

App. 1

**Court of Appeals of Ohio**  
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT  
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

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JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION  
No. 105239

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**STEPHANIE ANN LUCK**

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

**LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN**

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

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**JUDGMENT:**  
AFFIRMED

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Civil Appeal from the  
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas  
Case No. CV-14-828766

**BEFORE:** McCormack, P.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon,  
J.

**RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:** October 19, 2017

**FOR APPELLANT**

Larry Klayman, pro se  
2020 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. #800  
Washington, D.C. 20006

**ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE**

Robert B. Weltman  
David S. Brown  
Jack W. Hinneberg  
Weltman Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A.  
323 Lakeside Avenue, Ste. 200  
Cleveland, OH 44113

**ALSO LISTED**

**For Judicial Watch Inc.**

Thomas J. Wilson  
Comstock Springer & Wilson Co. L.P.A.  
100 Federal Plaza East, Ste. 926  
Youngstown, OH 44503-1811

TIM McCORMACK, P.J.:

{¶1} In this creditor’s bill action, defendant-appellant Larry Klayman appeals from the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment for plaintiff-appellee Stephanie Luck. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

**Procedural and Substantive History**

{¶2} Klayman and Luck were married and had two children together. Upon their divorce in 2003, the two entered into a separation agreement. A case was initiated in the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court that ultimately resulted in a judgment in favor of Luck for \$325,500 in 2011. This court upheld that judgment on appeal. *Klayman v. Luck*, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97074 and 97075, 2012-Ohio-3354. This 2011 judgment remains unsatisfied.

{¶3} In 2013, Klayman filed a defamation action against his former employer Judicial Watch, Inc. (“Judicial Watch”) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. A jury awarded Klayman \$181,000 in damages.

{¶4} On June 23, 2014, Luck filed a creditor’s bill against Klayman and Judicial Watch seeking to enjoin Judicial Watch from paying Klayman anything due on the 2013 judgment in favor of applying the funds to Luck’s 2011 judgment.

{¶5} On January 5, 2015, Luck propounded her first set of combined discovery requests to Klayman in the creditor’s bill action. Included in these requests was Luck’s request for admission No. 4, in which Luck requested that Klayman admit he had no real or personal property sufficient to satisfy her 2011 judgment against him. After requesting multiple extensions to respond to Luck’s discovery requests, Klayman responded to Luck’s request for admission No. 4 with a general objection. On July 21, 2015, the trial court ordered Klayman to answer this request for admission with an unqualified admission or denial. Klayman failed to respond.

{¶6} On December 5, 2016, the trial court granted Luck’s motion for summary judgment and found that Luck’s request for admission No. 4 was deemed admitted and established as a matter of law. The trial court found that Luck was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her creditor’s bill because she established all three elements required under R.C.

2333.01, and no genuine issue of material fact existed as to any of the three elements.

{¶7} On appeal, Klayman raises three assignments of error for our review. He argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Luck because (i) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin Klayman from receiving the proceeds of a federal judgment, (ii) the trial court improperly disregarded Klayman's right to financial privacy, and (iii) there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Luck's initial judgment against Klayman is valid.

### **Summary Judgment Review**

{¶8} We review the trial court's summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard that the trial court applies under Civ.R. 56(C). *Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.*, 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

{¶9} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) after construing the evidence most favorably for the party against whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can reach only a conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party.

{¶10} R.C. 2333.01 sets forth the criteria for a sufficient creditor's bill as follows:

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When a judgment debtor does not have sufficient personal or real property subject to levy on execution to satisfy the judgment, any equitable interest which he has in real estate as mortgagor, mortgagee, or otherwise, or any interest he has in a banking, turnpike, bridge, or other joint-stock company, or in a money contract, claim, or chose in action, due or to become due to him, or in a judgment or order, or money, goods, or effects which he has in the possession of any person or body politic or corporate, shall be subject to the payment of the judgment by action.

The three essential elements to a claim under R.C. 2333.01 are: (1) the existence of a valid judgment against a debtor, (2) the existence of an interest in the debtor of the type enumerated in the statute, and (3) a showing that the debtor does not have sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment against him. *Harris v. Craig*, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79934, 2002-Ohio-5063, ¶ 18.

### **Jurisdiction**

{¶11} Klayman's first assignment of error argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the enforcement of Klayman's federal judgment against Judicial Watch because the state and federal court systems are independent of each other.

{¶12} Klayman offers two arguments in support of this assignment of error. First, Klayman discusses the "old and well-established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to

restrain federal-court proceedings in *in personam* actions.” *Donovan v. Dallas*, 377 U.S. 408, 413, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964). The Supreme Court in *Donovan* was referring to a state court’s inability to limit the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his case in federal court. The Supreme Court further noted that the fact that a state court’s injunction issues only to the parties before a federal court, and not the federal court itself, is irrelevant. *Donovan* at 413.

{¶13} Ohio courts have echoed this interpretation. In a case with a similar fact pattern to the case at hand, when a plaintiff was unable to execute upon a default judgment obtained against a defendant in municipal court, a judgment debtor examination found that the defendant’s only asset was a breach of contract claim then pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. *Lakeshore Motor Freight (Co.) v. Glenway Industries, Inc.*, 2 Ohio App.3d 8, 440 N.E.2d 567 (1st Dist.1981). The municipal court subsequently ordered that any judgment rendered against the defendant in that action shall be in favor of the municipal court plaintiff and, further, “that the said Plaintiff may, through counsel, prosecute the breach of contract claim.” *Id.*

{¶14} The First District Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant-appellant in the *Lakeshore Motor Freight* case that a trial court is without “authority to allow the judgment creditor to usurp prosecution of a chose in action belonging to the judgment debtor, but must instead limit any order to the debtor’s equitable interest, *i.e.*, the potential proceeds, in any such

action.” *Id.* at 9. *See also Wheaton v. Lee Rd. Dev. Ltd. Liab. Co.*, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-075, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3549 (Aug. 10, 2001) (proceeds from judgment debtor’s chose in action is subject to attachment or encumbrance by way of a creditor’s bill; however, the right to prosecute the chose-in-action is not subject to attachment or encumbrance.)

{¶15} Based on the foregoing, Klayman’s reliance on *Donovan*, 377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409, is misplaced. Klayman was able to exercise his right to litigate a defamation action against Judicial Watch in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The trial court’s order enjoining Judicial Watch from paying Klayman pursuant to his judgment did not usurp Klayman’s prosecution of his case.

{¶16} Second, Klayman relies on the Supremacy Clause to argue that even when a state law is not in direct conflict with a federal law, the state law could still be found unconstitutional if it “is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress’s full purposes and objectives.” *Crosby v. Natl. Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 366, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). Klayman appears to be arguing that his right to receive payment on a federal judgment is superior to Luck’s right to receive payment on a state court judgment. This argument fails. While Klayman goes to great lengths to emphasize the federal nature of his judgment against Judicial Watch, he makes no attempt to articulate how proceeds from a federal judgment are immune to a valid lien under R.C. 2333.01.

{¶17} “A creditor’s bill action enables a judgment creditor to secure a lien on those assets of the judgment debtor that cannot be reached by the mere execution of the judgment.” *Am. Transfer Corp. v. Talent Trans., Inc.*, 8th Dist. No. 94980, 2011-Ohio-112, ¶ 8, citing *Union Properties, Inc. v. Patterson*, 143 Ohio St. 192, 54 N.E.2d 668 (1944). Specifically, the statute provides that any interest a judgment debtor has in a judgment or order shall be subject to the payment of the judgment by action. R.C. 2333.01. For Klayman’s argument here to succeed, a “judgment” under R.C. 2333.01 would need to be interpreted to exclude federal judgments. Because nothing in the statutory language or relevant case law supports such an interpretation, this assignment of error is overruled.

### **Discoverability of Financial Information**

{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Klayman argues that the trial court erred when it deemed admitted a request for admission that he did not have sufficient assets to satisfy Luck’s 2011 judgment. Specifically, Klayman asserts that he has a substantial interest in maintaining his financial privacy that overrides Luck’s interest in conducting discovery pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.

{¶19} Civ.R. 26(B)(1) provides:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of



the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, electronically stored information, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

{¶20} The third element for a claim under R.C. 2333.01 is a showing that the debtor does not have sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment against him. *Harris v. Craig*, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79934, 2002-Ohio-5063, at ¶ 18. A request for admission that mirrors the third element of Luck's claim here would be permissible under Civ.R. 26(B)(1), because it directly relates to an essential element of Luck's claim.

{¶21} While privileged material is clearly excluded from the scope of discovery, Klayman does not attempt to argue that the information sought was in any way privileged. Instead, he attempts to craft a separate exception to discoverable matter under Civ.R. 26(B)(1) using irrelevant case law. Klayman's attempt fails. Because his financial status was clearly relevant to the creditor's bill action, and the information was not privileged or otherwise exempt from discovery, Klayman's second assignment of error is overruled.

**Fraud**

{¶22} In Klayman’s third and final assignment of error, he argues that a genuine issue of material fact existed in the creditor’s bill action. Specifically, Klayman argues that the trial court erred by finding that Luck had a valid lien because the underlying judgment was obtained through fraud. In support of this assignment of error, Klayman only notes that he has appealed the validity of Luck’s judgment in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

{¶23} “A final judgment is conclusive and binding on the parties and can only be attacked on direct appeal, not collaterally.” *Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Willoughby*, 19 Ohio App.3d 51, 53, 482 N.E.2d 1267 (8th Dist.1984). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “in our jurisprudence, there is a firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are meant to be just that — final.” *Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce*, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 8. The court further determined that the reasons for disfavoring collateral attacks do not apply in two principal circumstances — when the issuing court lacked jurisdiction or when the order was the product of fraud. *Id.* at ¶ 9.

{¶24} Klayman’s direct appeal of Luck’s 2011 judgment was appealed to this court, and all seven assignments of error were overruled. *Klayman v. Luck*, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97074 and 97075, 2012-Ohio-3354. The pending appeal Klayman refers to in support of his argument is the most recent in a series of

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unsuccessful attempts to undermine Luck's 2011 judgment. In the absence of any genuine support for the assertion that the 2011 judgment was obtained through fraud, Klayman's third assignment of error is overruled.

{¶25} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/s/ Tim McCormack  
TIM McCORMACK,  
PRESIDING JUDGE  
MELODY J. STEWART, J., and  
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.,  
CONCUR

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**Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District**

County of Cuyahoga

Nailah K. Byrd, Clerk of Courts

STEPHANIE ANN LUCK	COA NO. LOWER
Appellee	COURT NO.
-vs-	105239 CV-14-828766
LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN	COMMON PLEAS
Appellant	COURT
Date 11/22/17	MOTION NO. 511657

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Journal Entry

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An application for en banc consideration must explain how the panel's decision conflicts with a prior decision from the Eighth District on a dispositive issue of law and why consideration by the court en banc is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions. App.R. 26(A)(2).

Appellant Klayman's application for en banc consideration only sets forth his disagreement with the panel's decision; it fails to cite any prior decision from the Eighth District and the point of law stated therein that conflicts with the present case. App.R. 26(A)(2)(b) and Loc.App.R. 26(C)(1). Accordingly, appellant's en banc application is summarily denied. Loc. App.R. 26(D).

/s/ Kathleen Ann Keough  
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH  
Administrative Judge

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**IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO**

STEPHANIE ANN LUCK Plaintiff	Case No: CV-14-828766 Judge: BRIAN J CORRIGAN
LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, ET AL. Defendant	<b><u>JOURNAL ENTRY</u></b>

96 DISP.OTHER – FINAL

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HER CREDITOR'S BILL ACTION. AFTER REVIEWING ALL EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PARTY, THE COURT FINDS THAT NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST, AND PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. OHIO REVISED CODE 2333.01 PROVIDES: "[W]HEN A JUDGMENT DEBTOR DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT PERSONAL OR REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LEVY ON EXECUTION TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT, ANY EQUITABLE INTEREST WHICH HE HAS . . . IN A JUDGMENT . . . SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF THE JUDGMENT BY ACTION."

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON HER CREDITOR'S BILL BECAUSE SHE HAS PROVEN ALL THREE ELEMENTS UNDER SECTION 2333.01: (1) THE EXISTENCE OF

A VALID JUDGMENT AGAINST A DEBTOR; (2) THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTEREST IN THE DEBTOR OF THE TYPE ENUMERATED IN THE STATUTE; AND (3) A SHOWING THAT THE DEBTOR DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ASSETS TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM. AM. TRANSFER CORP. V. TALENT TRANSP., INC., 8TH DIST. NO. 94980, 2011-OHIO-112. AS THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY FOUND, NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS THAT A VALID JUDGMENT EXISTS AGAINST THE DEBTOR. FURTHERMORE, PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTEREST IN THE DEBTOR – A JUDGMENT AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT JUDICIAL WATCH – OF THE TYPE ENUMERATED IN THE STATUTE. FINALLY, PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED, AND NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS, THAT MR. KLAYMAN DOES NOT HAVE ASSETS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM. ON JANUARY 5, 2015, PLAINTIFF PROPOUNDED REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION ON DEFENDANT KLAYMAN. REQUEST NUMBER 4 ASKED KLAYMAN TO ADMIT THAT HE HAD NO SUFFICIENT ASSETS TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT. DEFENDANT KLAYMAN OBJECTED TO THE REQUEST. ON JULY 22, 2015, THIS COURT ORDERED KLAYMAN TO UNQUALIFIEDLY ADMIT OR DENY REQUEST NO. 4. NEARLY 18 MONTHS LATER KLAYMAN HAS YET TO DO SO. REQUEST NO. 4 IS THUS DEEMED ADMITTED AND HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, THAT (1) PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID LIEN ON KLAYMAN'S JUDGMENT AGAINST JUDICIAL WATCH; (2) JUDICIAL WATCH IS ENJOINED FROM PAYING KLAYMAN PURSUANT TO HIS JUDGMENT AGAINST IT UNTIL PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT AGAINST KLAYMAN IS SATISFIED; (3) KLAYMAN IS ENJOINED FROM RECEIVING PAYMENT FROM JUDICIAL WATCH PURSUANT TO HIS JUDGMENT AGAINST IT UNTIL PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT AGAINST KLAYMAN IS SATISFIED; AND (4) JUDICIAL WATCH SHALL INSTEAD PAY ALL MONEY DUE AND OWING TO KLAYMAN PURSUANT TO KLAYMAN'S JUDGMENT AGAINST IT, TO PLAINTIFF.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FINAL.

COURT COST ASSESSED TO THE DEFENDANT(S).

PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 58(B), THE CLERK OF COURTS IS DIRECTED TO SERVE THIS JUDGMENT IN A MANNER PRESCRIBED BY CIV.R. 5(B). THE CLERK MUST INDICATE ON THE DOCKET THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL PARTIES, THE METHOD OF SERVICE, AND THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SERVICE.

Brian J. Corrigan  
Judge Signature 12/05/2016

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**The Supreme Court of Ohio**

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**CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS**

**May 9, 2018**

[Cite as *05/09/2018 Case Announcements*, 2018-Ohio-1795.]

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**APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW**

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**2018-0030. Luck v. Klayman.**

Cuyahoga App. No. 105239, 2017-Ohio-8231.  
DeGenaro, J., not participating.

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App. 17

**WRIT OF EXECUTION**

(Filed Jul. 8, 2016)

<b>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT</b>	DISTRICT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TO THE MARSHAL OF District of Columbia	
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, that of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements in your district belonging to:	
NAME Alan P. Dye, Registered Agent Judicial Watch, Inc c/o Webster, Chamberlain & Bean 1747 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W. <b>Case: 1:16-mc-01430</b> #1000 <b>Assigned to :</b> Washington DC 20006 <b>Unassigned</b>	
you cause to be made and levied	<b>Assign. Date : 7/8/2016</b>
as well as certain debt of:	<b>Description: Misc.</b>
DOLLAR AMOUNT 181,000.00	DOLLAR AMOUNT
and	
in the United States Court for the _____ District of <u>Columbia</u> , before the Judge of the said Court by the consideration of the same Judge lately recovered against the said, <b>Judicial Watch, Inc.</b>	
and also the costs that may accrue under this writ. And that you have above listed moneys at the place and date listed below; and that you bring this writ with you.	

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PLACE Wells Fargo, 1800 K St. NW		DISTRICT
CITY District of Columbia	DATE July 8, 2016	
Witness the Honorable		
DATE 7/8/16	CLERK OF COURT ANGELA D. CAESAR	
	(BY) DEPUTY CLERK /s/ Michael Darby	
<b>RETURN</b>		
DATE RECEIVED	DATE OF EXECUTION OF WRIT	
<b>This writ was received and executed.</b>		
U.S. MARSHAL	(BY) DEPUTY MARSHAL	

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**WRIT OF EXECUTION**

(Filed Jul. 8, 2016)

<b>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT</b>	DISTRICT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TO THE MARSHAL OF District of Columbia	
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, that of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements in your district be- longing to:	

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NAME	
Judicial Watch, Inc. By Serving Wells Fargo Bank 1800 K St NW Washington DC 20006	<b>Case: 1:16-mc-01430</b> <b>Assigned to :</b> <b>Unassigned</b> <b>Assign. Date : 7/8/2016</b>
you cause to be made and levied as well as certain debt of: <b>Description: Misc.</b>	
DOLLAR AMOUNT 181,000.00	DOLLAR AMOUNT
and	
in the United States Court for the _____ District of <u>Columbia</u> , before the Judge of the said Court by the consideration of the same Judge lately recovered against the said, <b>Judicial Watch, Inc.</b>	
and also the costs that may accrue under this writ. And that you have above listed moneys at the place and date listed below; and that you bring this writ with you.	
PLACE Wells Fargo, 1800 K St. NW	DISTRICT
CITY District of Columbia	DATE July 8, 2016
Witness the Honorable	
DATE 7/8/16	CLERK OF COURT ANGELA D. CAESAR
	(BY) DEPUTY CLERK /s/ Michael Darby

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<b>RETURN</b>	
DATE RECEIVED	DATE OF EXECUTION OF WRIT
<b>This writ was received and executed.</b>	
U.S. MARSHAL	(BY) DEPUTY MARSHAL

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**WRIT OF EXECUTION**

(Filed Jul. 8, 2016)

<b>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT</b>	DISTRICT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TO THE MARSHAL OF District of Columbia	
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, that of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements in your district be- longing to:	
NAME Judicial Watch, Inc. <b>Case: 1:16-mc-01430</b> 425 Third Street S.W. #800 <b>Assigned to :</b> Washington DC 20024 <b>Unassigned</b> By Serving: President <b>Assign. Date : 7/8/2016</b> Thomas J. Fitton <b>Description: Misc.</b>	
you cause to be made and levied as well as certain debt of: _____	
DOLLAR AMOUNT 181,000.00	DOLLAR AMOUNT
and	

<p>in the United States Court for the _____ District of <u>Columbia</u>,          before the Judge of the said Court by the consideration of the same Judge lately recovered against the said,  <b>Judicial Watch, Inc.</b></p>	
<p>and also the costs that may accrue under this writ.          And that you have above listed moneys at the place and date listed below; and that you bring this writ with you.</p>	
PLACE Wells Fargo, 1800 K St. NW	DISTRICT
CITY District of Columbia	DATE July 8, 2016
Witness the Honorable	
DATE 7/8/16	CLERK OF COURT ANGELA D. CAESAR
	(BY) DEPUTY CLERK /s/ Michael Darby
<b>RETURN</b>	
DATE RECEIVED	DATE OF EXECUTION OF WRIT
<b>This writ was received and executed.</b>	
U.S. MARSHAL	(BY) DEPUTY MARSHAL

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
CASE NO.: 13-20610-CIV-ALTONAGA**

**LARRY KLAYMAN,**

Plaintiff,

v.

**JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,**

Defendant.

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**FINAL JUDGMENT**

(Filed Jun. 11, 2014)

**THIS CAUSE** came for trial before the Court and a jury, United States District Judge, Cecilia M. Altonaga, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict on June 10, 2014, it is

**ORDERED AND ADJUDGED** that Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Larry Klayman, and against Defendant, Judicial Watch Inc., in the amount of **\$156,000.00** for compensatory damages and **\$25,000.00** for punitive damages, totaling **\$181,000.00**, for which sum let execution issue. Requests for costs and attorneys' fees shall not be submitted until after any post-trial motions are decided or an appeal is concluded, whichever occurs later. This judgment shall bear interest at the rate as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. section 1961, and shall be enforceable as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. sections 2001-2007, 28 U.S.C. sections 3001-3308, and

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). The Clerk shall mark this case closed.

**DONE AND ORDERED** in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 11th day of June, 2014.

/s/ Cecilia M. Altonaga  
**CECILIA M. ALTONAGA**  
**UNITED STATES**  
**DISTRICT JUDGE**

cc: counsel of record

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