No. 18-9257

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1 1st Street N.E.
Washington D.C. 20543-0001

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LONNIE RARDEN- PETITIONER

vs,

STATE OF OHIO - RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LONNIE RARDEN #547-085
LONDON CORRECTIONAL INSTUTION
P.O. BOX 69
LONDON, OHIO 43140

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at 2019-Ohio-601. Appendix A.

The opinion of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals court appears at 2018-Ohio-4487. Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was February 20, 2019.

A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: **N/A**

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted: **N/A**

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution holds that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Ohio Revised Code 2929.14 (E)(4) states in pertinent part: "If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison term consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime to to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

Ohio Revised Code 2929.14(B)(2) states in pertinent part: "(B)(2) The court shall impose a sentence and shall make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed in any of the following circumstances:

(a) Unless the offense is a violent sex offense or designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense for which the court is required to impose sentence pursuant to division (G) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, if it imposes a prison term for a felony of the fourth degree or a felony drug

offense that is a violation of a provision of Chapter 2925. of the Revised Code and that is specified as being subject to division (B) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code for the purposes of sentencing, its reasons for imposing the prison term, based upon the overriding purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code, and any factors listed in division (B)(1)(a) to (i) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code that if found to apply relative to the offender.

(b) If it does not impose a prison term for a felony of the first or second degree or a felony drug offense that is a violation of provision of Chapter 2925. of the Revised Code and for which a presumption in favor of a prison term is specified as being applicable, its reasons for not imposing the prison term and for overriding the presumption, based upon the overriding purposes and principals of felony sentencing set forth in sections 2929.11 of the Revised Code, and the basis of the findings it made under division (D)(1) and (2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code.

(c) If it imposes consecutive sentences under 2929.14 of the Revised Code, its reasons for imposing the consecutive sentences;

(d) If the sentence is for one offense and it imposes a prison term for the offense that is the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code or section 2929.142 [2929.14.2] of the Revised Code, its reasons for imposing the maximum prison term;

(e) If the sentence is for two or more offenses arising out of a single incident and it imposes a prison term for those offenses that is the maximum prison term allowed for the offense of the highest degree by division (A) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code or section 2929.142 [1919.14.2] of the Revised Code, its reasons for imposing the maximum prison term."

Ohio Revised Code 2929.19(B)(2)(d) states in pertinent part: "Notify the offender

that the offender may be supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(2)(c) of this section. This division applies with respect to all prison terms imposed for an offense of a type described in this division, including a term imposed for any such offense that is a risk reduction sentence, as defined in section 2967.28 of the Revised Code. Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(2)(d) of this section and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(d) of this section regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence a statement regarding post-release control."

Ohio Revised Code 2929.191 (C) states in pertinent part: "On and after July 11, 2006, a court that wishes to prepare and issue a correction to a judgment of conviction of a type described in division (A)(1) or (B)(1) of this section shall not issue the correction until after the court has conducted a hearing in accordance with this division. Before a court holds a hearing pursuant to this division, the court shall provide notice of the date, time, place, and purpose of the hearing to the offender who is the subject of the hearing, the prosecuting attorney of the county, and the department of rehabilitation and correction. The offender has the right to be physically present at the hearing, except that, upon court's own motion of the motion of the offender or the prosecuting attorney the court may permit the offender to appear at the hearing by video conferencing equipment pursuant to this division has the same force or effect as if the offender were physically present at the hearing. At the hearing, the offender and the prosecuting

attorney may make a statement as to whether the court should issue a correction to the judgment of conviction."

Ohio Revised Code 2967.28 (C) states in pertinent part: "Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(1) or (3) of this section shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control of up to three years after the offender's release form imprisonment, if the parole board, in accordance with division (D) of this section, determines that a period of post-release control is necessary for that offender. This division applies with all respect to all prison terms of a type described in this division, including a term of any such type that is a risk reduction sentence. Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(d) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence pursuant to division (D)(2) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement regarding post-release control. Pursuant to an agreement entered into under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code, a court of common pleas or parole board may impose sanctions or conditions on an offender who is placed on post-release control under this division."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 1, 2006 Petitioner was arrested by the Hamilton, Ohio Police Department for inducing a panic, violating a protection order and two counts of felonious assault.

Petitioner agreed to plea guilty via bill of information and receive a three (3) prison sentence for two (2) attempted aggravated assaults, Case No. CR2006-06-1027.

While awaiting to be transported to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, the Petitioner and a friend (Christina Hurst, hereinafter Hurst) came up with an escape plan. Unbeknownst to the Petitioner, Hurst got cold feet and informed the Butler County Jail Staff of the escape plans. The jail foiled the Petitioner's escape plans and charged him with escape, Case No. CR2006-07-1271.

While awaiting trial on the escape, Petitioner and Hurst concocked a plan to get even with the victim Emily Anderson, (hereinafter Anderson.) The plan was that Hurst would take Anderson out for "a night of partying and pill popping" (as the prosecution put it). Once Anderson passed out, Hurst would cut herself up and then placed the knife into Anderson's hand and then called the Hamilton Police Department and told them that Anderson attacked her with a knife.

The plan was carried out by Hurst just days after the Petitioner was charged with the escape. Shortly thereafter, Hurst went and took out a protection order against Anderson then went to Anderson's house and took letter's out of Anderson's mail box that the Petitioner wrote to Anderson. The letters had no practical value, Hurst was simply snooping.

Anderson claimed that she was set up by the Petitioner and Hurst. The Hamilton Police Department had the Petitioner transported from the county jail to an interview room at the Hamilton Police Department for questioning. Petitioner immediately requested an attorney and ended the interview.

When Hurst was questioned, she confessed to the entire incident. The Petitioner was directly indicted for one count of retaliation; two counts of complicity to perjury; one count of complicity to tampering with evidence; one count of menacing by stalking, and

Petitioner was given a public defender, (David Brewer) who worked part time as a magistrate and was married to a Butler County Assistant Prosecutor, (Brenda Cox). Petitioner had no trust, or confidence in Mr. Brewer, thinking that whatever he told Mr. Brewer, Mr. Brewer in return would convey the information to his wife and she would relay the information to the Assistant Prosecutor on the Petitioner's cases, (Lance Salyers). Therefore, Petitioner elected to proceeded to trial in pro se.[1]

On March 21, 2007, after proceeding to trial in pro se, a Butler County Ohio Jury convicted Appellant of one count of escape in Case No. CR2006-07-1271, (Petitioner feels that it is important to note that he was found guilty of a first degree misdemeanor escape in which carries a maximum penalty of 6 month in the county jail. However, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to 5 years in prison for the escape charge.) In Case No. CR2006-09-1593. The Jury also convicted the Appellant of one count of retaliation; two counts of complicity to perjury; one count of complicity to tampering with evidence; one count of menacing by stalking, and seventeen counts of violation of a protection order. The trial court immediately sentenced the Petitioner to a cumulative sentence of twenty-six and on half (26½) years in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. See Appendix C and C-1.

Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal with the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.

On April 21, 2008, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. *State v. Rarden,* (12th Dist.), Butler County Case No. CA2007-03-077. Petitioner has filed a number of appeals over the years.

The trial court improperly imposed post-release control. Therefore on March 26,

1 Petitioner is confident that issue will be before this Honorable Court via certriary some time this year.

2010, the Petitioner filed a pro se motion requesting that the trial court conduct a de novo sentencing hearing.

On April 14th, 2010, the trial court held a limited re-sentencing hearing, (but claimed in a new journal entries that it conducted a completely new, or de novo sentencing hearing) and AGAIN the trial court failed to properly impose post-release control. See Appendix D and D-1.

On December 11, 2017, Petitioner filed a Pro Se "Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence"[2] asserting that his sentences were void because the trial court issued judicial fact findings found in Ohio Revised Code *2929.14(B)(2)* and *2929.14(E)(4)* that were severed and prohibited between February 2006 pursuant to this Honorable Courts decisions in *Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 147 Led2d 435, 120 S. Ct 2348 (2000)* and *United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 and the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, 2006 Ohio LEXIS 516.*

Petitioner also asserted that the trial court must hold a hearing in pursuant to Revised Code 2929.191 and State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St. 3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927; 85 N.E. 2d 700; 2017 Ohio LEXIS 973.

The State responded with its usual argument by requesting that the trial court construe Appellant's motion as a post conviction petition as defined in Ohio Revised Code *2953.21.*

2. A "motion to correct an illegal sentence" is the only motion that the courts in Butler County cannot easily recast into a late post conviction petitions as defined in Ohio Revised Code 2953.21. The trial courts routinely recast motions into post conviction petitions as a way to circumvent giving a defendant any type of relief.

On February 7, 2018, the trial court simply denied Petitioner's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. CA2018-03-044. See Appdix E.

On Appeal, the Petitioner issued several assignments of errors.

1. **"APPELLANT WAS NOT PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF POST RELEASE CONTROL."**
2. **"THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROHIBITED FROM PACKAGING UP DEFENDANT'S POST RELEASE CONTROL."**
3. **"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED THE APPELLANT UNDER AN UNAUTHORIZED STATUE."**
4. **"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED THE APPELLANT UNDER AN UNAUTHORIZED STATUE."**
5. **"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED THE APPELLANT UNDER THE SENTENCING PACKAGE DOCTRINE."**
6. **"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ISSUING A JUDGMENT ENTRY STATING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONDUCTED A COMPLETE DE NOVO SENTENCING HEARING WHEN IN FACT IT DID NOT."**

The Butler County Prosecutor's Office conceded to the Petitioner's first assignment of error in light of the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in *State v. Grimes*, supra.

On November 5, 2018, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. In doing so, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals stated that it did not need to "accept an improper concession" by the Prosecutor's Office in reference post release control. see Appendix B. *State v. Rarden* , (12th Dist.), 2018-Ohio-4487; 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4805at ¶13.

For the record, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals has its facts wrong. Petitioner DID NOT assert, or argue in that motion that the trial court failed to conduct a

Petitioner DID NOT assert, or argue in that motion that the trial court failed to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing as the Twelfth District Court of Appeals claims in *Rarden, supra,* at ¶7 of its November 5th 2018 decision. Petitioner's argument was that the trial court just flat out lied in its 2010 journal entry by CLAIMING that it conducted a de novo hearing when in fact it did not hold a de novo hearing, it held a limited re-sentencing hearing. See Appendix D and D-1.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Unless this Honorable Court overrules *Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 147 Led2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403* and *United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 in this case. This Honorable Court holds* that trial courts should not engage in judicial fact finding to enhance a defendants sentence(s) because, it is a violation of the sixth amendment right to the United States Constitution.

The Supreme Court of Ohio followed those rulings in *State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, 2006 Ohio LEXIS 516. This Honorable Court denied certiorari, at 549 U.S. 979, 127 S. Ct. 442, 166 L. Ed. 2d 314, (2006).* In doing so, The Supreme Court of Ohio severed several portions of Ohio Sentencing Statues, Ohio Revised Codes 2929.14(B), (C), 2929.19(B)(2), 2929.14(D)(2),(3) and 2929.14(E)(4).

The Foster decision rendered well over one hundred cases to be remanded for re-sentencing. See *In re. Ohio Sentencing Statues, Cases*, 109 Ohio St. 3d 313, 2006-Ohio-3306, 847 N.E.2d 1174.

In the Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Petitioner's Appellate District), a number of cases were remanded verbatim for what Petitioner is presenting to this Court:

State v. Esterkamp, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3085; *State v. Pacate*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-6546; *State v. Hooks*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1272; *State v. Wilson* , (12th Dist.), 2007-Ohio-2298; *State v. Haney*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3899; *State v. Pennington*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-5376; S*tate v. St. John*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-6073; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6038; *State v. Banks*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3089; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 2970; *State v. Barnes*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4210; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4139; *State v. Gonzalez-Ortiz*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3087; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 2973; *State v. Hensley*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-6706; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6570; *State v. Carpenter*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4959; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4885; *State v. Jackson*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-6541; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6446; *State v. Robinson*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-6074; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6039; *State v. Thomas*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3779; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3731; *State v. Flynn*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2798; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 2632; *State v. Jones*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3239; 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3150; State v. Doyle, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-5373; *State v. Free*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1436; *State v. Moore*,(12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2800; *State v. Brown*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4209; *State v. Rhodes*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2401; *State v. Andrews*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2021; *State v. Bene*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2027; *State v. Landis*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-3538; *State v. Moore*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4556; *State v. Carnes*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2134; *State v. Leide*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2716; *State v. Hunnerman*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-7023; *State v. Palacio*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1437; *State v. Prater*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-7028; *State v. Lewis*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4960; *State v. Russell*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-5193; *State v. Craven*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4046; *State v. Johnson*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1896; *State v. Swanson*, (12th Dist.), 2006-Ohio-4692; *State v. Taylor*, (12th

Dist.), 2006-Ohio-5382.

In a nut shell, the court's in Ohio are basically telling the Petitioner, "you missed the bus, sorry about your luck" simply because the Petitioner's appellate counsel failed to argue these issues that voided the Petitioner sentences back in 2007. It has long been held by this Honorable Court that a void sentence can be collaterally attacked at ANY TIME. See, In re Eckart, (1897), 166 U.S. 481, also see State v. Fischer, (2010), 128 Ohio St. 3d 92; 2010-Ohio-6238; 942 N.E.2d 332; 2010 LEXIS 3184 at ¶30.

Petitioner is asserting that he is/was being denied due process and equal protection of the laws in accordance with the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution by the court's in the State of Ohio.

The second issue that the Petitioner would present to this Honorable Court is that he was denied equal protection of the law for the following reasons:

In that same "motion to correct an illegal sentence" to the trial court, the Petitioner argued:

The Ohio Revised Codes 2929.19 and 2967.28 holds that in when a trial court sentences a defendant, the trial court must do both; proper orally notify a defendant of post release control and proper journalize it in its journal entry.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has long held that a trial court must **properly orally notify** a defendant of post release control. *State v. Jordan*, 104 Ohio St. 3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864 at the first syllabus.

In the instant case, as stated above, at the original sentencing hearing held on March 21st, 2007, the trial court failed to properly orally notify the Petitioner of the terms of post release control but stated in its journal entry that the trial court did properly

of post release control but stated in its journal entry that the trial court did properly notify the Appellant of post release control.

On March 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a Pro Se, motion requesting that the trial re-sentence him because the trial court failed to properly notify the petitioner of post release control.

On April 14, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing. At that hearing, the trial court again failed to properly impose post release control.

Basically at the hearing, the trial court used language that mandated three years of post release control in both of the Petitioner's cases. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 2967.28, none of the charges in which the Petitioner was convicted of in both cases mandates post release control. See Appendix D and D-1.

The Petitioner asserted to the trial court that the Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that if a trial court fails to properly notify a defendant of post release control using the terms of "will" and "shall" in pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 2929.19(B)(2) and 2967.28 that portion of the sentence is void. *State v. Grimes, supra* at ¶9. In light of Grimes, supra, and Jordan, supra, Petitioner was again not properly notified of post release control, rendering that portion of his sentences null, void and contrary to law.

On February 7th, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant's motion without issuing any findings of facts of conclusion to law. See Appendix E.

On appeal, the Petitioner argued these same issues to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. The State of Ohio conceded to this argument. But the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. In doing so the Twelfth District Court of Appeals said that it did not need to "accept an improper concession" by the Prosecutor's

Petitioner asked the Twelfth District Court of Appeals to reconsider, or to certify the issue to the Supreme Court of Ohio because its decision is erroneous and that the line of cases that it relied upon in this matter is in direct conflict with at least five other appellate districts in Ohio. *State v. Pierce,* (4th Dist.), 2018-Ohio-4458; 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4756; *State v. Harper*, (10th Dist.), 2018-Ohio-2529; *State v. Hardy*, (5th Dist.), 2017-Ohio-9208; *State v. Bach*, (2nd Dist.), 2017-Ohio-7262; *State v. Lintz*, (11th Dist.), 2017-Ohio-5631. The courts in Ohio refuse to reconsider as well as refused to certify the conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

Petitioner presented all of these issues to the Ohio Supreme Court in a memorandum in support of jurisdiction brief as well as a motion for relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to accept jurisdiction and denied Petitioner's motion for relief. See Appendix A.

Petitioner is again, asserting that he is being denied equal protection of the laws in accordance with the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution by the court's in the State of Ohio.

This Honorable Court described Petitioner's situation best in a ruling from one hundred and thirty-three (133) years ago when it said that courts should never apply the laws with an "evil eye and unequal hand." *Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886), 118 U.S. 356, S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 200, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1938 at HN8.*

With the utmost respect, the Petitioner would also convey to this Honorable Court, that the court's in Ohio, including the Supreme Court of Ohio, is like the wild, wild west. Courts in different appellate districts in Ohio are ruling differently upon the same issue and then refusing to certify the conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio for resolution.

On a whim, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepts jurisdiction, or does not accept jurisdiction to hear a criminal cases depending on who is asking, or who is rubbing their political party the right way that week, or month.

There is no democracy in Butler County. ***NOT ONE*** *presently sitting Judge was elected into office in Court of Common Pleas in Butler County Ohio. Every Court of Common Pleas Judge was appointed by the Governor's Office. The United States is not a third world county, therefore, politics should have no place in the judicial system*[5].

CONCLUSION

If this Honorable Court does not accept jurisdiction to hear this case, it allows the rules of law to be subverted in Ohio and the wild wild west saga continues...

Respectfully submitted,



LONNIE RARDEN #A547-085
LONDON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
P.O. BOX 69
LONDON, OHIO 43140

Done this 29th day of April 2019.

3 Petitioner would be in remiss if he did not make this Honorable Court aware of the unehtical practices of the trial judge in the instant case. It was recently discovered that instead of her (the trial judge) giving motions the proper review that they deserve. She simply copies, cuts and pastes the same panacea decisions.