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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-14089-GG

PONCE D. HOWARD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama


ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

BEFORE: MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:



UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

ORD-42

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-14089
Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00230-WKW-GMB

PONCE D. HOWARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama

(October 26, 2018)

Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

APPENDIX B

Ponce D. Howard appeals, *pro se*, from the district court's grant of summary judgment to his former employer Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama ("Hyundai") in his race discrimination lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed, in stating his *prima facie* case of racial discrimination, to identify a similarly situated comparator outside his protected class who was treated more favorably or to show that Hyundai's termination of him for workplace violence was pretext for race discrimination.

At all times relevant to this appeal, Hyundai operated an automobile manufacturing facility in Montgomery, Alabama. In June 2012, Hyundai hired Howard to work as a paint inspector. In February 2015, Hyundai terminated Howard's employment following an investigation stemming from a workplace confrontation involving Howard and one or more of his coworkers.

Howard, who is black, alleged in his complaint that Hyundai discriminated against him on account of his race when it terminated his employment. In his complaint, Howard alleged the following facts surrounding a February 2015 incident between himself and a white coworker, Josh Denham. Denham began verbally attacking him for taking sick leave due to an illness and then gave Chris Arnold, a white supervisor, a broken tool to give to Howard as a part of the harassment. Denham continued the harassment, telling Howard that he would have

him fired and that Arnold and another white supervisor, Jeff Todd, would serve as his witnesses to the argument. Arnold then went to inform the Team Relations Department about the incident and, upon his return, pulled Todd and Denham to the side to tell them what to say when reporting the incident to Team Relations. Then, “one by one,” they reported the incident to Team Relations, saying what Arnold had told them to say. There were eight black people who witnessed the argument, including Irvin Smith and Carmen Paschal. Howard was ultimately discharged due to the argument after a meeting with Team Relations. While a white manager was present at the meeting, neither his black manager, nor his black supervisor was present. Additionally, he was not given a hearing prior to his termination, as required by Hyundai’s Human-Resources manual. Denham was not fired, and was instead transferred to “Hyundai Transformer.” Howard also attached his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge of discrimination.

After conducting discovery, Hyundai filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing, of relevance, that Howard failed to state a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination and that all of its actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-pretextual reasons. Hyundai asserted that, as a result of its investigation of the 2015 incident—during which it interviewed numerous individuals in addition to Arnold, Howard, and Denham—it had

determined that Howard had twice thrown a tool at Denham and made threatening statements and gestures towards Denham, which violated its Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy. Hyundai asserted that, at the time of Howard's violation, he had been subject to a probationary Serious Misconduct Letter (also known as a Letter of Conditional Employment), which had been issued in response to his prior violation of the Workplace Threats and Violence Policy in August 2013, such that his new violations warranted termination. Hyundai further indicated that Denham was also terminated after an investigation of him related to the 2015 incident concluded that he had violated its Harassment Policy and Serious Misconduct Policy. Hyundai asserted that Denham was not "transferred" to another job within the Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama company, and that Hyundai Power Transformers ("HPT") was a completely different company. Accordingly, Hyundai argued that Howard could not meet his burden to show that it did not actually believe he engaged in workplace violence and instead intended to discriminate against him, as he had merely argued with the conclusions of Team Relations and Human Resources, and offered no basis upon which to believe that its decision to terminate him was a product of discrimination.

Also in support of its summary judgment motion, Hyundai submitted numerous exhibits, including (1) Howard's deposition; (2) the declaration of Rick

Neal, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, who was white; (3) the declaration of Robert Clevenger, the Manager for Team Relations; and (4) all referenced exhibits. The following facts were set out by Clevenger's and Neal's declarations, Hyundai's internal investigation memoranda relating to the 2013 and 2015 incidents, Hyundai's official disciplinary policies, and Howard's Letter of Conditional Employment. According to Hyundai's official policies, Serious Misconduct Offenses—which include, for example, harassment and workplace violence—were punished outside of the normal process and resulted in either termination or a Letter of Conditional Employment. The Letter remained active for three years and required the employee to remain incident-free. After an investigation into the 2013 incident, Team Relations found that Howard made derogatory and threatening remarks to a black coworker, concluded that he had violated the Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and engaged in Serious Misconduct, and issued him a Letter of Conditional Employment instead of firing him.

On the day of the 2015 incident, both a black supervisor and Denham separately made complaints against Howard about the incident. Team Relations investigated the incident by interviewing and taking statements from employees who witnessed the incident, including Denham, Arnold, Smith, and Paschal. They made the following statements. Denham stated that Howard had twice thrown the

tool at him, hitting him in the leg one time, that Howard then got in his face and made fists and told him that he would beat him up, and that he made a gesture in the shape of a gun and said, "I'm going to come to your house and boom" and "I'll be in prison, but you'll be in the grave." Arnold stated that, after he gave the tool to Howard, he turned his back to walk away and then heard them start to argue. Arnold stated that he saw Howard approach Denham's work area to intimidate him and heard him threaten to beat Denham up, but that he did not see Howard make any gestures towards Denham. Howard's statement was similar to the allegations from his complaint, adding that he threw the tool "up the line towards the upgrader station" upon realizing that it was broken, that Denham cursed at him, and that he never threatened Denham. Smith corroborated the story that, after teasing and provocation by Denham, Howard twice threw the tool toward Denham and made threatening statements and gestures at him. Paschal stated that she had tried to calm Howard down and that Denham had been regularly harassing him.

Based on these interviews, Team Relations found the following: (1) Denham gave Arnold a broken tool to give to Howard; (2) Howard twice threw the tool in Denham's direction; (3) Denham told Howard "you are gone[;] that's your job"; (4) Howard walked over to Denham, made a fist gesture at him, and threatened to beat up and kill Denham; and (5) Denham instigated the incident and had harassed Howard on a daily basis. Team Relations also compared Howard's actions with

others who had been separated for Workplace Violence infractions to ensure consistency of punishment. Neal was the ultimate decision-maker as to whether Howard would be fired. Upon review of the investigation and Howard's disciplinary history, Neal determined that Howard's actions during the 2015 incident amounted to workplace violence, which was a Serious Misconduct Offense, and decided to fire Howard. Neal's decision was not influenced by Howard's race, and no one in the Employment Review Committee disputed the investigatory findings or termination decision.

Neal also conducted an investigation of Denham related to the 2015 incident and fired him because Denham also had previously been issued a Letter of Conditional Employment and his actions during the 2015 incident amounted to workplace violence, a Serious Misconduct Offense. Finally, HPT was not a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, and the two did not transfer employees.

Howard testified in his deposition to the following. At the time of the 2015 incident, he was on the Letter of Conditional Employment based on the 2013 incident, which he conceded had nothing to do with race. As to the 2015 incident, Denham and Todd were harassing him, and Arnold stood by, laughing. Arnold handed him the tool, which he threw in the trash can upon realizing that it was broken. He did not curse at, or threaten, Denham. Arnold went to Team Relations,

and then pulled Denham and Todd aside. Howard believed that Arnold, Denham, and Todd collaborated to tell Team Relations the same story against him, but conceded that he did not actually hear them do this and just made an assumption because their stories matched. Nothing was said about his race on this occasion. While Denham had made derogatory racial remarks to him, no one else at Hyundai had ever done so. Further, he agreed that he had no reason to believe that any of the individuals listed on the 2015 investigation memorandum prepared by Team Relations—including Neal and Clevenger—disfavored him because he was black. After Howard’s termination, Denham started working for HPT, which he assumed constituted a transfer because both companies had “Hyundai” in the name. He believed that his termination was based on his race because he was fired and Denham was not, and because his white supervisors did nothing about Denham’s harassment of him.

Howard responded to Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that he could establish a *prima facie* case of race discrimination and that Hyundai’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. In relevant part, he argued that he could establish pretext by arguing with the conclusions of Team Relations as to the 2015 incident and did so by adamantly denying that he committed workplace violence against Denham, and by claiming that he was not fired on the basis of his second Serious Misconduct Offense because Denham was not fired even though he

had at least five prior reports of workplace violence and harassment. He asserted that swifter and stronger action was brought against him after the 2015 incident than after the 2013 incident because the 2015 incident involved a white victim and the 2013 incident involved a black victim.

In support, Howard submitted declarations from himself, Smith, and Paschal. His declaration largely set out his prior allegations, adding that he believed that Denham attacked him during the 2015 incident because of his race, and that he had testified in his deposition that he had no reason to believe that two particular supervisors with whom he was familiar disfavored him because he was black, but that he did not know the other listed supervisors, including Clevenger and Neal. Smith declared that he saw Howard throw the tool “up the line,” but did not see him throw the tool at Denham, and that Denham and his two friends regularly made derogatory statements to Howard. In addition to the statements she provided in her investigatory interview, Paschal declared that she did not observe Howard taking any threatening actions against Denham during the 2015 incident, and that Denham had a history of making derogatory statements to coworkers and was only disciplined once.

Upon review, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”), recommending granting summary judgment in favor of Hyundai and dismissing Howard’s complaint. More specifically, the R&R concluded that (1)

Howard failed to state a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination because he failed to show that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside of his protected class, and (2) even so, Hyundai had proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, and he failed to submit sufficient evidence suggesting both that its proffered reason was pretextual and that its true motivation was based on race.

Howard objected to the R&R, arguing that it erroneously: (1) failed to focus on the overwhelming evidence that Denham had a long history of harassing Hyundai employees, which Hyundai failed to respond to; (2) weighed the evidence in Hyundai's favor and made improper credibility determinations; and (3) found that Hyundai's objections to his declaration should be sustained. The district court overruled the objections, adopted the R&R, and granted its summary judgment motion and dismissed with prejudice Howard's complaint. Howard filed a motion entitled "Motion for reconsideration and to alter order and judgment," reiterating his argument that the district court erred in adopting the R&R because it misapplied the summary judgment standard by crediting Hyundai's allegations over his own and relying on disputed evidence as to whether he committed workplace violence during the 2015 incident and whether he suffered discrimination. The district court construed Howard's motion as being brought

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and denied the motion because he failed to present any newly discovered evidence or show any manifest error of law or fact.

Howard appealed and moved for leave to proceed on appeal *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”), which the district court denied. Howard then moved this Court for leave to proceed on appeal IFP. We denied his motion on grounds that any appeal in this case would be frivolous. Howard paid his court costs, and this appeal followed.

I.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment *de novo*, applying the same legal standards as the district court. *Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc.*, 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). “We will affirm if, after construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we find that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” *Id.* at 1263–64. A plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence, and cannot rest his contentions on speculation or conjecture. *Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*, 748 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2014).

Briefs submitted by *pro se* litigants are construed liberally. *Timson v. Sampson*, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Notwithstanding this liberal construction, however, issues not briefed on appeal by a *pro se* litigant are deemed

abandoned, and we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a *pro se* litigant's reply brief. *Id.*

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish discrimination through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or statistical proof. *Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1264. When evaluating a discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, we primarily apply the framework set out in *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and *Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).¹ *Id.* Under this framework, a plaintiff is first required to establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination. *Id.* To establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination, a plaintiff may show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) who is qualified for the position; (3) but was subject to an adverse employment decision; and (4) a similarly situated employee who is outside the protected class was treated more favorably. *Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1264.

If the plaintiff establishes his *prima facie* case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

¹ This Court has noted that establishing the elements of the *McDonnell Douglas* framework is not the only way to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, and that a plaintiff may also present "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker." *Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

action. *Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1264. If the defendant produces such evidence, the burden shifts then back onto the plaintiff, who must produce evidence that the employer's proffered reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. *Id.* “[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him].” *Id.*

If the defendant's proffered reason is one that would motivate a reasonable employer to take the adverse action, the plaintiff “must meet that reason head on and rebut it,” and cannot prove pretext by recasting the defendant's reason or by substituting his business judgment for the defendant's. *Id.* at 1265–66 (noting that the pretext inquiry focuses on the employer's and not the employee's belief).

A plaintiff can show that an employer's justification of his termination based on his violation of a work rule is arguably pretextual by submitting evidence that: (1) he did not violate the work rule, or (2) if he did violate the rule, other employees outside the protected class who similarly violated the rule were not similarly treated. *Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc.*, 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must show both that the proffered reason was false, and that discrimination was the true reason for the adverse action. *Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 644 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011).

II.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Howard failed to state a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination. In applying the *McDonnell Douglas* framework, we note that there is no dispute regarding the first three elements of our analysis. Howard is a member of a protected class because he is black. Hyundai does not allege he was not qualified for his position as a paint inspector. Finally, Howard was subject to an adverse employment decision when Hyundai terminated his employment following the 2015 incident. It is with respect to the final element of the analysis—the presence of a comparator outside the protected class who received more favorable treatment—that the parties differ.

Taken as a whole, Howard’s pleadings raise the prospect of three potential comparators: Denham, Todd, and Arnold. Hyundai responds by arguing that each of Denham, Todd, and Arnold is not an appropriate comparator because he is not similarly situated to Howard (Denham, as best we can tell, because his disciplinary history differs slightly from Howard’s, and Todd and Arnold because they played no significant role in the 2015 incident). With respect to Denham, we can assume *arguendo* that he is an appropriate comparator.

Todd and Arnold, on the other hand, are not appropriate comparators. When determining whether employees are similar for purposes of the Title VII “similarly situated” analysis, this Court considers “whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct . . .” *Holifield v. Reno*, 115 F.3d 1555,

1562 (11th Cir. 1997). Although not dispositive, “[m]aterial differences in ranks and responsibilities are relevant for considering whether an employee is a proper comparator.” *Cyprian v. Auburn U. Montgomery*, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (citing *Rioux v. City of Atlanta*, 520 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2008)). The disciplinary histories of the plaintiff and the proposed comparator also are relevant to our inquiry. *See Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc.*, 330 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding two employees to not be similarly situated where one employee’s documented history of misconduct was “much worse . . . in both number and nature”).

We are ultimately persuaded that Todd and Arnold are not appropriate comparators because they are not accused of conduct that is the same or similar to Howard’s. In fact, the record indicates only that Arnold handed Howard a non-functioning tool as part of a practical joke and later laughed as events unfolded. As for Todd’s part in the encounter, Howard speculates that Todd told Denham and Arnold what to report to Team Relations about the event, but Howard also admits that he did not hear a word that any of Denham, Arnold, or Todd spoke during their huddle. Importantly, there is no indication in the record of either Arnold or Todd using profane language, threatening anyone, or throwing objects towards their coworkers. Howard even admits that other than their limited involvement in the 2015 incident, Arnold and Todd essentially ignored him.

Moreover, Todd is not even mentioned in the Team Relations memorandum interviewing witnesses to the 2015 incident, and neither Todd nor Arnold appears to have been subject to any Letter of Conditional Employment at the time of the 2015 incident. As the magistrate judge's R&R properly emphasized, "Todd's and Arnold's relevant conduct amounts to ignoring Howard, giving him menacing looks, huddling to speak with Denham following the incident . . . , and otherwise failing to stop Denham's harassment of Howard." Because Denham is the only proper comparator, we proceed to determine whether he received treatment that was more favorable than that afforded Howard.

In relevant part, Howard argues that Hyundai treated Denham more favorably following the 2015 incident because Hyundai (1) did not fire Denham promptly after the incident occurred, (2) assisted in arranging Denham's transfer to HPT, which Howard believed to be a related company, and (3) failed to appropriately address the earlier harassment Denham inflicted on Howard and other employees. Hyundai responds by noting that it also terminated Denham for his part in the 2015 incident shortly after terminating Howard; that Hyundai and HPT are unrelated corporate entities that do not transfers employees to one another; and that Howard never properly notified Hyundai of Denham's earlier harassment.

Even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Howard, we find that Denham was not treated more favorably than Howard after the 2015 incident. To begin, it is clear that Hyundai also fired Denham shortly after the 2015 incident. Once Hyundai concluded its investigation of Howard, Neal, Hyundai's Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, ordered an investigation of Denham's role in the incident. Hyundai then undertook an investigation of Denham that, as in Howard's case, culminated in the development of a detailed memorandum describing the company's findings. The memorandum is dated March 2, 2015, only six days after the Howard memorandum. Like the Howard memorandum, the Denham memorandum detailed relevant witness testimony from many of the same witnesses who were present during the incident. It reached written conclusions where facts were supported by the testimony of two or more witnesses. It recounted Denham's disciplinary history, including the fact that he was subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment. Finally, it presented the Hyundai policy at issue. After reviewing the findings, and without any notice that Howard might file an EEOC complaint or lawsuit, Neal determined that Hyundai should terminate Denham's employment, which it ultimately did.

We also disagree with Howard's assertion that Hyundai treated Denham more favorably by aiding in his "transfer" to HPT. It is uncontested that Hyundai and HPT are separate legal entities. Howard does not dispute Hyundai's

claims that neither entity is a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of the other and that the two entities do not share or transfer any management or employees, so we accept them as true. Most importantly, we find no evidence in the record that Hyundai actually transferred Denham or otherwise assisted him in obtaining employment with HPT.² Consequently, we find no disparate treatment on this ground.

Lastly, we find no disparate treatment in Hyundai's alleged failure to address Denham's earlier harassment. First and foremost, Howard testified in his deposition that he never formally reported any harassment or discrimination, involving Denham or otherwise, before the 2015 incident. Given this, it is hard to conclude that Hyundai should be faulted for failing to take action regarding Denham's earlier alleged misbehavior. *See Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.*, 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that an employer cannot be said to be on notice of alleged harassment unless it is reported to individuals designated in its anti-harassment policy). Additionally, a review of Denham's documented disciplinary history as set forth in the March 2, 2015 Team Relations memorandum reveals a series of relatively minor infractions and two incidents of Serious

² We also refuse Howard's invitation to take judicial notice of the fact that, in most employment situations, an applicant is required to submit the name of his or her last employer to the new employer. Apart from the fact this this is not the kind of thing about which courts ordinarily take judicial notice, *see Shahar v. Bowers*, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing well-known scientific facts, matters of geography, and matters of political history as typical examples of judicially noticeable information), we note that during his deposition Howard himself admitted to leaving two of his prior employers off the employment application he submitted to Hyundai. Moreover, Howard also failed to show us any similar case so extending the doctrine of judicial notice, and we decline to do so here.

Misconduct involving an altercation and, separately, inappropriate behavior towards other Team Members. Denham received Letters of Conditional Employment on each occasion, the first of which was inactive by the time of the 2015 incident. All in all, we take this as evidence that Hyundai was doing its best to fairly manage a difficult employee, but nothing in the record suggests that Hyundai departed from its documented procedures and afforded Denham any special treatment it did not later afford Howard. In particular, the record does not reveal that Denham committed any Serious Misconduct while subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment and was permitted by Hyundai to keep his job. Accordingly, we find no evidence of disparate treatment on this ground either.

Ultimately, we agree with the magistrate judge and the district court that Howard has not met his burden of demonstrating that a similarly situated employee outside his protected class was treated more favorably. As a result, he has failed to establish a *prima facie* case of race-based employment discrimination, and the district court did not err in granting Hyundai's motion for summary judgment.

III.

Although our analysis could end with the finding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment because Howard failed to establish a *prima facie* case of race discrimination, we write briefly to address his argument that Hyundai's proffered work-rule-violation reason was pretext for discrimination.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Howard established a *prima facie* case of race discrimination, Hyundai has articulated and produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of him—its determination that he had violated its Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy while he was already subject to a Letter of Conditional Employment. *See Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1264; *Jones*, 874 F.2d at 1540. Because violating established policies by engaging in workplace violence twice within a three-year period would motivate a reasonable employer to fire an employee, the burden shifted back to Howard to produce evidence that Hyundai’s proffered reason was actually pretext for discrimination. *See Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1264.

However, Howard has failed to prove that Hyundai’s proffered work-rule-violation reason was pretext for discrimination. While he claimed both that he did not violate any policies during the 2015 incident and that Denham was not similarly punished for his violations of those same policies, Howard has produced no evidence showing that Hyundai’s true reason for firing him was based on race. *See Damon*, 196 F.3d at 1363; *St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks*, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (noting that it must be “shown *both* that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason”). Rather, he largely relied on his conclusory opinions and beliefs that Denham attacked him during the 2015 incident because of his race, that he received harsher treatment after the 2015 incident because the

victim was white and not black, and that he was ultimately fired because of his race. *See Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1264–65. Further, these conclusory opinions and beliefs are contradicted by: (1) his testimony that race was not mentioned during the incident; (2) his testimony that no one else from Hyundai other than Denham had ever made derogatory racial statements toward him; (3) his testimony that he had no reason to believe that at least some of the individuals listed on the Team Relations memorandum disfavored him because he was black; and (4) his failure to testify or otherwise produce any evidence that the remaining individuals listed on that memorandum did disfavor him because he was black.

In his arguments on appeal, Howard makes much of his own testimony that he did not actually threaten anyone or throw the worn-down tool at Denham during the 2015 incident. He argues that, because Hyundai’s Team Relations memorandum reached different conclusions, there is a dispute of fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Hyundai responds by noting that the law does not require its conclusions regarding workplace misconduct to be free from error; instead, it only requires an employer’s conclusions to be honestly made and free from evidence of unlawful discriminatory animus. Hyundai is correct.

We have said many times that we are not a “super-personnel department,” and it is not our role to second-guess employers, “no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers.” *Id.* The fact that an employer’s legitimate belief is or may

potentially be incorrect is immaterial so long as the employer's decisions were not ultimately shown to be motivated by unlawful discriminatory animus. *See id.* at 1266 ("The question to be resolved is not the wisdom or accuracy of [the employer's] conclusion that [the Title VII claimant's] performance was unsatisfactory, or whether the decision to fire her was 'prudent or fair.'"); *Damon*, 196 F.3d at 1363 n.3 ("An employer who fires an employee under a mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct."); *Jones v. Gerwens*, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit the violation with which he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any *prima facie* case of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed the employee committed the violation."); *Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc.*, 555 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Even if [the employer] wrongly believed that [the Title VII claimant] violated this policy, if [the employer] acted on this belief it was not guilty of racial discrimination."). At the end of the analysis, our "sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the decision." *Alvarez*, 610 F.3d at 1266 (quotation marks omitted).

After a careful review of the entire record, we are convinced that Hyundai decided to terminate Howard based on its honest belief that he violated its Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy while

subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment. But even if Hyundai's conclusions regarding Howard's conduct during the 2015 incident were wholly or partially mistaken, it cannot be held liable for discriminatory conduct because Howard has also failed to point to any evidence that unlawful discriminatory animus actually motivated Hyundai's actions. Aside from the fact that Denham—who did not have the authority to terminate Howard's employment and played no part in Hyundai's decision to do so—had previously made derogatory racial remarks to Howard, and Howard's reference to his own skin color during the 2015 incident, the record presents no evidence that race actually played a part in any of the events leading to Howard's termination.

Further, Howard's failure to show any evidence that Hyundai's true reason for firing him was discrimination means that he also failed to show a "convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" raising a reasonable inference that Hyundai intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. *See Smith*, 644 F.3d at 1328.

IV.

We hold that the district court properly granted Hyundai summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Howard's complaint because he failed to establish a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination, and, even if the burden did shift to Hyundai, he failed to show that Hyundai's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for his termination was pretextual and that racial discrimination was the real reason for his termination.

AFFIRMED.³

³ Howard's motion to seal the record on appeal is hereby DENIED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

ORDER

On July 18, 2017, the Magistrate Judge filed a Recommendation (Doc. # 73) to which Plaintiff timely objected (Doc. # 75). Upon an independent and *de novo* review of the record and Recommendation, Plaintiff's objections are due to be overruled, and the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is due to be adopted.

Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation on numerous grounds, but none of the objections has merit.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred “by not focusing on the overwhelming evidence that Denham has a history of harassing HMMA team members and HMMA not responding to the harass[ment].” (Doc. # 75, at 1.) But the Recommendation addressed this by discussing the previous disciplinary action

APPENDIX C

against Denham, and Howard did not present any evidence of other past misbehavior for which a formal complaint was filed but no action was taken against Denham.

Second, Plaintiff claims that the Recommendation “weighed the evidence in a manner unfavorable to [him]” and made improper credibility determinations. (See Doc. # 75, at 2–3.) Again, the Recommendation did no such thing. It merely examined the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and concluded that they could not support a *prima facie* claim for employment discrimination or a showing of “discriminatory motive.” (Doc. # 73, at 24, 27.)

Third, Plaintiff contends that the Recommendation erroneously found that Defendant’s objections to portions of Plaintiff’s declarations were due to be sustained. This finding, Plaintiff argues, was made on the basis that the declarations were “self-serving.” (Doc. # 75, at 3.) To the contrary, the Recommendation found that some of the relevant statements had no basis in personal knowledge, some were overly vague, and others were too conclusory. It was on those grounds that the Recommendation found that Defendant’s objections were due to be sustained. (Doc. #73, at 14–17).

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff objects on other grounds, those grounds are without merit.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Doc. # 73) is ADOPTED;

2. Plaintiff's objections (Doc. # 75) are OVERRULED;
3. Defendant's Motion for Leave to Supplement its Evidentiary Submission (Doc. # 61) is GRANTED;
4. Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. # 62) is DENIED, but to the extent it contains an objection, it is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part (*see* Doc. # 73, at 14–17);
5. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 51) is GRANTED;

A final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 16th day of August, 2017.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

PONCE D. HOWARD,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.) CASE NO.: 2:16-cv-230-WKW-GMB
) [WO]
HYUNDAI MOTOR)
MANUFACTURING ALABAMA,)
)
Defendant.)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. Doc. 5. On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff Ponce D. Howard, proceeding *pro se*, brought this action alleging racial discrimination during his employment with Defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama (“HMMA”). Doc.

1. Howard filed an amendment to his complaint on August 31, 2016. Doc. 25. The court considers both pleadings to be operative. *See* Doc. 33 at 2 n.1.

Now before the court is HMMA’s motion for summary judgment. Doc. 51. In addition to the summary-judgment motion, HMMA has also filed a motion for leave to supplement its evidentiary submission (Doc. 61) and a motion to strike or object to a declaration filed by Howard (Doc. 62). With briefing complete, the motions are ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the applicable law, and the record as a whole, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 51) be GRANTED, and that all of Howard's claims be DISMISSED with prejudice. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that HMMA's motion for leave to supplement its evidentiary submission (Doc. 61) be GRANTED, and that the objections contained in the motion to strike (Doc. 62) be SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations to support both.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Strike

HMMA seeks an order striking portions of Howard's initial declaration (Doc. 60-1). Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the "court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). But declarations are not among the pleadings permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a).* Therefore, the court will not strike any portion of this filing. *See Taylor v. City of Gadsden*, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290–91 (N.D. Ala. 2013).

However, HMMA alternatively lodged objections to the declaration. Doc. 62. Federal courts "often treat a party's motion to strike certain evidence as an objection to that evidence's admissibility." *Taylor*, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 1291; *see also Zottola v. Anesthesia Consultants of Savannah, P.C.*, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2013)

(“[C]ourts tend to treat motions to strike as objections to the challenged portions of affidavits.”); *Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ.*, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333–34 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (same). This course of action is supported by the 2010 revision of Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which provides that a “party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). As the distinction is more a matter of form than substance, the court will treat HMMA’s motion as containing objections under Rule 56(c)(2), and will consider the objections simultaneously with the summary-judgment motion.¹ See *Taylor*, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 1291; *Campbell v. Shinseki*, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The plain meaning of [the Rule 56 amendments] show[s] that objecting to the admissibility of evidence supporting a summary judgment motion is now part of summary judgment procedure, rather than a separate motion to be handled preliminarily.”) (citation omitted).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is genuine only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

¹ In this case, the “objection functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment.

nonmoving party.” *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In responding to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.” *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Indeed, the non-movant must “go beyond the pleadings” and submit admissible evidence demonstrating “specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the evidence is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).

When a district court considers a motion for summary judgment, it “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” *Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga.*, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s role is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 249. “If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that

nonmoving party.” *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

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inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant summary judgment.” *Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty.*, 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Importantly, if the non-movant “fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient . . . to support a jury finding for the non-movant, summary judgment may be granted.” *Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.*, 116 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. Howard is a resident of Montgomery, Alabama, and was employed by HMMA from June 2012 through February 26, 2015. Doc. 53-1 at 9. Howard is a black male. Doc. 53-1 at 9–10.

HMMA manufactures Hyundai automobiles at its facility in Montgomery. Doc. 53-2 at 2. HMMA’s production employees, who are known as Team Members, receive direction from employees who have been designated as Team Leaders. Doc. 53-3 at 2. Team Leaders conduct an opening meeting at the beginning of each shift, make personnel substitutions for Team Members who are absent, and assist in managing the shifts. Doc. 53-3 at 2. They do not, however, have the discretionary authority to discipline, hire, or fire employees. Doc. 53-3 at 2. Team Leaders report to Group Leaders, who serve in a supervisory capacity and have considerable influence over personnel decisions. Doc. 53-3 at 3. Group Leaders report to Assistant Managers, and Assistant Managers report to Managers. Doc. 53-3 at 3.

Howard was a Team Member who worked as a paint inspector. Doc. 53-1 at 16. Howard and approximately 18 to 20 coworkers shared space on the Inspection Paint

Deck (“IP Deck”), which serviced two production lines. Doc. 53-1 at 16. In August 2013, Howard was formally disciplined after an altercation with a fellow Team Member named Darren Walton, a black male. Doc. 53-2 at 4. Walton alleged that Howard cursed at him, used a homosexual slur, and threatened him. Doc. 53-2 at 4. The allegations were corroborated by Joshua Denham, a white male who worked on the IP Deck with Howard. Doc. 53-2 at 4.

Team Relations, the department responsible for investigating workplace misconduct, concluded that Howard violated HMMA’s workplace violence policy. Doc. 53-3 at 5. A violation of this policy constitutes a Serious Misconduct Offense, a class of offenses considered to be too serious for HMMA’s standard disciplinary procedure and that could lead either to termination or to a Letter of Conditional Employment.² Doc. 53-3 at 4.

As a result of the 2013 incident, Kelly Rucker, a black male who was the Human Resources Senior Manager, exercised his discretion to issue Howard a Letter of Conditional Employment instead of terminating his employment. Doc. 53-3 at 6. A Letter of Conditional Employment remains active for three years and requires the employee to develop a corrective “action plan.” Doc. 53-2 at 2–3. A Letter of Conditional Employment is a “last chance alternative to termination” and “specifically warns employees that further misconduct may lead to immediate termination.” Doc. 53-3

² When a Team Member is alleged to have committed a Serious Misconduct Offense, Team Relations initiates an investigation, prepares a written memorandum, and presents the memorandum at a meeting between members of Team Relations and Human Resources. Doc. 53-2 at 3–4. Serious Misconduct Offenses include harassment, discrimination, workplace violence, intentional misrepresentations, and serious violations of performance standards. Doc. 53-2 at 3.

at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also* Doc. 53-2 at 13.

A. The Incident Involving Howard and Denham

On February 19, 2015, Howard was involved in an altercation with Denham on the production line. According to Howard's narrative of events, the incident began when Denham "verbally attacked" him and mocked him for missing work the day before due to an illness.³ Doc. 25 at 1; Doc. 53-1 at 19–20; Doc. 53-3 at 21. Howard had asked Denham to fill in for him while he went to the restroom. Doc. 53-1 at 19; Doc. 53-3 at 21. Denham replied, "[D]amn, you just got to work." Doc. 53-3 at 21. When Howard told Denham that he was sick, Denham replied, "[S]o f**king what." Doc. 53-3 at 21. Nevertheless, Howard went to the restroom and upon his return, Chris Arnold—a white male who is a Group Leader in the Quality Control Department—handed Howard a small tool that was deformed and unsuitable for use. Doc. 51-1 at 30; Doc. 53-3 at 6–8 & 21–22. When Arnold told Howard that Denham gave him the tool, Howard smirked while throwing the tool down the line in the direction of a garbage can. Doc. 53-1 at 30; Doc. 53-3 at 22. Howard did not threaten any other employee or throw the tool anywhere other than the garbage can, which was located between Howard and Denham. Doc. 53-1 at 30–31. He only threw the tool once. Doc. 53-1 at 30–31. After Howard threw the tool, Denham cursed at him and yelled, "[Y]our ass is fixing to go; now [you're] about to lose your job." Doc. 53-3 at 22. According to his initial statement, Howard stayed at his work station but told Denham, "[S]omeone [is going to] get you one of these days for picking

³ For Howard's account of the incident, the court relies principally on Howard's deposition but also on his statement incorporated into the Team Relations investigative report, *see* Doc. 53-3 at 21–22, because portions of Howard's deposition testimony are unclear or incomplete.

on people, but it won't be me." Doc. 53-3 at 22. This was a reference to what Howard characterized as Denham's daily harassment of his coworkers. Doc. 53-3 at 23. In Howard's deposition, he denied that this conversation occurred. Doc. 53-1 at 31 & 37.

According to Howard, no one said anything about his race during the incident. Doc. 53-1 at 23. After the altercation, Arnold reported the incident to Team Relations. Doc. 25 at 1; Doc. 53-1 at 20. Following his meeting with Team Relations, Arnold approached Howard and stated, "I ain't [sic] got nothing to do with that, man." Doc. 53-1 at 20 & 35-36. Arnold then convened with Denham and Jeff Todd⁴—a Quality Control Team Leader—and told them what to report to Team Relations about the incident. Doc. 25 at 1; Doc. 53-1 at 20. "[O]ne by one [they went to Team Relations] to report what Chris [Arnold] had told them to say." Doc. 25 at 1. Denham then told Howard that Arnold and Todd were his witnesses to the altercation and suggested that Howard should procure his own witnesses. *See* Doc. 53-1 at 18 & 22-23. Howard then decided that he needed to leave the production line. Doc. 53-1 at 23. He asked Todd if he would cover his role on the line, and Todd responded, "F**k you. I ain't [sic] getting nothing." Doc. 53-1 at 23. Todd then followed Howard, continuing to bother him about his illness, while Arnold laughed at the exchange. Doc. 53-1 at 23.

B. The Team Relations Investigation

Denham filed a formal complaint with Team Relations against Howard. Doc. 53-3 at 6. Jeanetta Taylor, a black female Team Relations specialist assigned to the Paint

⁴ According to Howard, he and Todd previously had a good relationship and "talked pretty much every other day." Doc. 53-1 19. However, Howard believes Todd aligned with Denham and Arnold in the dispute because Arnold was Todd's superior. Doc. 53-1 at 19.

Shop; Bruce White, a white male Assistant Manager; and Dennis Strobaugh, a white male Manager, opened an investigation. Doc. 53-3 at 6. During the course of the investigation, Team Relations interviewed any employee who may have witnessed the altercation, including Howard, Denham, Arnold, Irvin Smith (a black male Team Member), and Carmen Paschal (a black female Team Member). Doc. 53-3 at 6. Todd was not interviewed and has not been identified as a participant by any witness other than Howard. Doc. 53-3 at 7.

According to Denham, Howard asked another employee for a tool. Doc. 53-3 at 19. After Denham gave a tool to Arnold to hand to Howard, Howard threw the tool in Denham's direction. Doc. 53-3 at 19. Denham told Howard that Howard was "lucky" that the tool did not hit him, at which point Howard picked up the tool and threw it once again, striking Denham in the leg. Doc. 53-3 at 19. Denham then told Howard that he was in trouble, and Howard approached Denham while making threatening gestures and saying that he would "beat" him up. Doc. 53-3 at 20. Howard also told Denham that he was going to "come to [Denham's] house and boom," while making a gesture with his hand to mimic the firing of a gun. Doc. 53-3 at 20. Denham claims that Howard then stated, "I will be in prison and you will be in the grave." Doc. 53-3 at 20. At that point, Paschal and another employee approached Howard and attempted to calm him. Doc. 53-3 at 20.

Arnold stated that Denham asked him to hand a tool to Howard. Doc. 53-3 at 20. After telling Howard that Denham provided the tool, Arnold saw Denham and Howard arguing. Doc. 53-3 at 20. Howard stood close to Denham in an apparent attempt to

intimidate him and made several threatening statements. Doc. 53-3 at 20–21. Howard mentioned his own race during the altercation. Doc. 53-3 at 21. Arnold then left the line to find a supervisor. Doc. 53-3 at 21. Arnold did not see Howard make any hand gestures or throw any tools before he left. Doc. 53-3 at 20–21.

Smith stated that Howard asked for a tool and responded poorly when he received a defective tool from Arnold and Denham. Doc. 53-3 at 23. Howard threw the tool “up the line,” at which point Denham responded that “you better not hit me.” Doc. 53-3 at 23. In response, Howard threw the tool again. Doc. 53-3 at 23. Smith did not see whether the tool hit Denham, but he saw Howard approach Denham and make a threatening gesture with his left fist while stating, “[W]hat have I told you about playing with me?” Doc. 53-3 at 23. Denham told Howard that he was going to be fired, at which point Howard threatened to kill Denham if he was fired, indicating that he knew where Denham lived. Doc. 53-3 at 23. Howard then returned to his work station. Doc. 23-3 at 23. According to Smith, Denham regularly provoked Howard. Doc. 23-3 at 23.

Paschal did not witness the beginning of the incident. Doc. 53-3 at 24. The first thing she observed was Howard telling Denham, “You better leave me alone.” Doc. 53-3 at 24. When Paschal asked Howard about what was happening, Howard responded by stating that he was “tired” of Denham’s harassment. Doc. 53-3 at 24. Paschal then encouraged Howard to “just let it go,” but Howard would not. Doc. 53-3 at 24; Doc. 53-1 at 32. Paschal confirmed that Denham harassed Howard on a daily basis. Doc. 53-3 at 24. The last thing she saw was Howard telling Denham that he was “tired” and would not “keep putting up with [Denham’s harassment].” Doc. 53-3 at 24.

Based on the investigation, Team Relations concluded that Denham gave Arnold a broken tool to give to Howard as a joke. Doc. 53-3 at 7. When Howard received the tool, he threw it at Denham but missed him. Doc. 53-3 at 7. Howard then picked up the tool and threw it at Denham a second time, possibly hitting his leg. Doc. 53-3 at 7. Denham responded by saying, “You are gone; that’s your job.” Doc. 53-3 at 7. Howard then approached Denham and made a gesture toward him with his fist, while threatening to harm him. Doc. 53-3 at 7. Denham instigated the altercation and harassed Howard on a daily basis. Doc. 53-3 at 25.

On February 24, 2015, Team Relations prepared a memorandum and presented the findings of the investigation to the Employment Review Committee (“ERC”), which is comprised of management-level employees from both Team Relations and Human Resources.⁵ Doc. 53-2 at 3–4 & 7. The investigation memorandum included individual responses to interview questions, but its findings rely only on facts that are corroborated by more than one individual. *See* Doc. 53-2 at 23–32. Before reaching a determination, Team Relations compared the findings of the investigation to other instances of workplace violence in an effort to maintain consistency in its personnel decisions. Doc.

⁵ The court acknowledges that witness statements incorporated into an investigative report may present hearsay concerns. *See, e.g., United Tech. Corp. v. Mazer*, 556 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that investigative reports may fall under the business or public records exceptions to the hearsay rule, but “placing otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements by third-parties into a government report does not make the statements admissible”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, statements that can be reduced to admissible form are properly considered at the summary-judgment stage. *See Macuba v. Deboer*, 193 F.3d 1316, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 1999) (“For example, [a] statement might be admissible because it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, or does not constitute hearsay at all (because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted)”). Here, the court concludes that the summarized statements included in this narrative are likely to be non-hearsay as defined by the Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d), to fall within one of several exceptions to the hearsay rule, or to be admitted for purposes other than proving the truth of the matter asserted (*i.e.*, to demonstrate the effect on the listener). *See id.*

53-2 at 6. Ultimately, after reviewing the investigation's findings, HMMA's personnel policies, and Howard's disciplinary history, Richard Neal, a white male Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, decided to terminate Howard's employment. Doc. 53-2 at 6. Neal stated that Howard's race played no role in his decision. Doc. 53-2 at 6.

Because the investigation concluded that Denham started the altercation and had harassed Howard on a daily basis, at Neal's urging Team Relations initiated an investigation into Denham's conduct on February 26, 2015. Doc. 53-2 at 6. On March 2, Team Relations presented a memorandum summarizing its investigation into Denham's role in the altercation. Doc. 53-2 at 7. The investigation found that Denham had harassed Howard regularly and referred to him in offensive and derogatory terms, including "sissy," "boy," and "faggot." Doc. 53-2 at 7 & 36. As a result, Denham also had violated HMMA's policy against workplace violence and committed a Serious Misconduct Offense. Doc. 53-2 at 7. As with Howard, after reviewing HMMA's policies, the investigative findings, and Denham's disciplinary history, Neal decided to terminate Denham's employment.⁶ Doc. 53-2 at 7. According to Neal, Denham's race played no role in the termination decision. Doc. 53-2 at 7. The ERC concurred with Neal's decision to terminate both Howard and Denham as a result of the independent investigations. Doc. 53-2 at 7-8; Doc. 53-3 at 8-9.

⁶ Denham, like Howard, had been issued a Letter of Conditional Employment that was active at the time of the incident. Doc. 53-2 at 7.

C. The Events Following the Terminations

Howard was unemployed for eight to nine months, then worked with the City of Montgomery as a “heavy-equipment operator” before an on-the-job injury. Doc. 53-1 at 41. After his termination, Denham worked at Hyundai Power Transformers (“HPT”). Doc. 53-1 at 10. Because the two entities share the name “Hyundai,” and because Howard struggled to find new employment during the first few months after his termination, Howard believes that HMMA transferred Denham to HPT while blocking his own attempts to seek employment elsewhere. Doc. 53-1 at 10. However, HMMA and HPT are separate corporate entities and do not share any management or employees. Doc. 53-2 at 8. Neither entity controls or is controlled by the other. Doc. 53-2 at 8. There is no evidence in the record that HMMA transferred Denham or otherwise assisted him in obtaining employment.

IV. DISCUSSION

Before proceeding to the summary-judgment inquiry, the court must first address HMMA’s motions for leave to supplement its evidentiary submission (Doc. 61) and to strike or disregard certain portions of Howard’s Declaration (Doc. 62).

A. Motion for Leave to Supplement Evidentiary Submission

HMMA seeks to supplement its evidentiary submission with a copy of HMMA’s policy against harassment, Howard’s EEOC charge of discrimination, and a supplement to a declaration submitted with its summary-judgment motion. *See generally* Doc. 61. Howard has articulated no legal basis for his opposition to HMMA’s request. *See generally* Doc. 66. Instead, Howard argues substantively against the facts HMMA’s

supplemental materials demonstrate. *See* Doc. 66 at 1–3. There is no rule prohibiting supplemental evidence at the summary-judgment stage, particularly where the evidence is introduced in response to arguments made for the first time by the non-movant in a summary-judgment brief. *See, e.g., Green v. MOBIS Ala., LLC*, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that the defendant could submit supplementary evidence, “especially when such evidence is introduced to respond to an argument made for the first time by [the plaintiff] in her opposition brief”). Indeed, “[s]uch supplemental evidentiary submissions are routine in this Court and throughout the Eleventh Circuit.” *Id.* Thus, the court RECOMMENDS that HMMA’s Motion for Leave to Supplement its Evidentiary Submission (Doc. 61) be GRANTED.

B. Objections to Howard’s Declaration

HMMA objects to paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6 through 8, and 12 of Howard’s initial declaration (Doc. 60-1) “because they are inconsistent with his sworn testimony, are not based on personal knowledge, are hearsay, or are not understandable.” Doc. 62 at 1–3. Howard has since submitted a supplemental declaration modifying certain portions of the first declaration. Doc. 66-1.

In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may rely on declarations, but they “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the . . . declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Evidence that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4) may be subject to an objection. *See Taylor*, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. The amended declaration corrects the typographical deficiencies in

paragraphs 1 and 4 that were the subject of HMMA’s objections. *See* Doc. 66 at 3. Accordingly, HMMA’s objections to paragraphs 1 and 4 are due to be OVERRULED as moot.

However, other portions of Howard’s declarations do not comply with Rule 56(c)(4)’s requirements. For example, several of Howard’s statements contain factual assertions that lack any apparent basis in personal knowledge. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). The declarant must state his basis of knowledge, and “an affidavit stating only that the affiant ‘believes’ a certain fact exists is insufficient to defeat summary judgment by creating a genuine issue of fact about the existence of that certain fact.” *Pace v. Capobianco*, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2002); *see also Reeves v. Thigpen*, 879 F. Supp. 1153, 1164 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (finding “a statement merely indicating that an affidavit is based on information and belief is insufficient as a matter of law”). Paragraph 5 of Howard’s declaration states “I believe that Joshua Denham attacked me because of my race.” Doc. 60-1 at 3. Howard does not provide any basis for his personal knowledge or explanation of this belief. Howard’s later assertion that the belief is based on “personal knowledge of the totality of Denham, Arnold, and Todd’s conduct” fails to remedy the deficiency. Doc. 66 at 4. These are nothing more than unsupported statements lacking any articulable basis for Howard’s knowledge of Denham’s state of mind. Accordingly, HMMA’s objection to paragraph 5 of Howard’s initial declaration is due to be SUSTAINED.

Paragraph 12 states, as amended, “Cindi Olsin, White Female, Sue Hall, White Female in 2013 and Valerie Knox, Black Female, Telshia Golden, Black Female in 2015

reported to team Relations that Denham had verbally harassed them in a sexual nature. HMMA has employed Telshia Golden since 2013 and she is currently employed at HMMA.” Howard has not explained the relevance of a sexual-harassment allegation to a racial discrimination case, and at any rate this assertion also lacks a basis in personal knowledge. Howard argues otherwise in his response. *See* Doc. 66 at 3–4. He offers both that (1) “the events which he has personal knowledge of can be made admissible through the testimony of the individuals and other evidence” and (2) “[t]he fact that [he] was employed at HMMA during the time of the four complaints, and he came in contact with those individuals who made the complaint is sufficient.” Doc. 66 at 4. The court disagrees.

Howard’s contention that he acquired personal knowledge of these events due to his presence at HMMA and his unrelated encounters with the relevant individuals is vague and does little to clarify the source of his knowledge. Furthermore, in the absence of personal knowledge, merely asserting that he could marshal evidence at some later date—but not in response to the motion for summary judgment—is insufficient. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[I]n the face of the defendant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff [cannot] rest on his allegations . . . without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Not only has Howard failed to offer affidavits or declarations from these potential witnesses, but he has not even articulated the substance of their potential testimony beyond a thumbnail sketch. *See Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 324; *Reeves*, 879 F. Supp. at 1165. This is not enough to show his basis of personal knowledge or to

satisfy Rule 56(c)(4). HMMA’s objection to the statements contained in paragraph 12 is due to be SUSTAINED.

Finally, HMMA objects to paragraphs 6 through 8 of Howard’s declaration, arguing that they contain conclusory statements. Doc. 62 at 3. These statements directly address the statements of fact in HMMA’s summary-judgment brief. For example, Howard states that he “disagrees” with certain statements, that HMMA’s “recitation of [certain facts] is misleading,” and that other statements made by HMMA are “not factually correct.” Doc. 60-1 at 3. Because the “requirements of Rule 56 make it plain that declarations and affidavits which set forth conclusory arguments rather than statements of fact based on personal knowledge are improper,” *Short v. Mando Am. Corp.*, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2011), Howard’s statements that he opposes HMMA’s proffered facts—without offering any evidence of his own to contradict HMMA’s assertions—do not satisfy Rule 56’s requirements. *See Holifield v. Reno*, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[C]onclusory assertions . . . in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”). HMMA’s objections to paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 are therefore due to be SUSTAINED.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment

Howard claims that HMMA violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, *et seq.*, when it discriminated against him by terminating his employment on the basis of race. Doc. 25 at 2; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under Title VII, Howard may prove that HMMA discriminated against him by presenting either

direct or circumstantial evidence. *See, e.g., Maynard v. Bd. of Regents*, 342 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, Howard has offered only circumstantial evidence in support his claim.

In race-based employment discrimination claims supported by circumstantial evidence, courts apply the burden-shifting framework of *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a *prima facie* case of race discrimination. *See id.* at 802; *Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp.*, 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010). “If a plaintiff makes the requisite showing, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” *Brown*, 520 597 F.3d at 1174 (citing *Rojas v. Florida*, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)). This does not mean, however, that the employer must persuade the court that it was “actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” *Id.* Finally, if the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. *Id.*

1. *Prima Facie* Case

To make out a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was . . . treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected class.” *Maynard*, 342 F.3d at 1289; *see Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla.*, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). Here, the parties do not dispute that Howard is black, that he qualified for his employment at HMMA, and that HMMA terminated his employment.

They do disagree, however, about the final element. Specifically, HMMA claims that Howard “has not identified a similarly-situated employee who was treated more favorably than he was.” Doc. 52 at 15.

“A comparator is an employee outside of the plaintiff’s protected class who is similarly situated to the plaintiff ‘in all relevant respects.’” *Coar v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.*, 372 F. App’x 1, 3 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing *Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.*, 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004)). A comparator must be disciplined differently after being “involved in or accused of the same or similar misconduct.” *Holifield*, 115 F.3d at 1555. This requirement prevents “courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” *Burke-Fowler*, 447 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present.” *Wilson*, 376 F.3d at 1092 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Howard identifies several coworkers who could serve as comparators.⁷ Howard explicitly points to Denham as a comparator in his deposition and summary-judgment response (Doc. 53-1 at 10 & Doc. 59), but also mentions that HMMA “did not punish [Jeff Todd] and Chris Arnold, white males who were Denham’s cohorts in the bullying of Plaintiff at the work site of HMMA.” Doc. 66 at 9. In both instances, Howard alleges

⁷ In its reply brief, HMMA also addresses Howard’s implied contention that Howard, through his own conduct in 2013, could serve as a comparator. Doc. 63 at 6. Howard essentially argues that HMMA treated him differently in 2015 for an allegation of workplace misconduct against a white male—by being terminated—than he was treated in 2013 for misconduct toward a black male, which resulted only in a Letter of Conditional Employment. Doc. 59 at 9. This argument is unavailing. Among other reasons, Howard remains a member of the same protected class and therefore is not, by definition, an appropriate comparator. The existence of an active Letter of Conditional Employment in 2015 also would render these two events to be dissimilar.

that white employees engaged in some form of misconduct but were treated more favorably than he was. Thus, based on his contentions, the court will consider whether any of these three coworkers qualifies as a similarly-situated individual who was treated more favorably than Howard.

a. Jeff Todd and Chris Arnold

The record reflects that Todd and Arnold are both white males and therefore outside of Howard's protected class. Doc. 66 at 9. However, other aspects of Todd's and Arnold's positions and conduct prevent them from serving as comparators. For example, “[m]aterial differences in ranks and responsibilities are relevant for considering whether an employee is a proper comparator.” *Cyprian v. Auburn Univ. Montgomery*, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (citing *Rioux*, 520 F.3d at 1269). Howard's position and responsibilities at HMMA were different from those of both Todd and Arnold. Todd was a Team Leader and Arnold was a Group Leader in the Quality Control Department. Doc. 53-1 at 9 & 18. As a paint inspector, Howard was a Team Member. Doc. 53-1 at 11. As already discussed, Team Members receive direction and instruction from Team Leaders. Team Leaders conduct an opening meeting for the Team Members, cover for Team Members, and help manage each shift. Doc. 52 at 4. Group Leaders have supervisory authority and “substantial input on promotion, termination, and other employment decisions.” Doc. 53-3 at 3. Thus, the contrast between Howard and Todd and Arnold in their roles and responsibilities cuts against a finding that they are comparators.

More significantly, Howard has not established that Todd's or Arnold's actions are

“nearly identical” in either quality or quantity to his own. *See Maniccia v. Brown*, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). Howard claims that Arnold would often give him a “nasty look,” but usually did not interact with him. Doc. 53-1 at 18–19. Arnold also brought the tool to Howard that Howard threw at or near Denham, but otherwise played no significant role in the altercation. *See* Doc. 25 at 2. Following the incident, Arnold and Todd “went to the side of the car where Josh was working, and they got in a little huddle up where Chris told them exactly what he just told team relations (about the incident) what to say, and they went down there simultaneously.”⁸ Doc. 53-1 at 20. Howard also refers to Todd and Arnold as “cohorts” when referencing Denham’s bullying and states that “Denham and his cohorts had insulted Plaintiff on a regular basis,” and that they joined in on the harassment. Doc. 59 at 3 & 15.

In summary, then, Todd’s and Arnold’s relevant conduct amounts to ignoring Howard, giving him menacing looks, huddling to speak with Denham following the incident to fabricate a favorable version of the events, and otherwise failing to stop Denham’s harassment of Howard. In contrast, HMMA terminated Howard for threatening a coworker and throwing a tool in his direction while working under an active Letter of Conditional Employment. This is markedly dissimilar to Todd’s and Arnold’s alleged conduct and history, and their disparate roles and responsibilities only buttress this conclusion. Accordingly, Howard has failed to establish that Todd and Arnold are proper comparators.

⁸ Howard admits he could not hear the conversation among Denham, Arnold, and Todd. Doc. 53-1 at 20.

b. Joshua Denham

HMMA contends that Denham is not similarly situated because the two employees had different disciplinary histories and conduct during the incident. Doc. 52 at 15–16. Additionally, HMMA claims that even if the two are similarly situated, they were ultimately treated the same because both were terminated as a result of their misconduct while subject to a Letter of Conditional Employment. Doc. 52 at 16.

Denham is a white male, satisfying the requirement that he must be outside of Howard's protected class to serve as a comparator. Doc. 53-1 at 17. The two men also had similar, if not identical, duties and responsibilities. *See* Doc. 53-3 at 6 (identifying both Denham and Howard as Team Members in the Paint Department). Denham worked as a paint inspector, and Howard testified that they “did the same thing” at HMMA. Doc. 53-1 at 22. Additionally, Howard and Denham both had an active Letter of Conditional Employment at the time of the incident. Doc. 53-2 at 4–5 & 7. These letters resulted from serious violations of HMMA's code of conduct and informed both employees that they could be terminated for any additional violation. Doc. 53-1 at 61.

HMMA argues that Howard and Denham are not similarly situated because the conduct which led to their letters was dissimilar and each had the letter active on his file for a different period of time. Doc. 52 at 16. At the time of the incident, Denham's letter was 33 months old—three months shy of expiration. Denham received the letter in 2012 based on a complaint of inappropriate behavior toward his coworkers in April of 2012. Doc. 53-2 at 7. In contrast, Howard received his letter in 2013 after a verbal altercation involving threats of violence with another employee. Doc. 53-1 at 28. Howard denies

that the incident happened and states that he was told that HMMA “would let it stay on your record for about eighteen months to two years.” Doc 53-1 at 29. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the letter was active at the time of Howard’s termination.

HMMA directs the court to *Silvera v. Orange County School Board*, 244 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001), claiming that its holding validates the notion of differential treatment on the basis of distinctions similar to those in this case. In *Silvera*, the court found that an individual could not serve as a valid comparator when one subject had three prior arrests for violent conduct, while the other had none. *See id.* at 1260. The *Silvera* court also noted the relevance of one individual’s most recent arrest for a nonviolent offense having occurred two months before his termination, while the other was arrested two years prior. *Id.* No meaningful distinction based on timing exists in the instant case because the crucial distinction under HMMA policy is whether a letter is active or inactive, not how long it has been pending. *See* Doc. 53-1 at 59.

Silvera’s disparity in criminal history also does not factor into the present analysis, and in any event Howard and Denham both had one specific incident of misconduct leading to their letters of conditional employment. Moreover, Howard and Denham were terminated for the same class of offense—a Serious Misconduct Offense as a result of a violation of HMMA’s workplace violence policy. Doc. 53-2 at 6–7; Doc. 53-3 at 8–9. Thus, both Howard and Denham were on identical footing in the eyes of HMMA’s disciplinary structure, both before and after the incident leading to their terminations. That they did not behave during the February 2015 altercation in precisely the same way does not remove Denham from consideration as a comparator—Denham and Howard

found themselves in identical states of conditional employment, and were found to have committed equally serious misconduct violations. The court therefore concludes that Howard has established that Denham was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Although Denham and Howard are similarly situated, this does not necessitate a finding that HMMA treated Denham more favorably than Howard. The uncontested evidence in the record demonstrates that both employees were terminated after HMMA concluded that each engaged in a Serious Misconduct Offense while under an active Letter of Conditional Employment. *See* Doc. 53-1. Indeed, there is no indication that HMMA treated Denham more favorably when it is undisputed that his employment was terminated after a Team Relations investigation into his conduct, just as Howard's was. And Howard has not produced any evidence that HMMA had the ability to—or did in fact—transfer Denham to HPT, an entirely separate corporate entity. Accordingly, Howard has not met his burden to demonstrate that a similarly-situated employee outside of his protected class was treated more favorably, thus falling short of the requisite showing for a *prima facie* case of race-based employment discrimination.

2. Burden-Shifting Framework

Even if Howard could establish a *prima facie* case, HMMA has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. Neal, as the Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration at HMMA, had the discretionary authority to terminate any Team Member's employment, including Howard's. Doc. 53-2 at 6. According to Neal, HMMA held a meeting to discuss Denham's complaint against Howard on February 24, 2015. Doc. 53-2 at 5. At that meeting, Team Relations

presented a factual summary and the findings of an investigation into the incident based on interviews with other employees who witnessed it. Doc. 53-2. Neal reviewed the memorandum, which indicated that Howard threw a tool at Denham, “made some sort of fist gesture towards him,” and “threatened to beat up Denham and kill him.” Doc. 53-2 at 6. “After reviewing these findings, the applicable policies, and Howard’s disciplinary history,” Neal decided to terminate Howard’s employment. Doc. 53-2 at 6.

While Howard disputes that he committed violations of HMMA rules—during both the 2013 and 2015 incidents—the court need not look behind HMMA’s investigations and factfinding. “The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit the violation with which he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any *prima facie* case of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed the employee committed the violation.” *Jones v. Gerwens*, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989); *see Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc.*, 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is not our role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom of them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not made with a discriminatory motive.”). Neal’s deposition testimony establishes that he believed Howard broke company policies. His honest belief that Howard threatened violence against another employee while subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment constitutes a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for Howard’s termination. Therefore, HMMA has satisfied its burden at this stage of the *McDonnell-Douglas* analysis.

Because HMMA has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

Howard's termination, the burden shifts to Howard to submit sufficient evidence suggesting that HMMA's proffered reason was pretextual. "To show pretext, a plaintiff must show that the employer's offered reason was not the true reason for its decision, 'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" *Lucy v. Georgia-Pac. Corrugated I, LLC*, 497 F. App'x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Jackson v. St. of Ala. St. Tenure Comm'n*, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)). A proffered explanation is unworthy of credence when "the plaintiff has demonstrated . . . weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons." *Combs v. Plantation Patterns*, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pretext cannot be established by the plaintiff's own evaluation and opinion, *Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc.*, 161 F.3d 1318, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 1998), or by "simply quarreling with the wisdom of [the proffered] reason." *Chapman v. AI Transport*, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000).

"When, as here, the employer justifies the adverse employment decision by relying on a work rule violation, a plaintiff may prove pretext by proffering 'evidence (1) that [he or] she did not violate the cited work rule, or (2) that if [he or] she did violate the rule, other employees outside the protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not similarly treated.'" *Williams v. Ala. Dep't of Transp.*, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1058 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (quoting *Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc.*, 196 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999)). In response to HMMA's proffered justification for his termination,

Howard does not provide evidence showing he did not violate workplace rules and instead states that pretext is evident from the fact that he received more severe punishment following the 2015 incident—in which the alleged victim was white—than for his previous incident of misconduct involving a black victim. Doc. 59 at 14. However, it is undisputed that Howard was not subject to a Letter of Conditional Employment at the time of the 2013 incident. Indeed, that incident prompted the letter on file at the time of the 2015 incident. Beyond conclusory assertions and speculation, Howard has directed the court to no other direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of HMMA. And Howard has failed to demonstrate how or why HMMA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination is unworthy of credence. Accordingly, Howard’s attempt to demonstrate pretext is unsuccessful.

In light of the dearth of evidence suggesting discrimination and Howard’s own admission that he has no reason to suspect that racial bias influenced those who were interviewed about the incident or conducted the investigation, *see* Doc. 53-1 at 18, Howard has fallen short of his burden to demonstrate that HMMA’s stated reason for its employment action is pretextual. This leads to the conclusion that, even if Howard had successfully established a *prima facie* case of race discrimination, his claim would fail at the *McDonnell-Douglas* burden-shifting stage. Therefore, summary judgment on Howard’s Title VII claim is due to be granted in favor of HMMA.⁹

⁹ Because the court concludes that Howard’s claim fails on the merits, it makes no recommendation on the resolution of HMMA’s contentions that any potential recovery accruing to Howard is limited by after-acquired evidence or Howard’s physical inability to work. *See* Doc. 52 at 20–21.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51) be GRANTED, and that all claims asserted by Plaintiff Ponce D. Howard be DISMISSED with prejudice.

The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that HMMA's Motion for Leave to Supplement its Evidentiary Submission (Doc. 61) be GRANTED, and that the objections contained in the motion to strike (Doc. 62) be SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part, as set forth herein.

It is further ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the report and recommendation not later than **August 1, 2017**. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this report and recommendation is not a final order of the court, and therefore, is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation shall bar the party from a *de novo* determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report and recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest justice. *See Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); *Stein v. Reynolds Secs., Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982).

DONE this 18th day of July, 2017.



GRAY M. BORDEN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE