

# APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 17-1902

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CORY D. FOSTER,  
Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2-15-cr-00485-001)  
District Judge: Hon. Mark A. Kearney

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ARGUED  
March 13, 2018

Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, *Circuit Judges*

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JUDGMENT

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This cause came to be considered on the record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was argued on March 13, 2018. On consideration whereof,

It is now hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the order of the District Court entered on April 13, 2017 is hereby AFFIRMED. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of the Court.

ATTEST:

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit  
Clerk

DATED: May 23, 2018

# APPENDIX B

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

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(Opinion Filed: May 23, 2018)

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OPINION\*

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JORDAN, *Circuit Judge*.

Cory Foster appeals from federal robbery, carjacking, and firearm offense convictions. Because we agree with the District Court that any trial errors were harmless and that Foster was appropriately sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), we will affirm.

**I. BACKGROUND**

Over a three-week period in late 2014, Foster and an accomplice robbed three gas station convenience stores at gunpoint. They used a similar modus operandi during each robbery. First, they would enter the store at night wearing masks and gloves, with Foster carrying a gun. Second, Foster and his accomplice would force the employee working the cash register to open it. [Third, they would usher the employee into a back room, force the employee to turn over personal valuables, and kick, punch, or confine the employee. Last, Foster and his accomplice would steal cigarettes and the cash from the register before departing.

During the third robbery, Foster and his accomplice made off with more than cash and cigarettes – they also stole a car. As the robbery was underway, a customer named David Borkowski entered the store to find Foster pointing a gun at him. Foster and his

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\* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.

accomplice forced Borkowski into a back room and bound his hands and feet. They asked Borkowski for his wallet, and he replied that it was in his car. Foster or his accomplice then asked for Borkowski's keys. Borkowski replied that he left them in the ignition. Foster then stole Borkowski's silver Honda Accord and his accomplice drove off in a blue Chrysler Concorde.

Foster was arrested in Delaware on February 6, 2015, as a result of police following a tip that the stolen Accord had been observed at the Branmar Plaza Shopping Center in Wilmington. During the course of that arrest, State Troopers observed a handgun fall out of his left hand.<sup>1</sup> When they searched Foster, they confiscated keys to the stolen car, gloves, and a black knit cap. A search of the stolen car revealed more gloves, multiple rolls of duct tape, a lighter, a backpack, and Borkowski's wallet.

Foster was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and charged with three counts of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); one count of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; and four counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).<sup>2</sup>

At trial, the government's case-in-chief relied on cell phone location data, items recovered during and after Foster's arrest, a description of the getaway cars used by

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<sup>1</sup> Foster was separately charged and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware for unlawful firearm possession by a felon. He has challenged his conviction and sentence in that case in a separate appeal. *See United States v. Foster*, No. 16-3650 (3d Cir.).

<sup>2</sup> Foster was also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2 with aiding and abetting one of the firearm charges, all three robbery charges, and the carjacking charge.

Foster and his accomplice, surveillance footage from each convenience store, and testimony by eyewitnesses and investigating officers. The cell phone location data showed that Foster's cell phone was within the vicinity of each robbery at the time each took place. The handgun that the state troopers recovered during Foster's arrest in Delaware was shown to the four victims, and each testified that it resembled – at least in size and color – the gun used during the three robberies. Borkowski testified that neither the handgun, rolls of duct tape, nor gloves were in his car before Foster stole it. As to the getaway car used in at least one of the robberies, an officer testified that the dark blue Chrysler Concorde belonged to Foster's sister. That same car was driven by Foster when he arrived at the third robbery to case the location hours before the robbery occurred.

Eyewitnesses and three investigating officers narrated the surveillance footage of each robbery as it was shown to the jury. The eyewitnesses – the three convenience store employees and Borkowski – testified to the similar physical characteristics possessed by the taller, handgun-wielding perpetrator present at each robbery. While narrating the video, one witness began to opine about the robber's state of mind. Foster objected, prompting the following response from the Court: "Sustained, Sir. You can't – sustained. Strike the question. You don't know what the defendant is thinking. Or excuse me, you don't know what anyone is thinking in the video other than yourself. Strike my reference to any person." (App. at 85.)

As the surveillance footage was shown to the jury, the three investigating officers explained that the robbers used similar tactics during each robbery and observed that the gun-wielding robber depicted in each video possessed the same size and build, a

distinctive nose and similar gait, and wore similar clothing. Two officers who had viewed all three videos identified the gun-wielding robber as Foster. The third officer, who had viewed only videos from two of the robberies, concluded that it was the same individual in both videos. Foster objected to each officer's testimony. The Court responded to one such objection by stating, "Overruled. Lay opinion, testimony credible. Overruled." (App. at 101.)

Foster's sister and his probation officer also testified as to the similarity, or lack thereof, between the gun-wielding perpetrator in the surveillance footage and Foster. His probation officer affirmatively identified Foster as the gun-wielding perpetrator, pointing to similarities between the robber and Foster's skin tone, wide nose, unique gait, height, and weight. Foster's sister, in contrast, testified that the person in the videos was not her brother because that person had a different "physique." (App. at 154.) She nevertheless acknowledged that, in at least one of the videos, the robber shared some physical characteristics with her brother.

The jury convicted Foster on all counts. Before sentencing, Foster filed a motion to dismiss the four firearm counts, arguing that Hobbs Act robbery and carjacking are not crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).<sup>3</sup> The District Court denied the

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<sup>3</sup> Section 924(c)(1)(A) is a substantive offense that imposes strict mandatory minimum sentences on "any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ..., uses or carries a firearm[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). It defines a "crime of violence," in relevant part, as "an offense that is a felony and ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another[.]" *Id.* § 924(c)(3)(A). That subsection is not to be confused with § 924(e), which is purely a sentence-enhancing provision.

motion because it determined that both types of offenses qualified as crimes of violence under § 924(c). The Court sentenced Foster to a 714-month term of imprisonment, ordered him to pay \$10,890 in restitution, and imposed a \$700 special assessment.<sup>4</sup>

Foster appeals his conviction. He challenges the District Court's admission of the officers' video narration testimony, certain comments by the District Court, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his carjacking conviction.<sup>5</sup>

## II. DISCUSSION<sup>6</sup>

### A. The District Court's Erroneous Admission of Law Enforcement Officer Testimony Was Harmless.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness offering opinion testimony must limit his testimony to that which is "(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the

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<sup>4</sup> At sentencing, the government agreed to withdraw one of the firearm counts to lessen Foster's statutory sentence. Including that additional count would have raised the mandatory minimum by twenty-five years.

<sup>5</sup> Foster also challenges the District Court's determination that Hobbs Act robbery and carjacking are crimes of violence under § 924(c) of the ACCA. But he concedes that our decision in *United States v. Robinson*, 844 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2016), establishes that his Hobbs Act robbery conviction, and by the same reasoning, his carjacking conviction, can serve as predicate offenses for purposes of his § 924(c) convictions because he was contemporaneously convicted of a firearm offense. We agree and note that Foster has raised that issue only for issue preservation purposes. As such, we will not address it any further. Because Foster concedes that *Robinson* forecloses his § 924(c) challenge, we also decline to address his argument that the "residual clause" of § 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness.

<sup>6</sup> The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. An opinion only qualifies as helpful under Rule 701(b) “if it aids or clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise be as competent to understand.” *United States v. Fulton*, 837 F.3d 281, 292 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting *Lauria v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 145 F.3d 593, 600 (3d Cir. 1998)). The government here concedes Rule 701 error under our holding in *United States v. Fulton*, agreeing that the officers’ video narration testimony opining on shared physical characteristics between Foster and the perpetrators was improper. *See id.* at 298-300 (holding officers’ video narration testimony comparing the defendant to the subjects on a surveillance video unhelpful when the officers lacked sufficient familiarity with the defendants before trial). Thus, our inquiry turns on whether the District Court’s *Fulton* error was harmless.

Harmless error is “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). We have said that an erroneous “evidentiary ruling is harmless when it is highly probable that the error did not affect the result.” *United States v. Duka*, 671 F.3d 329, 349 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *United States v. Friedman*, 658 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir. 2011)). “High probability means that we have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendants.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Casseus*, 282 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2002)). “We may not simply conclude that it is more likely than not that the error was harmless. On the other hand, we may be firmly convinced that the error was harmless without disproving every ‘reasonable possibility’ of prejudice.” *United States v. Mathis*, 264 F.3d 321, 342 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting *United States v. Jannotti*, 729 F.2d 213, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984)). “The burden of demonstrating such high probability lies

with the government.” *Id.* at 342. In making that determination, we consider the error contextually within “the record as a whole.” *United States v. Stadtmauer*, 620 F.3d 238, 266 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting *United States v. Zehrbach*, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Here, given the overwhelming evidence at trial implicating Foster in each crime, we have a sure conviction that Foster was not prejudiced by the *Fulton* error. Foster’s probation officer positively identified Foster as the gun-wielding robber; cell phone records placed Foster in proximity to the robberies at the time they occurred; and when finally caught after evading arrest, Foster possessed Borkowski’s car, Borkowski’s wallet, a handgun, and various items commonly used when perpetrating a robbery. Moreover, evidence established that Foster drove his sister’s car to case the third convenience store hours before the robbery occurred, and police had observed that car in close proximity to the first robbed convenience store. That car also matched the physical description of the getaway car used by Foster’s accomplice during the third robbery. In light of that evidence, the District Court’s admission of the officers’ identification testimony was harmless.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Despite our determination that the error was harmless under the circumstances of this case, we underscore the *Fulton* error and trust that the government will not introduce similar law enforcement officer testimony in future criminal trials.

**B. The District Court's Remarks Were Not Reversible Error.<sup>8</sup>**

We evaluate a district court's allegedly prejudicial remarks for undue influence on the jury. *United States v. Stevenson*, 832 F.3d 412, 430 (3d Cir. 2016); *United States v. Olgin*, 745 F.2d 263, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1984). To determine whether a judge's comments unduly influenced a jury, we apply a “four-factor ‘sliding scale’ test,” *Stevenson*, 832 F.3d at 430 (citation omitted), which considers “the materiality of the comment, its emphatic or overbearing nature, the efficacy of any curative instruction, and the prejudicial effect of the comment in light of the jury instruction as a whole,” *Olgin*, 745 F.2d at 268-69.

Foster challenges two remarks made at trial. The first is a remark made by the Court after ruling on an objection to an eyewitness's testimony: “Sustained, Sir. You can't -- sustained. Strike the question. You don't know what the defendant is thinking. Or excuse me, you don't know what anyone is thinking in the video other than yourself. Strike my reference to any person.” (App. at 85.) Foster argues that comment was prejudicial because the jury could have construed the Court's remark as identifying

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<sup>8</sup> Because Foster challenges the District Court's alleged misstatements for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. *United States v. Stevenson*, 832 F.3d 412, 430 (3d Cir. 2016). Under plain error review, an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial where (1) the district court erred; (2) the error was clear or obvious; and (3) the “error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights,’” which typically means that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. *United States v. Stinson*, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting *Puckett v. United States*, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). If those three conditions are met, we then have discretion to remedy the error, and we exercise this discretion “only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” *Id.* (quoting *Puckett*, 556 U.S. at 135 (alteration omitted)).

Foster as one of the perpetrators. Foster contends that, given its materiality and emphasis, no curative instruction could have fully ameliorated the remark's prejudicial effect. We disagree.

The District Court's remark did not unduly influence the jury because the mistaken comment was immediately addressed by the District Court's curative instruction – “strike my reference to any person” – and by the jury instructions read as a whole. (App. at 85.) Indeed, the jury instructions repeatedly told the jury to disregard any comments the Court may have made during trial and emphasized to the jury its unique role as the factfinder. *See United States v. Gaines*, 450 F.2d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 1971) (no undue influence where trial judge informed the jury six times during charge that it had to make the ultimate adjudication in the case). Accordingly, the District Court's use of the phrase “the defendant” cannot fairly be seen as an undue influence on the jury, and Foster has not shown plain error.

The second remark Foster takes issue with is the District Court's response to one of his evidentiary objections to a law enforcement officer's testimony. The Court stated, “Overruled. Lay opinion, testimony credible. Overruled.” (App. at 101.)

Again, the District Court's remark was not an undue influence on the jury. To the extent Foster argues that the comment was material or emphatic because it vouched for the officer's credibility, the context shows otherwise. The discussion demonstrates that the District Court simply chose the wrong word – “credible” rather than “admissible” – when attempting to explain why the officer's testimony was allowed. *See Stevenson*, 832 F.3d at 430 (finding no undue influence because “the context of the exchange”

demonstrated that the court did not vouch for a witness); *Olgin*, 745 F.2d at 269 (explaining that a comment is material if it refers to a matter “central to the defense” and emphatic if “a jury may accept [it] as controlling” (citation omitted)).

Even if the comment had raised the specter of prejudice for lack of an immediate cure, the Court’s thorough charge reminded the jurors of their roles as final arbiters of credibility. *See Stevenson*, 832 F.3d at 431 (explaining that if a comment crossed the line “any error would have been ameliorated by the judge’s thorough instructions”). Accordingly, Foster cannot demonstrate that the Court’s use of the word “credible” unduly influenced the jury and, as a result, he has not shown plain error.

### **C. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Conclude That Foster Committed Carjacking.**

As to the carjacking count of conviction, we review Foster’s sufficiency of the evidence claim for plain error because he failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or move for a judgment of acquittal in the District Court.<sup>9</sup> *United States v. Burnett*, 773 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2014). Plain error requires us to review “only for a manifest miscarriage of justice—the record must be devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence must be so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Avants*, 367 F.3d 433, 449 (5th Cir. 2004)). “Such an error requires a defendant to establish that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in even permitting the jury to deliberate.” *Id.*

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<sup>9</sup> The standard of review for plain error is set forth *supra*, n.8.

In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [and determine whether] *any* rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.* (quoting *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in *Jackson*, 443 U.S. at 319)). We “must be ever vigilant … not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez*, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)).

A conviction for carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 requires the government to prove “that the defendant (1) with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm (2) took a motor vehicle (3) that had been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce (4) from the person or presence of another (5) by force and violence or intimidation.” *United States v. Applewhaite*, 195 F.3d 679, 685 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting *United States v. Lake*, 150 F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1998)). The intent described in element (1) requires a “nexus between the assault and the taking [of the car].” *Id.*

Here, Foster argues that the evidence did not show a nexus between the robbers’ assault on Borkowski and the subsequent taking of his car because “Borkowski felt threatened, and only offered the robbers his car to placate them and hasten their departure[.]” (Opening Br. at 47-48.) That argument certainly does not meet the high bar of plain error review. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Borkowski’s testimony establishes the nexus *Applewhaite* requires: the perpetrators asked

Borkowski for his keys while wielding a handgun and after binding his hands and feet.

That testimony alone is sufficient to sustain Foster's carjacking conviction.

### **III. CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.

# APPENDIX C

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)	JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
v.	)	
	)	Case Number: DPAE:2:15CR000485-001
CORY D. FOSTER	)	USM Number: 07914-015
	)	Russell M. Soloway
	)	Defendant's Attorney

## THE DEFENDANT:

pleaded guilty to count(s) \_\_\_\_\_

pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ which was accepted by the court.

was found guilty on count(s) one through five, seven and eight (1-5, 7 and 8) after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
18:1951(a), 18:2	Robbery which interferes with interstate commerce, aiding & abetting	11/18/2014	1
18:924(c)(1)	Using, carrying & brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence	11/18/2014	2
18:1951(a), 18:2	Robbery which interferes with interstate commerce, aiding & abetting	12/2/2014	3
18:924(c)(1)	Using, carrying & brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence	12/2/2014	4
18:1951(a), 18:2	Robbery which interferes with interstate commerce, aiding & abetting	12/7/2014	5
18:2119, 18:2	Robbery which interferes with interstate commerce, aiding & abetting	12/7/2014	7

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Count(s) six (6)  is  are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

April 12, 2017  
Date of Imposition of Judgment



Signature of Judge

KEARNEY, J.  
Name and Title of Judge

April 12, 2017  
Date

DEFENDANT: CORY D. FOSTER  
CASE NUMBER: DPAE:2:15CR000485-001

**ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION**

<u>Title &amp; Section</u>	<u>Nature of Offense</u>	<u>Offense Ended</u>	<u>Count</u>
18:924(c)(1), 18:2	Using, carrying & brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence	12/7/2014	8

DEFENDANT: **CORY D. FOSTER**  
CASE NUMBER: **DPAE:2:15CR000485-001**

## **IMPRISONMENT**

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:  
seven hundred and fourteen (714) months consisting of eighty-four (84) months as to count two (2), three hundred (300) months as to counts four and eight (4, 8) to run consecutively to each other, the sentence imposed in Delaware under docket number 15-cr-21-1, and thirty (30) months each as to counts one, three, five and seven (1,3,5,7) to run concurrent with each other.

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:  
the Defendant be placed at FCI Butner to receive treatment for and education regarding his diagnosis of depression.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at \_\_\_\_\_  a.m.     p.m.    on \_\_\_\_\_ .

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

before 2 p.m. on \_\_\_\_\_ .

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

## **RETURN**

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
at \_\_\_\_\_, with a certified copy of this judgment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By \_\_\_\_\_  
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: **CORY D. FOSTER**  
CASE NUMBER: **DPAE:2:15CR000485-001**

## **SUPERVISED RELEASE**

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of :

**two (2) years as to counts one, two, three, four, five, seven and eight (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8) to run concurrently.**

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. *(Check, if applicable.)*

The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. *(Check, if applicable.)*

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(Check, if applicable.)*

The defendant shall comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 16901, *et seq.*) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which he or she resides, works, is a student, or was convicted of a qualifying offense. *(Check, if applicable.)*

The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(Check, if applicable.)*

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

## **STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION**

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency directed by the court or probation officer;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- 10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- 13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

DEFENDANT: CORY D. FOSTER  
CASE NUMBER: DPAE:2:15CR000485-001

### **SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION**

1. The Defendant shall participate in a drug treatment program and mental health treatment program at the direction of the Probation Officer and shall remain in any recommended program until completed or until such time as he is released from attendance by the Probation Officer.
2. The Defendant will submit to urinalysis at the direction of the Probation Officer.
3. The Defendant shall provide the U.S. Probation Office with full disclosure of his financial records to include yearly income tax returns upon the request of the U.S. Probation Office. The Defendant shall cooperate with the probation officer in the investigation of his financial dealings and shall provide truthful monthly statements of his income.
4. The Defendant is prohibited from incurring any new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer, unless he is in compliance with a payment schedule for any fine or restitution obligation. The Defendant shall not encumber or liquidate interest in any assets unless it is in direct service of the fine or restitution obligation or otherwise has the express approval of the Court.

DEFENDANT: **CORY D. FOSTER**  
CASE NUMBER: DPAE:2:15CR000485-001**CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES**

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	<u>Assessment</u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>Restitution</u>
<b>TOTALS</b>	\$ 700.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 10,890.00

The determination of restitution is deferred until \_\_\_\_\_. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case* (AO 245C) will be entered after such determination.

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

<u>Name of Payee</u>	<u>Total Loss*</u>	<u>Restitution Ordered</u>	<u>Priority or Percentage</u>
B.S. (Lukoil Station Owner)	\$1,043.00	\$1,043.00	
Liberty Gas Station	\$3,500.00	\$3,500.00	
CITGO Gas Station	\$5,752.00	\$5,752.00	
D.B	\$575.00	\$575.00	
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$ 10,890.00</b>	<b>\$ 10,890.00</b>	

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ \_\_\_\_\_

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

the interest requirement is waived for the  fine  restitution.

the interest requirement for the  fine  restitution is modified as follows:

\* Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: **CORY D. FOSTER**  
CASE NUMBER: **DPAE:2:15CR000485-001****SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS**

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

**A**  Lump sum payment of \$ 700.00 due immediately, balance due  
 not later than \_\_\_\_\_, or  
 in accordance  C,  D,  E, or  F below; or

**B**  Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with  C,  D,  F below); or

**C**  Payment in equal \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., months or years), to commence \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

**D**  Payment in equal \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., months or years), to commence \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

**E**  Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or

**F**  Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

It is recommended the Defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program and provide a minimum payment of twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) per quarter towards restitution. In the event the entire restitution is not paid prior to the commencement of supervision, the Defendant shall satisfy the amount due in monthly installments of not less than one hundred dollars (\$100.00), to commence thirty (30) days after release from confinement. All restitution payments received shall be split for equal distribution to the four victims.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (*including defendant number*), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.