
NO. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 2018

Temarco Sartorio Pope, Jr. - Petitioner,

vs.

United States of America - Respondent.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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District Court Order Denying Motion to Suppress 9-5-17.....	2
Opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 12-10-2018	6
Judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 12-10-2018.....	13
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc 1-10-2019.....	14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TEMARCO SARTORIO POPE, JR.

Defendant.

No. 4:17-cr-00057-JAJ

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the defendant's July 14, 2017 Motion to Suppress. [Dkt. No. 26]. The Government responded on July 19, 2017. [Dkt. No. 31]. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on July 28, 2017, at which defendant was present and represented by Timothy Ross-Boon. The Government was represented by Stephan Bayens. The motion to suppress is **DENIED**.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In the early morning hours of January 22, 2017, Des Moines Police Officers responded to the AmericInn located at 1920 Hackley Avenue in Des Moines, Polk County, Iowa. Officers were responding to a call regarding a noise complaint. Upon the officers' arrival, they met with the complainant, the front desk clerk, who reported a loud party in Room 203. Officer Luke Eblen went to Room 203, where he heard loud music and detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the room. Officer Eblen then knocked and identified himself as a police officer. When an occupant of the room opened the door, Officer Eblen noticed it was heavily occupied, with approximately 30 people in the room. Officer Eblen asked to whom the room was rented but received no response. He then advised the occupants they would need to leave the room. Because Officer Eblen recognized some of the occupants as gang members in Des Moines, he instructed everyone to have their hands up when they walked through the door past the officers.

Toward the rear of the room, Officer Eblen observed the defendant, Temarco Sartorio Pope, Jr. Officer Eblen observed the defendant grab a black pistol, place it in the right side of his jean's waistband, and cover it with his shirt before attempting to leave the room. Officer Eblen stopped the defendant at the threshold of the doorway, detained him, and retrieved the pistol. The defendant stated he did not have a permit for the pistol. Officer Eblen identified the pistol as a

Springfield XD .40 caliber pistol. Officer Eblen ran the pistol's serial number through dispatch and learned that the pistol had been reported stolen. Officer Eblen rendered the pistol safe and noted there was a round in the chamber and eight rounds in the magazine.

Officer Eblen gave the defendant his *Miranda* warning. The defendant acknowledged his rights and agreed to speak with Officer Eblen. During the course of the subsequent post-*Miranda* interview, the defendant claimed he acquired the firearm from "the street." Officer Eblen reviewed the defendant's criminal history and learned he had been convicted of two prior felony offenses.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, "subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." *Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); see *United States v. Jacobsen*, 466 U.S. 109, 141 (1984). "A police officer 'may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.'" *United States v. Fields*, 832 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Illinois v. Wardlow*, 528 U.S. 118, 123 (2000)). An officer may further conduct a pat-down search for weapons if there exists reasonable suspicion that the person is armed. See *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The officer does not need to be entirely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent person in their situation would be warranted in a belief that their safety or the safety of others was in danger. *Id.*

Whether an officer's suspicions are reasonable is determined by the totality of circumstances coupled with the law enforcement officer's training, experience, and rational inferences. *Fields*, 822 F.3d at 834; *United States v. Zamora-Lopez*, 685 F.3d 787, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2012). Although a hunch is not satisfactory, the level of proof needed to support such a consideration is considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence and need not "rise to the level required for probable cause." *United States v. Arvizu*, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Further, reasonable cause may exist to investigate conduct that, subject to a legitimate explanation, turns

out to be lawful conduct. *See Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983).

ANALYSIS

In this case, Officer Eblen used his law enforcement training, background, experience, and reasonable inferences in conducting a *Terry* stop upon the defendant as he was exiting the room. To justify the intrusion, “the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 21. Officer Eblen credibly testified during the suppression hearing that “due to the large group of people inside the room, the alcohol, marijuana odors that were coming from the room, and recognizing several occupants, gang members here in the City of Des Moines, observing the firearm being possessed by somebody,” he determined that the defendant needed to be detained and searched for officer safety. [TR pg. 12]¹; *see Id.* at 21, 27. The Northern District of Iowa recently reached a similar conclusion under far more sparse but analogous facts. *See U.S. v. Sykes*, No. 17-CR-2009-LLR, 2017 WL 2514953, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 6, 2017).

Furthermore, at the time of the defendant’s detention and search, Officer Eblen was armed with reasonable, articulable suspicion and probable cause that the defendant was violating Iowa Code § 724.4(1). Iowa Code § 724.4(1) provides “a person who goes armed with a dangerous weapon concealed on or about the person, or who, within the limits of any city, goes armed with a pistol or revolver...whether concealed or not...commits an aggravated misdemeanor.” Officer Eblen personally observed the defendant grab a firearm, put it in his waistband, purposely conceal it with his t-shirt, and attempt to leave the room. A person goes armed with a pistol or revolver if it is deliberately kept on or about the person and is readily accessible. *See State v. Alexander*, 322 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Iowa 1982). The personal observations of Officer Eblen evidence the defendant’s presence within the city limits of Des Moines, the existence of the firearm, and the defendant’s deliberate possession and concealment of such. Whether or not the officer knew the defendant had a valid permit to carry weapons is immaterial to the statutory scheme of Iowa Code Chapter 724; it does not require the government to prove the absence of a duly-issued weapons permit. Under Iowa law, statutory exceptions, like having a weapons permit, are affirmative defenses. *See State v. Leisinger*, 364 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 1985). Nevertheless, Officer Eblen eventually learned

¹ TR denotes the transcript of the suppression hearing.

that the defendant did not have a permit to carry.


CONCLUSION

Officer Eblen had reasonable and articulable suspicion and probable cause to believe that criminal activity was afoot when he observed the defendant grab and place a pistol in his waistband and conceal it with his shirt. Officer Eblen factored in the large amount of people at the party, the alcohol and marijuana involved, and how he recognized multiple Des Moines area gang members into his decision.

Upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's July 14, 2017 Motion to Suppress is **DENIED**.

DATED this 5th day of September, 2017.



JOHN A. JARVEY, Chief Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 18-1264

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Temarco Sartorio Pope, Jr., also known as Temarco Sartorio Pope

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

Submitted: October 18, 2018
Filed: December 10, 2018

Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Around 4:00 a.m. one January morning, Des Moines police responded to a complaint about noise at an area motel. Outside the motel room in question, a police officer heard loud music and smelled marijuana, so he knocked on the door. When someone answered, the officer could see about thirty people crowded into what he agreed was "a pretty standard motel room." After receiving no answer to his question

about who had rented the room, the officer, having recognized some of the partygoers as gang members, ordered all the occupants to leave with their hands up.

Someone in the back of the room caught the officer's attention. The officer saw this man, later identified as Temarco Pope, Jr., place a black pistol in the waistband of his jeans and cover it with his shirt. The officer testified that, as Pope approached the officer to leave, he could see the outline of the gun through Pope's shirt. He then stopped Pope, who was the last partygoer to leave, and placed him in handcuffs. At that point, the officer disarmed Pope, who afterward admitted he did not have a permit for the gun.

After the government indicted Pope for being a felon in possession of a firearm, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he moved to suppress the gun and any other evidence, including some of his statements to police, obtained from his detention at the motel. Pope maintained that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaging in criminal activity since the officer had no reason to suspect that he lacked a permit to carry the gun. The district court¹ disagreed and denied the motion to suppress. Pope then pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He appeals and we affirm.

Police officers may briefly detain a person if they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; a mere hunch will not suffice. *United States v. Cotter*, 701 F.3d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 2012). We consider "the totality of the circumstances" when determining whether reasonable suspicion supported an officer's stop. *Id.* "We review reasonable-suspicion determinations de novo." *United States v. Cobo-Cobo*, 873 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 2017). The government maintains that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Pope was violating Iowa Code § 724.4(1),

¹The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

which makes it an aggravated misdemeanor for someone to go "armed with a dangerous weapon concealed on or about the person."

The question of whether an officer may stop someone he reasonably believes is carrying a concealed gun was raised in *United States v. Jones*, 606 F.3d 964, 966–67 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). We did not resolve that question, however, because we concluded that the officer there lacked a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had a gun in the first place. Judge Loken wrote a concurrence in which he opined that the officer could not have performed a stop even if he had a reasonable belief that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon. He maintained that "giving police officers unfettered discretion to stop and frisk anyone suspected of carrying a concealed weapon without some particularized suspicion of *unlawful* carrying conflicts with the spirit of" the Nebraska Constitution's guarantee of the right to bear arms and the statutory exceptions to the prohibition of carrying concealed weapons, such as the exception for holders of concealed-carry permits. *Id.* at 968–69.

The issue surfaced again in *United States v. Harris*, where an officer encountered a man sleeping on a bench with a gun dangling from his pocket. 747 F.3d 1013, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 2014). The defendant maintained that the officer should not have seized the gun because he lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We showed some sympathy for the argument, even citing *Jones* and asserting parenthetically that *Jones* held "that the officers did not have a justification to stop the defendant merely because they suspected the defendant was carrying a firearm." *Id.* at 1016–17. But that is not what our court held in *Jones*; that was Judge Loken's position in concurrence. Nonetheless, our court in *Harris* stopped short of holding that the government lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, upholding the seizure of the gun instead because the officer was performing a community caretaking function in seizing it. *Id.* at 1017–19. As a result, the *Harris* court's statement about *Jones* does not bind our panel because it was dictum, and "we need not follow dicta." *Shepard v. United States*, 735 F.3d 797, 798 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

It is true that we asserted in another case that "the mere report of a person with a handgun is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion." *Duffie v. City of Lincoln*, 834 F.3d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 2016). But *Duffie* did not involve a concealed gun; the defendant there openly displayed a gun in a place where he could legally carry a gun openly without a permit. So it made sense for us to conclude that a report of someone openly displaying a firearm did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. And the information the police had did not sufficiently indicate that the defendant there had some disqualification, such as being underage, that precluded him from openly carrying a gun legally.

Most of the cases from outside our circuit on which Pope relies involve situations similar to the one in *Duffie*. For example, in *Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department*, the Sixth Circuit determined that reasonable suspicion did not support an investigatory detention of a person whom police had stopped for openly carrying a gun in a state that requires no permit for doing so. 785 F.3d 1128, 1132–33 (6th Cir. 2015). Because carrying a gun openly was not a criminal offense, the court reasoned, there was no basis for the stop. *Id.*; see also *United States v. Black*, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); *United States v. King*, 990 F.2d 1552, 1555, 1558–59 (10th Cir. 1993). But that is not the situation we face. Carrying a concealed weapon in Iowa is a criminal offense, and possession of a concealed-weapons permit is merely an affirmative defense to a charge under § 724.4(1). See *State v. Leisinger*, 364 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 1985); *State v. Bowdry*, 337 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1983). In other words, carrying a concealed weapon in Iowa is presumptively criminal until the suspect comes forward with a permit, see *United States v. Gatlin*, 613 F.3d 374, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2010), and we see no reason why the suspect's burden to produce a permit should be any different on the street than in the courtroom. We thus think the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he personally observed Pope place the gun in his waistband. See *United States v. Dembry*, 535 F.3d 798, 800–01 (8th Cir. 2008).

And for what its worth, the Iowa Legislature seemingly contemplated the kind of stop that the officer performed here when it passed § 724.4(1) by providing that the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon does not apply to one "who displays to a peace officer on demand a valid permit." Iowa Code § 724.4(4)(i). That an officer may "demand" to see a permit would seem to assume that the officer may briefly seize the person to make such a demand. It would be odd to say that an officer may "demand" to see a permit during the course of a consensual encounter not amounting to a seizure. This legislative assumption is perhaps some evidence that a detention like the one involved here was considered reasonable in the political and social environment in which the statute was enacted.

Pope argues that, even if the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to frisk him for weapons as well. The Court in *Terry v. Ohio* held that an officer may frisk a suspect he believes is "armed and dangerous." 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Pope maintains that the officer merely knew that he was armed but had no reason to believe that he was also dangerous, especially since many law-abiding citizens carry guns legally nowadays.

We believe that the Supreme Court has already authorized police officers to frisk a suspect reasonably believed to be armed even where it could be that the suspect possesses the arms legally. In *Adams v. Williams*, the Court emphasized that the purpose of a *Terry* frisk is not to discover evidence of a crime "but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law." 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). The Supreme Court has also intimated at least twice that being armed with a gun necessarily means that the suspect poses a risk to an officer. In *Terry*, the Court said that a suspect's being armed "thus presented a threat to the officer's safety." 392 U.S. at 28. In another case the Court observed that a bulge in a suspect's jacket "permitted

the officer to conclude that [the suspect] was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger." *Pennsylvania v. Mimms*, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977).

Pope argues that we need not give *Adams*, *Terry*, or *Mimms* much weight because, he says, the Court decided them in an era in which criminals were the primary carriers of guns and thus almost always dangerous. Even if this factual assumption is true, a matter on which we express no view, it is the Supreme Court's prerogative alone to overrule its cases, regardless of whether doubts have been raised as to their continuing vitality. *See Bosse v. Oklahoma*, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam). And even if the Court decided these cases in a different legal environment, we think it remains reasonable to allow an officer to frisk someone whom the officer has lawfully stopped and whom the officer reasonably believes is armed. As the en banc Fourth Circuit recently explained, "[t]he presumptive lawfulness of an individual's gun possession in a particular State does next to nothing to negate the reasonable concern an officer has for his own safety when forcing an encounter with an individual who is armed with a gun and whose propensities are unknown." *United States v. Robinson*, 846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017).

Pope finally maintains that the frisk was unreasonable since the officer had already handcuffed Pope, which, he asserts, obviated any danger that he might have presented. We disagree. Handcuffs limit but do not eliminate a person's ability to perform harmful acts. *United States v. Sanders*, 994 F.2d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 1993). Though it is more difficult for him to do so, a person in handcuffs can still use a weapon to injure, and, of course, handcuffs can sometimes fail. *Id.* Further, unless Pope were to go home in the officer's handcuffs, at some point the officer would have to remove them, at which point Pope would have unfettered access to his gun. *See id.* The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to submit themselves to such dangers.

Finally, we note that Pope appears to raise a Second Amendment challenge to § 724.4(1) in his reply brief. Because he failed to raise the argument in his opening brief, we leave that issue for another day. *See United States v. Grace*, 893 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 2018).

Affirmed.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No: 18-1264

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Temarco Sartorio Pope, Jr., also known as Temarco Sartorio Pope

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines
(4:17-cr-00057-JAJ-1)

JUDGMENT

Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

This appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on the record of the district court and briefs of the parties.

After consideration, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

December 10, 2018

Order Entered in Accordance with Opinion:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Michael E. Gans

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No: 18-1264

United States of America

Appellee

v.

Temarco Sartorio Pope, Jr., also known as Temarco Sartorio Pope

Appellant

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines
(4:17-cr-00057-JAJ-1)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

Judge Kelly did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

January 10, 2019

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Michael E. Gans