

No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Thomas M. Juresic, — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

State of Illinois — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

~~Illinois Supreme Court, denied w/o opinion M14080~~
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Thomas M. Juresic , DHS/TDF
(Your Name)

17019 County Farm Road
(Address)

Rushville, Il. 62681
(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A

(Phone Number)

QUESTIONS OF LAW

1. Does a Department of Corrections (DOC) or sentencing court retain constitutional custody and personal jurisdiction over a person until the expiration of his sentence?
2. Can a civil commitment court constitutionally usurp the DOC or sentencing court custody and personal jurisdiction over a person prior to his expiration of sentence?
3. Does a civil commitment court have the power or authority to constitutionally usurp a persons custody and personal jurisdiction that is properly in the DOC or sentencing court and prior to the expiration of sentence, and in violation of the person's liberty interests rights, and due process and equal protection of the law rights?
4. Does a state civil commitment court have the constitutional authority and personal jurisdiction of a DOC prisoner or in custody of the sentencing court prior to the prisoner's expiration of sentence?
5. Does the civil commitment circuit court have constitutional power and authority and personal jurisdiction to issue judgments, orders or decrees prior to a prisoner's expiration of sentence and circumventing the custody and personal jurisdiction of the DOC or the sentencing court?
6. Are the judgments, orders and decrees of a civil commitment circuit court when issued prior to the prisoner's expiration of sentence or are the judgments, orders, and decrees null and void ab initio?

Questions of Law

7. Does a civil commitment circuit court have the jurisdiction and constitutional authority to enforce unconstitutional statutory provisions that do not provide personal jurisdiction prior to a personer's expiration of sentence in the custody and personal jurisdiction of the DOC or the sentencing court?
8. Does the state legislature have the constitutional authority to enact legislation that violates well established state and federal law in personal jurisdiction or is those unconstitutional statutory provisions not providing for personal jurisdiction null and void ab initio?
9. Does a state legislature have the constitutional authority to legislate in violation of well established jurisdictional mandate in violation of liberty interest rights, and due process and equal protection of the law rights?
10. Does a facially unconstitutional statutory provision become null and void ab initio, as a statute, if it cannot stand and be enforced wholly and independently of severed unconstitutional provisions?
11. Does a state legislature have the constitutional authority and descretion to enact statute that is constitutionally null and void ab initio due to lack of provision for personal jurisdiction?

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

In Re Commitment of

Docket Number:

Thomas M. Juresic,

Plaintiff.

IN PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
IN REVIEW OF ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT DENIAL
UNDER CAUSE M14080 AND 223872, and
[OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS STATE'S PETITION
UNDER 725 ILCS 207/1 ET SEG AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO, AND
UNDER MOTION FOR EXPEDIATED REORDER
MOTION TO DISMISS STATE'S PETITION
UNDER 725 ILCS 207/1 ET SEG AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO, AND
CHALLENGE TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNDER 725 ILCS 207/1 ET SEG AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO, AND
UNDER ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES 381 AND 383, AND
UNDER UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULES 10 (a-c), AND
TITLE 28, § 1257, AND
ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

NOW COMES Thomas M. Juresic, plaintiff herein, and seeking issues statutorily and constitutionally the same, and as a result of the facially unconstitutional statutory provisions under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seg, who deposes and attests as follows:

1. The plaintiff files in the instant cause under the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss and resulting from the same statutory and constitutional issues stemming from unconstitutionally legislated Illinois Statutory provisions, and to preserve the time and resources of the honorable addressed United States Supreme Court, and under U. S. Supreme Court, and under U. S. Supreme Court Rules 12(4), 10(a-c); Title 28 § 1257; and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
2. The plaintiff is in ignorance of the law and is without training nor experance in the laws forms, procedures and practice.
3. The plaintiff is detained in the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF) as addressed hereunder signed, and the attached and enclosed is presented for fair and impartial hearing as a pro se cause, and as a poor person under In Forma Pauperus, and as in all other courts under U. S. Supreme Court Rule 39(2).
4. The plaintiff is being unconstitutionally detained in custody under Illinois statutory provisions in 725 ILCS 207/1 et seg, and without personal jurisdiction by the Cook County Civil Circuit Court without the power nor authority to hear a null and void ab initio challenge under law.
5. That the plaintiff did believe after withdrawal in open Court of the said Motion to Dismiss 10-9-15, and the said motion was actually withdrawn; and thereafter the plaintiff refiled said Motion to Dismiss in the Illinois Supreme Court. because the Cook County Court had neither power nor authoity to hear the null and void ab initio cause

5. That the plaintiff did believe, after withdrawal in open court of the said Motion to Dismiss in hearing on 10/9/15, and the said motion was actually withdrawn; and thereafter the plaintiff refiled said Motion to Dismiss in the Illinois Supreme Court.
6. That on 10/9/15 the plaintiff requested of the Court and appointed attorney to obtain transcripts of hearings in cause 11 CR 800, In Re Juresic, held on 9/10/15, 10/9/15, 11/30/15, 1/20/16 and 1/27/16 and after repeated requests and repeated Court's Order to appointed attorney; M. J. Nolan finally obtained and delivered to plaintiff transcripts of hearings held on 2/1/16 and 3/23/16, which were not requested. (See Park v Chicago, 297 F.3d 606 (7th Cir 2002, Key 16; Sound of Music v Minnesota, 477 F. 3d 910 F.3d 910 (7th Cir 2007)).
7. The Illinois Supreme Court clerk informed the plaintiff that the said Motion to Dismiss was still pending in the Cook County Civil Circuit Court under cause 11 CR 800, In Re Juresic.
8. This reoccurred several times with the said repeated withdrawal of the said motion from Civil Cook County Court cause 11 CR 800. (See Docket entries of hearings on 10/16/15, 2/19/16, 10/12/16 as official withdrawal of Motion to Dismiss hearing dates).
9. that the plaintiff attempted to file Motion to Withdraw Motion to Dismiss and filing was refused by the civil circuit court, and plaintiff several times to withdraw motion in open Court and was silenced by the Court stating that appointed attorney, M. J. Nolan, was my only voice in the Court; and this was after my many attempts to terminate counsel's representation by filing and in open Court; and during this period of time plaintiff filed for defense counsel's termination pro se; and stated to appointed counsel that plaintiff had terminated his representation in cause 11 CR 800.
10. As plaintiff's filing pro se to withdraw appointed attorney's representation in cause 11 CR 800, and is the only way procedurally to terminate counsel under such grounds; such denial of pro se filing is the only way to terminate counsel through the Court and resulted in what amounted to a deliberate blocking of substantive and fundamental rights of the plaintiff in due process, equal protection due even a poor person, and access to the courts, and right of effective counsel, right to choose of effective counsel, and appeal by right process. (See Gons v Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US (2006).

11. That plaintiff filed said Motion to Dismiss as a courtesy to the Cook County Civil Circuit Commitment Court that a legal nullity would properly be expunged from the Court's records under cause 11 CR 800, In Re Juresic.

12. The withdrawal of the said Motion to Dismiss from the civil Commitment Court became a matter of unnecessary contention in at least five (5) hearings and over several months; and the said Court was not willing to proceed in hearing the said Motion to Dismiss.

13. The reasons for the plaintiff's termination of representation of the said appointed attorney, M. J. Nolan, extended far beyond his refusal to defend nor withdraw said Motion to Dismiss; and the repeated lies and misinformation to the plaintiff; and the appointed attorney refused to acknowledge requests to supply information that the plaintiff requested; and refused to allow or respond to contact by phone or mail with the plaintiff; and refused to discuss defense objective and strategy with the plaintiff; and violated all trust and confidence in the attorney/client relationship by giving false information to the plaintiff (such as being in contact with defense evaluator when he was not, even after after the court issued order); and giving unfounded advice and facts to the plaintiff and making the plaintiff believe that he was not representing the plaintiff's best interests (such as pleading in court that "parole was not a part of a criminal sentence"); and counsel's continued refusal to zealously and diligently defend plaintiff's meritorious issues. It seems to matter to him in his own self-interest that only matter in the instant cause to appointed attorney; and in that he would have a regular and permanent paycheck from the state now and once he was assured that I was committed for life; and this was the same attorney who could not keep a working phone so that he could stay in contact with his clients prior to his appointment to plaintiff's cause.

14. That the appointed counsel plainly lied about the issues placed in defense before the bar of the civil Commitment Circuit Court and about the issues in the said Motion to Dismiss, and as the motion was "frivolous" because "parole was not a part of a criminal sentence"; and further the judge agreed with the appointed attorney's assessment in open court; that the court thereafter did still hold the said Motion to Dismiss hostage without any attempt at hearing and ruling, and was withdrawn in cause 11 CR 800, without providing requested information to the Illinois Supreme Court (and in fact misinformed the said Supreme

Court that the motion was still pending when the motion's dismissal was being held hostage and had been withdrawn several times in attempt to cover-up the hostage holding denial in appeal; and the Court made no ruling of frivolous or any other ruling on the motion; while repeated offering the appdressed Court that the motion was still pending in the civil involuntary commitment Court.

15. That the plaintiff filed ATTACHED REFILEING OF MOTION TO DISMISS STATE'S PETITION UNDER 725 ILCS 207/1 ET SEG AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO dated 2/16/16 in the Illinois Supreme Court and filing was refused and returned; that the plaintiff began to believe that there was a conserted collusion to interfere with due process and equal protection and assure that no ruling could be made on the unconstitutionality of the said statutory provisions to be heard or even withdrawn from the hostage state of the said Motion to Dismiss being withdrawn to proceed in the higher courts; and against the constitutional challenge to 725 ILCS 207/1 et seg; and as a politically charged issue and issues of public bias and prejudice, and as a sancrosanct issue of the news media; and with all applied and great pressure; and that such bias and prejudice has over-came the individuals rights, protections and guarantees of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution; and as due to all individuals through the courts.

16. That the plaintiff has had to fight tooth-and-nail for years that the filing of the said Motion to Dismiss recieve hearing in 28 days; lawfully the said motion should have been replied to and heard within 28 days as stated in statutory provision 725 ILCS 5/2-607(a). The plaintiff pleads for hearing; and that in the interests of justice, due process, equal protection and liberty interests; as The Illinois Constitution (1970) §12 guarantees Remedy At Law, and this should not be a matter of convience of the Attorney General nor the courts.

17. That it is clear and plain that the state and the Attorney General seek delay to the constitutional challenge to 725 ILCS 207/1 et seg to frustrate and chill the reply to the said Motion to Dismiss, and as in violation of plaintiff's said rights.

18. That the plaintiff has repeatedly met with deliberate interference and obstruction of justice, and the attempt to force the plaintiff's cause into procedural limbo where frustration and lack of resourses would chill the issues until they are never heard at all or until the plaintiff's death; This sort of state and judicial sponsored action would cause the plaintiff to have to give up and the unconstitutional

statute popularity would be safe again. It should not be popularity that should decide constitutional issue, but be constitution and the U. S. Supreme Court should decide without popular or any other influence; and this sort of political nor social pressure shouldn't deem the constitution's import. This sort of political and judicial tactic, as in Illinois is being used in a well established format to block and kill a bothersome cause, such as the instant cause, from reaching lower court final judgment, that might reach the higher courts for constitutional judgment. That is what is happening in the plaintiff's cause rich in bias and prejudice at all levels.

19. That the plaintiff does pray the addressed U. S. Supreme Court, in fundamental fairness and justice, will allow the plaintiff to proceed judicial hearing in the instant cause without further judicial delay in exercise of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Hope is hard to find in this environment especially when such struggle is made. The plaintiff is an elderly person and cannot be expected to out-wait the unconstitutional deprivation of rights due every individual as supported in the said Motion to Dismiss. There are no procedural bars in a challenge of a legal nullity and "it should be heard at any time and in any court", as his Court has repeatedly and long established held.

20. The fact remains the plaintiff allowed the civil commitment court a courtesy to expunge a null and void action from the Court's records, as is the Court's duty, and at the same time for the Court to serve the law. It is not really expected in Illinois. That it remains also that the civil commitment Court does not have the power nor authority without personal jurisdiction to act upon the plaintiff's cause, as a legal nullity, but the said Court continued to hold the said Motion to Dismiss as hostage to the plaintiff's rights.

21. That the civil circuit court of Cook County in cause 11 CR 800 made no move to expunge the null and void ab initio cause from the Court's records nor has the civil court moved in any way to resolve the said Motion to Dismiss as a null and void ab initio cause. The actions of the civil commitment circuit court and the Illinois Supreme Court in a legal nullity and in violation of plaintiff's due process and equal

and equal protection and liberty interests. The plaintiff claims as right and before the addressed Court to be properly and fully heard under Illinois Supreme Court and U. S. Supreme Court rules, and Title 28 § 1257, and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

22. That the Plaintiff cannot reach the Illinois Supreme Court, except by original action, due to inapplicable procedural barrs in the Civil Commitment Circuit Court and Illinois Appellate Court that do not have the power and authority to hear a legal nullity in a null and void ab initio cause and without personal jurisdiction and without statutory support; and thereby the plaintiff is properly before the U. S. Supreme Court. Ill. Const. (1970), ART. 1 § 12, guarantee of remedy at law. That the lower state and federal state courts do not have the power nor authority, nor the personal jurisdiction to hear the instant cause. The Illinois Supreme Court has declined to rule and opinion in the instant cause, and thereby such null and void ab initio claim must be heard as a original action before the Court.

23. The criminal sentencing court judgment; and thereafter in issues from the civil commitment circuit court, even in the same county and the same judge are separate and different judicial bodies used for different constitutional purposes. The criminal sentencing court and as of the plaintiff's actual and constructive parts of the criminal sentence; and then the civil commitment circuit court still does not possess the personal jurisdiction in the instant cause. At the time of the civil commitment Court's issuance of petition, judgment, orders and decrees as made prior to the expiration of the plaintiff's criminal sentence, and is without personal jurisdiction of the plaintiff; and therefore the civil commitment court's petition, judgment, order, and decrees are made as null and void ab initio and without power and authority to act upon plaintiff's cause in any way. (See Title 28 § 3583(e)(2); FRCVP, rule 32.1(b), 18 USCA).

24. While the plaintiff was subject to the custody and personal jurisdiction of criminal sentence in the IDOC until expiration of actual and constructive sentence; and the plaintiff was also subject to unconstitutional civil circuit court custody without personal jurisdiction by the civil court's orders, decrees and judgments, and petition at the same time, and making the DHS/TDF and the commitment court custody and without personal jurisdiction and thereby null and

void ab initio; or which thereby became the civil commitment circuit court being as a part of the criminal state imposed continuum of punishment. And the petition, judgment, orders and decree of the civil commitment circuit court under cause 11 CR 800, In Re Juresic had no power or authority to enforce unconstitutional statutory provisions without personal jurisdiction; which said personal jurisdiction remained within the power and authority of the DOC and criminal sentence prior to expiration of actual and constructive criminal sentence. (See Doe v Harris, 772 F. 3d 563, 2014 WL 6435507; and Hankins v Lowe, 786 F.3d 603 (7th Cir 1997)).

25. That the Illinois legislature enacted unconstitutional statutory provisions under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq without provision for personal jurisdiction in the civil commitment court; and by said enactment of statutory provisions without provisions for personal jurisdiction and Thereby the statutory provisions are null and void ab initio and without power or authority to enforce any part of the statutory provisions and by civil commitment courts issuance of petition, order, decree and judgment without personal jurisdiction does not allow the civil circuit court the enforcement power and authority to a person subject to involuntary civil commitment; and while plaintiff remains under tolled parole, and in actual or constructive custody of the IODC until expiration of criminal sentence.

26. That the plaintiff is being detained without personal jurisdiction by the Cook County Civil Court in cause 11 CR 800 by null and void ab initio petition, order, decree and judgment; and by virtue of the civil circuit court's issuance of petition, order, decree and judgment prior to expiration of criminal sentence over the criminal personal jurisdiction.

27. That the plaintiff's entry onto parole was on 9/30/11, and under tolled parole as constructive part of criminal sentence, and DHS/TDF custody is without personal jurisdiction and is null and void ab initio; as the civil commitment circuit court under cause 11 CR 800 issued petition, order, decree and judgment was on 9/26/11 and was without personal jurisdiction then and thereafter.

28. That plaintiff is being detained by the Cook County Civil Commitment Circuit Court under cause 11 CR 800 in the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF) by null and void issuance of petition, judgment, order and decree prior to the expiration of plaintiff's constructive criminal sentence.

29. The civil court could not constitutionally have filed petition order, decree nor judgment without personal jurisdiction of the plaintiff's full expiration of criminal sentence including constructive part of criminal sentence as parole/MSR.

30. That the Illinois legislature enacted unconstitutional statutory provisions that provided for unconstitutional power and authority to the civil commitment Circuit Court to enforce unconstitutional statute under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq as without personal jurisdiction as null and void ab initio; and further in clear violation of plaintiff's substantive and fundamental rights under liberty interests, due process and equal protection of the law. USCA CONST. AMEND. 1,5,6,8,14.

31. That by the Illinois Civil Commitment Circuit and Appellate Court procedural bar, and without the power nor authority to act upon a legal nullity, and as ab initio; then the filing in the Civil Circuit and Appellate Courts are procedurally barred from hearing in the instant cause; and thereby violate and deny the plaintiff's fundamental and substantive rights of due process, equal protection, and liberty interest rights and were violative in extreme with the civil commitment Court's petition, judgments, orders, and decrees issued without personal jurisdiction; and in continued detainment and loss of liberty has caused irreparable and continuing injury for every day life cost to the elderly 61 year old plaintiff.

32. That the civil circuit commitment court has lost all power and authority to act upon the cause of the plaintiff under 11 CR 800 by following unconstitutional statutory provisions and strictures that were unconstitutionally enacted by the Illinois legislature without provision for personal jurisdiction. That as empowered the courts to enforce the issuance of petition, judgment, order and decree, and without personal jurisdiction, prior to the expiration of plaintiff's criminal sentence. The legislature granted and empowered the courts with authority and power to enforce unconstitutional statutory provisions without provisions for personal jurisdiction and as repugnant

32. Cont. ...to the Illinois and United States Constitutions and violative of due process, equal protection, and liberty interest rights as substantive and fundamental to the plaintiff. (See USCA Const. Amend. 1,5,6,8,14:In Re Hayes, 747 N.E. 2d 444, Key 19: Unconstitutional statutory provisions 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq: 207/10; 207/10(b); 207/10(b)(1); 207/9; 207/10(b)(2); 207/10(b)(3); 207/15; 207/15(a)(1); 207/15(b)(5); 207/30; 207/30(a); 207/30(b); 207/30 (c) and are all without provision for personal jurisdiction as enforced by the civil commitment courts prior to plaintiff's expiration of custody of criminal sentence, under the proper custody and personal jurisdiction of the DOC; but as enforced by the civil commitment circuit court as null and void ab initio and as unconstitutional under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.

33. That the plaintiff has not been brought to involuntary civil commitment trial, and is afore detained by DHS/TDF unconstitutional custody, without personal jurisdiction, for the last 6 years; and any judgment handed down by the court under involuntary commitment trial and without personal jurisdiction would be null and void ab initio in violation of due process and equal protection, and liberty interests and without personal jurisdiction usurped by the civil commitment court under cause 11 CR 800; and thereby the plaintiff's (3) years statutory parole/MSR has expired for years while in civil detainment awaiting commitment trial. That plaintiff remained in actual and constructive criminal sentence and under subject to violation of that parole; and the civil commitment court under cause 11 CR 800 remains without personal jurisdiction of the plaintiff. (SEE Baker v Wingo, 407 US 514).

34. That the plaintiff was in custody and personal jurisdiction of the DOC per order of the criminal sentencing court prior to expiration of criminal sentence, the civil commitment circuit court acted in null and void ab initio judgments, decrees, orders, and petition under 725 ILCS 207/2 et seq, and thereby without personal jurisdiction, and without constitutional statutory support; and the plaintiff was not properly nor constitutionally before the civil commitment court, nor could plaintiff procedurally proceed to the Illinois Appellate Court, and said courts are now and prior divested of any power, authority and personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff; and the said courts are without power and authority and personal jurisdiction to act in any way

34. Cont. ... in cause 11 CR 800 of the Plaintiff, as cause 11 CR 800 is null and void ab initio in lack of personal jurisdiction, and is null and void ab initio in enactment and enforcement of 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq; and as Attorney General instigated petition and unconstitutional filings of petition under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq against the plaintiff.

35. That the Illinois Attorney General, as filing non-political filings, under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq, as null and void ab initio did waive any rights to proceed in the process instant herein: and without power and authority of the state and state entities have lost all procedural rights to participate in reply in the instant cause; as have taken the eating of the poison apple of jurisprudence, and was without constitutional authority and power to act in the plaintiff's cause.

36. That the below listed statutory provisions are some of the unconstitutional statutory provisions under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq that the Illinois legislature unconstitutionally enacted without provision for personal jurisdiction and as null and void ab initio and without enforcement power and authority, and without personal jurisdiction and: as follows: 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq; 207/9; 207/10; 207/10(b); 207/10(b)(1); 207/10 (b)(2); 207/10 (b)(3); 207/15; 207/15(a)(1) 207/15(b)(5); 207/30; 207/30(a); 207/30(b); and 207/30(c) and in any other statutory provision thereunder without providing for personal jurisdiction; and so providing for statutory enforcement prior to expiration of criminal sentence; and any provision as null and void ab initio and as unconstitutional.

37. That with judgment in the severing of the unconstitutional statutory provisions as listed above under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq, and the said statutory provision cannot stand wholly and independently without the severed statutory provisions, and is facially unconstitutional; and by the addressed Court's past judgments must be adjudicated by text of statute alone; and without participation of state or federal entities outside of the Court's Justices; and without outside entities in hearing, nor argument, nor influence of any kind.

38. That the Illinois legislature does not have the power nor authority to enact nor enforce laws repugnant to the United States Constitution and in violation of the Bill of Rights; and that is inclusive of providing the states with the constitutional power and authority to enforce unconstitutional statutory provisions and as without subject matter nor personal jurisdiction nor in violation of due process of law; and without civil courts empowered to issue constitutionally null and void ab initio judgment, order, decree nor judgment without jurisdictional attachment over the plaintiff or laws subject matter; the plaintiff cannot constitutionally be the subject of a legal nullity in involuntary civil commitment under 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. and in violation of due process and First and Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests rights. USCA Const Amend 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14.

39. That the prior said unconstitutional provisions under 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. and as unconstitutionally enacted by the state legislature and as not having provision for jurisdictional; and the said statutory provision must be facilly struck down by the United States Supreme Court in appellate review for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction nor in due process; and in review of the finding of lawful pervasiveness to find for petition; and in placement in the punitive criminal code. (See Kansas vs Hendricks, 334 US 407). The

United States Supreme Court must facially strike down as null and void ab initio 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. and as unable to operate wholly and independently of the severed unconstitutional statutory provisions.

40. That 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. has been unconstitutionally enforced by the Illinois Courts for over 20 years without necessary jurisdiction and in abuse of statutory and constitutional personal rights, protections, and liberties has become common place and accepted as rampant and causing hundreds of persons to be constitutionally violated; and while causing hundreds of new statutes, revisions, and statutory adjustment because the Illinois Attorney General and Illinois legislature's 'slap-a-band-aid-on' legislative program under this sensationalized and political boon. That as the bias and prejudice-creating fear inspired statute to march in lock-step with Lisa and Michael Madigan, as legislative leader lefthundreds of persons, with billions spent, and lock the sex offender away without legal recourse by special legislative enactments; and as applied to the SVP statutory bias as a

money-pit political tool; and in the Illinois legislative policy that anything constitutionally violative can just be corrected by disguise and emergency legislation without constitutional import. The Illinois legislature has created an unconstitutional Frankenstein statutes that continually propagates corruption by continuing violations of constitutionally corrupt purposes of 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seq. and of the progenitives of this statute.

41. The Illinois legislature had to know all this time that it was making unconstitutional statutory jurisdictional concessions in the statutory construction and that constitutional violative provisions were enacted by unconstitutional mandate for reasons of political convenience, social control justifications, and fiscal acquirement, especially after the Illinois death penalty debacle, and to redirect public attention away from the politicians going-to-jail rotating door; and with 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seq. being placed in the Illinois criminal code as punitive creation; and the constant legislative rush to revisions that has resulted in harsher and more punitive enforcement and conditions of corruption in the enforcement of 725 ILCS 207 /1 et. seq.

42. That something is obviously very wrong with the Illinois ever growing statutory scheme that is bankrupting the state further, under 725 ILCS 207 and so many other inter-connector pertinent statutory provisions. That the federal SVP program commits less than 10% of those under petition, and the Illinois statutory scheme commits more than 99% of those subject to petition.

43. That 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seq. with the many jurisdictionally and constitutionally infirm statutory provisions, as enumerated herein, then the whole process must be drawn into constitutional question; and the created legal nullity ab initio of the whole process; and the trial portion of the statute cannot be constitutionally reached by action of petition, decree, order or judgment of enforcement of the civil commitment court, and thereby cannot statutorily nor constitutionally stand wholly and independently of the null and

void ab initio portions of the statute, and cannot be constitutionally reached for enforcement by any court. (See Fliessner vs Fitzgerald, 937 NE2d 1152; Kansas vs Hendrick, 334 US 407; Foucha vs Louisiana, 504 US 572, 582-83.

44. The constitutionally inexcusable delay in the plaintiff being allowed to exercise liberty interest, due process and equal protection rights, and when extended beyond the DOC criminal sentence expiration, active and constructive, that was to have fully expired prior to the actions of the involuntary commitment court in petition order, decree and judgment to gain personal jurisdiction of the plaintiff from the DOC. The full time detained by the Court's order in the DHS/TDF was without personal jurisdiction in constitutional violative custody under 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg.

45. That the state legislature must have known at some prior point, as is lawfully required, that unconstitutional statutory provisions and without provision for personal jurisdiction are constitutionally null and void ab initio. Thereby there should have been legislative or judicial recognition at some point in the last 20 years that 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. was constitutionally and jurisdictionally infirm and could not be enforced nor enacted.

46. That it is the court's constitutional duty to declare sue sponte that the statute could not be jurisdictionally acted upon in any manner. The Illinois Courts through political and social influence are still not recognizing nor addressing the said statutes lack of constitutional jurisdictional provision, and do not intend to do so when clear challenges appear in the state courts. In fact, the state courts will interfere with the due process necessary to expunge such legal nullities from the courts records regardless of the cost that outweigh the the social pressure. That the Illinois courts continue to violate the constitutional liberty interests and due process and equal protection under the law on a ad hoc basis, and without review by the addressed Court will continue to administer justice by null and void law, with unfair and unjust judicial adjudications with a blind evil eye and a crushing iron fisted discriminatory hand of bias in reach of the Constitution.

47. That statutory provisions in construction and timeliness that are not mere suggestion or guide-lines but are hard bright lines of statutory and constitutional mandates that provides all courts to obtain jurisdiction prior to the courts action of order, decree, judgment and petition in any case. That under the statute 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seq. such timeliness in jurisdiction must not sound until after the expiration of actual and constructive expiration in full of the criminal sentence. That a claim of legal nullity and voidness must be heard in any court at any time and it is that courts duty to so declare in null and void claim. That this is the last court to act constitutionally as is its purpose. The court must give a blind judicial eye to political and public bias and even the standing of the plaintiff. (In Re Litteral, 633 NE2d 74.)

48. That under due process the constitutional due process of plaintiff's rights that violated the criminal sentence jurisdiction thereby made the criminal sentence also null and void ab initio and without jurisdiction, and all the court's records must be vacated and expunged ab initio from all courts and venue.

49. When the plaintiff's liberty expectation was lost at expiration of criminal sentence by the unconstitutional civil circuit court's judgment, order, decree, and petition; and no matter what the twisted

and convoluted logic applied this was done without personal jurisdiction and it amount to extention of punative sentence on a daily basis and in violation of personal level of statutory and constitutional rights, protections and liberty under USCA First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the plaintiff.

50. That all attached and enclosed documents in the instant cause are in support of all filings, prior and current, claims, exhibits, and issues set forth in this complete instant cause.

51. That the plaintiff is blindly grouping in the legal darkness of ignorance, and self-taught law, and the laws practice forms and procedures; the plaintiff does not have a computer access; and the plaintiff in an indignant person without physical nor fiscal resources; and the plaintiff is civilly detained; and the plaintiff is unable to work due to doctors order due to age and physical problems; and therefore to meet all of the courts requirements under these circumstances is impossible for the plaintiff.

55. That the Illinois Attorney General and her father, Mike Madigan, has created a policy and program that costs Illinois billions of dollars and is used as a policial tool for social control via fear and knee jerk reaction to create even harsher and more restrictive treatment and conditions. The plaintiff prays that the honorable addressed Court and Justices shall be cognizant of the danger of retaliation against this plaintiff.

GROUND S FOR GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI


That due to the Illinois legislatures unconstitutional enactment of 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. without personal jurisdiction and the detainment of the plaintiff under that unconstitutional detainment since 2011. The statute, and without subject matter jurisdiction, and in violation of plaintiffs due process and equal protection of liberty under color of the law the Court should strike down, as facially unconstitutional 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. and order plaintiff's immediate release with prejudice. That protection of individual's constitutional rights is always a reason for grant of hearing before any court at any time, directly or collaterally. Government of Laws Doctrine: "The doctrine that the government must operate according to established consistant legal principles and not according to the interests of those who happen to be in power at a given time; esp., the doctrine that judicial decisions must be based on the law, regardless of the character of the litigants or the personal predilections of the judge." Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition.

The plaintiff has used the Thomas Reuter's Westlaw Correctional Law Library software.


PRAYER

That the Plaintiff prays the honorable addressed United States Supreme Court shall grant release of plaintiff and strike down 725 ILCS 207/1 et. seg. as facially unconstitutional and with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted:


Thomas Juresic, DHS/TDF
17019 County Farm Road
Rushville, Il. 62681


Sworn and subscribed to under penalty of perjury on this 7th day
of June, 2018.


Thomas Juresic.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND PROOF OF SERVICE

That Thomas Juresic, Plaintiff in Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was placed in a
United States Mail receptical at Dept. of Human Services
Treatment and Detention Facility, 10719 County Farm Road,
Rushville, Illinois 62681 under the plaintiff's name
and addressed to the United States Supreme Court, Office of the
Clerk, United States Supreme Court Building, First Street N.E.,
Washington, DC 20543-0001, on this *7th* day of *June*,
2018.

Sworn and subscribed to under penalty of perjury on this *7th*
day of *June*, 2018.


Thomas Juresic, DHS/TDF
17019 County Farm Road
Rushville, Illinois 62681

LIST OF PARTIES

[, All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[x] All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

That the plaintiffs are being held unlawfully and unconstitutionally in loss of liberty interest at expiration of criminal sentence under civil law that is without personal jurisdiction of the plaintiffs. That plaintiffs are being unconstitutionally held after expiration of criminal sentence without personal jurisdiction as is null and void ab initio. That Illinois statutory provision under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq is facially unconstitutional and thereby the detainment of plaintiffs has been and continues to be without personal jurisdiction of the civil circuit court. That such deprivation of liberty without personal jurisdiction under a law that is null and void ab initio and is without due process and equal protection of the law. That such said legal nullity cannot provide for personal jurisdiction as written by the Illinois legislature and enforced by the civil court. That the federal law and constitution provides that a null and void liberty deprivation may be brought up before any court at any time and is inclusive of title 28, §1257, Supreme Court Rules 10 (a-c), usca Const. Amend. 1, 5, 6, and 14 and any other additional violation of law and constitution.

That as a null and void claim under the U.S. Supreme Court does not hold discretionary power over the cause and the statutory unconstitutionality of a statute and the unconstitutional statute must be heard on text alone by facial nullity claim.

(See as follows):

1. Carlson v. Deluth, 958 F.Supp.2d 1040, key 28.
2. Chicago v Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
3. U.S. v Salerno, 481 US 739.
4. Client v Hynes, 75 Ill.2d 208.
5. Brumfeld v Louisiana, 806 F3d 289, key 2.
6. Burk v Johnson, 452 F3d 665.
7. Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 98 SCT 983, key 4 & 5.
8. Salmeron v D.C., 113 F.Supp.3d 263, key 2&3. While a decision to vacate a judgment is typically at the discretion of the court, there is no discretion on the part of the court when a motion is based on a void judgment; if the judgement is void, relief is mandatory.

LIST OF PARTIES

9. Jackson v Beech, 636 F2d 831, 835.
10. Eberhart v Integrated, 167 F3d 861, 871.
11. Bell v Iran, 734 F3d 1175, 1179.
12. Combs v Grain, 825 F2d 437, 441. Court has no discretion in a nullity; it is void or not.
13. PaVey v Conley, 528 F3d 494, key 3.
14. MvNutt v G.M., 298 US 178, 188-90, Key 2 & 3.
15. Prizevoits v Indiana Bell, 76 F3d 132, key 5.
16. Hyatt v CoCo, 302 F3d 707, 712-13, key 9.
17. People v Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 282 Ill Dec 183, key 4, 5, & 6.
18. U.S. Air v Espinosa, 559 US 260, key 11.
19. Rose v Homely, Bee 327, U.S. Sup. Ct., 2/1/1808. The operation of every judgment must depend on the power of the court to enter that judgment.
20. El Paso v Simmons, 379 US 497. Constitution was intended to preserve practical and substantive rights not to maintain theories.
21. Federal Housing v Darlington, 358 US 84. The Constitution is concerned with practical and substantive rights, not those that are unclear and gain hold by subtle and involved reasoning.
22. U.S. v Thornton, 514 US 779. Constitution nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of infringing on constitutional protections.
23. INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, key 12.
24. U.S. v Villamonte, 462 US 597, key 5.
25. U.S. v Prince Edward, 377 US 218. Constitutional principles cannot yield simply because of disagreement with them.
26. Truax v Corrigan, 257 US 312, 42 SCT 124, key 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 11. A purpose of the constitution was to protect the fundamental rights of the individual against experiments by the government. "Thereby if there is to be a respondent then it must be the Court itself."

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JURESIC V. STATE OF ILLINOIS
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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

EXHIBIT NUMBER: 1-12

NUMBER OF PAGES: 32

TITLE:

Facesheet
IN THE UNITED STATE'S SUPREME COURT
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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JURISDICTION

☐ For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was _____.

☐ No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ____ A ____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257; U.S. Supreme Court Rule(s) 12.2 & 12.4. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. That the jurisdiction of the state's highest court / the U.S. Supreme Court applies in challenge to the nullity of a State statutory provision, 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. as facially unconstitutional. That such said facial unconstitutionality is ruled upon by text alone by the Court. People v Thompson, 209 Ill2d 19; Key 4. Jackson v Beech, 636F2d 831, Key 4. Fed Rule of Civ Proc

☐ For cases from state courts: 60(b).

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was _____
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _____.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ____ A ____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

This a challenge to a nullity of a statute that may be filed in any court at any time. That time constraints do not apply. that this is all set out in the petition and attachments.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

☐ For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☒ is unpublished. **Illinois Supreme Court. M14080/223872
Denied, No Opinion**

The opinion of the _____ court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☒ is unpublished. **Illinois Appellate 1st District,
17-2242, Denied, No Opinion.**

NULL AND VOID PROCEDURES DEFINED

As has been long established law that the procedural rules governing the filing and hearing of a claim of null and void (ab initio) judgment, order, decree and statute are not as alike to other process before the courts.

Andress v Daubert, 2015 WL 7114627, Key 2, 3.

Dookerman v Cook County, 719 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2013)

Arnold v KJD, 2015 WL 8266 (SD Il), Key 1.

Jones v Brennan, 465 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 2006)

Burk v Johnson, 452 F.3d 667 (7th Cir 2006).

Atlantic v Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739.

Nougue v Clapp, 100 U.S. 551, 1879 WL 16706

Armstrong v Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 42-43, 133 N.E. 58.

Title 28, § 1257.

El v Judicial Peoria, 2015 WL 5542993 (CD Il).

Executive v Arkison, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014).

Fink v Ryan, 174 Ill.2d 302, 308, 344 Ill.Dec. 811.

Long v Shorebank, 182 F.2d 548 (7th Cir 1999), Key 4.

Richardson v Koch, 768 F.3d 732 (7th Cir 2014), Key 1.

Parker v Lyons, 757 F.3d 701 (7th Cir 2014), Key 4, 5. 9, 10.

Lance v Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 126 S.Ct. 1198 (2006), Key 1.

Yanhuss v Kohn, 2015 WL 5123699, Key 7.

Whitehead v Discovery, 2015 WL 4668758, Key2.

Hoang v Ummel, 24 Fed. Appx. 613 (7th Cir 2001).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

That plaintiff served criminal sentence from an Illinois criminal circuit court. That prior to the expiration of the criminal sentence personal jurisdiction was in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) and the criminal sentencing court. That prior to plaintiffs expiration of sentence the Illinois civil circuit court issued petition, summons, and detention order and all issue was prior to plaintiffs criminal expiration of sentence. That by issuance of cause, order, decree, or petition prior to plaintiffs expiration of criminal sentence then the civil circuit court was without personal jurisdiction of the plaintiff; and thereby any and all action taken by the civil circuit court and prior to full expiration of plaintiff's criminal sentence was then and then and thereafter all action taken by the civil court was null and void ab initio as without personal jurisdiction under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.

That the Illinois legislature enacted 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq as a civil law in denial and ignoring the civil circuit court's lack of personal jurisdiction and was unconstitutional in, at least, ten (10) provisions in the beginning of the statute, 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq and thereby leaves the statute facially unconstitutional and as so claimed in the plaintiffs petition. That in the statute is not providing for personal jurisdiction in statutory construction. That by not providing for civil personal jurisdiction under the said statute in liberty interests, due process, and equal protection, due process and equal protection clause; and cannot be enforced by the courts. That by facial unconstitutionality the said statutory provision, under 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq is null and void ab initio. That the plaintiffs have been held by years and decades by unconstitutional civil law detainment that is null and void ab initio.

REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION

That in the state of Illinois there are some 600 persons beinging unconstitutionally involuntarily civilly detained under a unconstitutional statutory scheme lacking in acquiring personal jurisdiction. That such manipulation of constitutional law is in reality made to support invidious discrimination based on public and political bias in discrimination of those persons labled 'sex offenders' and who have completed the continuum of state imposed punishment. That the petitioner and all other similarly situated have completed their actual and constructive criminal sentences.

Prior to their expiration of criminal sentence the civil commitment court acted in petition, order, summons, detention without constitutional personal jurisdiction; and prior to the expiration of criminal sentence and in violation of subject matter jurisdiction in legislative enactment and the court's enforcement. That all acts by the civil court prior to expiration of the criminal sentence is without personal jurisdiction and is thereby null and void ab initio in ten to thirteen provisions of 725 ILCS 207/1 et seg.

As a legal nullity in the criminal sentence also due to violation of personal and subject matter jurisdiction prior to the expiration of criminal sentence.

It is always in the public interest to protect the individual's fundamental rights under color of law and constitution.

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Thomas Juresic,
Plaintiff,
vs
State of Illinois,
Respondent

DOCKETING STATEMENT


As herin attached and enclosed in Petition For Leave to File Writ of Certiorari, is the most complete case file as plaintiff was able to obtain and supply for the Addressed Court's appellate review in unconstitutional detainment and Null and void statutory provisions under Illinois 725 ILCS 207/1 et seg. involuntary civil comittment statute.

The plaintiff is in unable to further accomplish what the court seems to procedurally require due to lack of personal resources and that plaintiff is civilly detained.


CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
To protect the USCA Constitutional rights of the plaintiff and to
strike harm done by unconstitutional statutory provision.

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas M. Jurase

Date:

June 7th, 2018