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(Oct. 21, 2015)	1a

DAVID J. HACKER
California Bar No. 249272
Illinois Bar No. 6283022
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
101 Parkshore Drive, Suite 100
Folsom, California 95630
Phone: (916) 932-2850
dhacker@ADFlegal.org

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF FAMILY AND LIFE
ADVOCATES d/b/a NIFLA,
a Virginia corporation;
PREGNANCY CARE
CENTER d/b/a PREGNANCY
CARE CLINIC, a California
corporation; and FALLBROOK
PREGNANCY RESOURCE
CENTER, a California
corporation;

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs,

v.

KAMALA HARRIS, in her official capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; THOMAS MONTGOMERY, in his official capacity as County Counsel for San Diego Case No. 3:15-cv-02277-JAH-DHB

MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

Accompanying papers: Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction County; MORGAN FOLEY, in his official capacity as City Attorney for the City of El Cajon, CA; and EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of the State of California;

Defendants.

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Here, the Act imposes compelled government messages on certain nonprofit pro-life organizations that provide information and free help to pregnant women to empower them to choose not to have abortions. It forces Plaintiffs to post certain disclosures in violation of their First Amendment right to free speech. It requires licensed medical centers, such as Plaintiff PCC and similar NIFLA members, to post a disclosure referring women and making arrangements for them to receive referrals for abortion. The Act requires unlicensed non-medical pregnancy centers, such as Plaintiff Fallbrook and similar NIFLA members, to place in all "digital" advertisements and post within their facilities disclosures telling women they have no medical licenses, even though those centers need no medical licenses since they are not offering medical services (and don't pretend to).

In compelling this speech, the Act interferes with the heart of Plaintiffs' freedom of speech. Forcing licensed Plaintiff centers to tell women where and how to arrange an abortion makes them promote the very opposite of their message. Unlicensed centers, in turn, must clutter or preclude their advertising altogether due to posting the long and prominent disclaimers. Those disclaimers, both in ads and at their facilities, force the Plaintiffs to begin their expressive relationship with a client with an immediate negative message that Plaintiffs [pg. 10] would not express in that way at that time. The message strongly suggests that Plaintiffs are unqualified to provide their information because they are not licensed physicians. This is false, however, because the unlicensed Plaintiff centers need no license since they provide no medical services. They are fully competent to share their viewpoint and personal help to women to aid them in choosing better options than abortion. The Supreme Court recognized in *Riley* that forcing a speaker to begin his relationship with an unwanted disclosure imposes a severe harm to speech rights because it may end the communicative relationship before it begins. 487 U.S. at 799-800

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