UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

•		
_	No. 17-4487	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	.,	
Plaintiff - App	pellee,	
v.		
DONOVAN LETRELL HALL,		
Defendant - A	ppellant.	
Appeal from the United States Dist Elizabeth City. Terrence W. Boyle		
Submitted: February 20, 2018		Decided: February 28, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, a	and DUNCAN and T	HACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curia	m opinion.	
Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal P Public Defender, OFFICE OF TH Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, N	IE FEDERAL PUBI Higdon, Jr., United United States Attor	LIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North States Attorney, Jennifer P. May- rneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Donovan Letrell Hall appeals following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012), and the imposition of a 110-month downward variant sentence. Hall challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and contends that the Government violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy by prosecuting him after he was prosecuted for the same conduct in state court. We reject these arguments and affirm the criminal judgment.

Turning first to Hall's double jeopardy claim, because Hall did not raise this argument in the district court, our review is limited only to plain error. *See United States v. Jackson*, 706 F.3d 264, 270 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing unpreserved Fifth Amendment double jeopardy challenge for plain error under *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993)); *United States v. Higgs*, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) (reviewing constitutional claim that was not raised below for plain error). The protection against double jeopardy "prohibits the government from subjecting a person to multiple punishments for the same offense." *United States v. Schnittker*, 807 F.3d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, "the Supreme Court has continually held that federal and state crimes are not the same offense, no matter how identical the conduct they proscribe." *United States v. Alvarado*, 440 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see Abbate v. United States*, 359 U.S. 187, 194-96 (1959) (declining to overrule established principle

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"that a federal prosecution is not barred by a prior state prosecution of the same person

for the same acts").

While Hall is correct in that there are several certiorari petitions that raise this issue currently pending before the Supreme Court, *see*, *e.g.*, *Gamble v. United States*, No. 17-646 (docketed Nov. 2, 2017); *Ochoa v. United States*, No. 17-5503 (docketed Aug. 4. 2017), the Court has not granted certiorari in these cases. Thus, as Hall readily concedes,

Abbate remains good law, and we reject this argument on that basis.

We next consider Hall's sentencing arguments. We review every federal sentence for reasonableness, employing an abuse of discretion standard. *United States v. Lymas*, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015). Reasonableness review first requires that we consider whether the district court committed a significant procedural error, such as failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. *Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Hall first challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, focusing on the district court's analytical process and explanation for the selected sentence.

When rendering a sentence, the district court must make and place on the record an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case. *United States v. Carter*, 564 F.3d 325, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). While the sentencing court must state in open court the specific bases for the selected sentence, the court's explanation "need not be exhaustive." *United States v. Avila*, 770 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 2014); *see also United States v. Johnson*, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (court need not explicitly reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record). The court's explanation must

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be sufficient "to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority." *Rita v. United States*, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

"Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the party's arguments and explain why he has rejected those arguments." *United States v. Bollinger*, 798 F.3d 201, 220 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court's rationale from the context surrounding its decision, *United States v. Montes-Pineda*, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006), "an appellate court may not guess at the district court's rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues that might explain a sentence[,]" *Carter*, 564 F.3d at 329-30. An insufficient explanation of the sentence imposed constitutes significant procedural error by the district court. *United States v. Lynn*, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).

Where, as here, the defendant preserved the issue of whether the explanation was adequate by arguing for a sentence different than that which was imposed, we review the issue for abuse of discretion. *Id.* If we find such abuse, we must reverse unless we conclude that the error was harmless. *Id.* The Government bears the burden of showing "that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the result and we can say with fair assurance that the district court's explicit consideration of the defendant's arguments would not have affected the sentence imposed." *United States v.*

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Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (alterations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Hall does not contest the computation of his Guidelines range, which was then

reduced to the applicable 10-year statutory maximum. He does contend, however, that

the district court procedurally erred in failing to explain either why it declined to award a

downward departure based on U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.23, p.s. (2016),

or the reasons for the chosen sentence.

The first prong of this argument stalls out of the gate. Defense counsel did not

specifically ask the district court at sentencing to grant a downward departure under

USSG § 5K2.23, p.s., which permits—but does not require—the sentencing court to

depart downward from the defendant's Guidelines range for a completed term of

imprisonment for another offense that would constitute relevant conduct to the instant

offense. The record makes plain that defense counsel instead framed her argument in

terms of a downward variance. By the same token, nothing in the record suggests that the

district court was unaware of its authority to depart downward on this basis. Because

"[w]e lack the authority to review a sentencing court's denial of a downward departure

unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so[,]" United States v. Brewer,

520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008), we agree with the Government that Hall's challenge to

the procedural reasonableness of the sentence "is better suited as one to the general

explanation of the sentence, not the explanation of a particular departure ruling."

(Appellee's Br. (ECF No. 26) at 20).

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On review, we conclude that the court's statements prior to announcing sentence demonstrate that Hall's individualized circumstances informed the court's decision to grant a 10-month downward variance from the 120-month statutory maximum. Indeed, the record makes plain the court's view that a long sentence was appropriate mostly because of Hall's extensive criminal background, which had been punished previously with light sentences and probationary terms. This is consistent with two of the main purposes identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)—to protect the public from future crimes by Hall and to specifically deter Hall from continuing to engage in crime. Moreover, the record establishes that a focal point at sentencing was Hall's contention that his federal sentence should be reduced, at minimum, in consideration of the state sentence he had served. The district court actively engaged both attorneys on this topic and ultimately acceded to defense counsel's request for such a reduction—even if not to the full extent sought. The sentencing transcript demonstrates that the judge considered Hall's individual characteristics and history, as well as the circumstances of this offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), in fashioning its sentence, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-59.

Even if we were to find procedural error in the district court's explanation, *see United States v. Blue*, 877 F.3d 513, 519-21 (4th Cir. 2017) (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing when the record did not provide adequate "contextual support" to discern the sentencing court's reasons for rejecting defendant's arguments for a downward departure), we accept the Government's alternative contention that such an error is harmless, *see Boulware*, 604 F.3d at 839-40. The court considered—and, ultimately, mostly accepted—Hall's argument for a sentence below the statutory

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maximum, which was based on the following facts: (1) that Hall's conviction arose from a guilty plea as opposed to after trial; (2) that Hall accepted responsibility and apologized to the arresting officer; (3) that Hall wanted to change his life for the better; and (4) that the same conduct formed the basis for Hall's state conviction. While it initially resisted defense counsel's arguments, the court eventually retreated from its position that it should impose the statutory maximum 120-month sentence and awarded a 10-month downward variance. Accordingly, even if there was a deficit in the court's explanation, we alternatively hold that the Government has established that such an error is harmless.

Finally, then, we address Hall's challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 51. Of course, we presume that a sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. *United States v. Susi*, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); *see Blue*, 877 F.3d at 519-20. "Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." *United States v. Louthian*, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

To undermine the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to the below-Guidelines sentence he received, Hall relies on the same core reasons advanced to demonstrate procedural error. But these arguments invite us to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors and the relevant circumstances in this case, which we will not do. *See United States v. Jeffery*, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that "district courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors"). On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its

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discretion in giving controlling weight to the need to protect the public from Hall's

unrelenting criminal conduct, Hall's extensive criminal history—which carries with it an

increased likelihood of recidivism—and the seriousness of the underlying offense, which

likewise was a focal point at sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). Accordingly,

we hold that Hall has failed to overcome the presumption of substantive reasonableness

afforded the below-Guidelines sentence he received.

For these reasons, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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FILED: February 28, 2018

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4487 (2:16-cr-00020-BO-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DONOVAN LETRELL HALL

Defendant - Appellant

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District of North Carolina

UNITED STATES OF AMERIC	A) JUDGMEN) JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE			
Donovan Letrell Hall) Case Number	r: 2:16-CR-20-1BO			
) USM Numbe	er: 63082-056			
) Halerie F. 1	Mahan			
THE DEFENDANT:	Defendant's Attor	mey			
was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.					
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offe	Ges:				
Title & Section Nature of Offens		Offense Ended	Count		
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 18 Possession of a Fi U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)	arm by a Convicted Felon.	September 25, 2015	1		
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The defendant has been found not guilty on c			ed pursuant to		
Count(s) It is ordered that the defendant must not or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs the defendant must notify the court and United S			f name, residence, to pay restitution,		
	Date of Imposition of Judgm	ment			
	Signature of Judge	us Bayly			
	Terrence W. Boyle, US Name and Title of Judge	District Judge			
	7/18/2017 Date				

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AO 245B (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in Criminal Case Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

2 of . Judgment — Page DEFENDANT: Donovan Letrell Hall CASE NUMBER: 2:16-CR-20-1BO **IMPRISONMENT** The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of: Count 1 - 110 months The defendant shall receive credit for time served while in federal custody. The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: The Court recommends the defendant NOT BE incarcerated in NC, SC, VA for West VA ☑ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal. ☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district: ☐ a.m. □ p.m. as notified by the United States Marshal. ☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons: ☐ before 2 p.m. on as notified by the United States Marshal. as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office. **RETURN** I have executed this judgment as follows: Defendant delivered on , with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

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AO 245B (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

_			Judgment-Page 3	of	7	
DE	FENDANT:	Donovan Letrell Hall				
CA	SE NUMBER:	2:16-CR-20-1BO				
			SUPERVISED RELEASE			
Upo	Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of: Count 1 - 3 years					
		1	MANDATORY CONDITIONS			
1.		mmit another federal, state of				
2. 3.	7 1					
	☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you					
	pose	a low risk of future substanc	e abuse. (check if applicable)			
4.	▼ You must co	operate in the collection of	DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)			
5.	directed by	the probation officer, the Bu	s of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 169 areau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the locate victed of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)			
6.	☐ You must pa	articipate in an approved pro	ogram for domestic violence. (check if applicable)			
You		h the standard conditions tha	at have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions or	the attache	ed	

APPENDIX C

AO 245B (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

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DEFENDANT: Donovan Letrell Hall CASE NUMBER: 2:16-CR-20-1BO

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

- You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your
 release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time
 frame.
- 2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
- 3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
- 4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
- 5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
- 7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
- 9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
- 10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
- 11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
- 12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
- 13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see *Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions*, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature	 Date

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AO 245B (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3C — Supervised Release

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DEFENDANT: Donovan Letrell Hall CASE NUMBER: 2:16-CR-20-1BO

ADDITIONAL STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant shall not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without approval of the probation office.

The defendant shall provide the probation office with access to any requested financial information.

The defendant shall consent to a warrantless search by a United States Probation Officer or, at the request of the probation officer, any other law enforcement officer, of the defendant's person and premises, including any vehicle, to determine compliance with the conditions of this judgment.

The defendant shall support the defendant's dependents, if any, and meet other family responsibilities.

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AO 245B (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

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T d	D	~	-6	7	
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DEFENDANT: Donovan Letrell Hall CASE NUMBER: 2:16-CR-20-1BO

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	THE deter	Idani	must pay the tota	ii crimmai moneta	ny penanties (inder the senec	idic of payments on	Sheet o.	
то	TALS	\$	Assessment 100.00	<u>JVTA A</u> \$	ssessment*	<u>Fine</u> \$	\$	Restitution	
			tion of restitution	is deferred until	·	An Amended	l Judgment in a C	Criminal Case (AO 245	c) will be entered
	The defer	ndant	must make restit	ution (including c	ommunity res	stitution) to the	following payees i	n the amount listed be	low.
	If the defe the priori before the	endan ty ord Unit	t makes a partial er or percentage ed States is paid.	payment, each pa payment column	yee shall rece below. How	eive an approxi ever, pursuant	mately proportione to 18 U.S.C. § 366	d payment, unless spe 4(i), all nonfederal vic	cified otherwise in tims must be paid
Nar	me of Pay	<u>ee</u>		Total Loss**	<u>*</u>	Restitu	tion Ordered	Priority or	Percentage
	,								
TO	TALS		\$ -		0.00	\$	0.00		
	Restituti	on an	ount ordered pur	suant to plea agre	eement \$ _				
	The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).								
	The cour	t dete	rmined that the c	lefendant does no	t have the abi	lity to pay inte	rest and it is ordere	d that:	
	☐ the i	ntere	st requirement is	waived for the	☐ fine	restitution.			
	☐ the i	ntere	st requirement fo	r the	□ restit	ution is modifi	ed as follows:		

* Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

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AO 245B (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

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DEFENDANT: Donovan Letrell Hall CASE NUMBER: 2:16-CR-20-1BO

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Hav	ing a	ssessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:
A		Lump sum payment of \$ due immediately, balance due
		□ not later than, or □ in accordance with □ C, □ D, □ E, or □ F below; or
В		Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with \Box C, \Box D, or \Box F below); or
С		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
D		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of [e.g., months or years], to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
E		Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
F	Ø	Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
		Payment of the special assessment shall be due immediately.
		ne court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during d of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate I Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court. Indant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
	Def	Fendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, corresponding payee, if appropriate.
	The	e defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
	The	e defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
Ø		e defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States: der for Forfeiture of Property entered on 7/18/2017.
Payr inter	nents est, (s shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine (6) community restitution, (7) JVTA assessment, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

APPENDIX D

17a File No STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 15CRS051241 ELIZABETH CITY County _ Seat of Court In The General Court Of Justice NOTE: [This form is to be used for (1) felony offense(s) and (2) misdemeanor offense(s), which are consolidated for judgment with any felony offense(s). Use AOC-CR-342 for DWI offense(s).] District X Superior Court Division STATE VERSUS JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT Name Of Defendant **ACTIVE PUNISHMENT - FELONY** HALL, DONOVAN, LETRELL (STRUCTURED SENTENCING) Race Date Of Birth (For Convictions On Or After Jan. 1, 2012) В M 09/06/1980 G.S. 15A-1301, -1340.13 Attorney For State Attorney For Defendant X Appointed Crt Rptr Initials Def. Waived Attorney Def. Found KIMBERLY D PELLINI Not Indigent ALICIA DAWN CASSIDY Retained AF The defendant X pled guilty (pursuant to Alford) to was found guilty by the Court of was found guilty by a jury of pled no contest to File No.(s) Off. Offense Description Offense Date G.S. No. F/M *Pun. CL. CL. 15CRS051241 51 POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY FELON 09/26/2015 14-415.1 14CRS000724 SELL/DELIVER MARIJUANA 52 01/06/2014 90-95(A)(1) F H 15CRS051223 51 ASSAULT BY STRANGULATION 09/23/2015 14-32.4(B) H *NOTE: Enter punishment class if different from underlying offense class (punishment class represents a status or enhancement). PRIOR The Court: X 1. has determined, pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.14, the prior record points of the defendant to be I III RECORD Any prior record level point under G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(7) is based on the jury's determination of this II IV X VI issue beyond a reasonable doubt or the defendant's admission to this issue. 2. makes no prior record level finding because none is required for Class A felony, violent habitual felon, or drug trafficking offenses. The Court (NOTE: Block 1 or 2 MUST be checked.): 1. makes no written findings because the term imposed is: (a) in the presumptive range. (b) for a Class A felony. (c) for adjudication as a violent habitual felon, G.S. 14-7.12. (d) for drug trafficking. for which the Court finds the defendant provided substantial assistance, G.S. 90-95(h)(5). (e) in the aggravated range, pursuant to G.S. 20-141.4(b)(1a). 🗵 2. finds 🗵 the Determination of aggravating and mitigating factors on the attached AOC-CR-605. 🗌 egregious aggravation under G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A, on the attached AOC-CR-618, which requires a sentence in excess of that authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17. 3. adjudges the defendant to be a habitual felon to be sentenced (offenses committed before Dec. 1, 2011) as a Class C felon. (offenses committed on or after Dec. 1, 2011) four classes higher than the principal felony (no higher than Class C). 4. adjudges the defendant to be a habitual breaking and entering status offender, to be sentenced as a Class E felon. 5. adjudges the defendant to be an armed habitual felon to be sentenced as a Class C felon (unless sentenced herein as a Class A, B1, or B2 felon) and with a minimum term of imprisonment of no less than 120 months. G.S. 90-95(e)(3) (drugs). G.S. 14-3(c) (hate crime). G.S. 50B-4.1 (domestic violence). 6. finds enhancement pursuant to: G.S. 14-50.22 (gang). Other: This finding is based on the jury's determination of this issue beyond a reasonable doubt or on the defendant's admission. 7. finds that the defendant committed the felony by using, displaying, or threatening the use or display of a firearm or deadly weapon and actually possessed the firearm or weapon about his or her person. This finding is based on the jury's determination of this issue beyond a reasonable doubt or on the defendant's admission. Pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.16A, the Court has increased the minimum sentence by (check only one) (Class A-E felony committed prior to Oct. 1, 2013) 60 months. (Class A-E felony committed on or after Oct. 1, 2013) 72 months. (Class F or G felony committed on or after Oct. 1, 2013) 36 months. (Class H or I felony committed on or after Oct. 1, 2013) 12 months. 8. finds the above-designated offense(s) is a reportable conviction under G.S. 14-208.6 (check only one) a. and therefore makes the additional findings and orders on the attached AOC-CR-615, Side One. b. but makes no finding or order concerning registration or satellite-based monitoring due to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 9. finds the above-designated offense(s) involved the physical or mental sexual abuse of a minor. (NOTE: If offense(s) is not also a reportable conviction in No. 8 above, this finding requires no further action by the court.) 10. finds that a motor vehicle commercial motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offense and that it shall be reported to DMV. 11. finds this is an offense involving assault, communicating a threat, or an act defined by G.S. 50B-1(a), and the defendant had a personal relationship as defined by G.S. 50B-1(b) with the victim. 12. (offenses committed on or after Dec. 1, 2008, only) finds the above-designated offense(s) involved criminal street gang activity. G.S. 14-50.25. 13. did not grant a conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96(a) because (check all that apply) the defendant refused to consent. committed on or after Dec. 1, 2013, only) the Court finds, with the agreement of the District Attorney, that the offender is inappropriate for a conditional discharge for factors related to the offense. 14. finds that the defendant used or displayed a firearm while committing the felony. G.S. 15A-1382.2. 15. (for judgments entered on or after Dec. 1, 2013, only) finds that this was an offense involving child abuse or an offense involving assault or any of the acts as defined in G.S. 50B-1(a) committed against a minor. G.S. 15A-1382.1(a1). The Court, having considered evidence, arguments of counsel and statement of defendant, Orders that the above offenses, if more than one, be consolidated for judgment and the defendant be sentenced (check only one) in the custody of: to Life Imprisonment Without Parole for Class A Felony. Class B1 Felony Violent Habitual Felon. G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A with egregious aggravation. X N.C. DAC Other: to Life Imprisonment With Parole, pursuant to G.S. Chapter 15A, Article 81B, Part 2A for a minimum term of: and a maximum term of: ASR term (Order No. 4, Side Two) CERTIFIEDto Death (see attached Seath Warrant and Certificates) months months months The defendant shall be given credit for 31 days spent in confinement prior to the date of this Judgment as a result of this strangers when the The sentence imposed above shall begin at the expiration of all sentences which the defendant is presently obligated to serve. The sentence imposed above shall begin at the expiration of the sentence imposed in the case referenced belowperior Pasquotank County, NC valid without impressed seal File No. Offense

APPENDIX D

18a The Court further Orders: (check all that apply) 1. The defendant shall pay to the Clerk of Superior Court the "Total Amount Due" shown below Restitution* Attorney's fees Appt Fee/Misc Total Amount Due 1977.50 0.00 \$ 140.00 *See attached "Restitution Worksheet, Notice and Order (Initial Sentencing)," AOC-CR-611, which is incorporated by reference. 2. The Court finds that restitution was recommended as part of the defendant's plea arrangement. The Court finds just cause to waive costs, as ordered on the attached AOC-CR-618. 4. Without objection by the State, the defendant shall be admitted to the Advanced Supervised Release (ASR) program. If the defendant completes the risk reduction incentives as identified by the Division of Adult Correction, then he or she will be released at at the end of the ASR term specified on Side One. G.S. 15A-1340.18. X 5. Other MONIES TO BE ENTERED AS A CIVIL JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. AFTER A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS WEAPON TO BE DESTROYED AS PROVIDED BY LAW. The Court recommends: 1. Substance abuse treatment.
2. Psychiatric and/or psychological counseling. X 3. Work release X should should not be granted. Payment as a condition of post-release supervision or from work release earnings, if applicable, of the "Total Amount Due" set out above. but the Court does not recommend restitution be paid as a condition of post-release supervision. from work release earnings. The Court further recommends: ORDER OF COMMITMENT/APPEAL ENTRIES It is ORDERED that the Clerk deliver two certified copies of this Judgment and Commitment to the sheriff or other qualified officer and that the officer cause the defendant to be delivered with these copies to the custody of the agency named on the reverse to serve the sentence imposed or until the defendant shall have complied with the conditions of release pending appeal. 2. The defendant gives notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Division. Appeal entries and any conditions of post conviction release are set forth on form AOC-CR-350 SIGNATURE OF JUDGE Date Name Of Presiding Judge (type or print) 10/26/2015 THE HONORABLE KENNETH F CROW ORDER OF COMMITMENT AFTER APPEAL Date Appeal Dismissed Date Withdrawal Of Appeal Filed Date Appellate Opinion Certified It is ORDERED that this Judgment be executed. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the sheriff arrest the defendant, if necessary, and recommit the defendant to the custody of the agency named in this Judgment on the reverse and furnish that agency two certified copies of this Judgment and Commitment as authority for the commitment and detention of the defendant. Date Signature Of Clerk Deputy CSC Asst. CSC Clerk Of Superior Court CERTIFICATION I certify that this Judgment and Commitment with the attachment(s) marked below is a true and complete copy of the original which is on file in this case Appellate Entries (AOC-CR-350) Restitution Worksheet, Notice And Order (Initial Sentencing) Felony Judgment Findings Of Aggravating And Mitigating Factors (AOC-CR-611) (AOC-CR-605) Judicial Findings And Order For Sex Offenders - Active Punishment Judicial Findings As To Forfeiture Of Licensing Privileges (AOC-CR-615, Side One) (AOC-CR-317) Additional Findings (AOC-CR-618) Victim Notification Tracking Form Convicted Sex Offender Permanent No Contact Order (AOC-CR-620) Additional File No.(s) And Offense(s) (AOC-CR-626) Other: Date Certified Copies Delivered To Sheriff Signature Of Clerk Deputy CSC X Asst. CSC

SEAL

Clerk Of Superior Court

APPENDIX I	
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	File No.
PASQUOTANK County	In The General Court Of Justice
County	☐ District ☒ Superior Court Division
Name Of Defendant	FELONY JUDGMENT FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING
HALL,DONOVAN,LETRELL Offense	AND MITIGATING FACTORS
POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY FELON	(STRUCTURED SENTENCING) G.S. 15A-1340.16
NOTE: When consolidating offenses for judgment, findings of aggravating factors Separate findings of aggravating factors and mitigating factors should be	and mitigating factors should be made only for the most serious offense
AGGRAVATING F	
1. The Defendant: a. induced others to participate in the com	mission of the offense.
b. occupied a position of leadership or don	ninance of other participants in the commission of the offense.
2. The defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the calculation. The offense was committed for the benefit of, or at the direction of	offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy.
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, and the	ne defendant was not charged with committing a conspiracy
3. The offense was committed for the purpose of: a. avoiding or p	reventing a lawful arrest b. effecting an escape from custody.
	b. paid to commit the offense.
5. The offense was committed to: a. disrupt b. hinder the lawf 6. The offense was committed against or proximately caused seriou	
of the Division of Adult Correction, jailer, fireman, emergency med	lical technician, ambulance attendant, social worker, justice or
judge, clerk or assistant or deputy clerk of court, magistrate, prose the performance of that person's official duties or because of the	ecutor, juror, or witness against the defendant, while engaged in
☐ 6a. The offense was committed against or proximately caused seriou	s harm as defined in G.S. 14-163 1 or death to a law
enforcement agency animal, an assistance animal, or a search are 2009.) as defined in G.S. 14-163.1, while engaged in the performan	nd rescue animal (Applies to offenses committed on or after December 1
7. The offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.	ice of the animal's official duties.
8. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more that	an one person by means of a weapon or device which would
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. 9. (select appropriate option depending on date of offense)	
a. (use for offenses committed prior to December 1, 2012) The defendant I	neld public office at the time of the offense and the offense
related to the conduct of the office. b. (use for offenses committed on or after December 1, 2012) The defendar	at held public elected or appointed office or public employment
at the time of the offense and the offense directly related to notify the State Treasurer as required by G.S. 15A-1340.16(f).)	he conduct of the office or employment. (NOTE: The court must
9a. The defendant is a firefighter or rescue squad worker, and the off worker. (Applies to offenses committed on or after December 1, 2013.)	ense is directly related to service as a firefighter or rescue squad
10. The defendant: a. was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the	ne crime. b. used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime.
11. The victim was: □ a. very young. □ b. very old. □ c. men12. The defendant committed the offense while on pretrial release on	
12a. The defendant committee the offense while on premarrelease on 12a. The defendant has, during the 10-year period prior to the commis	
been found by a court of this State to be in willful violation of the c	onditions of probation imposed pursuant to a suspended
sentence or been found by the Post-Release Supervision and Par or post-release supervision imposed pursuant to release from inca	ole Commission to be in willful violation of a condition of parole
reasonable doubt. (Applies to offenses committed on or after December	1, 2008.)
 13. The defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in the comm 14. The offense involved: ☐ a. an attempted taking of property of great mental and the community of the community o	
c. damage causing great monetary loss. d. an unusually large qu	antity of contraband.
15. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence	
☐ 16 The offense involved the sale or delivery of a controlled substance ☐ 16a. The offense is the manufacture of methamphetamine and was controlled substance.	e to a minor. mmitted where a person under the age of 18 lives, was present.
or was otherwise endangered by exposure to the drug, its ingredient	ents, its by-products, or its waste.
16b. The offense is the manufacture of methamphetamine and was committed 17. The offense was committed against a victim because of the victim	in a dwelling that is one of four or more contiguous dwellings.
18. The defendant does not support the defendant's family.	s race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.
18a. The defendant has previously been adjudicated delinquent for an	offense that would be a Class A, B, C, D, or E felony if
committed by an adult. The Court finds this aggravating factor 19. The victim of this offense suffered serious injury that is permanent	
19a. The offense is a violation of G.S. 14-43.11, G.S. 14-43.12, or G.S.	
committed on or after October 1, 2013.) 19b. The offense is a violation of G.S. 14-43.11, G.S. 14-43.12, or G.S.	
offense. (Applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 2013.)	CERTIFIED
20. Additional written findings of factors in aggravation:	TRUE and CORRECT CORV
	Deputy/Assistant/Clerk
The Court assessed the defendant of the training of the court of the c	
The Court accepts the defendant's admission to the aggravating factor a reasonable doubt.	r(s) noted above and tinds the supporting evidence to be beyond Not valid without impressed seal
The jury finds these aggravating factors beyond a resonable doubt.	Twhiassed serj
There are no findings of any aggravating factors.	

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APPENDIX D

20a MITIGATING	FACTORS
The defendant committed the offense under:	TACTORS
a. duress which was insufficient to constitute a defense by b. coercion which was insufficient to constitute a defense c. threat which was insufficient to constitute a defense but d. compulsion which was insufficient to constitute a defense	but significantly reduced the defendant's culpability. significantly reduced the defendant's culpability
2. The defendant.	
a. was a passive participant in the commission of the offer	nse.
b. played a minor role in the commission of the offense. 3. The defendant was suffering from a:	
a. mental condition that was insufficient to constitute a def	ense but significantly reduced the defendant's culpability for the
b. physical condition that was insufficient to constitute a de offense. 4. The defendant's:	efense but significantly reduced the defendant's culpability for the
a. age, or immaturity, at the time of the commission of the offense.	offense significantly reduced the defendant's culpability for the
b. limited mental capacity at the time of the commission of offense. 5. The defendant has made:	f the offense significantly reduced the defendant's culpability for the
	estitution to the victim.
6. The victim was more than 16 years of age and:	to the visuality
a. was a voluntary participant in the defendant's conduct. 7. The defendant:	b. consented to the defendant's conduct.
a. aided in the apprehension of another felon.b. testified truthfully on behalf of the State in another prosecution.	ecution of a follow
8. a. The defendant acted under strong provocation.	ecution of a felony.
b. The relationship between the defendant and the victim v	was otherwise extenuating.
a. could not reasonably foresee that the defendant's condi	uct would cause or threaten serious bodily harm or fear.
10. The defendant reasonably believed that the defendant's conduction of the second seco	o other persons.
11. The defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in conne	ction with the offense to a law enforcement officer:
b. prid	or to arrest.
12. The defendant has been a person of good character or has ha 13. The defendant is a minor and has reliable supervision available.	d a good reputation in the community in which the defendant lives.
14. The defendant has been honorably discharged from the United	d States Armed Services
🔼 15. The defendant has accepted responsibility for the defendant's	criminal conduct
 16. The defendant has entered and is currently involved in or has treatment program subsequent to arrest and prior to trial. 17. The defendant supports the defendant's family. 	successfully completed a drug treatment program or an alcohol
18. The defendant has a support system in the community.	
19. The defendant has a positive employment history or is gainfull	y employed.
20. The defendant has a good treatment prognosis and a workable 21. Additional written findings of factors in mitigation:	e treatment plan is available.
21. Additional written infulligs of factors in mitigation:	
☐ The Court makes no findings of any mitigating factors.	
DETERMIN	VATION
1. The Court finds that:	
the State provided the defendant with appropriate notice of the	aggravating factor(s) in this case.
 the defendant waived any notice requirements as to the aggrave. The Court finds that the State included in its criminal pleading the state. 	vating factor(s) in this case.
3. The Court, having considered the evidence and arguments present	ted at the trial and contanging begins and the
additional and maings of aggravating and milling factors as i	noted above
finds that the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors in miti	vation and that a mitigated sentence is justified
inakes no determination as to the relative weights of the factors	s found above, because the sentence imposed is in the
Presumptive larige.	
10/26/2015 THE HONORABLE KENNETH F CROW	Signature Of Presiding Judge
AOC-CR-605 Side Two Rev 10/13 Material opposite unmarked squares	s is to be disregarded as surplusage

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