Bazemore</u> , 839 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2016).....	2, 3
<u>United States v. Booker</u> , 543 U.S. 220 (2005).....	3, 5
<u>United States v. Sorrels</u> , 755 Fed. Appx. 436 (5th Cir. March 4, 2019)(unpublished).....	1
<u>United States v. Tuma</u> , 738 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2013).	2, 3

FEDERAL STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).....	3, 4, 5
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).....	4, 5
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).....	4
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).....	1

STATE STATUTES

F.S.A. § 921.141(3).....	4, 5
F.S.A. § 921.141(5).....	4

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. Amend V.	1
U.S. Const. Amend VI.....	1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Cody Shane Sorrels, respectfully petitions for a writ of *certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is captioned as *United States v. Sorrels*, 755 Fed. Appx. 436 (5th Cir. March 4, 2019)(unpublished), and is provided in the Appendix to the Petition. [Appendix A]. The judgment of conviction and sentence was entered May 18, 2018 and is also provided in the Appendix to the Petition. [Appendix B].

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit were filed on March 4, 2019. [Appendix A]. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

Criminal actions--Provisions concerning--Due process of law and just compensation clauses.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

Rights of the accused.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts and Proceedings Below

Petitioner Cody Shane Sorrels pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm in spite of a prior felony conviction. The court determined that his Guideline range exceeded his statutory maximum on the basis of multiple findings that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury. These included the amount and purity of drugs trafficked from his home and the maintenance of a drug-involved premises. These facts also did not appear in the indictment. The court imposed the statutory maximum of ten years.

B. The Appeal

Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contending that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that facts tending to alter the maximum range of reasonable sentences be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, citing *Hurst v. Florida*, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. (2016). The court summarily rejected this claim as foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. *See* [Appendix A](citing *United States v. Tuma*, 738 F.3d 681, 693 (5th Cir. 2013)).

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below conflicts with this Court’s opinion in *Hurst v. Florida*, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 616 (Jan. 12, 2016).

In *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), this Court held that any fact other than a prior conviction that increased the defendant’s maximum sentence must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. *See Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 490. In *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), it applied this holding to the then-mandatory federal sentencing Guidelines, finding that judges may not make the factual findings that alter the maximum of a mandatory Guideline range. *See Booker*, 543 U.S. at 226. To remedy the constitutional violation, this Court severed the provision of the United States Code making the federal Guidelines mandatory. *See id.* at 245-246. The *Booker* opinion did not, however, leave the district courts free to impose any sentence within the statutory range in all cases. *See id.* at 259-264. Rather, the district court is now required to calculate an advisory range, to apply the factors enumerated at 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), and to impose a sentence no greater than necessary to achieve certain sentencing goals. *See id.; Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38, 50-51 (2007). Should the sentencing court fail to perform that task in a substantively reasonable fashion, the sentence may be reversed by the court of appeals. *See Booker*, 543 U.S. at 261-264; *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 50-51. The facts underlying this analysis may be made by a judge, provided the judicial fact-finding is not clearly erroneous. *See Gall*, 552 U.S. at 51.

Petitioner argued below that the facts that altered the maximum or minimum reasonable sentence must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The court below rejected that claim, citing its prior decision in *United States v. Tuma*, 738 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2013). *See* [Appendix A]. *Tuma* held that judges may find any fact so long as it does not increase a statutory maximum, as this kind of fact-finding merely “influences judicial discretion.” *Tuma*, 738 F.3d at 693 (quoting *Alleyne v. United States*, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013)).

The decision below is not consistent with *Hurst*. Mr. Hurst was sentenced to death by a Florida judge, following an advisory verdict by a jury. *See Hurst*, 136 S.Ct. at 620. Under Florida law, a defendant convicted of capital murder may not receive a death sentence unless a trial judge

finds one of 16 enumerated aggravating factors. *See* F.S.A. §921.141(5). A Florida death sentence also requires the further finding “[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist ... and [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” F.S.A. §921.141(3). Notwithstanding the existence of an advisory jury, this Court held that the Florida scheme violated the Sixth Amendment. *See Hurst*, 136 S.Ct. at 621. Of particular importance for current federal cases, the Court premised its Sixth Amendment holding on the reality that, under Florida law, “[t]he trial court alone must find ‘the facts ... [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’” *Id.* at 622 (quoting F.S.A. §921.141(3)).

The findings “that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” to impose the death penalty and “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” is not analytically distinguishable from the finding required by 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), namely that the sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and provision of training and medical care. Both the Florida findings that authorize a death sentence and the finding required by 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) embody a value judgment – neither represents a simple, value-neutral finding of historical fact.¹ Both the Florida system and the federal post-*Booker* system require that the necessary findings be made explicitly. *See* F.S.A. §921.141(3); 18 U.S.C. §3553(c). And both provide appellate review of both the underlying historical facts and the resulting sentencing judgment. *See* F.S.A. §921.141(3); *Booker*, 543 U.S. at 261-264; *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 50-51. There is no material difference between the structure of the Florida system held unconstitutional in *Hurst* and

¹Although the Florida system provides a limited set of facts upon which a higher sentence (the death penalty) may be based, while the federal system is more open-ended, this distinction has already been held irrelevant for Sixth Amendment purposes. *See Blakely v. Washington*, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004)(“Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in *Apprendi*), one of several specified facts (as in *Ring*), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.”)

the federal system at issue here. When the district court imposes a sentence exceeding the statutory minimum, its finding that the sentence is no greater than necessary to achieve the goals named at §3553(a)(2) should be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The findings of historical fact that support this conclusion should likewise be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

This Court should grant *certiorari* to address this conflict as to the constitutional protections due at sentencing in the federal system. It is true that the argument was not pressed in the district court in this case. The present case might therefore be an inappropriate vehicle to address the issue. The issue recurs incessantly and should, Petitioner submits, be addressed quickly in some case before this Court. In the event that this Court grants certiorari to address the issue and rules in favor of Petitioner's position here, any error would become plain and reversible. *See Henderson v. United States*, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1121 (2013). In that event, the appropriate course would be to hold the instant Petition, vacate the judgment below, and remand in light of the forthcoming authority. *See Lawrence v. Chater*, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court should grant *certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Alternatively, he prays for such relief as to which she may justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 2019.

/s/ Kevin Joel Page
KEVIN J. PAGE
COUNSEL OF RECORD
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
525 GRIFFIN STREET, SUITE 629
DALLAS, TEXAS 75202
(214) 767-2746