

# APPENDICES LIST

## 1. Senthilnathan v. AT&T Inc, Docket No. 3:17-cv-01381 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2017), Court Docket

**PARTIES** AT&T Inc, Rajamani Senthilnathan  
**JUDGE** SAMUEL A LINDSAY  
**DATE FILED** May. 24, 2017  
**LAST UPDATED** Jan. 23, 2018 at 11:57 PM  
**FEDERAL NOS** Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [470]  
**CAUSE OF ACTION** 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

## 2. Senthilnathan v. AT&T Inc, Docket No. 3:17-cv-01385 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2017), Court Docket

**PARTIES** AT&T Inc, Rajamani Senthilnathan  
**JUDGE** DAVID C. GODBEY  
**DATE FILED** May. 24, 2017  
**LAST UPDATED** Aug. 13, 2017 at 11:51 PM  
**FEDERAL NOS** Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [470]  
**CAUSE OF ACTION** 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

## 3. RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN vs. AT&T INC Docket No. DC-15-04331 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2015) Court Docket

**PARTIES** AT&T INC, SENTHILNATHAN, RAJAMANI  
**DATE FILED** Apr. 17, 2015  
**LAST UPDATED** May. 07, 2015 at 12:30 PM  
**CAUSE OF ACTION** DEFAMATION

## 4. Rajamani Senthilnathan v. AT&T Inc, Docket No. 2:15-cv-01331 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2015), Court Docket

**PARTIES** AT&T Inc, Rajamani Senthilnathan  
**JUDGE** DAVID C. GODBEY  
**DATE FILED** Apr. 14, 2015  
**LAST UPDATED** Apr. 16, 2015 at 01:26 PM  
**FEDERAL NOS** Personal Injury - Assault [320]  
**CAUSE OF ACTION** 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION


RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN, §  
§  
Plaintiff, §  
v. § Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1381-L-BK  
§  
AT&T, INC., §  
§  
Defendant. §

**ORDER**

On January 3, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge Magistrate Judge Renée Harris Toliver entered the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (“Report”), recommending that the court grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for alleged violations of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the only cause of action asserted by Plaintiff. The magistrate judge further recommended that the court not allow Plaintiff to amend his pleadings. No objections to the Report were filed.

After considering the motion, briefs, pleadings, and Report, the court determines that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct, and **accepts** them as those of the court. The court, therefore, **grants** Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7); and **dismisses with prejudice** Plaintiff’s RICO cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Further, for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge, the court will not allow Plaintiff to amend his pleadings. As no other claims remain, the court will enter judgment by separate order.

**It is so ordered** this 18th of January, 2018.



Sam A. Lindsay  
United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

**RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN,**

§  
§  
§  
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§

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. **3:17-CV-1381-L-BK**


**AT&T, INC.,**

Defendant.

**JUDGMENT**

This judgment is issued pursuant to the court's order, dated January 18, 2018. It is, therefore, **ordered, adjudged, and decreed** that Plaintiff Rajamani Senthilnathan ("Plaintiff") take nothing against Defendant AT&T, Inc.; that this action is **dismissed with prejudice**; that all relief requested by Plaintiff is **denied**; that all allowable and reasonable costs are taxed against Plaintiff; and that all relief not expressly granted herein is **denied**.

Signed this 18th day of January, 2018.

  
Sam A. Lindsay  
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN, §  
Plaintiff, §  
§  
v. § Civil Case No. 3:17-CV-1381-L-BK  
§  
AT&T, INC., §  
Defendant. §

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to the District Judge's *Order of Reference*, Doc. 9, this cause is before the undersigned for a recommendation on *Defendant's Motion to Dismiss*. Doc. 7. For the reasons that follow, the *Motion to Dismiss* should be **GRANTED**.

**A. Procedural History**

Plaintiff filed his complaint in May 2017, alleging that Defendant, his former employer, violated the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") during the course of his employment. Doc. 3 at 3, 5-6. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he initially worked for Defendant in a contract position as a video-encoder. Doc. 3 at 5. He was hired as a full-time employee as part of Defendant's networking group, which necessitated a move from Dallas to Austin. Doc. 3 at 5. In his rambling and disjointed complaint, Plaintiff alleges that during and after his employment, (1) Defendant's hiring manager and "his coterie" had him purchase a home that was not in a "prime location" and sent someone to break into the house; (2) his manager, Michael Raftelis, caused "shoulder-instability" in Plaintiff's child in early 2012, and Raftelis and his coterie used electronic means to lead physicians to not correctly diagnose the child's scoliosis; (3) Raftelis watched all of Plaintiff's and his families' activities and spread rumors regarding Plaintiff's skills; (4) Raftelis used another person to "deny access to home-

reference lab, where 3rd party devices were tested”; and (5) Defendant’s hiring manager is “unable to verify [Plaintiff’s] employment,” and Plaintiff thus assumes he “was framed after [he] resigned.” Doc. 3 at 5. Plaintiff seeks over \$11 million in damages, health care coverage for his family for life, and the redaction of false statements from the Federal Register about Defendant’s settlement of an anti-trust suit filed by the Department of Justice in relation to Defendant’s acquisition of DirecTV. Doc. 3 at 6. Defendant now moves to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 7.

#### **B. Applicable Law**

A plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) when the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff’s complaint should “contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.” *Campbell v. City of San Antonio*, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).

Civil RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 must allege the existence of “(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise.” *Abraham v. Singh*, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil RICO plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, which establish the existence of an enterprise. *Elliott v. Foufas*, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989). The enterprise must be an entity “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

In other words, the “person” and the “enterprise” at issue must be distinct. *See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King*, 533 U.S. 158, 162 (2001). Accordingly, the “enterprise is not a pattern of racketeering activity, but must exist separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” *Whelan v. Winchester Prod. Co.*, 319 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Employees who, in the course of their employment, associate to commit RICO predicate acts do not form a distinct RICO “enterprise.” *Id.* A “pattern of racketeering activity” consists of two or more predicate criminal acts that are (1) related and (2) amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. *Abraham*, 480 F.3d at 355. The predicate acts can be either state or federal crimes. *St. Germain v. Howard*, 556 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

To establish injury, the plaintiff must allege financial harm to his business or property. *See In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig.*, 51 F.3d 518, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1995). This must be “a conclusive financial loss” of the plaintiff’s own money. *Id.* at 523. To sufficiently allege causation in relation to his damages, the plaintiff must show that a RICO predicate offense was the but-for and proximate cause of his claimed injuries. *Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York*, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010). Finally, apart from the substantive elements of a RICO claim, a plaintiff must bring such a claim within four years of the date he discovers the injury giving rise to his claim. *Rotella v. Wood*, 528 U.S. 549, 553-54 (2000).

### **C. Parties’ Arguments**

Defendant argues, *inter alia*, that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because, as an initial matter, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged either injury or the requisite causation necessary to maintain standing to bring a RICO claim. Doc. 8 at 11-13. Defendant further argues that some of the events Plaintiff alleges in his complaint occurred

outside RICO's four-year statute of limitations, namely his being hired to a full-time position by Defendant in 2010 and the alleged injuries to Plaintiff's child in 2012. Doc. 8 at 13. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege a distinct RICO participant and enterprise or a pattern of racketeering activity. Doc. 8 at 13-14.

Plaintiff responds that, since leaving his job with Defendant, (1) he has been unable to obtain employment or gain admission to a Ph.D. program; (2) his college transcript has been tampered with; and (3) only a company such as Defendant could "create so much havoc" in his life. Doc. 11 at 1. He argues that he cannot identify all persons who "colluded" against him because Defendant has not given him his personnel file. Doc. 11 at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that he did not receive a copy of Defendant's motion, which he alleges creates circumstantial evidence of mail delay or theft. Doc. 11 at 2.

#### **D. Analysis**

Plaintiff's complaint does not plead specific facts to state a civil RICO claim. His complaint stems from allegations against Defendant's employees who he contends committed various acts against him, but such acts do not form a distinct RICO "enterprise." *Whelan*, 319 F.3d at 229. Additionally, Plaintiff does not adequately specify two or more criminal acts that are (1) related and (2) amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. *Abraham*, 480 F.3d at 355. In short, Plaintiff has pled only conclusory allegations, which cannot establish the existence of an enterprise. *Elliott*, 867 F.2d at 881.

Neither has Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to establish that he suffered any concrete, conclusive injury to his business or property as a result of Defendant's actions. *In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig*, 51 F.3d at 523. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges in his complaint that he "le[ft] the company on [his] own" when another employee told him that he "should look for a

more engineering-oriented firm where [he could] grow [his] career better.” Doc. 3 at 5. Thus, he cannot plead that a RICO predicate offense was the but-for and proximate cause of any of his injuries. *Hemi Grp.*, 559 U.S. at 9. Finally, Defendant’s actions which are alleged to have occurred in 2010 and 2012 are barred by RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. *Rotella*, 528 U.S. at 553-54.

**E. Leave to Amend**

Ordinarily, a plaintiff should be granted leave to amend their complaint prior to dismissal. *See Brewster v. Dretke*, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[A] *pro se* litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint before it is dismissed.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint, however, consists of a patchwork of unrelated conspiracy theories for which he provides virtually no specific underlying facts. Thus, there is no possibility that relief can be awarded on any of his claims. *See McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp.*, 131 F.3d 558, 561-62 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (noting that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if it appears that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the plaintiff’s allegations).


Additionally, Plaintiff has twice filed suit against Defendant raising the same or similar allegations, and both cases were dismissed – the first at Plaintiff’s behest and the second when Plaintiff did not respond to a notice of deficiency that his complaint did not satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Senthilnathan v. AT&T*, No. 15-CV-1144-N-BH; *Senthilnathan v. AT&T*, No. 17-CV-1385-N-BH. In effect, Plaintiff has had several opportunities to plead his best case, and the Court therefore concludes that he has done so. *Jones v. Greninger*, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (dismissal with prejudice of a *pro se* case is appropriate if the court determines that the plaintiff has alleged his best case). As such, allowing Plaintiff to amend his

complaint would be futile and cause needless delay and waste of the Court's resources. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

**F. Conclusion**

For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that Defendant's *Motion to Dismiss*, Doc. 7, be **GRANTED**.


**SO RECOMMENDED** on January 3, 2017.



RENEE HARRIS TOLIVER  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND**  
**NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute, (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).



RENEE HARRIS TOLIVER  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN, )  
vs. )  
Plaintiff, )  
vs. ) No. 3:17-CV-1385-N (BH)  
AT&T INC., )  
Defendant. ) Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge

**ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

After reviewing all relevant matters of record in this case, including the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and any objections thereto, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court is of the opinion that the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and they are accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. The case will be dismissed by separate judgment for failure to prosecute or follow court orders.

SIGNED this 21<sup>st</sup> day of July, 2017.

  
D. C. Godbey  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION**

RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN, )  
vs. )  
Plaintiff, )  
vs. ) No. 3:17-CV-1385-N (BH)  
AT&T INC., )  
Defendant. ) Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION**

Pursuant to *Special Order 3-251*, this pro se case has been automatically referred for pretrial management. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the case should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute or follow orders of the court.

**I. BACKGROUND**

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in a prior closed civil action in this district on May 23, 2017. (*See* No. 3:15-CV-1144-N, doc. 14.) Because the complaint alleged different facts and different causes of action, it was construed and opened as a new civil case. (*Id.*, doc. 15.) By *Notice of Deficiency and Order* in this case, dated May 26, 2017, he was notified that his complaint did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and he had not paid the filing fee or submitted an application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (IFP). (*See* doc. 5.) Attached to the order were copies of his complaint, Rule 8, and a form IFP application. *See id.* The order specifically advised the plaintiff that he must file an amended complaint and either pay the filing fee or file his IFP application within fourteen days, and that a failure to do so could result in the dismissal of his case. *Id.* More than fourteen days from the date of the order have passed, but the plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint and either paid the filing fee, filed an IFP application, or filed anything else in this case.

## II. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to dismiss an action *sua sponte* for failure to prosecute or follow orders of the court. *McCullough v. Lynaugh*, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (§ 1983 prisoner action). This authority flows from a court's inherent power to control its docket, prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases, and avoid congested court calendars. *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962). The plaintiff failed to comply with the order that he file an amended complaint and either pay the filing fee or file his IFP application within fourteen days despite a warning that failure to do so could result in dismissal of the case. He has not filed anything else in the case. Because the plaintiff failed to follow a court order or otherwise show that he intends to proceed with this case, his case should be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute or follow orders.

## III. RECOMMENDATION

This case should be dismissed without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute or follow orders of the court, unless the plaintiff files an amended complaint and either pays the filing fee or files an IFP application within the time for objecting to this recommendation, or by some other deadline set by the Court.

**SO RECOMMENDED on this 16th day of June, 2017.**



IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

  
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION**

## **ORDER**

Pursuant to *Special Order 3-251*, this pro se case has been automatically referred for pretrial management, including the determination of non-dispositive motions and the issuance of findings, conclusions, and recommendations on dispositive motions. Before the Court is the plaintiff's *Motion to Withdraw Petition*, filed April 20, 2015 (doc. 10). He seeks to voluntarily dismiss his action.

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff may dismiss his action without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment. This right to voluntarily dismiss an action before the filing of an answer or summary judgment motion is “absolute and unconditional” and may not be “extinguished or circumscribed by adversary or court.” *International Driver Training Inc. v. J-BJRD Inc.*, 202 Fed. App’x 714, 715-16 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2006), quoting 8 James W. Moore et al., *Moore’s Federal Practice*, § 41.33[2], at 41-48 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2006) and *Am. Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee*, 317 F. 2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1963). A notice of voluntary dismissal under this rule is “self-executing”, and no further court action is required. *Id.*

Here, because the plaintiff has not yet served the defendant, it has not yet filed an answer or a summary judgment motion. Voluntary dismissal without a court order is therefore appropriate

under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The plaintiff's motion is liberally construed as a notice of voluntary dismissal of his claims without prejudice as provided by that rule, and no further action is required.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action pursuant to that notice.

**SIGNED this 21st day of April, 2015.**



IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN, )  
vs. )  
Plaintiff, )  
vs. ) No. 3:15-CV-1144-N (BH)  
AT&T INC., )  
Defendant. ) Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge

ORDER

Pursuant to *Special Order 3-251*, this pro se case has been automatically referred for pretrial management, including the determination of non-dispositive motions and the issuance of findings, conclusions, and recommendations on dispositive motions. Before the Court is the plaintiff's *Complaint for a Civil Case*, filed May 23, 2017 (doc. 14).

The plaintiff initially filed this action on April 14, 2015, alleging that the defendant's employee defamed him. (See doc. 4 at 9.) On April 20, 2015, he moved to withdraw his complaint, his motion was construed as a notice of voluntary dismissal, and this case was closed. (See docs. 9, 10.) More than two years later, the plaintiff electronically filed a new complaint in this closed case. Although there is a reference to some of the facts alleged in the original complaint, the new complaint alleges different facts concerning an injury to his child and does not allege a cause of action for defamation.

A post-judgment motion to amend a complaint may only be granted if a judgment is first vacated under Rule 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it should be denied unless a plaintiff clearly establishes that he could not raise the new evidence or argument prior to judgment. *Vielma v. Eureka Co.*, 218 F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 2000). Because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his prior action, and his new complaint appears to raise different allegations and a different cause

of action, his new complaint is not liberally construed as a motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). It is instead construed as a new civil action.

The Clerk of Court shall open a new civil case, file the new complaint and related filings in the new civil case, and directly assign the new case to Judge David Godbey and Magistrate Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez.

**SIGNED this 24<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2017.**



IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Texas District Court  
Dallas County (Civil)  
Docket for Case #: DC-15-04331

Docket Currency

Last Updated on Bloomberg Law  
May. 07, 2015 12:30 PM EDT  
Update Docket

## RAJAMANI SENTHILNATHAN vs. AT&amp;T INC

Date Filed: Apr 17, 2015  
Status: OPEN  
Case Location: 134th District Court  
Case Type: DEFAMATION

What does this mean?

Date Filed  
Apr. 17, 2015

## Parties and Attorneys

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## General Information

Docket Number  
DC-15-04331

Court  
Texas District Court, Dallas County

## Docket Entries

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Keywords

Entry Date

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Entry #	Filing Date	PDF	Description
BL-1	Apr 17, 2015	Request	NEW CASE FILED (OCA) - CIVIL
BL-2	Apr 17, 2015	Request	ISSUE CITATION
BL-3	Apr 17, 2015	Request	ORIGINAL PETITION
BL-4	Apr 17, 2015	Request	MOTION - SEAL
BL-5	Apr 17, 2015	Request	CASE FILING COVER SHEET
BL-6	Apr 21, 2015	Request	NOTICE OF DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION
BL-7	Apr 23, 2015	Request	CITATION; PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT SHF-1 S.M.; AT&T INC: Unserved
BL-8	Apr 27, 2015	Request	CANCELED; (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer TILLERY, DALE); Motion - Seal; BY COURT ADMINISTRATOR; (hearing held, ruling issued)
BL-9	Apr 27, 2015	View	ORDER - SEAL; TEMPORARY; Vol./Book 437G, Page 327, 1 pages
BL-10	Apr 30, 2015	Request	1ST DUE DILIGENCE ATTEMPT - SHF; SERVED MARIE GARCIA SR CLERK AT CT CORP SYSTEM 12:30 PM (EG)
BL-11	June 19, 2015	Request	DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION; (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer TILLERY, DALE)

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