

No. \_\_\_\_\_

IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

\_\_\_\_\_  
KEITH L. WILLIAMS - PETITIONER

vs.

KUL B. SOOD, et al., - RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KEITH L. WILLIAMS

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### QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Whether court of appeals or district court abused it's descretion:  
In (8)th amendment violation claim: by failing to acknowledge evidence  
that district court erred in granting the defendants motion for  
summary judgment: Where statute excused payment of initial partial  
filing fees: Since inmate lacked both assets and means by which to  
pay

## LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[x] All parties ~~do~~not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

1. Doctor Kul B. Sood
2. Doctor Anthony Carter
3. Lois Lindorff

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IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to  
review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

☐ For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at  
Appendix A to the petition and is

☐ reported at N/A; or,

☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;  
or,

☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at  
Appendix B to the petition and is

☐ reported at N/A; or,

☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;  
or,

☐ is unpublished.

☐ For cases from **states court**

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits  
appears at Appendix N/A to the petition and is

☐ reported at N/A; or,

☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;  
or,

☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the N/A court appears  
at Appendix N/A to the petition and is

☐ reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,

☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;  
or,

☐ is published.

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## JURISDICTION

☐ For cases from **federal courts:**

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was June 7, 2018.

☒ No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: \_\_\_\_\_, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for writ of certiorari was granted to and including None Filed (dated) on None Filed (dated) in Application No. A.

The jurisdiction of this Court invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

☐ For cases from **state courts:**

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was N/A. A copy of that decision appears at Appendix N/A.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was therefore denied on the following date: N/A, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix N/A.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of Certiorari was granted to and including N/A (date) on N/A (date) in Application No. A.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)



## CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

### 8 AMENDMENT

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted

### 14 AMENDMENT SECTION(1)

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

### Statutory Provisions

28 USC §§1915(b)(4).- In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.

### Summary Judgment Federal Rule (56(c)(2)

Under rule 56(c)(2), to win on summary Judgment prison officials have to prove to the judge there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants are entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Around April 18, 2016 the plaintiff Keith Williams mailed/filed a pro-se 1983 civil rights complaint to the Central District Court alleging 8th amendment constitutional violations. The complaint stated the plaintiff had been previously diagnosed with glaucoma in 1997 and as a result had taken timolol eye drops for five years after as treatment for the condition. I complained that even misdiagnosed with glaucoma in 1997 I was still entitled to follow-up treatment since there is no cure for glaucoma. That the eye-drops I took for treatment caused new medical conditions such as ringing in my ears, pain in my ears, pulsating drum beat in my ears, vision loss, glaucoma, pressure build in or behind my eyes, hypertension etc... That the defendants denied me treatment or improper treatment for my serious medical conditions. The complaint established that the 8th amendment violations began to occur April 20, 2014. That I wrote letters to the defendants Kul B. Sood, Anthony Carter, and Lois Lindorff from April 20, 2014 to Feb. of 2016 complaining about having a history of glaucoma. That after a year of complaining to the defendants in regards to new eye issues. I was finally allowed to see the eye doctor Anthony Cater. That on the date of 5-5-15 doctor Carter again diagnosed me with glaucoma. My complaint explained that failure to allow me access to healthcare or failure to provide me with proper treatment after acknowledging my condition caused me life time injuries that I was entitled to relief for under 1983. District Judge Sue E. Myerscough conducted a merit review of my claims around June 17, 2016. The district court found that I sufficiently stated a claim that I suffered from an objectively serious medical need. The district court emphasized in bold black print that...

1) Pursuant to its merit review the complaint states the following claim: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberated indifference.

See merit review opinion Appendix (G)).

The district court allowed the defendants attorneys to appear on record. During discovery I took interrogatories from Dr. Carter, Dr. Sood, and Lois Lindorff. Dr. Carter answered his interrogatories. Dr. Sood and Lois Lindorff refused to answer almost all of their interrogatories. I filed a motion before summary Judgment to compel the defendants to answer the interrogatories. The district court never ruled on motion to compel. A deposition was conducted. I filed for expert witness to establish my conditions and injuries independant of the defendants case for the purpose of trial. The district court refused to grant such request. I filed for injunctions that were denied. Nearly all my motions were either denied or went unanswered. All the defendants motions were granted including summary Judgment as a matter of law on March 8, 2018.

The district court later concluded that my appeal was not taken in good faith so I was not allowed to appeal in forma pauperis (See Court order Appendix (B)).

On May 23, 2018 I renewed with the court of appeal my motion for leave to proceed as a poor person, docket statement, and memorandum in support. I also attached evidence such as letters I sent to the defendants, interrogatories, medical records, affirmative defenses from Carter, the district court order granting summary Judgment, and a single page request to review the original record.

The court of appeals disregarded the new PLRA motion, with certification of six month trust fund ledger, memorandum in support of pauper motion, interrogatories, letters, medical records, all the evidence showing the district court erred in granting summary Judgment. The court of appeals did respond to a one(1) page attachment to use the original record which was denied. After denying the renewed pauper motion, memorandum, and my request to use the original record. The court of appeals said I should pay \$505.00 to the district court, or refile the motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, and memorandum by June 18. 2018

(see court order Appendix (A)).

The plaintiff received the May 30, 2018 appeals court order on June 8, 2018 and had only (10) days on lockdown with no access to law library to file a second pauper motion with the court of appeals. On June 8, 2018 I filed an extension of time explaining to the appeals court that they either failed to acknowledge my pauper motion and attached evidence, or the documents were misplaced during mailing (See attached motion and money receipts Appendix (N)).

Shortly after filing the motion for extension of time I received another order from the appeals court dated June 7, 2018. The court acknowledging the previously filed pauper motion, trust fund account statement, memorandum in support denied the renewed motion stating: The plaintiff has not identified a good faith issue that the district court erred in granting the defendants summary Judgment motions. The appeals court failed to review any of the attached evidence (see appeals court order Appendix (A)).

The district court did error in granting the defendants summary Judgment. The inference has been drawn in this case through letters sent to the defendants, interrogatories, deposition, affidavits, and the plaintiffs, medical records that after the plaintiffs initial complaints to Dr. Carter. Dr. Carter diagnosed the plaintiff with glaucoma, or glaucoma suspect. The court of Appeals denied the plaintiff a hearing on merits citing factors of Newlin v. Helman. The appeals court without allowing the plaintiff request to review the original record, or present evidence on appeal still instructed the district court to take \$505.00 from my trust fund account (Appendix (A)).

The court of appeals stated the appellant has not identified a good faith issue that the district court error in granting the defendants motion for summary Judgment. The letters sent to defendants Carter, Sood and Lindorff starting in April 20, 2014 established that this is the date that my claims accrues. All of my claims started on the date of April 20, 2014 the date I started writing letters to the defendants complaining about eye issues. When filing for summary Judgment the defendants in this case asked the district court to disregard any issues in the complaint that occurred before April 21, 2014 since the statute of limits would bar such issues. The record will reflect that the plaintiffs complaint was filed several days before April 21, 2016 making any issues within (2) year time frame-timely filed. Even if the district court disregarded any evidence of me being previously diagnosed with glaucoma.

The issues that occurred from April of 2014 to the filing date could not have been dismissed. see *Ownes v. Okure*, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989). The deadline for a section 1983 suite is determined by the states general personal injury statute which is (2) years in Illinois. *Newlin v. Helman* 123 F. 3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997).

The court of appeals abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs request to review the original record from the district court considering the fact that the appeals court also denied or disregarded any evidence in support of the plaintiffs pauper motion, memorandum, and 6 month ledger with certification showing that the plaintiff's trust fund account was a negative -\$167.41 (see Appendix (M)).

Appeal of petitioner, who applied for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and who contended that evidence was insufficient to justify his conviction and that trial court had committed reversible error by permitting United States Attorney to ask him irrelevant and prejudicial questions about another criminal offense, could not be characterized as frivolous, and he was entitled to be furnished with transcripts in order to afford him adequate opportunity to show court of appeals that his claimed errors were not frivolous and appeal was not taken in bad faith. *Farley v. United States* 354 U.S. 521, 16 LL Ed 2d 1529 77 S.Ct 1371 (1957) "Only statutory requirement for allowance of indigents appeal is applicants "good faith" and in absence of some evidence improper motive, appellants good faith is established by presentation of any issue that is not plainly frivolous; However, good faith test must not be converted into requirement of preliminary showing of any particular degree of merit and ...

unless issues raised are so frivolous that appeal would be dismissed in case of none indigent litigant request of indigent for leave to appeal forma pauperis must be allowed. *Ellis v. United States* 356 U.S. 674, 2L Ed 2d 1060, 78 S. Ct 974 (1958).

In this case, that court of appeals committed reversible error by failing to allow the plaintiff to have the court review the original record or present evidence on appeal attached to plaintiffs pauper motion and memorandum showing that the District Court erred in granting the defendants summary Judgment motions. The appeals court continued demands for the plaintiff to pay \$505.00 when plaintiff was a negative (-\$167.41) prohibited the plaintiff from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reasons that the prisoner had no assets and no means by which to pay the filing fee in violation of 28 USCS 1915 (B)(4).

The memorandum of law, interrogatories, Dr. Carters' Affidavit, medical records, letters, presented with the pauper motion presented to the District Court and Court of appeals, support an subjective inference that I complained to Dr. Carter, Dr. Sood, and Lois Lindorff about having a history of glaucoma. I specifically complained about the eye doctor ignoring my request to be seen and treated for black specs in my eye sight, pain in my eyes, dry eyes, blurred vision and pressure behind my eyes (see letters Appendix (E)).

After I complained from April 2014 to May 2015 a year after my initial complaint to the defendants. Dr. Carter diagnosed me with glaucoma (see deposition page 18, Appendix (C)).

That after I filed grievance on Dr. Carter he changed his diagnosis claiming I did not have glaucoma. (see deposition page 19-20, Appendix (C)). In the order entered by the district court stated the un-contradicted evidence in the record, however, does not support an inference of deliberate indifference. Because, First, Plaintiff letters were address to "Eye Doctor", and there is no evidence that Carter received the letters. Dr. Carter was asked by the plaintiff during interrogatories; How long have you worked for Hill or Wexford as an "eye doctor", and Carter replied, I have worked at Hill C.C. since around June of 2007 (Interrogatories page 1, Appendix (D)).

Any letter or request to the "eye doctor" is and was a letter to Dr. Carter since he was the only eye doctor working at Hill C.C. during the time in question. Whether Dr. Carter received the letters was a question for a jury to decide not the district court.

The district court further stated that there was no evidence that defendant Lindorff received the letters the plaintiff sent to Lindorff, and even assuming Lindorff received the letters plaintiffs claims still fail since the plaintiff must verify medical evidence that the delay caused the plaintiff harm. The plaintiff medical records attached here, Dr, Carters Affidavit, and district courts order granting the defendants summary Judgment all evince that on the date of 6-9-15, a year after plaintiffs initial complaint. Dr. Carter diagnosed the plaintiff as glaucoma suspect.



Where a plaintiff informs prison officials that he is being denied access to health care those officials may be liable under 1983 for their inaction U.S.C.A Const. 8 Amendment; 42 U.S.C.A 1983 Flournoy v. Ghosh 881 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

The plaintiff 1983 pro-se complaint delineates that Dr. Carter failed to treat the plaintiff increasing eye pressure which is described by Dr. Carter as glaucoma suspect. (See interrogatories page 3, par.4 (b) Appendix (D)).

The court in flournoy describe "Flournoys" glaucoma suspect/ocular hypertension one in the same as a failure to treat glaucoma. (see Federal Civil Procedure 2491 5; Flournoy v. Ghosh, 881 F.Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ill. 2012) page 981, para 10).

In this case, the delay or denial of treatment caused the plaintiff the injury of becoming glaucoma suspect. Other district courts such as in "Flournoy" also agree that failure to provide treatment violates the eighth amendment and the material facts preclude Summary Judgment.

Flournoy on inmate with ocular hypertension brought a 1983 action against state prison physician and warden alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical need in violation of eighth amendment. Defendants moved for summary judgment; Holdings; The district court, Joan B. Goltschall, J, held that:

- (1) Material fact issue regarding whether physician was deliberately indifferent to inmates ocular hypertension precluded summary judgment on 1983 claim against physician, and,
- (2) Material fact issue regarding whether warden was alerted to medical staffs failure to promptly provide inmates prescriptions precluded summary judgment on 1983 claim against warden.

Motions denied (see Johnnie F. Flournoy Jr. Plaintiff v. Parasarath; Ghosh, MD, and warden Terry McCann, defendants, case No.07c5297 United States District Court N.D. Illinois Eastern Division 2012, 881 F Supp. 2d. In July 2000, at the IDOC Joliet Correctional Center, Flournoy was diagnosed as "glaucoma suspect," with intraocular pressure in each eye of 20mm Hg. Intraocular pressure is the fluid pressure inside the eye, measured in millimeters of mercury. The average population is 10-12 mm Hg and the high limit of average is 21 mm Hg. High intraocular pressure, or ocular hypertension is associated with a risk of damage of optic nerve, which is irreversible and can lead to glaucoma. Medical records dated December 4, 2003, stated that "Flournoy" was glaucoma suspect in both eyes. Between October 2003 and July 2005, he was prescribed medicated eye drops to control his ocular hypertension. Flournoy received prescriptions for Xalatan eye drops on Dec. 1, 2004, and on March 9, 2005, Dr. Parikh in the "Flournoy" case stated: going without eye drops intended to prevent pressure build up in the eye" greatly increases the likelihood of having further damage to the optic nerve. Flournoy cite as 881 F. Supp. 2d 980 (ND Ill. 2012).

The Flournoy court found that Flournoy had easily met the first burden; to demonstrate that his deteriorating eye sight constituted a serious medical condition. The standard for conditions to be objectively serious does not create a high bar: see King v. Kramer 680 F. 3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012): Giving as examples of medical conditions that met the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim "a dislocated finger, a hernia, arthritis, heartburn and vomiting, a broken wrist, and, minor burns.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(C). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of submitting affidavits and other evidentiary material to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Once the moving party has sustained the initial burden, the opposing party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but instead must come forward with specific evidence, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in rule 56, showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex 477 U.S. at 324.

Estelle, this court held that: Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by Eighth Amendment whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in response to prison needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with treatment once prescribed; regardless of how evidenced deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious illness or injuries states cause of action under Civil Rights statute. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 8; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. Estelle v. Gamble: 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285.

In *Farmer*, this court held that an official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. *Farmer v. Brennan* 511 U.S. 825, 128 L.ED 2d 811, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).

In this case, on the date of Dec 1, 2015 Dr. Carter sworn Aff. evince that he seen the plaintiff in relation to his glaucoma suspect diagnosis in both eyes (car Aff. page 5, para 41). Mr. Williams reported pressure on the left side of his eye and ear (car. Aff. page 5, para 41 Appendix (H)). Again on June 7, 2016 I saw Mr. Williams for follow up visit for his glaucoma suspect in both eyes. Mr. Williams complained of pressue on the left side of his eye and ear (car. Aff. page 6, para. 47). On Aug 2, 2016 the plaintiff met with Dr. Carter and Dr. Carter stated the plaintiff did not always recognize lower brightness of lighting during the test (car. Aff. page 7, para 55-56, Appendix (H)). As a result of the defects the plaintiff was retested (car. Aff. page 7, par. 57 Appendix (H)).

On Sept 13, 2016 the results of the repeated test was the plaintiff left eye showed superior trace defect repeatable from the last visual field test. Dr. Carter again stated; Mr. Williams remained as a glaucoma suspect in both eyes. Because there was a suspicious defect we discussed to initiate treatment for prophylactic reasons. We started Xalatan drops on the date to lower his eye pressure to be extra safe (car. Aff. page 8, par. 62-65 Appendix (H)).

The district court granting summary judgment on March 8, 2018 supported Carters claims that Carter also prescribed plaintiff Xalatan after he determined there was suspicious defect in plaintiff left eye (page 42 of 52 courts Mar 8, 2018 motion).

Dr. Carters sworn interrogatories dated Nov 11, 2017 was conducted seven months before Dr. Carter June 13, 2017 Affidavit. Dr. Carter stated under oath in the interrogatories verbatim: "At the time you filed the lawsuit I had not prescribed any drops for you. However, as of September 13, 2016, I did start you on Xalatan drops to reduce eye pressure as I considered you to be glaucoma suspect on that date, "emphasis added " Dr. Carter without mentioning anything about a defect being his reasons for starting the eye drops, goes on to describe the glaucoma suspect condition (see interrogatories page 3, par. 4 B Appendix (D)).

Dr. Carter clearly to deceive the district court prevaricated in his sworn interrogatories that on the date of Sept 13, 2016 he diagnosed the plaintiff for the first time as being glaucoma suspect when in fact: Dr. Carter previously diagnosed the plaintiff as glaucoma suspect 15 months prior on 6-9-15 and had fail to start the eye drop treatment around the time when the plaintiffs eye pressure was at its highest point. This District court concluded in its March 8, 2018 motion granting the defendants summary judgment that: Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that shows the timing of Carters decision to prescribe Xalatan was a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.

The plaintiff disagree. No reasonable professional doctor would have diagnosed a patient as glaucoma suspect, allowed physiological cupping to began, reduced sensitivity inferior to occur, and trace defects before giving the plaintiff eye drops. The eye drops would have started before the injuries occurred. These injuries alongside Dr. Carters intent to conceal the actual date of diagnosis, created enough suspicion for the Districe Court to act in favor of the plaintiff by granting the plaintiffs request for expert witness to examine the extent of plaintiffs injuries independant of the defendants case.

The progression of cupping that was not present in the plaintiff eyes during the plaintiffs first visit with Dr. Carter on the date of 5-5-15 could have ment that dr. Carter was underscoring the plaintiffs eye pressure. Dr. Carters actions of prevaricating as to the date of diagnosing the plaintiff as glaucoma suspect clearly give validity to plaintiffs original claims that Dr. Carter diagnosed the plaintiff as having glaucoma on the date of 5-5-15 and changed the diagnosis once planitiff filed grievance. (see attached grievance and medical records Appendix (F), and (I)).

The court in (Flournoy) did not allow the defendants to act as expert witness in their own behalf in explanation of whether the cupping created permanent harm to Flournoy as a result of lack of eye drop medication. Once it was established that Flournoy suffered a progression of cupping the court concluded that the material facts precluded summary judgment.

The plaintiff in this case disclosed to the defendants a timely request under federal rules of evidence 702, 703, and 705 26 (D)(ii) indicating that his request for expert witness was solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under Rules 26 (a)(2)(B) or (C). The district Court allowed defendants Carter, Sood, and Lindorff to act as their own expert witness and in behalf of the plaintiff by relying on their version of events in regards to the plaintiffs conditions and injuries.

The plaintiff after seeing Dr. Carter for the first time on 5-5-15 filed grievance, and sent letters to Dr. Carter, Dr. Sood, and Lois Lindorff complaining about dry eyes, and burry vision. The plaintiff in these letters demanded the only treatment available for glaucoma and glaucoma suspect is eye drops. Dr. Carter affidavit clearly evince that Dr. Carter only started the eye-drops for glaucoma suspect after the plaintiff had already suffered defects from no treatment for the condition (Aff. page 8, para 65 Appendix(H)).

Dr. Carter was deliberate and indifferent to plaintiffs serious medical need on a subjective and objective basis. In addition his failures to provide the plaintiff treatment after a year of the plaintiff requesting to be seen constitute a medical denial or delay that caused the plaintiff to become glaucoma suspect. Dr. Sood, and Lois Lindorff also violated the plaintiffs 8th amendment rights established by letters personally sent to the defendants. Where a plaintiffs informs prison officials that he is being denied access to health care, those officials may be liable under 1983 for their actions (see *Flournoy V. Ghosh*, 881, F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ill.2012)).

- 1) Dr. Carter presented three(Affirmative Defenses) was that to the extent plaintiffs complaint seeks to hold a defendant responsible for any act or ommission occuring more than (2) years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, said claims are barred by the statute of limitations (see attached Affirmative defenses from Carter Appendix (0)).
- 2) To the extent plaintiff claims are based on any act or ommission occurring more than (4) years to filing of this lawsuit, said claims are barred by the applicable statute of respose.

3) Defendant seeks Qualified Immunity

The Central District Court denied David C. Gevas (plaintiff) pro-se complaint by granting judgment as matter of law to prison officials on the grounds that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. Gevas provided several letters to prison officials stating he was in danger. The Court concluded that Gevas had not put forward sufficient evidence showing that the officials were subjectively aware of the serious risk of harm to Gevas. The seventh Circuit Court of appeals reverse the District Court judgment, stating that: 1) Issue of whether prison officials had actual knowledge that inmate was in danger of being harm by his cellmate was for jury, and 2) Officials were notentitled to qualified immunity. (Gevas v. McLaughling, cite as 798 F.3d 475 (7th Cir.2015). The seventh Circuit in Gevas, quoted: Vance v. Peters 97 F. 3d 987,993(7th Cir.1996)



(Letters to prison administrators may support inference of knowledge, so long as prisoner demonstrates that communication, in its content and manner of transmission, gave prison officials sufficient notice to alert him or her to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety") (Quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 144 S.Ct. at 1997)

In this case the plaintiff letters sent to the defendants gave them sufficient notice to alert the defendants to an excessive risk to this I/Ms health in regards to the plaintiff eye complaints, and prior history of glaucoma. The plaintiff has also demonstrated that he suffered injury of glaucoma suspect, cupping progression in eyes, and superior trace defect, reduced sensitivity inferior failure to recognize light in parts of his eye all as a result of the defendants delay or denial, and failure to provide eye drop treatment after acknowledging the plaintiff glaucoma suspect condition. That Dr. Carter sworn Affidavit clearly demonstrates plaintiffs injuries, supported by the plaintiffs medical records.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The plaintiff- I am a citizen of the United States of America. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law that abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The lower courts in the state of Illinois has deprived me of the opportunity to have a jury weigh the evidence in my case. After I wrote letters and complained for a year to the defendants I was diagnosed as glaucoma suspect. Dr. Carter waited at least 15 months after he diagnosed me as glaucoma suspect to give me eye drops. I suffered defects being cupping, reduced sensitivity inferior, and trace defects while writing the defendants demanding eye drops after being diagnosed glaucoma suspect. Dr. Carter after diagnosing me glaucoma suspect on 6-9-15 has until this day continued on going treatment for my condition. I have to take eye drops for the rest of my life so that my injuries I suffered at the hands of the defendants does not render me completely blind. I been incarcerated 24 years of my life and my criminal background will make it hard for me to get a job let alone pay one hundred dollars per bottle of eye drops I need for my condition. The American tax payers in our society who took no part in causing my injuries should not be subjected or targeted to pay taxes for injuries I suffered at the hands of the defendants.

When the court system fails to recognize 8th amendment violations in regards to any inmate injuries our society as a whole one way or another pay the cost. To the contrary, when the court system acknowledge those 8th amendment violations that occur to inmates by institutional doctors or employees by making them responsible for their actions our society as a whole is relieved of the burden to provide money or medical care to inmates who are victims of the circumstances such as myself. Grant me a writ of Certiorari because at this point I am stuck with lifetime injuries with this Honorable Court being my only means of recourse. Grant me a writ of Certiorari because the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment and I did not have assets and means by which to pay the partial filing fee.

The plaintiff Keith L. Williams is cognizant that review on a writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. That a petition for writ of Certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. In this case, the decision by the lower courts to ignore the plaintiffs lifetime injuries and due process rights was so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's supervisory power.

The court of appeals denied me the opportunity to review the original record on appeal so as to disregard the evidence I presented to the district court that would have proved the district court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment.

The court of appeals further denied me the opportunity to present the evidence showing the district court erred, and denied the appeal in part because the court of appeals claimed I did not show the district court erred in granting summary judgment.


With all due respect to this court, if the court of appeals want let me use any of the original evidence presented to district court that was apart of the original record. Nor allow me to present evidence on appeal then why was I charged \$500.00 by the court of appeal when the court clearly denied me an appeal.

(see Court of Appeal Mandate Appendix (A)).

### CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Keith D. William", written over a horizontal line.

Date: August 8, 2018