Case No: _____

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ROBERT R. PRUNTY-PETITIONER

VS.

THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF DESOTO COUNTY FLORIDA, ET AL;

THE AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION, (AHCA) ET AL & THE JACK NICKLAUS MIAMI CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, ET AL

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PANEL, CASE NO: 17:14891

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT R. PRUNTY (Petitioner Pro Se)

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ARCADIA, FLORIDA 34266

(863) 991-5195

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1.) DOES THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS THREE JUDGE PANEL HAVE THE RIGHT TO CREATE CONFLICTS AMONGST THE CIRCUITS WHEN IT UNILATERALLY CHANGED THE SUPREME COURT TEXT AND MEANING IN FRY V. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOL?.....PG.2 & 21

2.) DOES CHANGING THE TEXT, VERNACULAR AND MEANING OF A SUPREME COURT OPINION ABRIDGE THE COURTS ORIGINAL MEANING TO THE POINT OF CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION?.....PG.S 2, 4 & 23

3.) IS THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PANEL PERMITTED TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW PRINCIPLES BY UNILATERALLY CREATING "SEPARATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM RULINGS" FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN LITIGANTS EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PROCESSES.....PG.S 2 ,4 & 24

4.) IS REVIEW WARRANTED BECAUSE 34 C.F.R. 300.154(d)(2)(v) MANDATES THAT PUBLIC AGENCIES LIKE SCHOOL DISTRICTS OBTAIN PARENTAL CONSENT BEFORE ACCESSING FEDERALLY

LIST OF PARTIES

1.) Robert R. Prunty, (PETITIONER PRO SE')

2.) The School District of Desoto County Florida and Board of Directors- (Respondents)

3.) The Agency for Health Care Administration and Board of Directors- (Respondents)

4.) The Jack Nicklaus Miami Children's Hospital and Board of Directors- (Respondents)

**RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

1. Petitioner has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of Petitioner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX ITEMS:

APPENDIX A IS ORIGINAL 11TH CIRCUIT APPEALS PANEL OPINION

APPENDIX B IS ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION SEEKING REHEARING

APPENDIX C IS DISTRICT COURT'S ORIGINAL ORDER DENYING COMPLAINT

APPENDIX D IS DISTRICT COURT ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS RULES 59 AND 60 MOTIONS

APPENDIX E IS MAGISTRATE RECOMMENDATION TO COURT TO GRANT MOTIONS TO DISMISS

APPENDIX F IS THE FINAL ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT DENYING PETITIONER'S RULE 60 MOTION

APPENDIX G IS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

1.) DOES THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS THREE JUDGE PANEL HAVE THE RIGHT TO CREATE CONFLICTS AMONGST THE CIRCUITS WHEN IT UNILATERALLY CHANGED THE SUPREME COURT TEXT AND MEANING IN FRY V. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOL? PETITIONER BELIEVES REVIEW IS WARRANTED.....PG.S 4 & 21

2.) DOES CHANGING THE TEXT, VERNACULAR AND MEANING OF A SUPREME COURT OPINION ABRIDGE THE COURTS ORIGINAL MEANING TO THE POINT OF CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION? PETITIONER BELIEVES REVIEW IS WARRANTED.....PG.S 2, 4 & 23

3.)IS THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PANEL PERMITTED TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW PRINCIPLES BY UNILATERALLY CREATING "SEPARATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM RULINGS" FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN LITIGANTS EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PROCESSES.....PG.S 2 ,4 & 24

APPENDIX:

Order by District Court denying Petitioner's request for Reconsideration.

Case 2:16-cv-00577JES-CM. December 8th 2016

Plaintiff's Rule 59 & 60 denied. Case 2:16-cv-00577JES-CM March 29th 2017

Statutory Provisions Involved:

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS & TREATISES.....PG.S 5, 6, 7 & 9

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' Three Judge Panel, filed originally on June. 14th 2018, affirmed the District Courts ruling and was unreported. This ruling appears at Appendix A.

The subsequent Order of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Panel denying Petitioners Motion for Rehearing was entered on July 23rd 2018, and appears at Appendix B.

The Opinion Order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida which granted the defendants several motions to dismiss, and appears at Appendix C. This Order was entered on February 1st 2017.

The District Courts Opinion Order granting defendant AHCA's Motion seeking an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff's Rules 59 and 60 motions, at Appendix D. Order entered on February 23rd 2017.

The District Courts Opinion Order denying Plaintiff's motion seeking reconsideration of the Magistrates recommendations, at Appendix E. Order entered on December 8th 2016.

The District Courts Opinion Order denying Plaintiff's Motions made pursuant to FRCP Rules 59 & 60, at Appendix F. The Order was entered on March 29th 2016.

JURISDICTION

On July 23rd 2018 Petitioners Motion seeking a Rehearing was denied by the Three-Judge Panel. On **May 6th 2016** Petitioner initially brought suit against Respondent defendants in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging Constitutional Challenges to Florida Statutes as well as violations of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), Title VI, Invasion of Privacy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and allegations —claiming IDEA was **forever** violated under **34 CFR §300.154(d)(2)(v)** due to the policy of defendants completely failing to obtain ***Parental Consent*** for over (5) five years, while defendants surreptitiously and

unlawfully accessed Medicaid and other Federally supported services by unilaterally filling out all Petitioner's children's IEP contracts without a Parents Consent or Signature. (See: First Amended Complaint).

Ironically, Judgement was entered against Petitioner by the District Court on **May 6th 2017.** Petitioner timely filed several post-judgment motions which failed. Petitioner thereby appealed. Judgement was entered by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Three-Judge panel on June 14th 2018. Petitioner sought relief by a Motion for Rehearing, which was denied on **July 23rd 2018.**

Because Florida Medicaid, (AHCA) is also a party to this action, and because **28 U. S. C. §2403(a)** may apply, Service by Certified Mail was also made upon the Florida Attorney General and the Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N. W., Washington, DC 20530-0001. Accordingly, the United States District Court has already Certified to the Florida Attorney General the fact that the constitutionality of an Act of Congress was drawn into question in this case.

This writ is also filed under this Court's Rule 11 and all listed entities in this action were served by first class certified mail. Petitioner has also complied with Supreme Court notifications required by Rule 29.4 (b)&(c). The Petitioners Motion for Rehearing was denied on July 23rd 2018.

Therefore, the Jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Three-Judge Panel is hereby being invoked under **28 U.S.C. 1254(1)** and **Supreme Court Rule 10(c).**

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

First Amendment to the United States Constitution

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

sec. 1—-All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Parental Consent Doctrine according to Federal Regulations:

34 C.F.R. Sec.300.154(d)(2)

(iv) Prior to accessing a child's or parent's public benefits or insurance for the first time, and after providing notification to the child's parents consistent with paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section, must obtain written, parental consent that—

(A) Meets the requirements of §99.30 of this title and §300.622, which consent must specify the personally identifiable information that may be disclosed (e.g., records or information about the services that may be provided to a particular child), the purpose of the disclosure (e.g., billing for services under part 300), and the agency to which the disclosure may be made (e.g., the State's public benefits or insurance program (e.g., Medicaid)); and

(B) Specifies that the parent understands and agrees that the public agency may access the parent's or child's public benefits or insurance to pay for services under part 300.

(v) Prior to accessing a child's or parent's public benefits or insurance for the first time, and annually thereafter, must provide written notification, consistent with §300.503(c), to the child's parents, that includes—

(A) A statement of the parental consent provisions in paragraphs (d)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) of this section;

(B) A statement of the "no cost" provisions in paragraphs (d)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section;

(C) A statement that the parents have the right under 34 CFR part 99 and part 300 to withdraw their consent to disclosure of their child's personally identifiable information to the agency responsible for the administration of the State's public benefits or insurance program (e.g., Medicaid) at any time; and

(D) A statement that the withdrawal of consent or refusal to provide consent under 34 CFR part 99 and part 300 to disclose personally identifiable information to the agency responsible for the administration of the State's public benefits or insurance program (e.g., Medicaid) does not relieve the public agency of its responsibility to ensure that all required services are provided at no cost to the parents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts giving rise to this case

Starting in late 2011, when Petitioner moved to Desoto County, Florida with his wife, five children and their nanny, Petitioner noticed all the paperwork and I.E.P. Contracts involved in the school's enrollment process at Desoto County Schools, were "already filled out" and only needed a "parent's signature" for completion and execution. (See Appeal Appendix, Case No. 2:17-cv-291, at docket no. 25, par.(s) 1,2 & 12).

However, upon actually reading the unilaterally and suspiciously created IEP Contracts, Petitioner noticed that even though he only signed one IEP Contract in (5) five years, the policy of exclusion from the process mandated by **34 C.F.R. 154** went forth as if Petitioner had actually signed the IEP Contracts which were unlawfully created in the first instance.

Therefore, and in the midst of the confusion about being ignored as a Parent for years, Petitioner filed a lawsuit inaccurately claiming that this case was based upon the 13th Amendment due to the alleged forced exclusion. That action was filed in 2014 and is known as Case 1:14-cv-20834.

In that action Petitioner learned that Florida Statutes supported the full exclusion of Parents regarding the obtaining of "Parental Consent" before providing necessary services to students. This knowledge became the basis for this present action, known as Case 2:17-cv-00577.

The Original Complaint is found at docket 1 of Case No. 2:17-cv-00577. Petitioner withdrew the Constitutional Challenge after Amendment of this Complaint, since all parties as well as the Florida Attorney General failed to respond to such allegations of the Original Complaint.

By the time of the filing of Case 2:17-cv-00577, Petitioner had fully learned of the secret policy of the Respondents which systematically excludes Parents from giving Consent regarding their children's educational and medical destines, and Petitioner thereby chose to vigorously litigate about such a devastating reality as that described above.

B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Although the First Amended Complaint clearly informed the Court that Petitioner was the only affected and aggrieved person involved in the case, the Court insisted that the case was about children and their education. (See Complaint and Courts Order at Appendix C).

As evidence of Petitioner being the sole aggrieved person, please see paragraph 21(a) of the First Amended Complaint, which clearly spelled out the prerogative and intent of this Petitioner. (See: First Amended Complaint's Par. 21(a) below):

First Amended Complaint—(par. 21.a.)

> ***"Furthermore, the procedural violations pursuant to IDEA, have nothing to do with children and everything to do with parents. There is no relief under IDEA that can be applied in such a scenario, as will be shown below. In any event, Plaintiff, as the main aggrieved person in this action seeks relief in this case that cannot be remedied by the relief supported by IDEA. Therefore, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is futile and can never be applied to this Plaintiff pursuant to the IDEA. For the following reasons, and as a point of reference, please be advised that this Plaintiff's Complaint and alleged injuries do not relate to or seek:***

a.) The identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child, or
b.)Any provisions of a free and appropriate public education.
c.) Any educational program of any child whatsoever.
d.) Any educational injuries, except retroactive physical and emotional injuries.
e.) Any declaratory orders under IDEA.
f.) Any orders for future conduct under IDEA.
g.) Any compensatory education under IDEA.
h.) Any reimbursement for tuition under IDEA.
i.) Any expunction of records under IDEA.
j.) Any recension of diplomas under IDEA.
k.) Any repayments or payments under IEE's or IDEA.
l.) Any education related damages whatsoever.
m.) Any damages relating to the "special education" or "related services" of children whatsoever, under IDEA.
n.) Any educational needs of children under IDEA whatsoever.——
(Please see First Amended Complaint—Case 2:17-cv-00577)

However, even after viewing this reality of the Complaint, the Appeal Panel, Magistrate and the District Court actually attempted to create **another separate narrative** which all falsely claimed Petitioner brought the action about children and their educational needs. (See Appendix C, D & E).

Obviously, the Lower Courts had no concern or regard for the **facts**, the **law,** the **Plaintiff** or the **children** who are being **irreparably doomed** by the horrifying acts of exclusion reminiscent of chattel slavery —which are systemically perpetuated as Florida State Policy— and legally supported by the defendants and now, the District and Appeals Court, under the guise of **IDEA**, **Exhaustion**, and antiquated pre-Brown v. Board of Education styled Florida statutes which intentionally exclude parents of African American persons like slaves on a

plantation, politely hidden behind the dark workings of a typical U.S. pro-slavery pre-civil war city.

The District Court subsequently ruled against Petitioner in every regard. The entire facts of the First Amended Complaint were completely disregarded by the lower court while the constant false narrative of the defendants was embraced and supported by the District Court.

C. THE APPELLATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

Step for step, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Panel agreed in every regard with the District Court. As Petitioner screamed from the top of it's lungs about the personal treatment by defendants that had nothing to do with children, every lower Court screamed just as hard that the case is about children.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals is well aware that children are not at issue when there is a policy in place that excludes "parents" in violation of **Sec. 300.154(d)(2).**

At no time has any defendant come forth with proof that it **ever** obtained "Parental Consent" in over five years of Petitioner's children being enrolled at the District School of Desoto County Florida, as a matter of fact and law. Nor did they obtain Parental Consent with any other verifiable proof that is required by Federal law and statutes.

Therefore, after the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Panel acquiesced in further overlooking the Complaint, it also unilaterally decided to overlook the plain commands of the United States Supreme Court as well when it further manipulated the plain commands of this Court regarding the Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools case decision, to the extreme detriment of Petitioner's case in chief, as well as it's "gravamen".

In order to completely and further rhetorically destroy the integrity of Petitioner's Complaint, both the Appeals Panel and the District Court described the "gravamen" of the Complaint as relating to "children and a FAPE". However, and with all due respect to the U.S. Judiciary, nothing could be further from the truth. (See: Complaint, par. 21. A.)

In it's final Opinion, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Panel decided to actually stray from the Supreme Court text in manners devastating to the expression and intent of the Supreme Court's Opinion in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools. See below comparison—

U.S. SUPREME COURT FRY V. NAPOLEON RULING:

> ..."***Could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school——say a public theater or library....and second, could an adult at the school—say an employee or visitor—have presented the same grievance"?***

11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PANEL'S FRY VERSION:

> ***"Could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school, such as a public library—and, Could an adult at the school say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance?—***

Here it can clearly be seen that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Panel neatly and intentionally neglected to mention the phrase **"Public Theaters"**, because all "**Public Theaters**" mandate by Federal Law that no persons under 13 years of age can visit such theaters "without being accompanied by a Parent or other adult. **34 C.F.R. 154** is identical in its purpose and intent.

Likewise, Federal Law also attempts to prevent school districts and health agencies from brazenly exploiting Federal Resources and minor age children by equally mandating that ***"Parental Consent"*** must be obtained before accessing educational and or medical services for the first time.

Thus, the "gravamen" of Petitioner's action is based 100% upon the intentional failure of defendants to ever attempt to obtain the Federal mandated ***"Parental Consent"*** to access Federally supported services, and none other.

Surely the Appeals Panel is well-aware of the surreptitious and developmentally devastating crime of intentionally failing to obtain parental consent— that is being so blatantly done in Florida. Such Parental Consent "**must**" be obtained "**before**"

I.E.P's are even discussed, as a matter of fact and law. **(See: I.D.E.A. 34 C.F.R. Sec.300.154(d)(2)).**

REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

1.) DOES THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS THREE JUDGE PANEL HAVE THE RIGHT TO CREATE CONFLICTS AMONGST THE CIRCUITS WHEN IT UNILATERALLY CHANGED THE SUPREME COURT TEXT AND MEANING IN FRY V. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOL? PETITIONER BELIEVES REVIEW IS WARRANTED.

On February 22, 2017, the opinion of the Court in Fry v. Napoleon was written by Justice Elena Kagan, joined by the Chief Justice, Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.

The Opinion of the Honorable Supreme Court in **Fry** was Published.—(See: Fonseca v. Consol. Rail Corp., F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2001); GTE Mobilnet. Of Cal. Ltd. P'Ship v. City and Cnty. Of S.F., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 n. 4 (N.D. Cal.2006)—and represented ***"Supreme Court Precedent"*** with regards to the case at issue.

The words or text of the Opinion thus became "written in stone" guideposts for the lower courts, in that these are designed to provide "predictability", "fairness", "appearance of justice"; "judicial economy", "and collegiality". (See: Hohn v. United States, 524 US, 236 (1998))& James C. Rehnquist, Note, "The Power That Shall Be Vested In A Precedent": Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the Supreme Court...66 B.U. L.Rev. 345, 347 (1986).

Therefore, when a 3-judge panel unilaterally changes the expression of a "United States Supreme Court Opinion", such an effort is an attempt to make nationwide its own rulings, over and above those of the U.S. Supreme Court. (See: United States v. AMC Entm't. Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771 (9th Cir. 2008).

Most importantly, the expression of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Panel's Opinion which left out the U.S. Supreme Courts actual text, was and is a self-defeating attempt at Judicial Activism, Horizontal Stare Decisis or a Law of the Circuit end run around the United States Supreme Court's **Supreme** right to formulate and control the force, depth and complexity if it's hallowed rulings.

2.) PETITIONER BELIEVES REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION'S 1ST AMENDMENT FORBIDS THE ABRIDGMENT OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH

To "abridge" means to shorten by omissions while retaining the basic contents: to **abridge** a reference book. to reduce or lessen in duration, scope, authority, etc.; diminish; curtail: to **abridge** a visit; to **abridge** one's freedom. to deprive; cut off.

In this case it is clear that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Panel unilaterally decided to "shorten", "omit", "curtail", "diminish", and or otherwise limit the United States Supreme Court Opinion and expression from the Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools case, as a matter of fact and law.

The fraudulent speech performed by the Panel was done against this Petitioner and Supreme Court Jurisprudence itself, and any others in the same circumstance of being excluded from school enrollment participation by state and federal agencies and school districts.

Essentially, the Panel "lied" on the Supreme Court as well as the liability/exhaustion scenario described by the Court, merely to fraudulently destroy Petitioner's cause. Lies are not protected by the 1st Amendment if they are part of such a fraud. Future cases would have to take the statements of the 11th Circuit as true, even when they are not. (See: New York Times v Sullivan (1964)).See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U. S., at 771 (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections of the First Amendment).

3.) IS THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PANEL PERMITTED TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW PRINCIPLES BY UNILATERALLY CREATING "SEPARATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM RULINGS" FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN LITIGANTS EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PROCESSES.....PG.S 2 ,4 & 24

Since the case of Brown v Board of Education was decided, the concept of "separate but equal" has taken a different form. Nowadays, in order to maintain the "separate but equal" status objectives of the "States", and remain "politically correct", interested persons are merely ignored, unless they have excellent legal counsel or a charismatic civil rights leader pleading their case.

In this case, myriad African American parents were ignored for over (5) five years, high-handedly—-in face of the I.D.E.A. mandate concerning "Parental Consent". (See: 34 C.F.R. 300.154(d)(2)(v)).

Even Federal Law was ignored while the predatory defendants pretend parents don't exist by creating **bogus** IEP Contracts, merely to more closely manipulate Federal funds and outcomes regarding minorities and the disabled.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals 3-judge Panel is no different than the defendants in Brown v. Board of Education. They hope to make new law regarding parents of African American children in school settings, and forever allow school districts and health agencies to decide the futures of African American children and families.

Thus, the "separate but equal" concept thrives surreptitiously in at least the 11th Circuit. Certainly, if the Plaintiff had been a race other than African American, the Panel would not have changed the words of the Supreme Court Opinion in Fry.

Changing the United States Supreme Court's protected expression by anyone is wrong. For a U.S. Court of Appeals to do the same thing is an outrage. No person has a right to fraudulently lie and deprive another of Due Process of Law. This Petitioner has a right to be protected from such crimes against humanity, according to the 14 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

4.) PETITIONER BELIEVES REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE 34 C.F.R. 300.154(d)(2)(v) MANDATES THAT PUBLIC AGENCIES LIKE SCHOOL DISTRICTS ALWAYS OBTAIN PARENTAL CONSENT BEFORE ACCESSING FEDERALLY RESOURCES OR PERFORMING THE I.E.P. PROCESS AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL LAW.

Finally, and as can be clearly seen from the Complaint, the "gravamen" of the case has always been about this Petitioner and not children. Children cannot provide "Parental Consent". This Petitioner has persistently complained about such failure to obtain Parental Consent, as the 11th Circuit Appeals Panel is equally aware.

Armed with the knowledge of the Complaint, anyone could discern immediately that Petitioner is merely complaining about a long time "policy of exclusion" which forbids certain persons from the traditional school enrollment process. Therefore, and as a matter of fact and law, "No IEP contract can exist before **34 C.F.R. 154** has been fulfilled"....

Since at least 2006, **34 C.F.R. 300.154(d)(2)(v)** has **been** the Law. That's at least (10) ten years before Petitioner ever filed the Original action. It appears the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Panel choose to also ignore this violation of Federal Law by the defendants while at the same time changing the language of the U.S. Supreme Court in Fry.

Because the defendants "still" to this day, operate and maintain the policy of separation, exclusion and a lack of parental consent, anyone aware of the IDEA Statute stated above who does nothing is as guilty as the named defendants. Therefore, **34 C.F.R.154(d)(2)(v)** is violated daily by force and Florida's supporting unconstitutional educational statutes.

CONCLUSION

The case presents an issue of national importance. Aside from being incorrect based solely upon the Original expression of the Supreme Court in Fry, the issue the Panel is trying to control relates to thousands of other African American parents who have never been allowed the opportunity to give "parental consent" for the educational and medical needs of their children, nationwide as well. The problem is far larger than this Petitioner and his family.

In Desoto County Florida there are between 500 to 700 families directly affected by the policy of intentionally failing to obtain parental consent. The sinister policy works to free up Federal dollars deemed by the States to be best put elsewhere.

Desoto County Florida merely scratches the surface of the problem. Nationwide, the number is astronomical.

The "No Parental Consent Policy" allows interested agencies and entities falling under Title VI and other Federal Statutes to shape and mold the quality of funding in their prospective districts, while parents have no idea about the resources

secretly being withheld from their children, and the Government thinks the monies are being used properly.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Three-Judge Panel, by actually changing the text of the U.S. Supreme Court's Opinion in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, has created a dispute amongst lower courts that can only be corrected or settled by the U.S. Supreme Court about what the law actually is.

Such a far departure from Supreme Court Precedent deviates from the accepted and usual course of proceedings.

This Petitioner believes it to be quite scandalous and dastardly for Magistrates, Federal Judges and Three-Judge Appeals Court Panels to attempt to "re-write" the narrative of a litigant's actual complaint, to his detriment, while he himself watches in amazement.

It is equally abhorrent when a trusted Appeals Panel chooses to lie and commit fraud upon the Court, by changing the literal expressions of the United States Supreme Court.

Courts at every level of this case have claimed the case is brought concerning children and a FAPE, when **no** part of the Complaint states such a fabrication.

This mantra has been chanted by defense counsel, Magistrates, Federal Judges and Appellate Judges alike. The buck must stop somewhere.

All lies are not supported by the First Amendment. Lies of this Judicial magnitude, which promote a Fraud Upon the Court and upon the Petitioner, must not be accepted or tolerated in a civilized society.

Respectfully Submitted



Robert R. Prunty

I, Robert R. Prunty, the Petitioner in the above described case, hereby declare under penalty of perjury and 28 U.S.C. 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct.



Robert R. Prunty

October 19th 2018

Petitioner hereby further certifies that a copy of the foregoing was sent by Certified Mail to the following listed recipients, on or about October 19th 2018



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1.) United States Supreme Court
% Clerk's Office
1 First St NE, Washington, DC 20543

2.) The Honorable Ms. Pam Bondi;
Florida Attorney General
State of Florida
The Capitol PL-01
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

3.) The Hon. Mr. Noel Francisco, Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N. W., Washington, DC 20530-0001.

4.)The School District of Desoto County, Florida
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APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TABLE OF CONTENTS