[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-15495
Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket Nos. 4:14-cv-00262-HLM; 4:09-cv-00011-HLM-WEJ-2

SHERMAN EDWARD WILLIAMS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

(January 23, 2018)

Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Sherman Williams appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his 192-month sentence for armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Williams argues that his sentence was illegal because *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), invalidated the "risk-of-force" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), and because his armed bank robbery conviction is not a predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). Because we have previously concluded both that *Johnson* did not invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) and that armed bank robbery is a predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), we affirm.

When we granted Williams a certificate of appealability (COA), we had not yet resolved the question of whether *Johnson*, which invalidated the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), also invalidated the "risk-of-force" clause contained in § 924(c)(3)(B). But we have since determined that it did not, and we are bound by this conclusion. *See Ovalles v. United States*, 861 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, in light of *Ovalles*, Williams's first claim is without merit.

We have also previously determined that a conviction for armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), "clearly meets the requirement for an underlying felony offense, as set out in § 924(c)(3)(A)." *In re*

Hines, 824 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Williams argues that *In re Hines* "has no precedential effect" here because it was an order on an application for a second or successive § 2255 motion, but we have made it clear that "our prior-panel-precedent rule applies with equal force as to prior panel decisions published in the context of applications to file second or successive petitions." *In re Lambrix*, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, our holding in *In re Hines* is binding precedent, and it forecloses Williams's second argument.

Johnson did not invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), and armed bank robbery is a predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). *Ovalles*, 861 F.3d at 1259; *In re Hines*, 824 F.3d at 1337. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Williams's motion to vacate his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-15495-EE

SHERMAN EDWARD WILLIAMS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

BEFORE: WILSON, JULIE CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:



UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

ORD-42