

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-13709  
Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-20822-JEM

DEVON A. BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ANN COFFIN,  
Florida Department of Revenue, Program Director,  
individual and official capacity,  
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,  
Office of Child Support Enforcement, Title IV-D Agency,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Southern District of Florida

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(March 21, 2019)

Before MARCUS, WILSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Devon Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order dismissing his amended civil complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman<sup>1</sup> doctrine. In his complaint, Brown requested that the district court review and reject final state court child-support and enforcement orders entered against him after he lost in state court. On appeal, Brown does not address in his initial brief the district court's ruling that his claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. After thorough review, we affirm.

We typically review a district court's application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (11th Cir. 2013). The party asserting the claim bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005).

Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from reviewing state court decisions because lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. See Alvarez v. Att'y Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262–64 (11th Cir. 2012). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

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<sup>1</sup> The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Exxon Mobil Co. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine applies not only to federal claims actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court but are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment, or if it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues. Id. However, it does not apply when a party did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his or her federal claims in state proceedings. Id. We’ve applied Rooker-Feldman principles to child custody proceedings on multiple occasions and have concluded that, under Rooker-Feldman, we may not interfere with final judgments rendered by state courts. See Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332–35 (11th Cir. 2001); Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison Cnty., Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1990); Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988).

In Florida, judges of the circuit court appoint “general magistrates” to hear certain matters, including child support enforcement actions, referred to them with consent of all parties. Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490. The rules provide for state judicial review of the general magistrate’s report and recommendation. Id. The parties may file exceptions to the report within 10 days from the time it is served on them. Id.

Then, the circuit judge must review the entire record and give a hearing on the exceptions, and may amend the order, conduct further proceedings, or refer the matter back to the general magistrate for further proceedings. In re Family Law Rules of Procedure, 663 So. 2d 1049, 1051–52 (Fla. 1995); Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490, 12.491. If no party files exceptions, a circuit judge reviews the report and enters an order, at which point a party may file a motion to vacate and request a hearing on the court's order on the magistrate's recommended order. Hinckley v. Dep't of Revenue ex rel. K.A.C.H., 927 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.491(f). An appeal from that order may be appealed to the state appellate court. Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

An issue is abandoned when a party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal fails to plainly and prominently raise the issue. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681, 683 (11th Cir. 2014). Although we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, we will not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant's reply brief. Id. It is insufficient for a party to make only passing references to a claim without supporting argument or citation to authority. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82. Liberal construction of pro se pleadings “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).

Here, Brown has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order on appeal because he does not address the order in his initial brief. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Additionally, Brown makes no reference the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. He argues only that the district court “did not dismiss [the case] based upon any legal argument based upon the merits,” which does not adequately identify the issue and is no more than a passing reference to the district court’s decision without supporting argument or citation to authority. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82. Although Brown says in his reply brief that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because he was not seeking review of state court rulings, that child support laws are “treaties” and “contracts,” not “law,” and that family courts are not Article III courts, we will not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Thus, Brown has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order on appeal.

But even if we were to review the issue on appeal, we would conclude that the district court properly sua sponte dismissed Brown’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Brown, who lost in state court, requested that the district court review and reject the final state court child-support and enforcement orders, a request he made clear in both his prayer for relief

in the amended complaint and his motion to “temporarily stop the Title IV-D child support enforcement until this court constitutionally solve[s] the case.” While he claims he is seeking relief from the Florida Department of Revenue’s administrative actions in enforcing a child support order, the harm he actually seeks to remedy is the Florida state court’s judgment in favor of the Department. See Staley, 837 F.2d at 1017–18. As a result, Brown essentially has admitted that success in this case requires a reversal of the state court’s decision. Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1273.

As for Brown’s federal claims that the Florida Department of Revenue and its Director violated his constitutional rights by obtaining orders to garnish his tax return and suspend his driver’s license, pursuant to the child support order, they are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260. Specifically, he challenges the authority of the state magistrate to issue the orders enforcing his child support obligations, the process he was afforded, and the validity of the child support enforcement statute, alleging that the state magistrate had not taken the proper oath and violations of his rights to due process and trial by jury, and rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Succeeding on these federal claims would effectively nullify the state court judgment, as he expressly requests, because it would require the federal court to deem the state court’s authorization to use “additional remedies to enforce the arrearage” unconstitutional. See Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260; Liedel, 891 F.2d at 1545–46. Therefore, his allegations are

inextricably intertwined with the underlying state-court dispute regarding his child support obligations.

Finally, Brown had a reasonable opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments before the state courts. See Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1332–33. Unlike the plaintiff in Goodman, who challenged a search that was not discussed in her child custody hearing and who therefore had no opportunity to raise her constitutional challenges to the search, Brown’s challenges to the state magistrate’s authority, the process afforded him, and the validity of the child support statute could have been raised in the state court proceeding and on appeal, in accordance with Florida law. See id.; Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490; Robinson, 928 So. 2d at 362. Thus, to the extent Brown believes the state-court orders were delivered without authority, he must seek a remedy in state court, since his claim invites review and rejection of the state-court judgment by asking the federal court to determine whether it was wrongfully issued. Because we do not have the jurisdiction to overturn the Florida state court’s decision, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

**AFFIRMED.**

APPEAL,CLOSED,JG,REF\_PTD,REF\_PTN,REF\_RR

**U.S. District Court**  
**Southern District of Florida (Miami)**  
**CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17-cv-20822-JEM**  
**Internal Use Only**

Brown v. Coffin et al  
Assigned to: Judge Jose E. Martinez  
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman  
Case in other court: USCA, 18-13709-EE  
Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights

Date Filed: 03/02/2017  
Date Terminated: 08/16/2018  
Jury Demand: Plaintiff  
Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other  
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

**Plaintiff****Devon A. Brown**

represented by **Devon A. Brown**  
P.O. Box 470373  
Miami, FL 33247  
PRO SE

V.

**Defendant****Ann Coffin**

*Florida Department of Revenue,  
Program Director, individual and  
official capacity*

represented by **Carrol Y. Cherry Eaton**  
State of Florida Office of the Attorney  
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Carrol.CherryEaton@myfloridalegal.com  
**LEAD ATTORNEY**  
**ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED**

**Defendant**


**Florida Department of Revenue**  
*Office of Child Support Enforcement,  
Title IV-D Agency*

represented by **Carrol Y. Cherry Eaton**  
(See above for address)  
**LEAD ATTORNEY**  
**ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED**

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
03/02/2017	<u>1</u>	COMPLAINT for Title IV-D Limited Jurisdiction and Constitutional Due Process Violation against Ann Coffin, Florida Title IV-D. Filing fees \$



		400.00. IFP Filed, filed by Devon A. Brown. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Civil Cover Sheet)(kpe) Modified on 3/2/2017 (kpe). (Entered: 03/02/2017)
03/02/2017	<u>2</u>	Judge Assignment to Judge Jose E. Martinez (kpe) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
03/02/2017	<u>3</u>	Clerks Notice pursuant to 28 USC 636(c). Parties are hereby notified that the U.S. Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman is available to handle any or all proceedings in this case. If agreed, parties should complete and file the attached form. It is not necessary to file a document indicating lack of consent. (kpe) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
03/02/2017	<u>4</u>	MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
03/03/2017	<u>5</u>	ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman for a Ruling on all Pre-Trial, Non-Dispositive Matters, and for a Report and Recommendation on all Dispositive Matters. Signed by Judge Jose E. Martinez on 3/3/2017. (jas) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
06/06/2017	<u>6</u>	ORDER denying without prejudice <u>4</u> Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed <i>in forma pauperis</i> . Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 6/6/2017. (jf00) (Entered: 06/06/2017)
06/12/2017	<u>7</u>	AMENDED COMPLAINT against Ann Coffin, Florida Title IV-D, filed by Devon A. Brown.(kpe) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
06/12/2017	<u>8</u>	MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
06/13/2017	<u>9</u>	ORDER granting <u>8</u> Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff shall have until June 27, 2017 to specifically indicate if service by the U.S. Marshal is requested for the complaint and summonses. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 6/13/2017. (jf00) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
06/14/2017	<u>10</u>	MOTION/Request for U.S. Marshal Service by Devon A. Brown. Responses due by 6/28/2017 (kpe) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
06/14/2017	<u>11</u>	ENDORSED ORDER granting <u>10</u> Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Special Process Server. The US Marshals shall serve the Complaint and the summonses, within two weeks from the date the summonses are filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 6/14/2017. (jf00) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
06/15/2017	<u>12</u>	Summons Issued as to Ann Coffin. (kpe) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
06/15/2017	<u>13</u>	Summons Issued as to Florida Department of Revenue. (kpe) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
08/02/2017	<u>14</u>	CLERKS NOTICE of Compliance re 11 Order for Appointment of Special Process Server. Copies of documents for service placed in U.S. Marshal's mailbox. (asl) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
08/07/2017	<u>15</u>	

		Plaintiff's MOTION to Show Good Cause to Temporarily Stop the Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
08/31/2017	<u>16</u>	NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Carrol Y. Cherry Eaton on behalf of Florida Department of Revenue. Attorney Carrol Y. Cherry Eaton added to party Florida Department of Revenue(pty:dft). (Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
09/05/2017	<u>17</u>	SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on <u>7</u> Amended Complaint with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline. Florida Department of Revenue served on 8/11/2017, answer due 9/1/2017. (kpe) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
09/18/2017	 <u>18</u>	Summons (Affidavit) Returned Unexecuted as to Ann Coffin. Correct status of service is executed and not unexecuted. (kpe) Modified on 9/19/2017 (kpe). (Entered: 09/18/2017)
09/18/2017	<u>19</u>	MOTION TO DISMISS <u>7</u> Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Florida Department of Revenue. Responses due by 10/2/2017 (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Endorsed Order of Dismissal, # <u>2</u> Exhibit Notice of Appeal)(Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
09/18/2017	<u>20</u>	MOTION for Judicial Notice by Florida Department of Revenue. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Endorsed Order of Dismissal, # <u>2</u> Exhibit Notice of Appeal)(Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
09/18/2017	<u>21</u>	Clerks Notice of Docket Correction to correct status of service re <u>18</u> Summons Returned Unexecuted. <b>Correction</b> Other. (kpe) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
09/18/2017	<u>22</u>	SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on <u>7</u> Amended Complaint with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline. Ann Coffin served on 9/13/2017, answer due 10/4/2017. (kpe) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
09/18/2017	<u>23</u>	MOTION for Clerks Entry of Default as to Florida Department of Revenue by Devon A. Brown. (jas) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
09/18/2017	<u>24</u>	VACATED Clerks Entry of Default as to Florida Department of Revenue, Office of Child Support Enforcement Title IV_D Agency. Signed by DEPUTY CLERK on 9/18/2017. (jas) Modified on 8/15/2018 per DE <u>43</u> Order (kpe). (Entered: 09/19/2017)
09/20/2017	<u>25</u>	MOTION to Vacate <u>24</u> Clerks Entry/Non-Entry of Default by Florida Department of Revenue. Responses due by 10/4/2017 (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Administrative Order No. AOSC17-46)(Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
09/20/2017	<u>26</u>	MOTION Motion to Accept as Timely Filed re <u>19</u> MOTION TO DISMISS <u>7</u> Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Florida Department of Revenue. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Administrative Order No. AOSC17-46)(Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 09/20/2017)

09/27/2017	<u>27</u>	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's <u>19</u> MOTION TO DISMISS <u>7</u> Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Devon A. Brown. Replies due by 10/4/2017. (kpe) (Entered: 09/27/2017)
09/27/2017	<u>28</u>	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's <u>25</u> MOTION to Vacate 24 Clerks Entry/Non-Entry of Default filed by Devon A. Brown. Replies due by 10/4/2017. (kpe) (Entered: 09/27/2017)
10/05/2017	<u>29</u>	MOTION TO DISMISS <u>7</u> Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Ann Coffin. Attorney Carrol Y. Cherry Eaton added to party Ann Coffin(pty:dft). Responses due by 10/19/2017 (Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
10/13/2017	<u>30</u>	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's <u>29</u> MOTION TO DISMISS <u>7</u> Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Devon A. Brown. Replies due by 10/20/2017. (kpe) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
12/18/2017	<u>31</u>	ORDER denying <u>15</u> Plaintiff's Motion to Show Good Cause to Temporarily Stop the Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 12/18/2017. (jf00) (Entered: 12/18/2017)
12/19/2017	<u>32</u>	MOTION to Show Good Cause to Temporarily Stop the Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement Until This Court Constitutionally Solve the Case by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
12/26/2017	<u>33</u>	RESPONSE in Opposition re <u>32</u> Motion To Show Good Cause filed by Ann Coffin, Florida Department of Revenue. Replies due by 1/2/2018. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Final Judgment, # <u>2</u> Exhibit Modification of Final Judgment)(Cherry Eaton, Carrol) (Entered: 12/26/2017)
12/27/2017	<u>34</u>	Plaintiff's Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Oppose Plaintiff's Motion to Show Good Cause to Temporarily Stop the Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement re <u>33</u> Response in Opposition to Motion, by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 12/28/2017)
12/27/2017	<u>35</u>	Second Plaintiff's Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Oppose Plaintiff's Motion to Show Good Cause to Temporarily Stop the the IV-D Child Support Enforcement re to <u>33</u> Response in Opposition to Motion, by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
03/16/2018	<u>36</u>	Plaintiff's Judicial NOTICE by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
04/26/2018	<u>37</u>	ENDORSED ORDER granting <u>20</u> Defendant Department of Revenue's motion for judicial notice. The Undersigned takes judicial notice of the endorsed Order on Defendant's motion to dismiss entered by United States District Judge Marcia G. Cooke in Case No. 16-24654-CIV-COOKE on March 28, 2017 [20-1] and the Notice of Appeal filed in Case No. 16-24654-CIV-COOKE on April 24, 2017 [20-2]. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 4/26/2018. (jf00) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

04/26/2018	<u>38</u>	OMNIBUS ENDORSED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS on Defendant Department of Revenue's motion to vacate the Clerk's entry of default <u>25</u> and motion for the Court to accept Defendant Department of Revenue's motion to dismiss as timely filed <u>26</u> . Defendant's answer to the amended complaint was due on September 13, 2017. Defendant filed its motion to dismiss on September 18, 2017. In Defendant's motion, it explains that this five-day delay was due to Hurricane Irma. As a result, the Undersigned finds that there is good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) to set aside the Clerk's entry of default <u>24</u> , and recommends that Judge Martinez grant both of Defendant's motions <u>25</u> and <u>26</u> . The parties shall have fourteen calendar days from the date of this report to file written objections, if any, with the District Judge. Each party may file a response to the other party's objection within fourteen calendar days from the date of the objection. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the report, and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this report, except upon grounds of plain error and if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016). Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 4/26/2018. (jf00) Modified status/text per Chambers on 4/26/2018 (sk). (Entered: 04/26/2018)
04/30/2018	<u>39</u>	OPPOSITION/OBJECTIONS to <u>38</u> Report and Recommendations by Devon A. Brown. (ls) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
05/17/2018	<u>40</u>	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss <u>19</u> and <u>29</u> and on Plaintiff's Motion for the Court to temporarily stop the Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement <u>32</u> . Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 5/17/2018. (jf00) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
05/23/2018	<u>41</u>	OBJECTIONS to Magistrate's Omnibus <u>40</u> Report and Recommendations by Devon A. Brown. (kpe) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
07/05/2018	<u>42</u>	MOTION for Summary Judgment for Jurisdictional Fraud by Devon A. Brown. Responses due by 7/19/2018. (kpe) (Entered: 07/05/2018)
08/15/2018	<u>43</u>	ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S OMNIBUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION for <u>25</u> Motion to Vacate Clerk's Entry of Default; <u>26</u> Motion to Accept Motion to Dismiss. Order granting <u>25</u> & <u>26</u> Motions. The Clerk's Entry of Default [ECF. No. 24] is Vacated. Signed by Judge Jose E. Martinez on 8/14/2018. <i>See attached document for full details.</i> (kpe) (Entered: 08/15/2018)
08/16/2018	<u>44</u>	ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S OMNIBUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEFENDANTS' <u>19</u> & <u>29</u> MOTIONS TO DISMISS. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ECF No. 71 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This case is CLOSED and all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Jose E. Martinez on 8/16/2018. <i>See attached document for full details.</i> (kpe) (Entered: 08/16/2018)

09/04/2018	<u>45</u>	Notice of Appeal as to <u>44</u> Order on Report and Recommendations, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Devon A. Brown. FILING FEE: (NOT PAID). Within fourteen days of the filing date of a Notice of Appeal, the appellant must complete the Eleventh Circuit Transcript Order Form regardless of whether transcripts are being ordered [Pursuant to FRAP 10(b)]. For information go to our FLSD website under Transcript Information. (apz) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
09/04/2018		Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Order under appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re <u>45</u> Notice of Appeal, Notice has been electronically mailed. (apz) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
09/05/2018	<u>46</u>	Acknowledgment of Receipt of NOA from USCA re <u>45</u> Notice of Appeal, filed by Devon A. Brown. Date received by USCA: 9/4/2018. USCA Case Number: 18-13709-EE. (apz) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
09/13/2018	<u>47</u>	TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by Devon A. Brown re <u>45</u> Notice of Appeal, No Transcript Requested. (hh) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
09/28/2018	<u>48</u>	Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 11(c), the Clerk of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: <u>45</u> Notice of Appeal, Appeal No. 18-13709-EE. The entire record on appeal is available electronically. (apz) (Entered: 09/28/2018)