

# EXHIBIT A

**United States Court of Appeals**  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

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**No. 17-5136**

**September Term, 2017**

**1:16-cv-00908-CKK**

**Filed On: November 1, 2017** [1702579]

Anica Ashbourne,

Appellant

v.

Donna Hansberry, Director, Global High  
Wealth, et al.,

Appellees

12.11.17

**ORDER**

It is **ORDERED**, on the court's own motion, that the following briefing schedule will apply in this case:

Appellant's Brief	December 11, 2017
Appendix	December 11, 2017
Appellees' Brief	January 10, 2018
Appellant's Reply Brief	January 24, 2018

All issues and arguments must be raised by appellant in the opening brief. The court ordinarily will not consider issues and arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief. To enhance the clarity of their briefs, the parties are cautioned to limit the use of abbreviations, including acronyms. While acronyms may be used for entities and statutes with widely recognized initials, briefs should not contain acronyms that are not widely known. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Procedures 41 (2017); Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 2010).

Parties are strongly encouraged to hand deliver the paper copies of their briefs to the Clerk's office on the date due. Filing by mail could delay the processing of the brief. Additionally, parties are reminded that if filing by mail, they must use a class of mail that is at least as expeditious as first-class mail. See Fed. R. App. P. 25(a). All briefs and appendices must contain the date that the case is scheduled for oral argument at the top of the cover, or state that the case is being submitted without oral argument. See D.C. Cir. Rule 28(a)(8).

**United States Court of Appeals**  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

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**No. 17-5136**

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Failure by appellant to respond to a dispositive motion or comply with any order of the court, including this order, will result in dismissal of the case for lack of prosecution. See D.C. Cir. Rule 38.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to appellant by certified mail, return receipt requested, and by first class mail.

**FOR THE COURT:**  
Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/  
Michael C. McGrail  
Deputy Clerk

# EXHIBIT B

**United States Court of Appeals**  
**FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT**

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**No. 15-5351****September Term, 2017**

FILED ON: NOVEMBER 3, 2017

ANICA ASHBOURNE,

APPELLANT

v.

DONNA HANSBERRY, DIRECTOR, GHW, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Columbia  
(No. 1:12-cv-01153)

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Before: SRINIVASAN, *Circuit Judge*, and WILLIAMS and RANDOLPH, *Senior Circuit Judges*.

**J U D G M E N T**

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the briefs filed by the parties. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 34(j). The court has accorded the issues full consideration and determined they do not warrant a published opinion. *See* D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is

**ORDERED** and **ADJUDGED** that the district court's judgment is affirmed.

Ashbourne appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment on her claims against the Treasury Department. She claims that the Department terminated her probationary employment in violation of the Privacy Act and the Fifth Amendment. Her Privacy Act claims impermissibly recast a federal personnel management decision as a factual challenge under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C). *See, e.g., Albright v. United States*, 732 F.2d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Further, Ashbourne received adequate process to protect her interest in her professional reputation. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

In its Notice of Proposed Termination, the Department found that Ashbourne's description of her work experience at Ashbourne & Company and C.J. Johnson, Inc. was "misleading." As to Ashbourne & Company, the Department's conclusion rested on discrepancies between Ashbourne's resume and e-QIP submissions, all submitted by Ashbourne

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herself. Ashbourne does not challenge the factual accuracy of these records. She therefore has no basis under the Privacy Act for disputing the Department's determination. *See, e.g., Kleiman v. Dep't of Energy*, 956 F.2d 335, 337–38 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

As to C.J. Johnson, Inc., the Department's conclusion rested on discrepancies between Ashbourne's account—that she resigned from the company—and her former supervisor's account—that she was fired. Ashbourne does not challenge her supervisor's affidavit, but argues that the Department was required to take reasonable steps to verify whose account was true. *See Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons*, 959 F.2d 307, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Department satisfied this obligation by giving Ashbourne an opportunity to explain the discrepancy by submitting affidavits with the help of counsel. Ashbourne's response did not mention the factual discrepancy that forms the basis of this Privacy Act claim. Without notice, the Department was under no continued duty to verify each factual matter mentioned in her supervisor's affidavit through an independent inquiry into third-party sources and documents. *Cf. McCready v. Nicholson*, 465 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (further inquiry was necessary “in light of McCready having brought her attendance at the committee meeting to the Inspector General's attention”). When the Department's further inquiry did not reveal whose account was accurate, the Department followed *Doe v. United States*, 821 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc), by including both her and her supervisor's accounts in her file.

Ashbourne's Fifth Amendment claim also fails. Even if we assume arguendo that Ashbourne's termination sufficiently “stigmatized . . . her reputation” so as to infringe her “protected liberty interest in reputation,” *Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 753 F.2d 1092, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1985), she was given a sufficient “opportunity to clear [her] name.” *Codd v. Velgar*, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977). Due process requires only that the Department “must provide notice of the charges and an opportunity to refute them effectively.” *McCormick v. District of Columbia*, 752 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2014). By allowing Ashbourne to challenge the termination decision through affidavits with the help of counsel in accordance with the Civil Service Reform Act, *see* 5 C.F.R. § 315.805, the Department afforded Ashbourne adequate process.

Pursuant to D.C. CIR. R. 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41.

**FOR THE COURT:**

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

# EXHIBIT C

**United States Court of Appeals**  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

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**No. 15-5351**

**September Term, 2017**

**1:12-cv-01153-BAH**

**Filed On:** February 14, 2018

Anica Ashbourne,

Appellant

v.

Donna Hansberry, Director, GHW, et al.,

Appellees

**BEFORE:** Garland, Chief Judge; Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Griffith, Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, Millett, Pillard, Wilkins, and Katsas, Circuit Judges; Williams and Randolph\*, Senior Circuit Judges

**ORDER**

Upon consideration of appellant's motion for leave to file petition for rehearing en banc out of time and request for oral argument, the lodged petition for rehearing en banc, and the absence of a request by any member of the court for a vote, it is

**ORDERED** that the motion be granted. The Clerk is directed to file the lodged document. It is

**FURTHER ORDERED** that the request for oral argument and the petition be denied.

**Per Curiam**

**FOR THE COURT:**

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken R. Meadows

Deputy Clerk

\* Senior Circuit Judge Randolph would deny the motion for leave to file.



15-5351

Anica Ashbourne  
7422 Drumlea Road  
Capitol Heights, MD 20743

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