No. _____

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

JUDITH M. BROWN-WILLIAMS et al.,
Petitioners
v.

BENTLEY MOTORS, INC., et al.
Respondents

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of California

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JUDITH M. BROWN-WILLIAMS
IN PRO PER
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the Petitioner prevail in the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act violation of (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1790 et seq.)

2. Did Respondent file the Judgment entered And signed by the trial Court on April 27, 2009?

3. Was the April 27, 2009 judgment filed by the Respondents incorrect and false?

4. Did Petitioners prove with the specificity required that the Respondents in concert committed the worst species of "fraud upon the Court" and RICO Violations?

5. Did Petitioners have good cause to file the several Actions that caused Petitioners to be deemed vexatious?

6. Where the Petitioners sanctioned by the trial due To inadvertence surprise and excusable neglect?

LIST OF PARTIES

BENTLEY MOTORS INC.

RUSNAK PASADENA

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES

MARK V. MOONEY

JUDGE MARK V. MOONEY

NORMAN TAYOR AND ASSOCIATES

LAW OFFICE OF JIM O WHITWORTH

BRADLEY & GMELICH LLP

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California Code of Civil Procedure § 1790

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1 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 1, *Negligence:*

7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23

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3 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 3267 et. Seq.

Rule 8.500

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18 U.S.C. A § 1961

18 U.S.C. A § 1962

28 U.S.C. § 1257 (a)

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)

U.S.C. Rule 10 (a) (b) (c)

6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005)
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgments below.

OPINIONS BELOW

Supreme Court of California Order dated July 11, 2018
Appendix 1

Supreme Court of California Order dated July 11, 2018
Appendix 2

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JURISDICTION

On July 11, 2018, the highest state court, the Supreme Court of California made an Order regarding a petition for Review and a copy of that decision appears at Appendix 1.

This Court jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.§1257 (a) to review the decision of the Court of Appeals because the Petitioners have filed a timely petition for Review in the California Supreme Court.

This Court's review is necessary because the petition raises a federal claims and state court claims in another.

This Court Review is necessary to settle an important legal question of great public interest as this case is about "Fraud upon the Court" by a Judge[s] of the Superior Court of Los Angeles who are elected and paid by the state.

This is an omnibus Case that has traversed every Court and it is necessary to secure uniformity of appellate decisions throughout the state, and to settle an important issue of law in the matter (*Judith M. Brown-Williams et al V. Bentley Motors Inc. et al)* Supreme Court of California Case No. S249094.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Seventh Amendment To The United States Constitution

In suits common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury, shall be preserves, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

LAWS GOVERNING REVIEW

Review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. This Writ of Certiorari contains compelling reasons.

(a) the United States Court of Appeals has entered a decision of another United States Court of Appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power;

(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state c ourt of appeals.

(c) A state Court or a United States court of appeals

(d) has decided an important question of federal law t that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners prevail in their "lemon law" action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code, § 1790 et. Seq.) against respondents Bentley Motors , Inc., and Rusnak/Pasadena and Judgment has not been entered.

The Court of Appeals Opinion on February 3, 2012 Affirmed the Judgment on July 2, 2007 and Judgment on September 25, 2008 and Petitioners are entitled to an amount cost and legal fees to be determined on post-judgment motions recited therein.

On July 11, 2011 the Court of Appeals issued the Courts ***REMITTITUR*** for (notice of appeal filed

August 18, 2009 by Bentley Motors, Inc., and Rusank/ Pasadena.

On February 3, 2012 the Court of Appeals Opinion ask the "Question #7– What are the [appellants] damages?

On April 5, 2012 the Court of Appeals issued the Courts***REMITTITUR*** to the trial Court.

On October 1, 2012 the United States Supreme Court denied the Writ of Certiorari.

On May 5, 2015 the Hon. Judge Stephen Pfahler granted the respondents Motion to find Petitioners Vexatious in the related case *(Judith M. Brown-Williams et al. v. Bentley Motors Inc. et al.)* Case No. PC056141.

On July 6, 2017 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal Issued the MEMORANDUM.

On July 28, 2017 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Issued the MANDATE.

Petitioners in pro per due to inadvertence surprise and excusable neglect filed several ex parte and motions to Request entry of the judgment and subsequently was sanction by the Court.

On January 16, 2018 after filing a proper post-Judgment the Petitioners submitted a Proposed Judgment on Special Verdict that references a June 25, 2007 trial to

the trial Court Hon. Judge Debre K. Weintraub Dept. 1 to complete the post-judgment motions.

On January 18, 2018 still confused by the Court denial the trial Court added additional sanctions due to Petitioners continued inadvertence and excusable neglect.

The trial Court answered the question of the Court of Appeal with Petitioners damages nunc pro tunc but yet again due to Petitioners inadvertence surprise and excusable neglect filed Motion for Reconsideration in order to achieve the entry of petitioners Judgment and the Court denied the request and stated the decision was made over six years ago.

After petitioners sought similar relief in the United States District Court before the Hon. Judge George Wu that was summarily denied.

On March 2, 2018 Petitioners filed a Writ of Mandate in the Court of Appeals and on May 21, 2018 the Court denied the petition.

On May 31, 2018 petitioners filed a Petition for Review in the Supreme Court of California and on the Court denied the petitioners petition on July 11, 2018.

The Court's footnote is the basis of this action.

The Court's *footnote*: *To the appellants brief mention other issues, such as the trial court's evidentiary ruling in limine directing counsel not to disclose to the second jury details about the first jury's findings; purported failure of appellants trial counsel to obtain appellants consent to counsel's stipulation to a bench trial on damages; and collusion of appellant's trial attorneys with respondent, appellants' failure to discuss these issues with cogent arguments supported by citations to the record and legal authorizes, waives the issue on appeal. (Badie v. Bank Of America supra,* 67 cal. App. 4th at pp.784-785.)

Petitioners inadvertence surprise and excusable neglect and the Respondents continued "Fraud upon the Court" with Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization with the assistance of the trial Court the fraud continued and Petitioners were powerless to stop the slander and defamation of their character or stop the several trial court sanctions.

THE JUDGMENT WAS FINAL IN 2012

The Respondents knew the judgment was final when the Court of Appeal issued the Remittitur on April 5, 2012 and the Respondents continued the fraud on the Court filing a Notice of Entry of Judgment with a

declaration by Court Clerk A. Williams.

Its clear by the record the Petitioners had a final Judgment and each Respondent had a duty under the law and betrayed the Petitioners knowing and in collision.

The qualifying word "final" emphasizes the character of the judgment, order or proceedings from which the Court can affords relief; and hence the interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court then to afford such relief from them as justice requires.

The subdivision include mistake or neglect of others which may be just as material and call just as much for supervisory jurisdiction as where the judgment is taken against the party through his mistake, inadvertence or surprise.

Fraud, intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party are express grounds for relief by motion under CCP 1008(a) and 1008(b) and Other Methods of Relief From Judgment amended subdivision (b) and the Effect of Rule 60(b) on (1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 942,945 The amendment make fraud an express grounds for relief by motion; and under the

saving clause fraud may be urged as a basis for relief byindependent action as established doctrine permits. *See* Moore and Rodgers. Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J.623, 653-659; 3 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 3267 et. Seq.

And the Rule expressly does not limit the power of the court, when fraud has been perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. As an illustration of this situation, *(Hazel Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.* (1944) 322 U.S. 238.

Petitioner's acts had to be extraordinary NUNC PRO TUNC and the fact a judge was involved made it impossible to find counsel willing to assist and it is till unclear what the Court requires to finalize the Verified Complaint against respondents for Fraud on the Court and the Court has the power to issue an extraordinary writ.

RESPONDENTS EXTRINSIC FRAUD

A judge is not the Court. *(People v. Zajic 88 Ill. App. 3d 477, 410 N.E. 2d 626 (1980). A Judge is a judicial officer, paid by the state to act impartially and lawful. AJudge is also a judicial officer of the Court, as well are all attorneys. Whenever an officer of the Court commits fraud during a proceeding in the Court, he/she is engaged*

in "fraud upon the Court." In (Bulloch v. United States 763 F. 115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) the Court stated: "Fraud upon the Court is fraud directed at the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury... it is where the Court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function--- thus where the impartial function of the court have been directly corrupted." Fraud upon the Court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit court of Appeals to" embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the Court. (Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F. 3d 689 (1968); (7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d, ed., p. 512, p.60.3. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the Court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

The Respondents acts were "Extrinsic fraud" Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization and "intrinsic fraud" which includes lying, perjury, misrepresentation that was raised during the proceedings but due to the collusion of Petitioners counsel with the Respondents this was not raised in the trial Court.

The Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) passed by congress with the declared purpose of seeking to eradicate organized crime in the United States. *(Russello v. United States,* 464 U.S. 16, 26-27 104 S. Ct. 296, 302-303, 78 l. Ed 17 (1983). A violation of section 1962 (c), requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity. *(Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,* 479, 496, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L. Ed. 2d (1985). To be found guilty of violating the RICO statue the followingmust be proved (1) that Defendants enterprise exist, (2) predicated acts were committed by the Defendants, (3) Defendants was associated with or employed by the enterprise. (4) Defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, (5) and that the Defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. *(United States v. Phillips,* 664 F. 2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. Unit B. Dec. 1981)

An "enterprise" is defined as including any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. A §1961.

As to the continuity requirement, the Plaintiffs have shown that the Defendants racketeering acts found to have been committed pose a threat to continued racketeering activity and proving; (1) that the Defendants acts are part of a long term association that exist for a criminal purpose, (2) that the Defendants acts are a regular way of conducting the Defendants ongoing legitimate act or inaction, (3) that they are a regular way of conducting or participating in an enterprise of ongoing fraudulent acts and fraud upon the Court. *Id.*

When a RICO action is brought before continuity can be established, then liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated. The matter herein confirms the continuity of the Defendants actions as shown in the record of the most recent Superior Court of Los Angeles hearings that confirms the Defendants herein continued the fraud upon the Court and do not get a free pass to commit fraud. The Supreme Court held. *Id.* However, Hon. Judge Scalia wrote in his concurring

opinion that it would be absurd to say that "at least a few months of racketeering activity... is generally for free, as far as RICO is concerned." *Id. at 254, 109 S. Ct. 2908.* Therefore, if the predicate acts involve a distinct threat of long term racketeering activity, either implicit or explicit, a RICO pattern is established. *Id.* at 242, 109 s. Ct. at 2902.

The RICO statue expressly states that it is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the subsections of 18 U.S.C.A.§1962. Plaintiffs have proven but the government need not prove that the Defendants agreed with every conspirator, knew all of the other conspirators, or had full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy. *(Delano,* 825 F. Supp. at 542. All that must be shown is: (1) that the Defendants agreed to commit the substantive racketeering offense through agreeing to participate in two or more racketeering acts; (2) that the Defendants knew the general status of the conspiracy; and (3) that defendants knew the conspiracy extended beyond their individual role. *(United States v. Rastelli,* 870 F. 2d 822, 828 (2nd Cir.)

In Hartford the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, largely

because of the spurious article by an impartial outsider. Finally, Hazel capitulated and paid $1,000,000.00 and entered into a license agreement. The information about the fraud was brought to light ten years later. Hazel then instituted action to have the judgment against him set aside and the judgment of the District Court reinstated. When this case reached the Supreme Court, Hon. Justice Black, writing for the majority of the Court directed the district court to set aside its judgment in the first action entered pursuant to the Circuit Court of Appeals' Mandate, and to re-instate its original judgment.

The Court said:

> "... [The] general rule [is] that [federal courts will not alter or set aside their judgments after the expiration of the term at which the judgments were finally entered... [But] every element of the fraud here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside the fraudulent begotten judgment. Here... we find deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals... The Public Welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud..."

Id at 244,245. Hartford justified a belief that a liberal doctrine was to be applied in federal courts, and that fraud synonymous with the *Hartford* fraud would be the basis for relief. Since the *Hartford* case was used by the advisor Committee to define the term "fraud on the Court" what this case means is what Federal Rule 60(b) means.

The Respondents herein were in concert with others in a conspiracy and all actions were illegal and in the furtherance of a common scheme or design to achieve the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy and its unlawful purpose. *(Angelus Securities Corp. v. Ball.* 20 Cal. App. 2d 423, 432, [67 P. 2d. 152]

The Petitioners attorney was not authorized merely by virtue of his retention in this litigation to impair the client's substantial rights... "For example the law is well settled that an attorney must be specially authorized to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a compromised settlement or pending litigation." Such decisions differ from the routine and tactical decisions that have been called 'procedural' and this matter is an example of *"fraud on the*

Court."(Blanton v. Womancare 38 Cal. 3d 396, 404-405 (1985))

"The inherent power in every Cour[t] control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers'" [t]he paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar." (Ibid)

Two ethical duties are entwined in an attorney-client relationship. First is the attorney's duty of confidentiality, which fosters open communication between clients and counsel, based on the client's understanding that the attorney is statutorily obligated. (Bus. & Prof. Code. §6068, subd. (e)) to maintain the client confidence. *(SpeeDee supra 20 Cal. 4th at p. 1146, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816 890 p.2d 371)* the second is the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to the client. *(Flatt v. superior Court* (1994) Cal. 4th 275, 282, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 885, 950) These ethical duties are mandated by the California Rules of Professional Conduct. (Rule 3-310(c)&(e). *The Court has held;* The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to Plaintiffs from an

act or acts done in the furtherance of the common design.... In such an action the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity. *(Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court* (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 44,, citing *(Mox Incorporated v. Woods* (1927) 2020 Cal. 675, 677-678.) (*Id. at* 511)'Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. By Participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her own torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate tortfessors. Standing alone, a conspiracy does not harm and engenders no tort liability it must be activated by the commission of an actual tort.

"A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not

per se give rise to a cause action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting in damage." "A bare agreement amount two or more persons to harm a third person cannot injure the latter unless and until acts are actually performed pursuant to the agreement. Therefore, it is the acts done and not the conspiracy to do them which should be regarded as the essence of the civil action' and breach of duty. *(Allied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra* 7th Cal. 4th at 510-511)

The court of appeals reviews de novo the district court's evaluation of judicial concern, such as the interrelationship of certified claims and remaining claims, and the possibility of piece meal review. *See (Gregorian v. Lzvestia,* 871 F, 2d 1515, 1518-19 (9th Circuit 1989) (mixed question of law and fact); *see also (Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency,* 810 F. 3d 622, 628 (9th Circuit 2015); *SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int'l Corp.,* 617 F. 3d 1072,1084 (9th Circuit 2010); *(AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc.,* 465 F. 3d 946, 949 (9th Circuit 2006) (Amended) ("The district court's Rule 54(b0 certification of the judgment is reviewed de novo to determine if it will lead to 'piecemeal appeals' and for 'clear unreasonableness'

on the issue of equity.") *(Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC,* 422 F. 3d 873,879 (9th Circuit 2005) (explaining that judicial concerns are reviewed de novo). The court of appeals reviews for abuse of discretion the court's assessment of equitable factors, such as prejudice and delay. *See (Gregorian,* 871 F 2d at 1519); see also *Platform Wireless Int'l Corp.,* 617 F. 3d at 1084) (assessing equities under "substantial deference" standard); *(Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt,* 939 F. 2d 794, 797 (9th Circuit 1991)(citing Gregorian for the single proposition that the court reviews a rule 54(b) certification for abuse of discretion).

Finally *"fraud upon the Court"* tolls the statute of limitations based on the Respondents in collusion with Petitioners attorney that impaired and diminution of a right or remedy, as well as the loss or extinction of a right or remedy. *See (Id, At.; Adams v. Paul (1995)* 11 cal. 4th 583, 589-592, fn5)

Exceptional and special situation exist and the Court has continued jurisdiction and continued Jurisdiction exist in this matter as all matter are related to not only the initial lemon Law case but also for the fraud on the Court after the judgment was entered on July 2, 2007, September

25, 2008 and again after the Court of Appeals entered final Judgment on April 27, 2009. *(Mason & Associates,Inc. v. Guarantee Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Livermore Valley* (1969) 269 Cal. App.2d 132. 133-34 (emphasis added) This is a highly unusual situation, and it necessary to petition the court to recall a remittitur to correct a clerical error or to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. *See (In re Grunau* (2008) 169 Cal. App. 4th 997 (appeal dismissed decades earlier is reinstated to remedy lawyer misconduct. Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1(a)(1) An Appeal, other than in a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal. An appeal, other than in a limited case, may be taken from any of the following;

(1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment, other than as provided in paragraphs (8)(9) and (11) or a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by section 1222.
(2) From an order made after a judgment made Appealable by paragraph (1)
(3) From an order granting a motion to quash service of summons or granting a motion to stay the action on the grounds of inconvenient forum, or from a written order of dismissal under Section 581d following an order granting a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum.
(4) From an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

As a last resort petitioners in this rear case must seek relief that is available to clarify a judgment that is ambiguous with regard to some aspect of the Opinion.

"The formulation of the standard of care is a question of law for the court. Once the court has formulated the standard, its application to the facts of the case is a task for the trier of fact if reasonable minds might differ as to whether up parties conduct was conform to the standard." *Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.* (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 539, 546 [25 Cal Rptr. 2d 97, 863 P. 2d],

Restatement Second of Torts, section 282, defines negligence as "conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable new risk of harm."

Restatement Second of Torts, section 283, provides, "unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances."

The California Supreme Court has stated: "Because application of [due care] is inherently situational, the amount of care deemed reasonable in any particular case may vary, while at the same time the standard of conduct itself remains constant, i.e. . due care commensurate with

the risk posed by the conduct taking into consideration all relevant circumstances. [Citations]. *(Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center* (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 992, 997 [35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685,884,P.2d 142]; see *(Tucker v. Lombardo (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 457,464, [303 P.2d 1041].)*

The proper conduct of a reasonable person in particular situation may become settled by judicial decision or may be establish by statute or administrative regulation. *(Remirez supra, 6* Cal.4th at p. 547.)(See CACI Nos. 418 to 421 on negligence pre se.)Negligence can be found in the doing of an act, as well as in the failure to do an act. (Rest.2d Torts. § 284.)

EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST

In light of the extraordinary revelations known to the Court but is newly uncovered by the Petitioners as evidenced by the filings the Petitioners could not have understood the magnitude of the Respondents fraud and racketeering activities NUNC PRO TUNC.

Petitioners have pleaded the matter herein with the specificity required and identified pertinent procedural events and analyze relevant facts and legal authorities and have confined those facts which were

established at trial and contained in the record that supports the Petitioners contention. *(Mansell v. Board of Administration* (194) 30 Cal. App. 4th 539, 545-546. *(Guthrey v. State of California* (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1115-1116) *(Pulver v. Avco Financial Services* (1986) 182 cal. App. 3d 622,632 and there are no matters in dispute and Petitioners entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The acts of the Respondents detailed and recited herein is a roadmap to the worst species of fraud on the Court in collusion with members of the Court and is a serious ethical violation by ministerial officers.

The Respondents Fraud on the Court, Oppression, Malice and RICO violations lasted almost 14 years and is extraordinary and but for the efforts of Petitioners in pro per up against unbelievable odds the Respondents would have continued their RICO Act and continue to defile the Court NUNC PRO TUNC.

The Respondents fraud herein stated warrants the historic power of the Court as with an award Statutory Damages for "Fraud on the Court" that sends a very clear message to similarly suited corporations and others that seek to defile our Courts and our Judicial System that the

Court will not tolerate these disgraceful tactics as displayed in this matter NUNC PRO TUNC.

"Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act commonly referred to as RICO Act is designed to combat organized crime in the United States. It allows prosecution and civil penalties for racketeering up to twice the profits of the Company and the Supreme Court has held that 500 times is not excessive and could and should be used to punish a the Defendants fraud that is beyond egregious and violated not only the Plaintiffs legal rights but violated the very fabric of our judicial system.

The Independent Action filed for Fraud Uponthe Court and RICO Act Violation is related and Petitioners have provided the Court with the specificity required with uncontroverted evidence of the Respondents "Fraud on the Court" and Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Violations and there are no matters in dispute.

This matter concerns public trust and the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar and an attorneys duty to maintain undivided loyalty to their clients to avoid undermining

public confidence in the legal profession.

REASONS WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

Because good cause exist to grant Petitioners Writ and finalize the Judgment against the Respondents:

Because the Petitioners have proved with the specificity required that Respondent in concert with the trial Court and Petitioners attorneys committed the worst species of fraud and Punitive Damages are warranted.

Because this is an omnibus matter that traversed every Court and Petitioners were not sophisticated enough to understand the legal process required to prosecute their state and federal claims.

Because there are no matters in dispute as to the state claims or the federal claims.

Because this Independent action for Fraud on the Court against the Respondents and the trial Court and Others for Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization has been heard in a private matter in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Because Petitioners have suffered long enough with emotional and financial distress that have reeked havoc and caused collateral damage to the Petitioners and their entire family for 14 plus years.

Petitioners have brought to the attention of the Court the worst species of fraud and RICO Violations and discussed these issues with cogent arguments supported by citations to the record and legal authorities and after 14 years Petitioners deserve finalization of this matter and final statutory Judgment NUNC PRO TUNC.

Petitioners pray this Court grants this Writ.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated August 23, 2018

Judith M. Brown-Williams In Pro Per

Alvin E. Williams In Pro Per