

18-8326

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Supreme Court, U.S.  
FILED

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Dana Gray, W76776 – Petitioner

v.

V. Romero, M.D.

A. Comelli, M.D.

N. Loadholdt, F.N.P.

C. Rebel, M.D.

V. Mundunuri, M.D.

J. Ziomek, D.P.M.

- Respondents

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO  
THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dana Gray: W76776

Petitioner Pro se

Central California Women's Facility: 512-17-01L

P.O. Box 1508

Chowchilla, CA 93610

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1		
2	Questions Presented .....	i
3	List of Parties .....	i
4	Table of Contents .....	ii
5	Index of Appendices .....	iii
6	Table of Authorities .....	iv
7	Opinions Below .....	1
8	Jurisdiction .....	1
9	Constitutional & Statutory Provisions .....	2
10	Statement of the Case .....	3
11	Reasons for Granting the Petition .....	7
12	Prayer For Relief .....	15
13	Certificate of Compliance .....	16
14	Verification .....	16
15	Signature .....	16
16	Proof of Service .....	17

## INDEX OF APPENDICES

	<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>
3	A1	12/4/2018	Final Order #18-15816 USCA
4	A2	12/20/2018	Request For Stay of Mandate Pending Certiorari
5			#18-15816 USCA
6	B.	5/23/2018	Denial Order #18-15816 USCA
7	C.	3/19/2018	Initial Denial Medical Expert USDC
8	D.	3/29/2018	72(a) Objections USDC
9	E.	4/3/2018	Denial of "Motion of Reconsideration" USDC
10	F.	4/16/2018	72(a/b) Objections USDC
11	G1	5/1/2018	Notice of Appeal #18-15816 USCA
12	G2	6/6/2018	Petition For Panel Rehearing #18-15816 USCA
13	H.	7/3/2018	USDC Judge Drozd's Ruling
14	I.	8/21/1997	Dr. Pace's Report
15	J.	2/12/2018	Sixth Amended Complaint (6ac) USDC
16	K.	2013-2019	Electronic Docket Listings – USDC
17	L1	2/28/2018	Motion for Summary Judgment 6ac USDC
18	L2	3/5/2018	Motion to Dismiss 6ac USDC
19	M.	3/14/2018	Request for Expert Witness USDC
20	N.	4/2/2018	Disputed Facts USDC
21	O.	5/21/2018	Objections to Findings/Recommendations to
22			Deny 6ac USDC
23	P.	6/12/2018	Request For Stay of Proceedings USDC
24	Q.	2/7/2019	Appeal #18-16787 Reply Brief USCA

25

# TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	<u>Page</u>
United States Constitution	
Eighth Amendment .....	14
First Amendment .....	2, 7
Fourteenth Amendment .....	2, 7, 10, 12
Seventh Amendment .....	2, 7, 12
Federal Statutes	
28 USC §1254(1) .....	2
28 USC §1915(d) .....	2, 9
28 USC §1915 A(a-b(1)) .....	2, 13, 14
42 USC §1983 .....	4, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16
Prison Litigation Reform Act .....	13, 14
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	
Rule 60 .....	7
Rule 72 .....	1, 3, 6, 7
Federal Rules of Evidence	
706 .....	3
Case Law	
<u>Benjamin v. Jacobsen</u> , 935 F. Supp 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) .....	11
<u>Bonner v. City of Pritchard, Ala.</u> , 661 F.2d 1206 (11 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) .....	11
<u>Bounds v. Smith</u> , 430 US 817 (1977) .....	10
<u>Christopher v. Harbury</u> , 536 US 403 (2002) .....	12
<u>Crooker v. United States</u> , U.S.D.C. (D. Mass) 2015 U.S. District LEXIS 12386 .....	14

1	<u>Curtis v. Loether</u> , 415 US 189 (1974) .....	12
2	<u>Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm</u> , 509 US 579 (1993).....	12
3	<u>Erickson v. Pardus</u> , 551 US 89 (2007) (per curiam).....	15
4	<u>James v. Eli</u> , 889 F.3d 320 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2018).....	14
5	<u>Lewis v. Casey</u> , 518 US 343 (1996) .....	10, 11
6	<u>McDonald v. Chicago</u> , 561 US 742 (2010) .....	12
7	<u>Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes</u> , 526 US 687 (1999).....	12
8	<u>Pedraza v. Jones</u> , 71 F.3d 194 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) .....	9
9	<u>Pierce Cty, WA v. Guillen</u> , 537 US 129 (2003) .....	1
10	<u>Turner v. Safley</u> , 482 US 78 (1987) .....	10, 11
11	<u>In re Westin</u> , 18 F.3d 860 (10 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994).....	13

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1                   **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

2                               **PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

3  
4                               **OPINIONS BELOW**

5   Petitioner's U.S. District Court case, Eastern District of California, is #1:13-cv-01473-DAD-  
6   GSA.

7  
8   The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Appellate number is #18-15816.

9   The final order of the U.S. Court of Appeals following Petition for Panel Rehearing is in  
10   Appendix A, and is unpublished.

11  
12   The initial denial of the U.S. Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) is found in Appendix B.

13   The initial U.S. District Court order denying a neutral medical expert is in Appendix C and is  
14   interlocutory and dispositive.

15  
16   Petitioner's 72(a) objections to the initial denial order are in Appendix D.

17   The U.S. Magistrate Judge's conversion of the 72(a) objections into a motion for reconsideration  
18   and denial are in Appendix E.

19  
20   Petitioner's follow-up 72(a/b) objections are in Appendix F.

21   Petitioner's Notice of Appeal is in Appendix G.

22   U.S. District Court Judge Drozd's delayed ruling on a 72(a) objection as "frivolous" and denying  
23   expert is in Appendix H.

24  
25  
26                               **JURISDICTION**

27           The United States Court of Appeals decided this case (Appendix B). A timely Petition  
28   for Rehearing was denied 12/4/2018 (Appendix A). Review of cases destined to preordained  
29   negative outcomes is reason to grant a writ of certiorari [Pierce Cty, WA v. Guillen, 537 US 129  
30   (2003)].

1 The Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals implicitly agrees that this appeal #18-  
2 15816 is of a dispositive motion by not mentioning jurisdiction in the denial of the Petition for  
3 Panel Rehearing (Appendix G2).

4 The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 USC §1254(1).

## 5 **CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

### 6 **U.S. CONSTITUTION**

#### 7 **FIRST AMENDMENT**

8 “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech...or the right of the  
9 people... to petition the government for redress of grievances”

#### 11 **SEVENTH AMENDMENT**

12 “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the  
13 right of a trial by jury shall be preserved...”

#### 15 **FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT**

16 “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of  
17 law...”

### 19 **STATUTES**

#### 21 **28 USC §1254 (1)**

22 “Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court...(1). By writ of  
23 certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil...case, before or after rendition  
24 of judgment or decree.

#### 26 **28 USC §1915(d)**

27 “the officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [in  
28 forma pauperis] cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases...”

#### 30 **28 USC §1915 A(a-b(1))**

31 “(a) screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as  
32 soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks  
33 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. (b)  
34 Grounds for dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the  
35 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or  
36 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted...”

1 **FEDERAL RULES**

2  
3 **FRCP 72(a/b)**

4 “(a) Non-dispositive Matters - ...The magistrate judge must promptly conduct the  
5 required proceedings...A party may serve and file objections to the order within 14  
6 days...(b) dispositive Motions and Prisoner Petitions. (1)...A magistrate judge must  
7 promptly conduct the required proceedings when assigned, without the parties’ consent, to  
8 hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner petition challenging the  
9 conditions of confinement...The magistrate judge must enter a recommended  
10 disposition...(2)...Within 14 days..., a party may serve and file specific written objections to  
11 the proposed findings and recommendations...(3)...The district judge must determine de  
12 novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The  
13 district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further  
14 evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”

15  
16 **Federal Rules Evidence 706**

17 “(a)...On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show cause  
18 why expert witnesses should not be appointed...The court may appoint any expert...of its  
19 own choosing. ...(c)...the expert is entitled to a reasonable compensation, as set by the  
20 court...(2) in any other civil case by the parties in the proportion and at the time that the  
21 court directs...”  
22

23 **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

- 24 1. 1.5 cm. leg length discrepancy diagnosed in Petitioner by Dr. Pace while in Riverside County  
25 Jail, 8/21/1997. (See Appendix I)
- 26 2. Petitioner arrived at CCWF prison 10/28/1998.
- 27 3. Petitioner wore heel lift 1998-2005 at CCWF.
- 28 4. Serial lumbar spine X-rays and MRI’s document Petitioner’s progression from “normal L/S  
29 spine” in 1999 to lumbar scoliosis with nerve root compression in 4/19/2011 because heel lift  
30 and/or orthopedic shoes were denied by all of the respondents beginning in 2006.
- 31 5. Respondent Dr. Rebel, Orthopedist of record 10/19/2006 – 4/19/2011 opined “no leg length  
32 discrepancy” in 2006 with no physical exam or review of imaging studies and denied  
33 Petitioner heel lifts or orthopedic shoes (See Appendix J, Claim I).

- 1 6. Respondent Dr. Ziomek, DPM, Podiatrist of record from 6/10/2008 until 2017 also opined  
2 "no leg length discrepancy" without X-ray or measurement, also denied Petitioner heel lift  
3 and/or orthopedic shoes (See Appendix J, Claim II)..
- 4 7. Respondent Dr. Romero, Primary Care Physician from 2006 to 2010 followed these specialty  
5 opinions and stopped all pain medication and ADA accommodations on 5/3/2010 without  
6 any measurement for leg length discrepancy or evaluation of lumbar spine (See Appendix J,  
7 Claim III).
- 8 8. Respondent Dr. Comelli gave second opinion to Dr. Romero 6/16/2010. Fully agreed with  
9 her with no exam or testing of Petitioner (See Appendix J, Claim IV).
- 10 9. Respondent NP Loadholdt answered healthcare grievance in place of supervisory M.D. No  
11 exam. Agreed with Dr. Romero and Dr. Comelli 8/2/2010 (See Appendix J, Claim V).
- 12 10. Referred to neurosurgeon 4/19/2011 for lumbar scoliosis with nerve root compression (MRI  
13 3/15/2011) due to no treatment for leg length discrepancy.
- 14 11. Respondent Dr. Mundunari, Primary Care Physician 2011-2015 refused to provide heel lift or  
15 orthopedic shoes causing lumbar scoliosis with nerve root compression to worsen by  
16 11/19/2012 (See Appendix J, Claim VI).
- 17 12. Petitioner became aware of deliberate indifference and medical negligence 1/4/2013 when  
18 she saw a non-surgical neurologist for a second opinion who opined that her pain was likely  
19 unrelated to her spinal deformity further delaying surgical treatment of Petitioner's lumbar  
20 spine.
- 21 13. Final healthcare grievance submitted 6/9/2012.
- 22 14. Government Claim form #608835 submitted 12/30/2012 and denied 3/1/2013.
- 23 15. 42 USC §1983 lawsuit filed 9/12/2013.

- 1 16. Pleading stage of lawsuit 9/12/2013 - 2/4/2016 when all claims of deliberate indifference and  
2 medical negligence found cognizable against all defendants (See Appendix K, ECF 47).
- 3 17. All defendants served Fourth Amended Complaint 2/24/2016 (See Appendix K, ECF 50).
- 4 18. Jury trial requests by five (5) respondents (See Appendix K, ECF 58, ECF 63-65, ECF 82).
- 5 19. Discovery 5/2/2016 – 1/31/2017 (See Appendix K, ECF 60, 148).
- 6 20. Motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings granted with leave to amend 3/28/2017  
7 (See Appendix K, ECF 184).
- 8 21. Fifth Amended Complaint filed and stricken for excess pages without leave to amend  
9 5/2/2017 (See Appendix K, ECF 205, 206).
- 10 22. Petitioner filed “Word-Condensed Fifth Amended Complaint” 5/26/2017, (See Appendix K,  
11 ECF 214).
- 12 23. Petitioner filed motions to determine status of “Word-Condensed Fifth Amended Complaint”  
13 which were denied in reverse order (9/11/2017) (ECF 268-272) to essentially eviscerate any  
14 complaint; appeal filed 10/6/2017 (#17-17017) (ECF 276).
- 15 24. Sixth Amended Complaint ordered to prove timeliness of claims 12-12-2017 (See Appendix  
16 K, ECF 296).
- 17 25. Sixth Amended Complaint filed 2/12/2018 (See Appendix J).
- 18 26. Respondents filed motions to dismiss 3/5/2018 and for summary Judgment 2/28/2018 (See  
19 Appendix L1 and L2).
- 20 27. Petitioner requested expert witness 3/14/2018 (See Appendix M).
- 21 28. Petitioner statement of disputed facts 4/2/2018 proving need for neutral expert (See  
22 Appendix N).
- 23 29. Denial expert witness 3/19/2018 (See Appendix C).

- 1 30. 72(a) objections 4/2/2018 (See Appendix D).
- 2 31. Conversion to motion for reconsideration 4/3/2018 plus denial (See Appendix E).
- 3 32. 72 (a/b) objections to conversion and denial 4/20/2018 (See Appendix F).
- 4 33. Notice of appeal #18-15816 5/2/2018 (See Appendix G).
- 5 34. Findings/Recommendations 4/30/2018 by U.S. Magistrate Judge to “rescreen” Sixth  
6 Amended Complaint and deny that claims are cognizable (See Appendix K, ECF 328).
- 7 35. Petitioner’s objections 5/24/2018 to Findings and Recommendations to essentially deny Sixth  
8 amended Complaint (See Appendix O).
- 9 36. Petition for Panel Rehearing #18-15816 (See Appendix G2).
- 10 37. Petitioner’s request for stay of proceedings 6/12/2018 until Appeal #18-15816 completed  
11 (See Appendix P).
- 12 38. Petitioner’s urgent filing for TRO/preliminary injunction 6/28/2018 to prevent transfer of  
13 jailhouse lawyer to another institution (See Appendix K, ECF 339-345).
- 14 39. U.S. District Court Judge Drozd’s ruling finding “frivolous” 7/3/2018 (See Appendix H).
- 15 40. Motion for reconsideration 7/19/2018 to object to frivolous filings (See Appendix K, ECF  
16 347).
- 17 41. Terminating sanctions for “frivolous” motion for reconsideration 8/20/2018 (See Appendix  
18 K, ECF 353).
- 19 42. Motion (in #18-15816) to rescind and stay mandate pending this writ of certiorari 12/20/2018  
20 (See Appendix A2).
- 21 43. Appeal #18-16787 pending oral argument and/or decision regarding terminating sanctions  
22 (Petitioner’s reply brief Appendix Q).
- 23
- 24

1                                   **REASONS TO GRANT THIS PETITION**

2   **ARGUMENT I**

3       **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS NEED TO RELIABLY APPOINT NEUTRAL**  
4       **MEDICAL EXPERTS IN INDIVIDUAL PRISONER PRO SE §42 USC 1983 MEDICAL**  
5       **CARE CASES WITH COGNIZABLE CLAIMS IN WHICH DISPUTED MEDICAL**  
6       **FACTS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT IN ORDER TO PREVENT**  
7       **PREORDAINED NEGATIVE OUTCOMES. THESE EXPERTS WILL ASSURE THE**  
8       **PRISONER PLAINTIFFS' ACCESS TO COURT UNDER THE FIRST AND**  
9       **FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND**  
10       **ACCESS TO A CIVIL JURY UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT.**  
11  
12

13    A. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A NEUTRAL MEDICAL EXPERT  
14       IS DISPOSITIVE.

15           Rule 60 Motions for Reconsideration follow a final judgment. Petitioner first objected to  
16       the United States Magistrate Judge's denial of the medical expert witness with Rule 72(a)  
17       objections [Appendix D]. However, after the magistrate judge converted these to a "Motion  
18       for Reconsideration," she reasoned it would have been more appropriate to call them Rule  
19       72(b) objections. She resubmitted "72(a/b) objections" [Appendix F].

20           When the United States District Judge finally ruled three months later, he stated the  
21       objections to the denial of the expert witness were "not clearly erroneous or contrary to law"  
22       implying the order was not dispositive [Appendix H, p.2]. However, Judge Drozd ignored the  
23       Magistrate Judge's conversion of the objections to a motion for reconsideration indicating the  
24       order is dispositive (Appendix H).

25           Petitioner filed this appeal #18-15816. The United States Court of Appeals did not deny  
26       the Petition for Panel Rehearing for lack of jurisdiction implying the order to deny the expert  
27       witness is appealable and dispositive [Appendix A1, p.1].  
28

1 B. NEED FOR A NEUTRAL MEDICAL EXPERT IN PETITIONER'S CASE

2       Petitioner's case requires a neutral medical expert because the order is dispositive. Thus  
3 this case is capable of serving as an example of similarly situated cases. Petitioner made the  
4 District Court aware of her reasons for the court to appoint the medical expert in her initial  
5 request (Appendix M) and in her "Disputed Facts" (Appendix N).

6       The neutral medical expert is also required to opine whether a "specialist of record" in  
7 still an "active contributor" to a patient's care (in response to Respondent Ziomek's claim in  
8 motion to dismiss that a specialist's report is past history once the visit is completed (see  
9 Appendix L2, p.7).

10       Respondents want the Court to believe that each of them acted independently. This is not  
11 true in Central California Women's Facility (CCWF) Medical Department; now headed by  
12 three Medical Chief Executives in 2019. In 2013 it was headed by one Chief Medical  
13 Officer. These medical administrators all use "utilization management" to guide medical  
14 provider professional decision-making. The neutral medical expert can elaborate on this  
15 process. Because of "utilization management," the acts of all of the Respondents in  
16 Petitioner's case constitute one "continuing course of conduct."

17       While intentional concealment of the diagnosis of leg length discrepancy and failure to  
18 provide orthopedic shoes to protect Petitioner's back may appear "easy to understand" by lay  
19 people as the District Court infers (Appendix C, p.2); the coordinated activities of six prison  
20 Medical Respondents are very complex and require explanation by a neutral medical expert  
21 witness. Reliable appointment of neutral medical experts in Petitioner's case and similarly  
22 situated cases will allow the cases to proceed through contested motions to dismiss and  
23 motions for summary judgment with medical authenticity and fairness.

1 C. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

2 Congress sets forth the ideal standard in the IFP Statute 28 USC 1915(d) when they state,  
3 “witnesses shall attend as in other cases...” (emphasis added). Petitioner discusses this with  
4 the District Court in Appendix D (p.3).

5 Congress did not, however, authorize independent funding. Court-appointed expert  
6 witnesses are ultimately paid by the losing party. The District court will pay the bill if the  
7 indigent prisoner pro se loses. Why would Congress make it mandatory for witnesses to  
8 attend these cases but not provide separate funding for expert witnesses? Perhaps Congress  
9 felt it was the duty of the Federal courts to provide accountability to the medical profession  
10 in prisons with their own funds. This has led to the present situation: preordained negative  
11 outcomes for deserving pro se prisoners in medical care cases.

12 Once disputed medical facts are presented to the District Court, the Court will know  
13 whether the prisoner has the evidence needed to make their case. Non-medical personnel  
14 cannot fully comprehend the medical evidence once it is available. As in Predraza v. Jones,  
15 only a neutral medical expert can knowledgably evaluate the medical positions of both sides  
16 [71 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995)]. In Predraza v. Jones a prisoner pro se wanted a neutral  
17 medical expert to evaluate whether or not heroin withdrawal was an understandable reason  
18 for delay in filing. Heroin withdrawal is a serious medical condition and only a neutral  
19 medical expert can opine about its symptoms, duration, etc. [Id.].

20 Predraza in the alternative asked the District Court for a “jailhouse expert witness” [Id.].  
21 It was denied. Petitioner tried this option. The declaration of Donna M.B. Anderson, M.D.  
22 introduced Petitioner’s medical theory of the case to the District Court but was ultimately  
23 stricken because Dr. Anderson is a prisoner (see Appendix K, ECF 219).

1 Even though Congress did not authorize separate funds for neutral medical expert  
2 witnesses; justice demands that the Courts use medical experts reliability with disputed  
3 medical facts. Prison medical officials currently expect accountability primarily in class  
4 action suits (upon information and belief). Individual prisoners are subject to extremes of  
5 physical suffering and pain (personal experience). Evidence shows that this set of medical  
6 care cases requires the District Courts to utilize expert witness expertise that may not be  
7 required in non-medical cases.

8 D. CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE ACCESS TO COURT.

9 Prisoners are guaranteed “meaningful access to court” [Bounds v. Smith, 430 US 817,  
10 822 (1977)]. This right has been limited by the requirement of an “actual injury” to the  
11 prisoners before bringing a claim [Lewis v. Casey, 518 US 343, 351-353 (1996)]. Narrowly  
12 interpreted, these cases pertain to prison officials “impeding” prisoner access to courts [Id.].

13 Petitioner, however, humbly asks this High Court to look at constitutional access to court  
14 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments through a wider lens. In Petitioner’s case and in  
15 similarly situated cases, it is the United States District Court that is limiting “access to court”  
16 and “impeding” prisoners pro se from obtaining deserved damages.

17 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court held “when a prison regulation impinges on  
18 inmate’s constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate  
19 penological interests...” [482 US 78, 89 (1987)]. Analogously, in this set of prisoner pro se  
20 medical cases, the District Court’s denial of expert witnesses is only valid if it is related to  
21 legitimate District Court interests. Petitioner believes that “saving money” is not a valid  
22 reason to deny justice.

1        There is no legitimate government interest in maintaining unconstitutional medical care  
2        in prisons. Pro se prisoners have no other means for legal relief other than 42 USC §1983  
3        Federal cases (Prisoners have no right to litigation unrelated to their criminal sentences or  
4        conditions of confinement) [Lewis v. Casey, 518 US 343, 355 (1996)]. The ripple effect of  
5        opening the door to some of these deserving lawsuits to win damages will be positive for the  
6        state of health of American prisoners. Unfortunately, the cost will not be de minimus  
7        [Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78 (1987)].

8        Petitioner's need for a neutral medical expert witness and the need for reliable  
9        appointment of neutral medical experts in similarly situated cases meets the Lewis v. Casey  
10       criteria [518 US 343,353 (1996)]. These pro se prisoner plaintiffs are suffering "actual  
11       injury" by losing cases due to preordained negative outcomes. The medial care claims are  
12       about conditions of confinement. They are definitely not "frivolous" once claims have been  
13       ruled cognizable.

14       "Access to court" is meaningless unless it confers the ability to win meritorious lawsuits.  
15       Lewis has been interpreted by some courts to mean that pro se prisoners are only required to  
16       be able to file a complaint [Benjamin v. Jacobsen, 935 F. Supp 332, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)].  
17       Others, however lean on the Lewis Court's comment that "It is the role of courts to provide  
18       relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who suffered, or who will imminently  
19       suffer, actual harm..." [Lewis v. Casey, 518 US 343, 249 (1996) (emphasis added)]. The  
20       Eleventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals held that the right of access to court was not  
21       satisfied "[merely] by permitting the prisoner to file a complaint" [Bonner v. City of  
22       Pritchard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1212-1213 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (en banc)].

1 This High Court has addressed litigants ability to win cases in 2002 in an non-prisoner  
2 case [Christopher v. Harbury, 536 US 403, 414 (2002)]. Petitioner humbly asks this Court to  
3 revisit this issue and to advise District Courts that neutral medical experts routinely be  
4 obtained in prisoner pro se 42 USC §1983 medical care cases after disputed facts have been  
5 presented to the Court to prevent preordained negative outcomes.

6 E. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A CIVIL JURY

7 This High Court has never accepted the “total incorporation theory” of the Fourteenth  
8 Amendment whereby the amendment “[would be] deemed to subsume the provisions of the  
9 Bill of Rights en masse” [McDonald v. Chicago, 561 US 742 (2010)]. Gatekeeping judicial  
10 functions that prevent a case from reaching a civil jury are allowed without violating the  
11 Seventh Amendment [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, 509 US 579 (1993)] (regarding  
12 appointment of an expert witness)]. On the other hand, the Seventh Amendment right to a  
13 jury trial has been affirmed in Federal cases “in suits at common law” [Curtis v. Loether, 415  
14 US 189 (1974)].

15 In one case where the right to a jury trial based on the Seventh Amendment was upheld,  
16 the Court concluded that 42 USC §1983 lawsuits dealt with “Causes and Actions analogous  
17 to those tried at the time of [the United States Constitution’s] founding and that the particular  
18 trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common law right  
19 as it existed in 1791” [Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 US 687 (1999), HN 11].

20 Medical care cases fall within the substance of common law in 1791. Court appointment  
21 of neutral medical expert witnesses in cases discussed in this Petition is necessary to preserve  
22 all party’s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States

1 Constitution. Respondents requested a jury trial in Petitioner's case when they answered the  
2 Fourth Amended complaint (Appendix K, ECF 58, 63-65, 82).

## 3 4 **ARGUMENT II**

5 **INDIVIDUAL PRISONER PRO SE §42 USC 1983 MEDICAL CARE CASES**  
6 **WITH COGNIZABLE CLAIMS IN WHICH DISPUTED MEDICAL FACTS**  
7 **HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT ARE EXTRAORDINARY. THEY**  
8 **ARE EXTRAORDINARY BECAUSE THEY ARE RARE; AND BECAUSE THEY**  
9 **HAVE SURVIVED 28 USC §1915 A(a-b(1)) SCREENING, PRISON LITIGATION**  
10 **REFORM ACT EXHAUSTION AND FAILED ATTEMPTS AT SETTLEMENT.**  
11 **NEUTRAL MEDICAL EXPERT OPINION IS REQUIRED TO ADVISE**  
12 **DISTRICT COURTS CONCERNING THE VIABILITY OF THE MEDICAL**  
13 **POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES IN THE FACE OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS**  
14 **AND/OR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.**  
15

### 16 **A. NO NEED FOR MANDAMUS; APPEAL SUFFICIENT**

17 The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals denies Petitioner's Petition for  
18 Panel Rehearing (which it reframed as a motion for reconsideration) in this Appeal #18-  
19 15816 because Petitioner "has not demonstrated that this case warrants the intervention of  
20 this court by means of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus" (Appendix A, p.1).  
21 Petitioner believes she erred in requesting the mandamus in the Petition for Panel Rehearing  
22 (Appendix G2, p.15). Mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal [*In re Westin*, 18 F.3d 860,  
23 864 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994)]. Mandamus is inappropriate as long as this appeal is based on an  
24 appealable order [*Id.*]. The Court of Appeals could have given relief by reversing District  
25 Court orders denying the expert witness (see Appendix C, E, F, & H).

### 26 **B. THESE CASES ARE EXTRAORDINARY**

27 Despite the denial of this appeal at the Appellate Level, individual prisoner pro se 42  
28 USC §1983 medical care cases in which disputed medical facts have been presented to the  
29 District Court are extraordinary. They are extraordinary because they are rare and because

1 they have survived 28 USC §1915 A(a-b(1)) screening, Prison Litigation Reform Act  
2 exhaustion and failed settlement attempts.

3 These cases are rare. Most prisoner pro se medical care cases fail before reaching this  
4 point. Petitioner knows of only one case in the past ten years that has reached settlement  
5 [Crooker v. United States, U.S.D.C. (D. Mass) Case No. 3:13-cv-30199-FDS, 2015, U.S.  
6 District LEXIS 12386]; and one where summary judgment reversed in favor of plaintiff  
7 [James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2018)]. Statistically, these few are not enough.

8 There are over 2 million prisoners in the United States. In the 1990's, at least 200,000  
9 serious medical errors occurred in the United States' general population in one year [Institute  
10 of Medicine]. At that time, the population was approximately 250 million people.  
11 Calculation gives a serious error rate of 1/1250 persons. Using this rate to apply to prisoners,  
12 one would expect a minimum of 1300 serious medical errors per year among the United  
13 States' prison population. There clearly have not been 13,000 medical care lawsuits settled  
14 in favor of prisoner plaintiffs in the last ten years.

15 Prisoner pro se cases in which disputed facts have been presented have survived 28 USC  
16 §1915 A(a-b(1)) screening. The prisoner has stated cognizable claims under the Eighth  
17 Amendment to the United States Constitution and the defendants have been served process.  
18 All "frivolous" claims have been dismissed.

19 These cases have also survived exhaustion of administrative remedies under Prison  
20 Litigation Reform Act. The Prison Litigation Reform Act has been very effective at reducing  
21 the number of prisoner pro se cases filed [Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, p.413-414].

22 In these cases, disputed medical facts have been presented to the Court. Often the  
23 prisoner plaintiff has been served with motion for Summary Judgment by the Respondents as

1 Petitioner was. In the alternative, objections to motions to dismiss contain disputed facts or  
2 preparatory documents for settlement conferences. In one way or another, the District Court  
3 has become aware that the prisoner can articulate and substantiate the pertinent factual details  
4 from their point of view.

5 These four qualities – rarity, survival of screening, survival of exhaustion, and survival of  
6 failed settlement attempts – make this small set of prisoner pro se medical care cases  
7 “extraordinary.” For this reason, these cases all deserve to have neutral medical expert  
8 witnesses appointed by the District Courts to opine for the Court concerning the medical  
9 facts. The District Court will then be better able to exercise its discretion in interpreting the  
10 law while allowing for the liberal construction of pro se pleadings [Erickson v. Pardus, 551  
11 US 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)]. Court appointed neutral medical expert witnesses should be  
12 reliably given to these cases that have become extraordinary by reaching the “disputed facts”  
13 stage of the proceedings.

## 14 15 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

16 Petitioner humbly prays that:

- 17 1) This High Court grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari concerning the Ninth Circuit  
18 United States Court of Appeals, case #18-15816;
- 19 2) This High Court advise lower courts to obtain court appointed medical expert witnesses  
20 in all individual prisoner pro se 42 USC §1983 medical care cases in which the District  
21 Court has been presented with disputed medical facts;

