

No. 18-\_\_\_\_\_

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

\_\_\_\_\_  
GERSON GONZALEZ TOVAR

*Petitioner*

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

*Respondent*

\_\_\_\_\_  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari  
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit  
\_\_\_\_\_

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
\_\_\_\_\_

KEVIN J. PAGE  
*Counsel of Record*  
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
525 GRIFFIN STREET, SUITE 629  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75202  
(214) 767-2746

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## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. Whether 18 U.S.C. §2251 authorizes conviction upon proof that materials used to produce child pornography once crossed state lines at an unspecified prior occasion, when there is no evidence that the production or possession of child pornography itself caused such movement?
- II. Whether Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution permits Congress to impose criminal sanctions for all conduct undertaken using materials that have moved in interstate commerce, however remotely, whether or not the criminal conduct caused such movement?
- III. Whether the sufficiency of a factual basis for a defendant's plea should be subject to plain error review, or whether, under *Sullivan v. Louisiana*, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), such a case lacks "an object" upon which review for harmless and plain error may operate?

### PARTIES

Gerson Gonzalez Tovar is the petitioner; he was the defendant-appellant below. The United States of America is the respondent; it was the plaintiff-appellee below.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented..	ii
Parties..	iii
Table of Contents..	iv
Index to Appendices..	v
Table of Authorities..	vi
Opinions Below..	1
Jurisdictional Statement..	1
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved..	1
Statement of the Case..	3
Reasons for Granting the Writ..	4
I. The decision below conflicts with <i>Bond v. United States</i> , 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014).....	4
II. The applicability of <i>Sullivan v. Louisiana</i> , 508 U.S. 275 (1993), to a guilty plea is an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, resolved by this Court.....	8
Conclusion..	12

## INDEX TO APPENDICES

- Appendix A Judgment and Opinion of Fifth Circuit
- Appendix B Judgment and Sentence of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Page No.

### **FEDERAL CASES**

<i>Bond v. United States</i> , 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). . . . .	3, 4, 5, 6
<i>Boykin v. Alabama</i> , 395 U.S. 238 (1969). . . . .	9
<i>Gonzales v. Raich</i> , 545 U.S. 1 (2005). . . . .	8
<i>Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States</i> , 379 U.S. 241 (1964). . . . .	7
<i>Jones v. United States</i> , 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed. 2d 902 (2000). . . . .	5, 6
<i>McCarthy v. United States</i> , 394 U.S. 459, 467, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969).. . . .	10
<i>NLRB v. Jones &amp; Laughlin Steel Corp.</i> , 301 U.S. 1 (1937).. . . .	6
<i>National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius</i> , ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).. . . .	3, 7, 8
<i>North Carolina v. Alford</i> , 400 U.S. 25 (1970).. . . .	8-9
<i>Perez v. United States</i> , 402 U.S. 146 (1971). . . . .	8
<i>Shreveport Rate Cases</i> , 234 U.S. 342 (1914). . . . .	7
<i>Southern R. Co. v. United States</i> , 222 U.S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L. Ed. 72 (1911). . . . .	7
<i>Sullivan v. Louisiana</i> , 508 U.S. 275 (1993).. . . .	8, 9, 11
<i>United States v. Baker</i> , 489 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2007).. . . .	11
<i>United States v. Bass</i> , 404 U.S. 336, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971).. . . .	5, 6
<i>United States v. Bradley</i> , 455 F.3d 453 (4 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). . . . .	11
<i>United States v. Dominguez-Benitez</i> , 542 U.S. 74 (2004).. . . .	10
<i>United States v. Edgerton</i> , 408 Fed. Appx. 733 (4th Cir. 2011). . . . .	10
<i>United States v. Garcia</i> , 587 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2009).. . . .	10
<i>United States v. Luna-Orozco</i> , 321 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2003). . . . .	10
<i>United States v. Marek</i> , 238 F.3d 310 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). . . . .	10
<i>United States v. Maye</i> , 582 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2009). . . . .	10
<i>United States v. Olano</i> , 507 U.S. 725 (1993).. . . .	11

<i>United States v. Tann</i> , 577 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2009).	10
<i>United States v. Tovar</i> , 727 Fed. Appx. 89 (5th Cir. June 15, 2018).	1
<i>United States v. Vonn</i> , 535 U.S. 55 (2002).	11

## FEDERAL STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).	3
18 U.S.C. § 2251.	4, 6
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).	passim
18 U.S.C. § 229	4, 5
18 U.S.C. § 229(a).	4, 5
18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A).	5
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).	1

## FEDERAL RULES

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.	8, 10
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1-2).	8
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).	2, 4, 8, 10
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52.	9, 11
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).	11
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).	11
Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.	1

## UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8.	1
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### **PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

Petitioner Gerson Gonzalez Tovar respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

### **OPINIONS BELOW**

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is captioned as *United States v. Tovar*, 727 Fed. Appx. 89 (5th Cir. June 15, 2018)(unpublished), and is provided in the Appendix to the Petition. [Appx. A]. The district court entered judgment on August 24, 2017, which judgment is attached as an Appendix. [Appx. B].

### **JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT**

The instant Petition is filed within 90 days of an opinion affirming the judgment, which was entered on June 15, 2018. *See* SUP. CT. R. 13.1. This Court's jurisdiction to grant *certiorari* is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED**

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides in part:

The Congress shall have power... [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian [sic] tribes

Title 18, Section 2251(a) of the United States Code provides:

Sexual exploitation of children

(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.



Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) provides:

*Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea.* Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.

## STATEMENT

### **A. Facts and Trial Proceedings**

Petitioner Gerson Tovar was indicted on three counts of enticing a minor to produce a sexually explicit image, and one count of production of child pornography “using materials that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer.” 18 U.S.C. §2251(a). He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, admitting in the factual resume that the images were produced using materials that had moved across state lines. The factual resume did not admit that his offense caused any object to cross state lines, nor that they had done so in the recent past. The plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal. The district court accepted the agreement, and imposed a sentence of 204 months imprisonment, plus ten years of supervised release, and forfeiture.

### **B. Appellate Proceedings**

On appeal, Petitioner contended that the factual resume failed to admit a prosecutable offense. Specifically, he argued that 18 U.S.C. §2241(a) should be construed to require either recent movement of materials from which child pornography had been generated, or movement of these materials as a result of the defendant’s conduct, and 2) that if it could not be so construed, it exceeded Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. He cited *Bond v. United States*, \_\_U.S.\_\_, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) and *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, \_\_ U.S. \_\_, \_\_, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012)(Roberts, J., concurring), in support of these contentions. Although he conceded that his claim had not been preserved in district court, he contended that the failure of the factual basis to admit a prosecutable offense could not be forfeited.

The court below noted that it had previously rejected the same claim, and hence concluded that “[g]iven the current state of the law, as Tovar concedes, the district court’s finding that there was a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea was not a clear or obvious error.” [Appx. A].

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

### **I. The decision below conflicts with *Bond v. United States*, \_\_U.S.\_\_, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014).**

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that the admissions made by the defendant in connection with a plea establish a prosecutable offense. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). In Petitioner’s district, these admissions are called the “factual resume.” Petitioner’s factual resume admitted that the camera used to produce the prosecutable image had been transported across state lines. It did not admit that the offense itself caused the movement of the camera, nor that the movement of the camera was recent. Nor did it admit any other fact establishing that the offense involved the buying, selling, or movement of any commodity. Petitioner contended below that the factual resume was therefore insufficient to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2251.

Section 2251 of Title 18 authorizes conviction when the defendant produces a sexually explicit visual depiction of a minor, “if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer....” 18 U.S.C. §2251(a).<sup>1</sup> To be sure, the statute may be read to include conduct that has little or nothing to do with the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, such as the production of child pornography with a telephone that crossed state lines years ago for entirely innocent purposes. But *Bond v. United States*, \_\_U.S.\_\_, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), suggests that this is not the proper reading.

Bond was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §229, a statute that criminalized the knowing possession or use of “any chemical weapon.” *Bond*, 134 S.Ct. at 2085-2086; 18 U.S.C. §229(a). She placed toxic chemicals – an arsenic compound and potassium dichromate – on the doorknob of a romantic rival. *See id.* This Court reversed her conviction, holding that any construction of the statute capable of reaching such conduct would compromise the chief role of states and localities in the

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<sup>1</sup>Other portions of the same statutory Subsection authorize conviction only when the defendant’s offense conduct is more closely related to interstate commerce, as when the depiction itself travels in interstate commerce, or in the channels of such commerce. Those parts of the statute are not at issue here.

suppression of crime. *See id.* at 2093. It instead construed the statute to reach only the kinds of weapons and conduct associated with warfare. *See id.* at 2090-2091.

Notably, §229 defined the critical term “chemical weapon” broadly as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” 18 U.S.C. §229F(8)(A). Further, it criminalized the use or possession of “any” such weapon, not of a named subset. 18 U.S.C. §229(a). This Court nonetheless applied a more limited construction of the statute, reasoning that statutes should not be read in a way that sweeps in purely local activity:

The Government’s reading of section 229 would “‘alter sensitive federal-state relationships,’” convert an astonishing amount of “traditionally local criminal conduct” into “a matter for federal enforcement,” and “involve a substantial extension of federal police resources.” [*United States v. ]Bass*, 404 U.S. [336] 349-350, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 [(1971)]. It would transform the statute from one whose core concerns are acts of war, assassination, and terrorism into a massive federal anti-poisoning regime that reaches the simplest of assaults. As the Government reads section 229, “hardly” a poisoning “in the land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.” *Jones [v. United States]*, 529 U.S. [848,] 857, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 [(2000)]. Of course Bond’s conduct is serious and unacceptable—and against the laws of Pennsylvania. But the background principle that Congress does not normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal prosecution for a chemical weapons attack.

*Bond*, 134 S. Ct. at 2091-2092.

As in *Bond*, it is possible to read §2251(a) to reach the conduct admitted here: use of an object that once moved across state lines to commit a criminal act, without proof that the crime caused the instrumentality to move across state lines, nor even proof that the instrumentality moved across state lines in the recent past. But to do so would intrude deeply on the traditional state responsibility for crime control. Such a reading would assert the federal government’s power to criminalize virtually any conduct anywhere in the country, with little or no relationship to commerce, or to the interstate movement of commodities.

It is plain that Congress intended the “interstate movement” requirement to bind §2251 to federal interests in interstate commerce. This prong of the statute should therefore be read in a way that accomplishes this purpose. The better reading of the phrase “produced ... using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer” – which appears in §2251 – therefore requires a meaningful connection to interstate commerce. Such a reading would require either: 1) proof that the defendant’s offense caused the materials to move in interstate commerce, or, at least, 2) proof that the relevant materials moved in interstate commerce at a time reasonably near the offense.

The court below rejected these claims. This Court should grant *certiorari* clarify that the federalism presumptions employed in *Bond* are not limited to the treaty power or to statutes closely related to international relations. This Court has long cautioned that federal criminal statutes are presumed to respect the traditional balance of federal and state authority, absent strong indications to the contrary. *See Jones v. United States*, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (“We have cautioned, as well, that ‘unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance’ in the prosecution of crimes.”) (citing *United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). This presumption applies to all criminal enactments that carry a risk of intrusion into the state domain. It is not limited to statutes like that at issue in *Bond*.

The statute at issue triggers the concerns recognized in *Bond*, and in this Court’s precedent regarding the use of federalism as a canon of construction in criminal cases. As construed below, the statute of conviction is effectively a blanket prohibition on the production of child pornography – nearly all photography or video-recording conducted in the present age will involve the use of an object made with an interstate component. It may well be that a blanket prohibition on the production of child pornography would fall within Congressional authority under the interstate commerce clause. This Court has held that the interstate commerce clause authorizes the federal government to prohibit economic conduct that affects commerce as a class. *See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). It has permitted regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of

commerce. See *Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964); *United States v. Darby*, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); *Shreveport Rate Cases*, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); *Southern R. Co. v. United States*, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). Congress might arguably reason that the production of child pornography as a class affects commerce because it is often traded across state lines. It might also arguably – though less obviously – reason that regulating the use of cameras made with interstate parts involves the “channels” or “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce. But it does not appear to have intended a blanket prohibition. Rather, it has limited prosecution under §2251(a) to the production of images that actually move across state lines, or that were made with materials that moved across state lines. Because this jurisdictional element has no particular relationship to the culpability of the offender, the rather clear Congressional intent manifested is to cabin the reach of the statute so that it reaches only obvious federal interests. In short, the jurisdictional element suggests that Congress did not intend a blanket federal ban on the production of child pornography.

Congress would have good reason for concern about the effect of §2251(a) on the federal-state balance as it was construed below. As construed below, the statute authorizes federal imprisonment of nearly all those engaged in a serious crime traditionally prosecuted by the state, whether or not the offense had any economic impact. This extraordinary displacement of state criminal authority would raise serious constitutional concerns, even if it did not ultimately transgress constitutional boundaries. A controlling opinion of this Court has just recently recognized that special constitutional concerns are posed by statutes that regulate conduct without regard for its temporal relationship to interstate commerce. *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.*, 132 S.Ct. at 2590 (2012)(Roberts, J., concurring). It held that the government could not use the interstate commerce clause to compel passive individuals to purchase health insurance on the grounds that they would actively purchase health care at some unspecified time in the future. It explained that in such a case, there was simply no cognizable commercial activity to regulate:

The Government ... argues that because sickness and injury are unpredictable but unavoidable, “the uninsured as a class are active in the market for health care, which they regularly seek and obtain.” The individual mandate “merely regulates how individuals finance and pay for that active participation--requiring that they do so

through insurance, rather than through attempted self-insurance with the back-stop of shifting costs to others.”

The Government repeats the phrase “active in the market for health care” throughout its brief, but that concept has no constitutional significance. An individual who bought a car two years ago and may buy another in the future is not “active in the car market” in any pertinent sense. The phrase “active in the market” cannot obscure the fact that most of those regulated by the individual mandate are not currently engaged in any commercial activity involving health care, and that fact is fatal to the Government's effort to “regulate the uninsured as a class.” Our precedents recognize Congress's power to regulate “class[es] of activities,” not classes of individuals, apart from any activity in which they are engaged

The individual mandate's regulation of the uninsured as a class is, in fact, particularly divorced from any link to existing commercial activity.

*Id.* at 2590-2591 (Roberts, J., concurring)(citing *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005), and *Perez v. United States*, 402 U.S. 146, 153 (1971))(emphasis deleted)(citations to government's brief omitted).

Someone who takes pictures with a camera bought years ago, made with products that years ago crossed state lines, is not “actively engaged in commerce.” The federal government's efforts to regulate what kind of pictures may be taken with such a camera are no more a “regulation of interstate commerce” than is a compulsion to buy health insurance. Yet the court below unhesitatingly construed the statute below to reach precisely that conduct.

**II. The applicability of *Sullivan v. Louisiana*, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) to a guilty plea is an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, resolved by this Court.**

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that the district court “determine that there is a factual basis for the plea” before entering judgment thereon. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The act of admitting guilt is unlike the other protections – like admonishment about the penalties and foregone rights – that accompany a defendant's decision to enter a plea of guilty. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1-2). The admission of guilt is the very heart of the plea – it is in the ordinary case the sole moral and legal justification for punishment in the absence of trial. *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400

U.S. 25, 32 (1970)(“Ordinarily, a judgment of conviction resting on a plea of guilty is justified by the defendant's admission that he committed the crime charged against him and his consent that judgment be entered without a trial of any kind.”) Thus, while *Boykin v. Alabama*, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), observed that “[a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts,” there is ordinarily no plea without a confession. *Boykin*, 395 U.S. at 242.

The court below found that the plain error doctrine, codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52, applies to breaches of this requirement. *See* [Appendix A]. This conclusion seriously undermines the defendant’s protections against erroneous pleas of guilty, misunderstands the function of Rule 52, and reflects confusion as to the proper application of *Sullivan v. Louisiana*, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).

In *Sullivan v. Louisiana*, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), this Court evaluated the applicability of the harmless error doctrine to a claim of instructional error, specifically to a claim that the jury was not properly instructed on reasonable doubt. *See Sullivan*, 508 U.S. at 277. The State argued that the verdict would have been the same but for the misinstruction. But this Court unanimously held that it would violate the defendant’s right to trial by jury for an appeals court to overlook the error. *See id.* at 281. This Court reasoned that criminal defendants have a right to have the jury determine in the first instance that they are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that to ignore the faulty instruction would essentially substitute the court of appeals’ opinion for that of a jury. *See id.* It explained further:

Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the *Chapman* inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-error review in the present case becomes evident. Since, for the reasons described above, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of *Chapman* review is simply absent. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt -- not that the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty.



*See Sullivan*, 508 U.S. at 280.

In *United States v. Dominguez-Benitez*, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), however, this Court made clear that the logic of *Sullivan* does not apply to all claims of error in the taking of a plea. Rather, this Court held that in the absence of an objection at the colloquy, the doctrine of plain error applied to the failure of the district court to provide the defendant with the proper warnings. *See Dominguez-Benitez*, 542 U.S. at 82. This required the defendant to show a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” *See id.* at 83.

*Dominguez-Benitez*, however, deals with claims of “error” in the taking of a plea – it does not purport to establish a standard of review for the absence of a cognizable plea. *See id.* Indeed, *Dominguez-Benitez* establishes that the “outcome” presumed to exist when the doctrine of plain error is applied in the Rule 11 context *is* the plea, which in the ordinary case is the admission of guilt. It would appear at least arguable under *Sullivan*, that the plea of guilty is the “object” upon which harmless or plain error analysis acts. By this logic, the defendant’s claim that he never admitted guilt, and accordingly that he entered an incomplete plea, is thus arguably not subject to either doctrine. The courts of appeals have nonetheless applied the doctrine of plain error to claims of this kind. *See United States v. Garcia*, 587 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2009); *United States v. Tann*, 577 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2009); *United States v. Edgerton*, 408 Fed. Appx. 733, 735-736 (4th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Marek*, 238 F.3d 310, 315 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001)(*en banc*); *United States v. Maye*, 582 F.3d 622, 626-627 (6th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Luna-Orozco*, 321 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).

The issue merits this Court’s attention. First, the application of plain error review to the sufficiency of the defendant’s plea effectively renders Federal Rule 11(b)(3) unenforceable. This provision “is designed to ‘protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.’” *McCarthy v. United States*, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules). A defendant who **does not understand** that his conduct falls outside the statute of conviction is obviously very

unlikely to object to the inadequacy of her own factual basis. Given the function of the factual basis requirement – to protect the defendant from inadvertent pleas to non-existent offenses – it is bizarre to suggest that the defendant, rather than the court, should bear the burden of identifying such misapprehension.

Second, the application of the plain and harmless error doctrines to the insufficiency of the factual basis misunderstands the function of Rule 52. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 is the foundation for the doctrines of harmless and plain error. The doctrine of harmless error provides that an error may be ignored if it had no effect on the outcome. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The doctrine of plain error provides that a party complaining of unpreserved error must demonstrate plain or obvious error and that the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). These Rules deal with “error,” what this Court has described as “deviation from a legal rule.” *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 732-733 (1993). And while the entry of conviction without a factual basis is an error in this sense – it is something more as well. It is the total absence of a plea, akin to the absence of a verdict of guilty in a trial. Conviction in the absence of plea or verdict is not the type of “error” that can be plausibly subjected to harmless or plain error review.

Third, the failure of this Court to specify the analog of *Sullivan* in the plea context has generated inconsistent opinions within the courts of appeals. The D.C. Circuit has suggested that some Rule 11 errors, such as extensive judicial participation in a plea agreement, may be beyond the reach of the plain error doctrine. *See United States v. Baker*, 489 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2007)(observing that “not all Rule 11 violations are created equal” and finding the standard of review a “difficult question”). The Fourth Circuit, however, cited this Court’s decisions in *Dominguez-Benitez* and *United States v. Vonn*, 535 U.S. 55 (2002) for the proposition that “all forfeited Rule 11 errors were subject to plain error review.” *United States v. Bradley*, 455 F.3d 453, 461 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). This confusion regarding the scope of Rule 52 as it relates to pleas of guilty should be addressed by granting *certiorari* in this case.

**CONCLUSION**

FOR THESE REASONS, Petitioner asks that this Honorable Court issue an order granting the writ of *certiorari* to review the decision below.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Kevin Joel Page  
Kevin J. Page  
*Counsel of Record*  
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
525 GRIFFIN STREET, SUITE 629  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75202  
(214) 767-2746