

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

C O N T E N T S

	PAGE
ORAL ARGUMENT OF LARS R. ISAACSON, ESQ. On behalf of the Petitioner	3
LISA H. SCHERTLER, ESQ. On behalf of the Respondent	31
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LARS R. ISAACSON, ESQ. On behalf of the Petitioner	57

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

P R O C E E D I N G S

(10:12 a.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear argument first today in Case 07-9712, Puckett v. United States.

Mr. Isaacson.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF LARS R. ISAACSON
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MR. ISAACSON: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court:

This case is framed by two major facts: Jimmy Puckett pled guilty and waived his fundamental right to trial in exchange for a promise by the government that they agreed he was qualified for a three-level reduction in his offense level; and the government of the United States breached this promise.

The teachings of this Court in this situation are instructive. For a plea to be valid, it must be voluntary and intelligent.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Isaacson, you said there were two facts. Aren't there three? Isn't it a fact that after the plea bargain the defendant in essence broke his side of the bargain by committing a crime while he was in jail?

MR. ISAACSON: No, Your Honor. He did not

1 breach the plea agreement by doing that. He --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I used to teach
3 contract law and I'll tell you that would have been a
4 breach of contract. That would have been a breach on
5 his part.

6 Now, the government has conceded the breach
7 of the plea agreement. I don't -- I can't understand
8 why they did that, but they apparently have conceded it.
9 Does that mean that we have to ignore it for purposes of
10 deciding what the -- what the remedy is? Ignore the
11 reality that there was a breach? I mean, you know,
12 if the government said, we will ask the court to
13 sentence at the lower end because of the -- the remorse
14 that the defendant has shown, and the defendant then
15 demonstrates that he has no remorse by -- you know,
16 suppose he comes and stabs the judge -- is the
17 government really supposed to have to go before the
18 judge and say, "Your Honor, this man is really
19 remorseful and you should sentence him at the lower
20 end"?

21 It seems to me it's a basic principle of
22 contract law that a party to a contract cannot take
23 action which makes it impracticable for the other side
24 to carry out his part of the bargain, and that's what
25 your client did. The government couldn't practicably go

1 in and make that argument when he had demonstrated
2 himself to be an unremorseful criminal.

3 MR. ISAACSON: The government in this case
4 drafted a plea agreement, and most plea agreements --
5 I've practiced in the Northern District of Texas quite
6 often, and virtually every plea agreement has a
7 provision in it that says if the defendant does some
8 type of criminal activity, thus it will render it void.
9 This plea agreement did not have that in it.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh.

11 MR. ISAACSON: So it's different than most
12 plea agreements.

13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So you want to us make the
14 inference that the impermissible or criminal activity
15 was permitted by the absence of this specific clause.
16 You say there is no implied condition, no implied
17 covenant?

18 MR. ISAACSON: Well, I'm not -- what we are
19 saying is the government needs to obey the promise in
20 the plea agreement. The promise in the plea agreement
21 is --

22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, the questions so far
23 indicate that one of the promises was an implied promise
24 that you will keep the terms of the agreement by lawful
25 behavior. So that just -- what you say just begs the

1 question.

2 Now, I recognize the government has conceded
3 a breach, and we will probably move on from that point.
4 But, as Justice Scalia indicates, it puts the case in a
5 very artificial posture, it seems to me.

6 MR. ISAACSON: It is -- well, it is up to
7 the judge to determine whether or not the defendant gets
8 the acceptance points or not. The bargain here was not
9 that Mr. Puckett would get the points, but that the
10 government would agree that he was qualified to receive
11 those points.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And there is nothing
13 theoretically inconsistent with the government -- you
14 can feel remorse. I mean, you're not going to do it
15 again. You going to feel remorse every time you do it,
16 but that doesn't mean he didn't feel remorse from the
17 crime he was pleading to.

18 MR. ISAACSON: Yes, 3E1.1. There is a
19 number of different factors that go into whether or not
20 someone gets the acceptance points. It is the judge's
21 discretion to give those points and there are a number
22 of different factors that go into it. Certainly the
23 termination of criminal activity is one 1 of those
24 factors the court looks at, but it's not the only one.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But this judge said --

1 and he was open in his thinking. He said: "Unheard to
2 me that I would give acceptance of responsibility credit
3 to someone that as soon as he gets sent to jail is out
4 there committing another crime."

5 MR. ISAACSON: That is what Judge --

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The judge did say that.
7 He said it was unknown to him that judges give
8 acceptance of responsibility credit to someone who in
9 the interval between the plea and when he shows up in
10 court for sentencing commits another crime.

11 MR. ISAACSON: That is what Judge Sanders
12 did say.

13 JUSTICE SOUTER: Your point is not that he
14 should have gotten the reduction. Your point is that
15 the government should have made the recommendation.

16 MR. ISAACSON: Well, the position --

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: Isn't it? Isn't that your
18 point?

19 MR. ISAACSON: Yes.

20 JUSTICE SOUTER: The agreement called for
21 them to make a recommendation and they didn't make it.
22 In fact, they recommended the contrary. And that's your
23 gripe, right?

24 MR. ISAACSON: The plea agreement did not
25 say the government had to get up there and make a

1 statement at sentencing that he was supposed to get his
2 points. They just agreed he was entitled to his
3 acceptance points.

4 There was two parts of the plea agreement.
5 The first part that they agreed to was, you know, that
6 he was entitled to those points; and the second part was
7 that they would recommend at sentencing that he get the
8 lower in the guideline range. The first part was not --
9 did not say they had to get up there and say that. They
10 chose on their own to get up there and breach the plea
11 agreement by saying, he's not entitled to those points.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Where is that in the
13 record, do you know offhand? Where the plea agreement
14 is?

15 MR. ISAACSON: It's page 54a of the Joint
16 Appendix volume 1, paragraphs 8 and 9.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Thank you.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose Justice
19 Ginsburg's point is relevant, though, on the question of
20 prejudice. If the judge gets up there and says, I don't
21 care what the government says, I am not going to give
22 anybody a departure when they have committed another
23 crime, then you haven't been prejudiced by the
24 government's breach.

25 MR. ISAACSON: Well -- I believe he has been

1 prejudiced by the government's breach, because once the
2 government violates the plea agreement on the first
3 level, as we know under the prior precedents of this
4 case, it makes the actual plea agreement void. And
5 secondly, the Santobello case clearly talks about it is
6 not important the effect on the sentencing judge
7 what the -- in Santobello the government breached a plea
8 agreement and the judge said: It doesn't matter the
9 government breached the plea agreement; I would have
10 done the same thing anyway; it makes no different. This
11 Court said specifically that's not relevant.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, the judge would have
13 known about what happened anyway from -- from the
14 presentence investigation, wouldn't he?

15 MR. ISAACSON: Correct.

16 I guess the point I am trying to make is the
17 agreement here was not that Judge Sanders would give him
18 acceptance points. The fact is the government made the
19 position -- and I should point out that Mr. Puckett, he
20 gave up all his rights just for this slim reed of hope.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But he could have, if he
22 felt that way -- I mean, there they were in the
23 courtroom; all of them knew about the plea agreement
24 because there had been the Rule 11 colloquy when it was
25 taken, right?

1 MR. ISAACSON: I'm sorry, ma'am. I didn't

2 --

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: When the plea was

4 taken --

5 MR. ISAACSON: Yes.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- it was the same judge,

7 wasn't it?

8 MR. ISAACSON: Yes, Judge Sanders.

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And so they were all

10 there and the defendant was asked all these questions,

11 and the government-- and the judge knew about the

12 government's side of the plea bargain.

13 MR. ISAACSON: Right, yes.

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So it was not a secret to

15 anyone that the government said it would ask for the

16 extra acceptance of responsibility credit. And yet the

17 defendant and his lawyer stand there and they don't say

18 a word: Wait a minute, judge. They didn't object at --

19 there was no motion to withdraw the plea, was there?

20 MR. ISAACSON: Mr. Puckett had made a motion

21 prior to the sentencing to withdraw his plea on his own.

22 He basically pro se had done that. But not --

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But --

24 MR. ISAACSON: I'm sorry.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Before the judge there

1 was no plea to withdraw the plea.

2 MR. ISAACSON: During the sentencing, no,
3 there was not.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And so that's why we are
5 -- if he had asked to withdraw the plea, then we'd have
6 a different case. But he didn't, so we are here on
7 plain-error review.

8 MR. ISAACSON: Our point is that we suggest
9 plain error shouldn't be applied to this case. This
10 court in Santobello said 35 years ago when the
11 government breaches a plea agreement it can never stand.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But Santobello was a case
13 where there was a timely objection.

14 MR. ISAACSON: That is correct, but the
15 principles of whether or not when the government
16 breaches a plea agreement that renders the underlying
17 conviction void raises it to a different level.

18 JUSTICE ALITO: Why should that be the case?
19 I know plea agreements are not strictly governed by
20 contract law, but there is an analogy and your whole
21 argument seems to be that the government's breach
22 rendered the plea agreement void. But why would that
23 so? There was a plea agreement, voluntarily entered
24 into, and then there was a breach. So, why shouldn't
25 the issue be what is the remedy for the breach? And why

1 shouldn't it be governed by the plain-error rule like
2 most errors that occur at trial?

3 MR. ISAACSON: I would suggest it goes to
4 the very heart of whether or not he actually pled.
5 Justice Ginsburg's raised a great point about what Judge
6 Sanders did in this case. He was long involved. The
7 promises in the plea agreement were talked about. Mr.
8 Puckett had every right to rely upon those promises when
9 he foreclosed his right to jury trial, his right to
10 present witnesses on his own behalf. This is a
11 solemn --

12 JUSTICE ALITO: But you can say that in
13 every case in which parties enter into a contract and
14 later there is a breach. The fact that one of the
15 parties later breaches doesn't mean that there never was
16 a contract. There was an agreement that he voluntarily
17 entered into at that time. And then there was a --
18 subsequently there was a breach, but that doesn't mean
19 that he involuntarily -- he did not voluntarily enter
20 into the agreement, does it?

21 MR. ISAACSON: I would suggest this Court's
22 precedent is that it has to be a knowing waiver of his
23 rights, that promises that are unfulfilled or
24 unfulfillable render the plea itself void. The
25 constitutional due process overtones or overpinnings of

1 a plea agreement as opposed to a normal contract makes
2 this different.

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What relief are you
4 seeking now? You didn't -- you didn't ask to withdraw
5 the plea when you were before the sentencing judge.

6 MR. ISAACSON: We request -- what relief do
7 I want?

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Right.

9 MR. ISAACSON: Mr. Puckett would like the
10 plea agreement to be set aside and be allowed to take
11 this case to trial.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Which would expose him to
13 a considerably greater penalty.

14 MR. ISAACSON: Potentially, yes.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why wouldn't it suffice to
16 give your client everything that he was entitled to if
17 the case were remanded to a different judge and the
18 government were required to go before that judge and
19 make the commitment that it undertook in the plea
20 agreement?

21 MR. ISAACSON: We believe --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why wouldn't that be a
23 perfectly satisfactory remedy?

24 MR. ISAACSON: We believe that the action of
25 the government, again, rendered the plea agreement

1 itself void, without value, and he would -- Mr.
2 Puckett --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you have to say that.
4 But let's assume I don't agree with that. Let's assume
5 I agree with Justice Alito that his entry into it was
6 voluntary and all that's happened is that one of the
7 commitments on the part of one of the parties has not
8 been complied with. Why isn't it an adequate remedy for
9 that problem to send it back to a new judge and have the
10 government come before that judge and make the same
11 commitment it was supposed to under the agreement?

12 MR. ISAACSON: Certainly that is a remedy
13 some circuits have used. Why that is not effective, we
14 believe the defendant should have the right to be able
15 to choose. When it reaches this level, the plea
16 agreement is void.

17 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask essentially two
18 questions. You mentioned the fact that this is not --
19 this is an unusual agreement, and that some of the
20 provisions were negotiated and the record shows they
21 were -- they were deliberately undertaken. It seems to
22 me that this was probably a scrivener's error. The
23 normal -- most plea agreements would include a provision
24 that if the defendant engaged in unlawful conduct, all
25 bets are off. And my hunch was that somebody just

1 forgot to put the boilerplate language in the agreement.
2 Is that fair to say? I can't imagine the government
3 negotiating an agreement that doesn't include that
4 clause.

5 MR. ISAACSON: I certainly can't put myself
6 on the sides back then. I think it's fair to say it's
7 unusual. The government in its breach -- sorry -- in
8 its brief indicated it could have included it in there.

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It did include it in the
10 motion, didn't they?

11 MR. ISAACSON: It was --

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Wasn't there a motion --

13 MR. ISAACSON: Yes.

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- for credit for
15 acceptance of responsibility, and had as a condition
16 that the defendant be law-abiding?

17 MR. ISAACSON: Yes, that was included in the
18 motion filed the next day for the additional point, that
19 is correct.

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So isn't it odd that the
21 -- that these documents both meant to serve the same
22 purpose, one has the provision for law-abiding conduct
23 in the future and the other doesn't?

24 MR. ISAACSON: Well, one is a plea agreement
25 that is entered in open court with the defendant present

1 with his attorney and the second is a motion filed by
2 the United States attorney the day after. So they are
3 different. Certainly they have different, I would
4 suggest, importance.

5 JUSTICE STEVENS: But going back to my
6 question, isn't it a likely explanation for the
7 defendant's lawyer's failure to object that he just
8 didn't realize this agreement didn't have this normal
9 provision in it?

10 MR. ISAACSON: I -- I can't. As to
11 whether -- I would suggest that it is -- this is a --
12 normally, these are normally included in these
13 agreements, I would suggest to you.

14 JUSTICE STEVENS: Right.

15 MR. ISAACSON: But I would suggest to you
16 also that it was not included in this agreement, and
17 since the government drafted it I don't think we can
18 just assume it should be there.

19 JUSTICE STEVENS: No, I understand that.
20 But the other thing I wanted to ask you: You keep using
21 the term "void." Do our cases say that any breach of a
22 plea agreement renders it void rather than subject to
23 some kind of other remedy?

24 MR. ISAACSON: Well, if it is -- I think the
25 language of -- of Brady -- certainly a plea must stand

1 unless it is induced by misrepresentation, unfulfilled
2 or unfulfillable promises. Recently in the Bousley,
3 case: Statements in there can't go; not good if it's
4 induced by misrepresentation; Machibroda --

5 JUSTICE STEVENS: But those are cases that
6 say that the remedy is setting aside the -- the guilty
7 plea, but they don't characterize the -- the agreement
8 as having become void, if I -- if I remember correctly.

9 MR. ISAACSON: Well, again, I am -- citing
10 from Machibroda: A guilty plea, if induced by promises
11 or threats which would deprive it of a private or
12 voluntary act are void.

13 JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes, but those -- that
14 goes to the integrity of the guilty plea, not to whether
15 or not the underlying contract became void, I think.
16 Maybe I'm missing something.

17 MR. ISAACSON: Well, I -- I think what we
18 are saying is once the government takes its action, it
19 deprives the plea of its voluntary character.

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: It doesn't -- it doesn't
21 retroactively render the government's promise a
22 misrepresentation. Every time a -- a party to a
23 contract fails to comply with a contract, he hasn't been
24 guilty of fraud. "Misrepresentation" would mean the
25 government had no intention of complying with it when --

1 when it entered into it, and you -- you don't assert
2 that was the case, do you?

3 MR. ISAACSON: No, but I would suggest that
4 Santobello again talks about the intent, whether or not
5 -- in that case there were two prosecutors who didn't
6 know what one -- the other one was doing, and this Court
7 said that's not important; it is the integrity of the
8 plea that's important and the government's breach
9 thereof.

10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Under the law of contracts
11 I assume -- I haven't looked it up yet -- that you can't
12 rescind for a nonmaterial breach. A trivial breach
13 doesn't always allow rescision. And isn't it trivial if
14 the district court said: You know, I don't care if the
15 Attorney General of the United States and the Solicitor
16 General himself both came into the court on their hands
17 and knees begging me to do this. I wouldn't do this. I
18 wouldn't give you an increase.

19 MR. ISAACSON: Well --

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So it seems to me an
21 immaterial breach, other than as to one level -- and
22 correct me if I am wrong. I take it as to level one --
23 or as to the third level, they need the recommendation
24 before they have the authority to reduce. Am I right
25 about that?

1 MR. ISAACSON: I'm sorry -- I am missing --
2 what are you talking about?

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: There are some instances
4 in which the -- the prosecution must make the
5 recommendation before the district judge has the
6 authority to depart downward, am I correct?

7 MR. ISAACSON: I -- I -- I am sorry. For
8 the downward departure and acceptance of responsibility,
9 they are different. For the first two points, it can be
10 done in the plea agreement. The third has to be done by
11 the prosecution.

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's right. So -- so
13 this -- this district judge, I take it, did not have the
14 authority to go down by -- by a third without the
15 recommendation?

16 MR. ISAACSON: Well, the government filed a
17 motion. I don't know if they officially had withdrawn
18 it or not. I know at sentencing they argued against it,
19 so -- I am not sure if the judge had the power to or
20 not. The motion was already on file. The government
21 had already asked for that. Now, they changed their
22 mind.

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Even as to the third
24 level, the district judge said, you know, I will assume
25 that they have made the argument. I will assume they

1 have made the argument. I wouldn't hear the -- I -- I
2 wouldn't grant -- I wouldn't follow the recommendation.
3 I am not going to depart downward even assuming the
4 government -- it seems to me that there is -- the
5 government's breach is immaterial.

6 MR. ISAACSON: Well, in terms of materiality
7 of the breach, in Santobello there are those exact
8 words: The government is in a very poor position to
9 talk materiality after they've breached the agreement.

10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: My reading of Santobello
11 is the same as yours on that point, and it's difficult
12 for me to understand.

13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There was part of this
14 agreement that was honored. In fact, the judge after
15 having said that, I never heard of giving credit for
16 responsibility to somebody who commits a crime in the
17 interim, but he said: I understand there was an
18 agreement to sentence at the low end, and that's what
19 I'm going to do.

20 MR. ISAACSON: That's correct.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So if you say what you
22 want is a trial, the defendant would be exposed to not
23 just the upper level; plus weren't there add-ones in
24 this case that the judge ordered to be served
25 concurrently rather than consecutively?

1 MR. ISAACSON: Yes, there were three
2 underlying Federal charges that he was on supervisory
3 release for that the judge ran concurrently with the
4 sentence in this case.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: What would counsel say about
6 a case in which it's unclear whether there is a breach?
7 There is a factual dispute as to whether there was a
8 breach. Let's say the government agrees that it will
9 reserve the right to call all relevant facts to the
10 attention of the sentencing judge, but won't take a
11 position on sentencing. And the prosecutor in
12 sentencing makes certain remarks that might be
13 interpreted as taking a position or might be interpreted
14 as simply calling facts to the judge's attention.

15 Would it be your position that when a
16 defendant hears that, the defendant can sit back and
17 wait and see whether he or she is satisfied with the
18 sentence and then after this sentence is imposed raise
19 the issue of breach on appeal and not be subject to
20 plain error, rather than calling it to the attention of
21 the sentencing judge at the time when the -- the
22 potential breach could be adjudicated?

23 MR. ISAACSON: I think there are two parts
24 to your question, Your Honor, if I could address them.
25 In regard to a de minimus breach of the plea agreement,

1 we recognize that technical defects in a plea agreement
2 may not always require automatic reversal. However, the
3 government must always fulfill completely the promises
4 they have made in the agreement. And that goes to the
5 difference between a -- a plea agreement is being
6 different than a normal contract.

7 In a normal contract, you think of a -- an
8 Exxon merging with Mobil, things of that nature. This
9 is a situation where the government's -- the obligations
10 in the plea agreement for the vast majority are on the
11 defendant, what he has to do. He gives up his rights.
12 He must cooperate, things of that nature. As on page
13 51a shows, the government's agreements are extremely
14 small. There's only two paragraphs. And that's
15 normally how it is. Our position is if the government
16 breaches its promises, that's when it must be reversed.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: I'm not sure that really
18 answers my question.

19 MR. ISAACSON: Well --

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Are you saying as to some
21 errors there is a plain-error rule, in some breaches
22 there is a plain-error rule, but not as to all breaches?

23 MR. ISAACSON: No. I'm -- what I'm saying
24 is the threshold of whether there is a breach or not --
25 the question has been posed of whether or not every

1 single breach is automatic reversal.

2 We -- we recognize that there may be some
3 that have absolutely no basis or do not really imply or
4 go into what the government promised to do. Because the
5 government's promises as a part of the plea agreement,
6 again, are just two paragraphs of this case. Our
7 suggestion is when the government breaches what they
8 promised to do, that's when the automatic reversal --

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you are saying, if -- if
10 I understand you correctly, that even if at the trial
11 your client's lawyer had objected and had -- and had
12 said, Your Honor, the government promised to recommend,
13 you know, a lower thing, what the trial judge would have
14 to have said was, the plea agreement is invalid. And
15 the trial judge could not say, oh, yes, the government
16 has to make that recommendation.

17 You are -- you are saying it is invalidated
18 by the mere fact of the government's not having done it,
19 right?

20 MR. ISAACSON: Yes.

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: So no objection need to be
22 made or can be made, right?

23 MR. ISAACSON: Well, certainly, we -- we'd
24 never suggest --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Wow.

1 MR. ISAACSON: Well, Your Honor, it -- it
2 seems harsh and perhaps it is harsh, but the government
3 has to abide by the contracts they make.

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but I take it -- you
5 never really answered Justice Alito's question. I take
6 it that the defendant and his counsel can knowingly
7 recognize that an error is being committed, say nothing,
8 listen to the sentence, and then object later. That's
9 your position, yes or no?

10 MR. ISAACSON: For it to be reversible, yes.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's inconsistent
12 with the answer you gave me.

13 MR. ISAACSON: I'm sorry.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: The answer you gave me is
15 that automatically the guilty plea is washed out --
16 automatically.

17 MR. ISAACSON: We -- if the government
18 breaches the plea agreement, yes.

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: It is automatically washed
20 out?

21 MR. ISAACSON: Well, I would suggest --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: And, therefore, he
23 cannot -- he cannot sit around and wait to see what
24 happens. What happens is -- whatever happens, it's
25 invalid. The plea agreement is no good. You have to

1 have a new trial.

2 MR. ISAACSON: I would suggest that the word
3 "void" may also be "voidable."

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Voidable -- then your
5 answer to me would be different. It's -- it's not void.
6 It's voidable, so that he can play dog in the manger and
7 wait and see what happens, and then if it's in interest
8 that -- in his interest to void it, he does. If it's in
9 his interest not to void it, he doesn't.

10 MR. ISAACSON: Your Honor, these are not
11 easy issues. Certainly, defense attorneys should not
12 ever sit on his hands and let these things go. To take
13 a chance and to just say, oh, we are going to do nothing
14 and just sandbag, like is suggested by the government,
15 I'm suggesting that is never going to occur.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It would not be
17 cost-free for you, because if you just sit there and
18 say, you know, the agreement is void, the government is
19 going to say, well, fine, I will see you in court; and
20 we will have a trial; and you are going to get twice as
21 much as you would have gotten anyway.

22 You have some interest, since you entered
23 the guilty plea, in going forward with the plea.

24 MR. ISAACSON: It's absolutely -- Mr.
25 Puckett --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but let's put
2 it this way. Maybe this is the same question anyway.
3 Let's say it is the same facts as we have here but
4 instead of saying, I can't do this, the judge says, I'm
5 going to do this. And, look, I think you are
6 remorseful. I'm going to give you three points. And
7 that's all you agreed with the government. The
8 government says we'll recommend it, and the judge says,
9 well, you're going to get it anyway. I think you should
10 get it. The agreement has still been breached, right?
11 The government didn't recommend.

12 MR. ISAACSON: It has been breached.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So in that
14 situation, you think you can withdraw the agreement?

15 MR. ISAACSON: I would suggest that it would
16 be at the defendant's option to do so. The point that
17 I'm trying to make --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well --

19 JUSTICE SOUTER: But why -- why should the
20 defendant have the option to withdraw from an agreement
21 when he got everything under the best possible
22 circumstances that he could have expected?

23 MR. ISAACSON: Because the government --
24 well, we don't know that, what the sentence would have
25 been by the sentencing judge.

1 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but we are talking
2 about the Chief Justice's hypothetical at this point.
3 And they -- in his hypothetical, the sentencing judge
4 says, I'm going to give you the three points; you are
5 going to get everything that on the rosier scenario you
6 could have hoped for.

7 Why should he be able to withdraw his plea
8 at that point?

9 MR. ISAACSON: Because the jurisprudence
10 teaches that the result of the effect on the sentencing
11 judge is simply irrelevant. If the government breach --

12 JUSTICE SOUTER: In other words, your
13 position is -- is kind of a theoretical formalistic
14 position, that -- I'm not sure if this is the wrong
15 words here -- there is a metaphysical quality to the
16 plea, and even though things turn out as well to him as
17 he could possibly have expected had the agreement been
18 kept punctiliously, if the government simply omits the
19 words he can walk away from the plea? I mean, that's
20 your position?

21 MR. ISAACSON: I believe so, yes. But there
22 is a reason for it. This Court has stated the
23 government cannot breach the plea agreement. That's all
24 we're saying. The power the government has in reducing
25 the plea, the rights the defendants are giving up, it

1 should be at the option of the defendant to decide.

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but usually -- I mean,
3 the theory of relief in contract law depends upon relief
4 from something. And if, in fact, there is -- there is
5 no discernible damage that has been suffered, if on the
6 other hand -- again, taking the Chief's hypothetical --
7 there is an affirmative demonstration that no damage
8 occurred, normal principles of contract would say there
9 is nothing to give him relief from. The law of contract
10 is -- is not a metaphysical construct. Why should the
11 law of plea agreements be?

12 MR. ISAACSON: I -- I'm not suggesting it
13 would be metaphysical. I'm simply suggesting --

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, I think you are. I
15 mean, you are saying even though he has come out with,
16 you know, a rose in his mouth, he can still, if he is
17 crazy enough, throw away the whole plea agreement.

18 MR. ISAACSON: I think that suggests that
19 the result on the judge has to do with the breach, what
20 the government does. The concept is, if the government
21 breaches the plea agreement, the defendants should have
22 the right to withdraw from the plea even if there is no
23 effect on the sentence.

24 JUSTICE SOUTER: What I'm getting at -- I
25 think what we are all trying to get at -- is in order to

1 have a rule, an absolute rule like yours, we usually
2 look for a good reason to have that rule. And since we
3 are talking about an agreement, the place to look for
4 the good reason is in the consequences to the defendant.
5 And when the consequences are terrific, when they are
6 the best that he could possibly have hoped for, there
7 doesn't seem to be a good reason to adopt your very
8 theoretical construct of agreement.

9 Is there some reason that we are just not
10 seeing?

11 MR. ISAACSON: Because it doesn't occur. I
12 mean, the government could not cite a single case in
13 which this --

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Never mind what the
15 government can cite. I'm asking you if there is a good
16 reason to adopt this absolute rule of yours.

17 MR. ISAACSON: There is an absolute -- the
18 good reason is the defendant should get the promises the
19 government has elicited for his giving up of his
20 fundamental constitutional rights. 99.9 percent of the
21 time that's going to be adverse to the defendant, as it
22 was in this case.

23 A possibly hypothetical situation where the
24 judge would forego or ignore what the United States
25 attorney says and give him acceptance points is so rare,

1 as I suggest, to not really be --

2 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask this kind of
3 conceptual question? Is it your view that a breach of a
4 plea agreement can never be concluded to be harmless
5 error?

6 MR. ISAACSON: Harmless error? Yes, I -- if
7 it -- well, harmless error if you are talking about
8 structural error, I mean it's a little different
9 analysis.

10 JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm trying to get rid of
11 the labels like "plain error" and "structural." But if
12 in fact it's totally harmless and everybody agrees it's
13 harmless, would the government still have to -- or would
14 there be an adverse consequence nevertheless?

15 MR. ISAACSON: Yes, I believe so.

16 JUSTICE STEVENS: So, there could never be
17 harmless error, harmless breach of a plea agreement?

18 MR. ISAACSON: Yes, Your Honor.

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why wouldn't someone read
20 what happened here as the defendant saying, well, I
21 didn't get the acceptance credit, but the judge is still
22 sentencing me at the low end, and he's still making the
23 sentences run concurrently, so I think -- why, if he
24 doesn't try to withdraw the plea, why isn't it the
25 logical assumption that he says I didn't get the whole

1 promise but I got part of it, and I'll take it?

2 MR. ISAACSON: Well, I think sometimes the
3 defendant might well do that. I mean, it's not --

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How do we know this one
5 didn't?

6 MR. ISAACSON: Well, by certainly the appeal
7 that we raised. Certainly he stated on the record some
8 questions or concerns about what overall had happened to
9 him, and certainly he pursued this appeal.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
11 We will give you a couple minutes for rebuttal.

12 MR. ISAACSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ms. Schertler.

14 ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA H. SCHERTLER

15 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

16 MS. SCHERTLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
17 it please the Court:

18 When the government breaches a plea
19 agreement, an objection made in the district court
20 serves important purposes that relate to the functioning
21 of Federal courts. It permits the district court and
22 the parties to determine whether a breach has occurred,
23 and it also, in many cases, may permit an immediate cure
24 of that breach to be administered, obviating the need
25 for appellate review of the issue altogether.

1 A central purpose of the contemporaneous
2 objection rule is to ensure that the district court
3 proceedings are as free of error as possible. And that
4 purpose is served in this context, the plea breach
5 context, as it is in others.

6 Rule 52(b) reinforces the contemporaneous
7 objection rule by placing a heavier burden on the party
8 who does not object in the district court to win relief
9 on appeal.

10 The government's submission to the court
11 today is that the plain-error standard does apply to
12 forfeited claims that a plea agreement has been
13 breached, that the Olano framework should be followed,
14 and that one component of the plain-error showing in
15 this context should require a defendant who did not
16 object to a breach in the district court to show a
17 reasonable probability that the outcome of the
18 proceeding was affected by the breach.

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just to explore the issue
20 of breach for a moment, suppose hypothetically, same
21 facts here, but it is all vented and discussed and aired
22 and objected to in the district court.

23 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes, Your Honor.

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The defense attorney says,
25 well, now, if you look at paragraph 8 and so forth, and

1 the government says, well, Your Honor, well, he
2 committed another crime. And then the judge says -- and
3 we are not going to move for the recommendation. And
4 the judge says: I will assume that you made the
5 recommendation, and I will just tell you right now I
6 wouldn't take the recommendation anyway. I'm not
7 going -- I wouldn't give a lowered sentence even if you
8 made the objection. What result?

9 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, I think the result
10 there is controlled by Santobello.

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it? Because in
12 Santobello there was no reason given for the prosecutor
13 to violate the plea agreement. Here there's a good
14 reason. Can you distinguish Santobello on that basis?

15 MS. SCHERTLER: I would -- I would -- I
16 would seek to distinguish Santobello. As we say in our
17 brief, there seemed to have been multiple problems going
18 on in Santobello. And in -- and it was unclear that the
19 district court in Santobello even knew what the terms of
20 the agreement were.

21 This court -- a court in that situation
22 would have been aware -- would have sorted through what
23 the terms of the agreement were. Now -- and -- and, we
24 don't believe that there is a reason not to apply
25 harmless error review in this context as there is in any

1 other context.

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: Excuse me, were you --
3 Justice Kennedy, were you through? I'm sorry, I thought
4 you started a question again.

5 The problem I have with the harmless error
6 suggestion that you've made is this. If the government
7 does engage in some breach of the agreement, it seems to
8 me the consequence is that an individual has given up a
9 trial and as a consequence of that has given up liberty,
10 without either the trial that he is entitled to or
11 fulfillment of the conditions for giving up the liberty.

12 And isn't there -- isn't there a very high
13 value to be placed on the fact that nobody in the United
14 States under the constitutional guarantees should be --
15 should be sitting behind bars without either a
16 conviction following full trial, invocation of whatever
17 rights he wants to invoke, or a voluntary agreement to
18 be behind bars? And -- and when neither of those
19 conditions is fulfilled, don't we have an error that as
20 a matter of constitutional law cannot be regarded as
21 harmless.

22 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, there -- certainly I
23 agree, Justice Souter, that -- and although there is
24 distinguishable facts in Santobello, that that theme is
25 present in Santobello as well. And the Court there said

1 that it was not -- at the very least, the Court said
2 when the government has not fulfilled its promise and an
3 objection is raised and the defendant has suffered an
4 adverse consequence that was somehow related to the
5 government's broken promise, that the Court is not going
6 to find harmlessness simply based on the district
7 court's statement itself that it didn't rely on what the
8 government had said.

9 Now, we would submit, however, that there
10 could be cases -- and the Chief Justice's hypothetical
11 would have one of those -- where even in a setting where
12 an objection is raised, if the defendant receives the
13 benefit that was the aim of the promise he secured from
14 the government -- for instance, if in Santobello the
15 defendant there received the lowest possible sentence
16 that he might have gotten -- that in that circumstance,
17 Santobello should not preclude harmless error review,
18 and the defendant cannot be said to have -- to be in
19 jail having not received the benefit.

20 JUSTICE SOUTER: I -- I think I would agree
21 with you there because, by whatever means, the defendant
22 has gotten everything the defendant bargained for.

23 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes, Justice Souter.

24 JUSTICE SOUTER: It may have come by a more
25 circuitous route, but he got it all.

1 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes.

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: But in the case when,
3 unlike the Chief Justice's hypothetical, when we don't
4 know that, when we -- the judge sort of keeps his
5 thoughts to himself or herself, then don't we have the
6 -- the problem of the -- the individual behind bars,
7 neither as a result of trial nor as a result of the deal
8 that he made?

9 MS. SCHERTLER: I agree that is -- that is
10 the strong suggestion of Santobello when there has been
11 an objection made. We would -- we would submit to the
12 Court that the analysis must differ when no objection is
13 made in the district court.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Doesn't -- whether we
15 accept that proposition or not that the analysis must
16 differ, doesn't that really depend on -- on what value
17 we place on the importance of the proposition that I
18 started with? If somebody's behind bars, it's either as
19 a result of a valid conviction after trial or a
20 voluntary agreement that says, yeah, I will stay there.
21 And if -- if we place a very high value on the liberty
22 interest -- in -- in retaining liberty except under
23 those two conditions, then isn't it fair to us -- isn't
24 it sensible for us to say even in a plain-error
25 situation, we are going to recognize this -- this kind

1 of prejudice, despite the fact that he didn't object?
2 If we place a high value on the liberty interest, we
3 wouldn't accept your position; isn't that fair?

4 MS. SCHERTLER: The high value that the
5 Court placed on the liberty interest in that situation
6 would also have to be to the exclusion of other very
7 important interests that are served by making sure that
8 objections are raised in the district court.

9 JUSTICE SOUTER: You are right, there is no
10 question about it. If -- we are saying we will take
11 a -- a less efficient process, a process less efficient
12 perhaps even for getting at the truth, because we think
13 the liberty interest is that important. You are
14 entirely right.

15 MS. SCHERTLER: I -- and -- but I also would
16 add on to that that I don't think it is only efficiency,
17 that that is the sole interest that would be sacrificed
18 by an -- by an absolutist approach, really, that Your
19 Honor has suggested. There also would be interests,
20 fairness interests, that would be compromised by that
21 rule, because just a rule that --

22 JUSTICE SOUTER: Will you give me an
23 example?

24 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes, yes. The rule that
25 Petitioner proposes, for example, is that when a

1 government breach occurs, one need not object in the
2 district court, one may raise it on direct appeal and
3 one automatically gets to elect to withdraw the plea.
4 That would create incentives on the part of defendants
5 to -- to withhold objections.

6 JUSTICE SOUTER: No -- no question, but it
7 seems to me that the answer to that is, it's an
8 incentive that would never come into play if the
9 government kept its word.

10 MS. SCHERTLER: Well --

11 JUSTICE SOUTER: So why -- why should -- why
12 is the government really in a position to object to
13 that?

14 MS. SCHERTLER: Because this Court has
15 the -- what it permits is manipulation of the system by
16 -- by counsel, really.

17 JUSTICE STEVENS: You're talking about
18 manipulation of the system. I just wonder if the
19 government wasn't manipulating the system when they said
20 we should grant cert in this case. You did -- you did
21 agree that the cert should be granted.

22 MS. SCHERTLER: Oh, we did acquiesce, yes.
23 Yes, Justice Stevens.

24 JUSTICE STEVENS: And are you taking the
25 position that -- that every case, that the absence of

1 objection would always be controlling?

2 MS. SCHERTLER: The --

3 JUSTICE STEVENS: For example, in this
4 particular case, it seems to me that if the -- if you
5 had an objection and if the judge had agreed with the
6 objection and said I will set aside the plea because of
7 adopting the arguments of your opponent, I think the
8 government would have appealed, and said that that
9 decision is so wrong and it's because it's really
10 harmless error. I think here the real question is
11 whether there's harmless error available, rather than
12 turning anything on whether or not an objection was made
13 in the district court.

14 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, but this -- this is
15 the question on which the circuits had divided, and
16 which is why we acquiesced in this case to sort through
17 that question.

18 JUSTICE STEVENS: But in talking about the
19 division of the circuits, do you think all breaches of
20 -- of plea agreements should be governed by precisely
21 the same standard? Or do you think there are varying
22 facts in different cases?

23 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, I think that the
24 analysis of a breach in each case will differ and it
25 first and it will in the -- first and foremost depend

1 upon what the standard of appellate review is and
2 whether an objection has preserved, in which case it
3 would be the government's burden to show that a breach
4 is harmless, or in the plain-error sentencings the --
5 the burdens are reversed; and we think the -- the
6 ordinary rules codified in rule 52(a) and (b) apply in
7 this context equally.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's clear, isn't
9 it, that the defendant in this case was in fact
10 prejudiced? The judge -- Judge Sanders said it's very
11 rare, he said, that you would depart -- or I
12 forget whether it's depart or --

13 MS. SCHERTLER: So rare as to be unknown.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So rare -- I thought
15 he said "rare to unknown," "to be unknown" -- you are
16 right.

17 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But I suspect it's
19 probably rarer still for the government to recommend
20 that. So you can't really say that he wouldn't have
21 done this or he certainly wouldn't have considered it.
22 It's one thing to say I've never heard of that. It's
23 another thing when one of your colleagues is there
24 saying, this is what you should do.

25 MS. SCHERTLER: The -- let me respond to

1 that immediate point. Which is -- my response would be,
2 yes, if the government were to recommend that he
3 received acceptance of responsibility in this situation,
4 that may be considered significant; but the district
5 court judge would also know that it was in fulfillment
6 of a promise that was made before renewed criminal
7 activity occurred from jail. And so, given that
8 circumstance --

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah, but none of us
10 can know what the judge would have done. I mean, we
11 have had cases here where the government's
12 recommendation of downward departures has been pretty
13 surprising to me as well, and it's because they were
14 informants or whatever and they have engaged in some
15 pretty bad conduct; and I don't know what Judge Sanders
16 would have done.

17 MS. SCHERTLER: And here under the plain
18 error standard it was the defendant's burden to show a
19 reasonable probability that something different would
20 have happened. The court of appeals made findings on
21 this record that the record showed that nothing
22 different would have happened, even had the government
23 complied with its promise.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: Looking at this, why can't
25 we say the following? Some circuits have said that they

1 will never recognize plain error, when it's a breach of
2 a plea agreement. That's wrong. It could be plain
3 error like any other kind of a case, every other kind of
4 issue. Sure. But the error here isn't plain. On the
5 one hand, all they did, the promise was the government
6 agreed to request that his sentence be placed at the
7 lowest end, and they followed it. In the other part
8 they made no promise. They simply agreed that he had
9 demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. And then
10 what they did at the trial, they said, "we don't want
11 him to get acceptance of responsibility at this point."

12 Now, some people could argue that here is an
13 implicit promise in paragraph 1, not to say something at
14 the trial that is contrary to their recognition in
15 paragraph 8. That's where it is. On the other hand,
16 you could argue that there is implicit, also, a promise
17 not to implicitly do the first implicit, if what he has
18 done in the meantime is commit another serious crime.

19 So we have two arguments, one of which says
20 they committed error, and one of which says they didn't
21 commit error; and the argument turns on two implicit
22 readings of paragraph 8. Therefore, it is not plain.
23 End of case. What's wrong with that?

24 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, the -- the government
25 has conceded, and I don't --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I mean, the
2 government would like a whole lot of questions answered.
3 So what I don't see is how the government can come here
4 because they want a lot of questions answered, and get
5 us to take the case, which I'm not sure was a wonderful
6 idea; maybe it was. But then we take the case, and now
7 they want us to say, no, no, don't take the obvious
8 response to it because we would like you to answer five
9 other questions.

10 So what I want to know is, what's wrong with
11 what I said? Is that a possible outcome?

12 MS. SCHERTLER: That is a possible outcome,
13 Justice Breyer, and clarification for -- from this Court
14 that the plain-error standard does apply to this type of
15 error as it does to others would certainly help to
16 resolve the conflict that does exist out there in the
17 courts of appeal.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I may have gotten
19 lost in the dialogue. As you understand it,
20 Justice Breyer's suggestion was that you win, right?
21 You get plain error, and then sometimes you apply it and
22 it comes out one way, and sometimes you apply it the
23 other.

24 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes. Yes, Chief Justice.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you are happy to

1 go along that.

2 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes. The -- it does not
3 give the courts all of the guidance that would be
4 helpful as to how to apply other components of the
5 plain-error standard in this context.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But that's a big
7 difference, right? As you said earlier, harmless error,
8 the government has the burden; plain error, the
9 defendant has the burden. That's certainly going to
10 change how you approach however many different factual
11 contexts.

12 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, yes, Mr. Chief
13 Justice. I mean, what -- the reason that this case
14 seemed to us a good vehicle to address these questions
15 is that they was agreement throughout the appellate
16 process that there was an error that was plain and,
17 therefore, it provides an opportunity to address -- if
18 the Court chooses, which it need not, but if the Court
19 chooses -- to address how the substantial rights aspect
20 of the plain-error standard and discretionary aspect --

21 JUSTICE STEVENS: It seems to me that the
22 government has tried to pick a case in which it has the
23 strongest opportunity to win on the merits in order to
24 have us decide a rule that really isn't important in a
25 lot of other cases, but it is totally unimportant in

1 this case.

2 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, Justice Stevens, what
3 one finds when one looks through a lot of these -- when
4 these cases are brought, there often is a dispute and a
5 real -- and a genuine dispute as to whether a breach has
6 occurred or not. And those cases, of course, do not
7 allow exposition -- explanation about the other
8 components.

9 JUSTICE STEVENS: But don't you think it
10 would have been open to the government to make the
11 argument that Justice Breyer has made and said there
12 really wasn't a breach here, at least an insignificant
13 breach that should be ignored?

14 MS. SCHERTLER: As we acknowledge in our
15 brief, there might be arguments out there that there
16 were implicit terms to this plea agreement that were
17 breached by the defendant. Those arguments were never
18 made in the court of appeals in this case, and so we are
19 accepting that record as a way --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: They can only get -- they
21 can only get your breach if they find an implicit
22 agreement. The implicit agreement is that you will not
23 tell the court that, in light of changes, paragraph 8 no
24 longer describes the situation. You didn't breach
25 paragraph 8, as taken literally. You agree he had shown

1 that acceptance of responsibility. What you told the
2 court was, now we don't think he should have this
3 acceptance of responsibility, which previously he had
4 shown, because he's committed another crime. Those are
5 the exact words you said to the court.

6 Now, he may have made an implicit not to do
7 that. On the other hand, that implicit promise may be
8 negative by, you know, the other implicit acceptance of
9 the fact that this applies only where we don't commit
10 another crime.

11 So I'm just saying this -- I'm not saying
12 you are even right. I'm just saying, having those two
13 arguments, it seems that you aren't plainly wrong. You
14 aren't plainly wrong. So how do I get to the other
15 questions if I believe that? Do I say, "Hypothetically
16 if the error here were plain, which I think it isn't,
17 then I'd like to tell you where the burden of proof
18 lies."? By the way, if I happened to think that that's
19 whatever it is, then I will go into a few other things.
20 That's really what I feel you are asking me to do
21 because I don't think it's plain. Maybe the other
22 people think it's plain.

23 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, I mean -- as I've --
24 as I've already indicated, having the Court state that
25 the -- Rule 52(b) applies here is a -- is a -- I think,

1 a helpful --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: I think it's plain. What
3 about paragraph 9? Are you ignoring paragraph 9?

4 JUSTICE BREYER: You fulfilled paragraph 9,
5 didn't you?

6 MS. SCHERTLER: The -- paragraph 9 indicates
7 that the government agrees to request that Puckett's
8 sentence placed at the lowest end of the guideline
9 levels deemed applicable by the court. And there has
10 been no claim, at any point in this proceeding, that
11 that provision has been breached. What happened at the
12 sentencing was that the district court stated on the
13 record: I know that there is an agreement in here that
14 that the lowest end of the guideline is appropriate, and
15 I intend to follow that.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think it's very
17 clear that there has been a breach here. And it's not
18 fanciful to say he felt remorse and then he went and did
19 it again. That happens all the time.

20 You know, when I have a rich dessert I
21 shouldn't have, I feel bad about it afterwards. It
22 doesn't mean I will not do it again. I mean, why isn't
23 that the case here?

24 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, I -- I guess that it's
25 a matter of some disagreement, but -- I mean, we have --

1 we have taken the position that this was a breach of the
2 government's agreement that he qualified for a
3 three-level reduction in his offense level. That was
4 the --

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And you can put that
6 before the judge. You are supposed to go there and say,
7 "Look, we agreed to recommend it and we do recommend
8 it." You could say, "And by the way, you should know
9 that he's gone out and done this again." But you most
10 -- you certainly prejudiced him by not doing what you
11 said you would do.

12 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, we breached the
13 agreement by not doing what we said we would do, and the
14 question we would submit to the Court is whether, given
15 the absence of an objection, Petitioner carried his
16 burden of showing that we did prejudice him. And the --

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, but isn't it the
18 fact that we can never know what Judge Sanders would
19 have done if the government had what it said it would
20 do. And because -- why shouldn't you bear the burden of
21 showing there is no prejudice when you can't tell
22 because you're the one that breached the agreement?

23 MS. SCHERTLER: Because in the plain-error
24 setting, this Court has made clear that the burdens
25 shift and that, under the third component of that

1 standard, it is the defendant's burden, if he did not
2 object, to show an effect on the outcome of the
3 proceeding, that his substantial rights were violated.

4 And here -- and I would note that the court
5 of appeals made findings that the result would have been
6 the same, and Petitioner in this Court has never
7 challenged those findings on this record.

8 JUSTICE BREYER: Can you say just for me,
9 because I am changing a little bit here in light of that
10 question, but what is it precisely that the government
11 said it would do that it did not do?

12 MS. SCHERTLER: The -- paragraph 8 of the
13 plea agreement indicates that the government --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: What does it say? What are
15 the words that it says the government did not do?

16 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, we indicated to the
17 district court that Petitioner did not qualify for
18 acceptance of responsibility. And paragraph 8 was a
19 government agreement that he did qualify for acceptance
20 of responsibility.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: So he did agree. "We
22 agreed that he does qualify." And then when you got to
23 the court, you said, now we don't agree that he
24 qualifies at this point.

25 MS. SCHERTLER: That's correct. And there

1 was -- and there an intervening event, obviously, that
2 affected the judgment, but because the explicit
3 provision of this particular plea agreement, which I
4 agree is atypical, as the government's motion for the
5 third point made clear, did not have a qualification in
6 there. And that -- that is the base -- I mean, I don't
7 mean to be arguing strenuously that the government did
8 something wrong here, because there were -- but the fact
9 is, given the terms of this plea agreement, there --
10 that is the basis for our concession that there was a
11 breach.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: As a matter of practice
13 among U.S. attorneys, we do have six and a half years at
14 stake here, right? That's the difference between the
15 two levels? Why wouldn't it be the appropriate thing
16 for the U.S. attorney, the assistant U.S. attorney, to
17 say, "Judge, I want to call your attention to paragraph
18 8 of the plea agreement. At the time we entered into
19 it, we made that undertaking." And so then everybody is
20 sure that the judge's mind is focused on that. Wouldn't
21 that be the better practice?

22 MS. SCHERTLER: Absolutely,
23 Justice Ginsburg, and if there had been an objection
24 based on that provision of the plea agreement, that may
25 have been very well what would have happened. The

1 breach could have been cured. And the fact is that, in
2 the absence of that objection, the breach was not cured
3 when it could have been, and that is one reason -- that
4 is why it makes sense to apply the plain-error standard
5 in this context.

6 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, could the breach have
7 been cured? I mean, the point -- it seems to me, the
8 point at which the defendant would have known that the
9 government had breached the agreement was when the
10 government stood there before the court and said, "In
11 fact, he hasn't accepted responsibility. He went out
12 and committed another crime while he was behind bars."

13 It seems to me that that's the point -- and
14 maybe this phrase occurred somewhere in the record --
15 that that's a bell that you can't unring. For the
16 defendant to get up and object and said, "Wait a minute,
17 were you supposed to represent to the court that you
18 agreed that I did accept responsibility" -- to require
19 the government to fulfill that undertaking at that point
20 would have been ridiculous. I suppose the U.S. attorney
21 could have said, "Oh, yes, he's right, Judge. We agreed
22 that he accepted responsibility." But the U.S. attorney
23 has already just said a moment before, "He hasn't. We
24 really don't mean that at all."

25 There's no way, it seems to me, that there

1 could have been a better outcome in a case like this,
2 even if the objection had been contemporary.

3 MS. SCHERTLER: Well, there would be more
4 than one way to cure a breach such as this, if an
5 objection had been raised in the district court. One
6 way would have been by the correction on the record that
7 we have just discussed, but another way --

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: Which would have been
9 silly.

10 MS. SCHERTLER: But if the defendant -- and
11 if the defendant said that, that would be a silly way to
12 correct it. It also could have been sent to another
13 judge for resentencing, just as the Court in Santobello
14 said, that a remedy could be accomplished.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It was sent to another
16 judge, that judge would still have the presentence
17 report. After all, it wasn't the government that
18 initiated reneging on the -- if it was the -- it was the
19 presentence report. And before the government said a
20 word, the judge had read and was discussing the
21 presentence report, which said, judge, earlier, we said
22 you should give credit for acceptance of
23 responsibilities, now we must tell you, you should not.

24 MS. SCHERTLER: The probation officer said
25 that.

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes.

2 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes. And I don't think
3 Petitioner -- Petitioner even contends that he is
4 entitled now -- or he contends he is entitled to get out
5 of this plea. But taking the more typical remedies that
6 this Court proposed as one possibility in Santobello, I
7 don't think Petitioner would say that a judge should not
8 know that he did -- that he engaged in subsequent
9 criminal conduct. That is information that any judge
10 sentencing him must know about in order to fairly assess
11 what sentence he should receive.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Maybe Judge Sanders
13 would look at this kind of the way that we have been
14 discussing it, and he would look and say, boy, it's --
15 it's -- he committed subsequent conduct, how can you
16 recommend that I depart? He says, but on the other
17 hand, every plea agreement I have seen you always say if
18 he commits subsequent conduct that is illegal, that all
19 bets are the off. You didn't say that here, so I'm
20 going to take the recommendation seriously.

21 I don't think it's -- maybe I am repeating
22 myself, but I don't think it is at all clear that the
23 result wouldn't be different here.

24 MS. SCHERTLER: Well -- and again, I guess I
25 would give the same response, that it -- it is

1 Petitioner's burden to show a likelihood, a reasonable
2 likelihood that it would have been different.

3 JUSTICE SOUTER: With respect, that is not
4 what Olano says, is it? The -- the -- the basic Olano
5 standard is a -- is a violation of substantial rights
6 standard.

7 MS. SCHERTLER: Yes, Justice Souter.

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: And one way that you could
9 show a violation of substantial rights would be a -- a
10 demonstration that the outcome would have been
11 different. But another possibility of showing that
12 violation is -- is whether -- and I know you don't
13 accept it, but it's the one that I proposed earlier,
14 there is a violation of substantial rights if somebody
15 is sitting behind bars without having gotten there by
16 the performance of an agreement that he made, or as a
17 result of a trial. And that, too, could satisfy the
18 Olano formulation, could it not?

19 MS. SCHERTLER: It could, Justice Souter.
20 And if the Court were to take that position, we would
21 argue that there is still, under the plain-error
22 standard, the fourth component, the discretionary
23 component --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: I know you want to -- as I
25 point out one other thing to you. I think it's a hard

1 question, burden of proof and these other things, that I
2 just turned the page, after the person, Ms. Simms, she's
3 the prosecutor, and she's absolutely clear to me, others
4 can disagree, that this judge knew just what the
5 government had agreed to, and the prosecutor was saying
6 that now things have changed.

7 And then the judge turns to the probation
8 officer, and the probation officer says, just to
9 reiterate what Ms. Simms said, the new offense,
10 according to the guidelines of the guideline manual,
11 prohibits any acceptance of responsibility. Now, if
12 that turns out to be right, of course, it couldn't
13 matter less whose burden of proof it is.

14 MS. SCHERTLER: It was not correct, as a
15 matter of fact, and the defense attorney made that
16 correction, and the -- and the judge accepted that. And
17 if I could go back --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: He wasn't -- was he
19 convicted of this new crime?

20 MS. SCHERTLER: He -- not at the time of
21 these proceedings.

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It was just an
23 allegation, right?

24 MS. SCHERTLER: That's right. Another --
25 another defendant had pled guilty to this crime, and the

1 factual statement supporting his plea had implicated
2 Petitioner as having instigated the crime, suggested
3 to --

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why did we assume
5 anything anyway? I assume he denies the allegations.

6 MS. SCHERTLER: He admitted the allegations
7 to the probation officer, and that is what was reflected
8 in the presentence report.

9 And if I could return to Justice Souter's
10 question about if the Court were to take the position
11 that a form of substantial rights is affected in every
12 case of a government breach of plea agreement, we would
13 respectfully submit that as this Court analyzed a
14 similar type of difficult question in Johnson and
15 Cotton, that the fourth discretionary component of the
16 standard should preclude relief or should at least give
17 the district court, the court of appeals discretion to
18 not grant relief where, as in this case, there has been
19 no showing that there was an effect on the outcome, and,
20 as the Court of Appeals found, an affirmative record
21 that the outcome would have been exactly the same.

22 Thank you, Your Honors. We would ask that
23 the judgment be affirmed.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

25 Mr. Isaacson, why don't you take two

1 minutes.

2 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LARS R. ISAACSON

3 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

4 MR. ISAACSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

5 The problem that the Puckett panel had in
6 the third prong of 52(b) they focused on whether or not
7 there is prejudice at sentencing. That was the focus of
8 the Puckett panel. That is why they said 52(b) plain
9 error applied and was found in that case.

10 The problem with that is that Santobello
11 clearly points out that prejudice to the trial judge,
12 that the trial judge -- what the trial judge would have
13 done is simply not relevant. That is why 52(b) cannot
14 be applied in this case.

15 Secondly, when the government argues that
16 there is no prejudice -- you have to show prejudice at
17 sentencing, the judge would have done something
18 different, that is virtually an impossible standard.
19 Under 18 U.S.C. 355 -- there are a number of factors a
20 sentencing judge has to take into. The idea -- and
21 there is many different factors they must look at, all
22 of these different things.

23 The idea that a defendant can somehow show a
24 judge would have come to a different result but for the
25 government breach is an impossibility.

1 The final point I would make is, the
2 argument the government is making now about prejudice,
3 it would make no difference at all if the defendant had
4 objected at the time. If there is no effect on
5 sentencing, it would not pass muster under plain-error
6 or the harmless error standards. So the next case that
7 is going to come before this Court is when you have an
8 objection, and then they're going to say the exact same
9 argument here.

10 We would ask you to reverse the decision of
11 the Fifth Circuit.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
13 The case is submitted.

14 (Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the case in the
15 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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A	<p>adequate 14:8 adjudicated 21:22 administered 31:24 admitted 56:6 adopt 29:7,16 adopting 39:7 adverse 29:21 30:14 35:4 affirmative 28:7 56:20 affirmed 56:23 ago 11:10 agree 6:10 14:4 14:5 34:23 35:20 36:9 38:21 45:25 49:21,23 50:4 agreed 3:14 8:2 8:5 26:7 39:5 42:6,8 48:7 49:22 51:18,21 55:5 agreement 4:1,7 5:4,6,9,20,20 5:24 7:20,24 8:4,11,13 9:2,4 9:8,9,17,23 11:11,16,22,23 12:7,16,20 13:1,10,20,25 14:11,16,19 15:1,3,24 16:8 16:16,22 17:7 19:10 20:9,14 20:18 21:25 22:1,4,5,10 23:5,14 24:18 24:25 25:18 26:10,14,20 27:17,23 28:17 28:21 29:3,8 30:4,17 31:19 32:12 33:13,20 33:23 34:7,17 36:20 42:2</p>	<p>44:15 45:16,22 45:22 47:13 48:2,13,22 49:13,19 50:3 50:9,18,24 51:9 53:17 54:16 56:12 agreements 5:4 5:12 11:19 14:23 16:13 22:13 28:11 39:20 agrees 21:8 30:12 47:7 aim 35:13 aired 32:21 Alito 9:12 11:18 12:12 14:5 21:5 22:17,20 Alito's 24:5 allegation 55:23 allegations 56:5 56:6 allow 18:13 45:7 allowed 13:10 altogether 31:25 analogy 11:20 analysis 30:9 36:12,15 39:24 analyzed 56:13 answer 24:12,14 25:5 38:7 43:8 answered 24:5 43:2,4 answers 22:18 anybody 8:22 anyway 9:10,13 25:21 26:2,9 33:6 56:5 apparently 4:8 appeal 21:19 31:6,9 32:9 38:2 43:17 appealed 39:8 appeals 41:20 45:18 49:5 56:17,20</p>	<p>APPEARAN... 1:14 appellate 31:25 40:1 44:15 Appendix 8:16 applicable 47:9 applied 11:9 57:9,14 applies 46:9,25 apply 32:11 33:24 40:6 43:14,21,22 44:4 51:4 appointed 1:16 approach 37:18 44:10 appropriate 47:14 50:15 argue 42:12,16 54:21 argued 19:18 argues 57:15 arguing 50:7 argument 1:12 2:2,7 3:4,7 5:1 11:21 19:25 20:1 31:14 42:21 45:11 57:2 58:2,9 arguments 39:7 42:19 45:15,17 46:13 artificial 6:5 aside 13:10 17:6 39:6 asked 10:10 11:5 19:21 asking 29:15 46:20 aspect 44:19,20 assert 18:1 assess 53:10 assistant 1:17 50:16 assume 14:4,4 16:18 18:11 19:24,25 33:4</p>	<p>56:4,5 assuming 20:3 assumption 30:25 attention 21:10 21:14,20 50:17 attorney 16:1,2 18:15 29:25 32:24 50:16,16 51:20,22 55:15 attorneys 25:11 50:13 atypical 50:4 authority 18:24 19:6,14 automatic 22:2 23:1,8 automatically 24:15,16,19 38:3 available 39:11 aware 33:22 a.m 1:13 3:2 58:14</p>
			B	
			<p>b 40:6 back 14:9 15:6 16:5 21:16 55:17 bad 41:15 47:21 bargain 3:22,23 4:24 6:8 10:12 bargained 35:22 bars 34:15,18 36:6,18 51:12 54:15 base 50:6 based 35:6 50:24 basic 4:21 54:4 basically 10:22 basis 23:3 33:14 50:10 bear 48:20 begging 18:17 begs 5:25</p>	

<p>behalf 1:15,19 2:4,6,9 3:8 12:10 31:15 57:3 behavior 5:25 believe 8:25 13:21,24 14:14 27:21 30:15 33:24 46:15 bell 51:15 benefit 35:13,19 BENJAMIN 1:3 best 26:21 29:6 bets 14:25 53:19 better 50:21 52:1 big 44:6 bit 49:9 boilerplate 15:1 Bousley 17:2 boy 53:14 Brady 16:25 breach 4:1,4,4,6 4:11 6:3 8:10 8:24 9:1 11:21 11:24,25 12:14 12:18 15:7 16:21 18:8,12 18:12,21 20:5 20:7 21:6,8,19 21:22,25 22:24 23:1 27:11,23 28:19 30:3,17 31:22,24 32:4 32:16,18,20 34:7 38:1 39:24 40:3 42:1 45:5,12 45:13,21,24 47:17 48:1 50:11 51:1,2,6 52:4 56:12 57:25 breached 3:16 9:7,9 20:9 26:10,12 32:13 45:17 47:11</p>	<p>48:12,22 51:9 breaches 11:11 11:16 12:15 22:16,21,22 23:7 24:18 28:21 31:18 39:19 Breyer 41:24 43:1,13 45:11 45:20 47:4 49:8,14,21 54:24 Breyer's 43:20 brief 15:8 33:17 45:15 broke 3:23 broken 35:5 brought 45:4 burden 32:7 40:3 41:18 44:8,9 46:17 48:16,20 49:1 54:1 55:1,13 burdens 40:5 48:24</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">C</p> <p>C 2:1 3:1 call 21:9 50:17 called 7:20 calling 21:14,20 care 8:21 18:14 carried 48:15 carry 4:24 case 3:4,11 5:3 6:4 9:4,5 11:6 11:9,12,18 12:6,13 13:11 13:17 17:3 18:2,5 20:24 21:4,6 23:6 29:12,22 36:2 38:20,25 39:4 39:16,24 40:2 40:9 42:3,23 43:5,6 44:13 44:22 45:1,18</p>	<p>47:23 52:1 56:12,18 57:9 57:14 58:6,13 58:14 cases 16:21 17:5 31:23 35:10 39:22 41:11 44:25 45:4,6 central 32:1 cert 38:20,21 certain 21:12 certainly 6:22 14:12 15:5 16:3,25 23:23 25:11 31:6,7,9 34:22 40:21 43:15 44:9 48:10 challenged 49:7 chance 25:13 change 44:10 changed 19:21 55:6 changes 45:23 changing 49:9 character 17:19 characterize 17:7 charges 21:2 Chief 3:3,9 6:12 8:18 25:16 26:1,13,18 27:2 31:10,13 31:16 35:10 36:3 40:8,14 40:18 41:9 43:18,24,25 44:6,12 47:16 48:5,17 53:12 55:18,22 56:4 56:24 58:12 Chief's 28:6 choose 14:15 chooses 44:18 44:19 chose 8:10 Circuit 58:11</p>	<p>circuitous 35:25 circuits 14:13 39:15,19 41:25 circumstance 35:16 41:8 circumstances 26:22 cite 29:12,15 citing 17:9 claim 47:10 claims 32:12 clarification 43:13 clause 5:15 15:4 clear 40:8 47:17 48:24 50:5 53:22 55:3 clearly 9:5 57:11 client 4:25 13:16 client's 23:11 codified 40:6 colleagues 40:23 colloquy 9:24 come 14:10 28:15 35:24 38:8 43:3 57:24 58:7 comes 4:16 43:22 commit 42:18 42:21 46:9 commitment 13:19 14:11 commitments 14:7 commits 7:10 20:16 53:18 committed 8:22 24:7 33:2 42:20 46:4 51:12 53:15 committing 3:23 7:4 completely 22:3 complied 14:8 41:23 comply 17:23</p>	<p>complying 17:25 component 32:14 48:25 54:22,23 56:15 components 44:4 45:8 compromised 37:20 conceded 4:6,8 6:2 42:25 concept 28:20 conceptual 30:3 concerns 31:8 concession 50:10 concluded 30:4 concurrently 20:25 21:3 30:23 condition 5:16 15:15 conditions 34:11 34:19 36:23 conduct 14:24 15:22 41:15 53:9,15,18 conflict 43:16 consecutively 20:25 consequence 30:14 34:8,9 35:4 consequences 29:4,5 considerably 13:13 considered 40:21 41:4 constitutional 12:25 29:20 34:14,20 construct 28:10 29:8 contemporane... 32:1,6 contemporary</p>
--	---	--	---	---

52:2	32:2,8,10,16	decide 28:1	depend 36:16	district 5:5
contends 53:3,4	32:22 33:19,21	44:24	39:25	18:14 19:5,13
context 32:4,5	33:21 34:25	deciding 4:10	depends 28:3	19:24 31:19,21
32:15 33:25	35:1,5 36:12	decision 39:9	deprive 17:11	32:2,8,16,22
34:1 40:7 44:5	36:13 37:5,8	58:10	deprives 17:19	33:19 35:6
51:5	38:2,14 39:13	deemed 47:9	describes 45:24	36:13 37:8
contexts 44:11	41:5,20 43:13	defects 22:1	despite 37:1	38:2 39:13
contract 4:3,4	44:18,18 45:18	defendant 3:22	dessert 47:20	41:4 47:12
4:22,22 11:20	45:23 46:2,5	4:14,14 5:7 6:7	determine 6:7	49:17 52:5
12:13,16 13:1	46:24 47:9,12	10:10,17 14:14	31:22	56:17
17:15,23,23	48:14,24 49:4	14:24 15:16,25	dialogue 43:19	divided 39:15
22:6,7 28:3,8,9	49:6,17,23	20:22 21:16,16	differ 36:12,16	division 39:19
contracts 18:10	51:10,17 52:5	22:11 24:6	39:24	documents
24:3	52:13 53:6	26:20 28:1	difference 22:5	15:21
contrary 7:22	54:20 56:10,13	29:4,18,21	44:7 50:14	dog 25:6
42:14	56:17,17,20	30:20 31:3	58:3	doing 4:1 18:6
controlled 33:10	58:7	32:15 35:3,12	different 5:11	48:10,13
controlling 39:1	courtroom 9:23	35:15,18,21,22	6:19,22 9:10	downward 19:6
convicted 55:19	courts 31:21	40:9 44:9	11:6,17 13:2	19:8 20:3
conviction 11:17	43:17 44:3	45:17 51:8,16	13:17 16:3,3	41:12
34:16 36:19	court's 12:21	52:10,11 55:25	19:9 22:6 25:5	drafted 5:4
cooperate 22:12	35:7	57:23 58:3	30:8 39:22	16:17
correct 9:15	covenant 5:17	defendants	41:19,22 44:10	due 12:25
11:14 15:19	crazy 28:17	27:25 28:21	53:23 54:2,11	D.C 1:8,18
18:22 19:6	create 38:4	38:4	57:18,21,22,24	
20:20 49:25	credit 7:2,8	defendant's	difficult 20:11	E
52:12 55:14	10:16 15:14	16:7 26:16	56:14	E 2:1 3:1,1
correction 52:6	20:15 30:21	41:18 49:1	direct 38:2	earlier 44:7
55:16	52:22	defense 25:11	disagree 55:4	52:21 54:13
correctly 17:8	crime 3:24 6:17	32:24 55:15	disagreement	easy 25:11
23:10	7:4,10 8:23	deliberately	47:25	effect 9:6 27:10
cost-free 25:17	20:16 33:2	14:21	discernible 28:5	28:23 49:2
Cotton 56:15	42:18 46:4,10	demonstrated	discretion 6:21	56:19 58:4
counsel 21:5	51:12 55:19,25	5:1 42:9	56:17	effective 14:13
24:6 31:10	56:2	demonstrates	discretionary	efficiency 37:16
38:16 56:24	criminal 5:2,8	4:15	44:20 54:22	efficient 37:11
58:12	5:14 6:23 41:6	demonstration	56:15	37:11
couple 31:11	53:9	28:7 54:10	discussed 32:21	either 34:10,15
course 45:6	cure 31:23 52:4	denies 56:5	52:7	36:18
55:12	cured 51:1,2,7	depart 19:6 20:3	discussing 52:20	elect 38:3
court 1:1,12,16		40:11,12 53:16	53:14	elicited 29:19
3:10,17 4:12	D	Department	dispute 21:7	engage 34:7
6:24 7:10 9:11	D 3:1	1:18	45:4,5	engaged 14:24
11:10 15:25	damage 28:5,7	departure 8:22	distinguish	41:14 53:8
18:6,14,16	day 15:18 16:2	19:8	33:14,16	ensure 32:2
25:19 27:22	de 21:25	departures	distinguishable	enter 12:13,19
31:17,19,21	deal 36:7	41:12	34:24	entered 11:23

12:17 15:25 18:1 25:22 50:18 entirely 37:14 entitled 8:2,6,11 13:16 34:10 53:4,4 entry 14:5 equally 40:7 error 11:9 14:22 21:20 24:7 30:5,6,7,8,11 30:17 32:3 33:25 34:5,19 35:17 39:10,11 41:18 42:1,3,4 42:20,21 43:15 43:21 44:7,8 44:16 46:16 57:9 58:6 errors 12:2 22:21 ESQ 1:15,17 2:3 2:5,8 essence 3:23 essentially 14:17 event 50:1 everybody 30:12 50:19 exact 20:7 46:5 58:8 exactly 56:21 example 37:23 37:25 39:3 exchange 3:13 exclusion 37:6 Excuse 34:2 exist 43:16 expected 26:22 27:17 explanation 16:6 45:7 explicit 50:2 explore 32:19 expose 13:12 exposed 20:22 exposition 45:7	extra 10:16 extremely 22:13 Exxon 22:8 <hr/> F <hr/> fact 3:22 7:22 9:18 12:14 14:18 20:14 23:18 28:4 30:12 34:13 37:1 40:9 46:9 48:18 50:8 51:1,11 55:15 factors 6:19,22 6:24 57:19,21 facts 3:11,21 21:9,14 26:3 32:21 34:24 39:22 factual 21:7 44:10 56:1 fails 17:23 failure 16:7 fair 15:2,6 36:23 37:3 fairly 53:10 fairness 37:20 fanciful 47:18 far 5:22 Federal 21:2 31:21 feel 6:14,15,16 46:20 47:21 felt 9:22 47:18 Fifth 58:11 file 19:20 filed 15:18 16:1 19:16 final 58:1 find 35:6 45:21 findings 41:20 49:5,7 finds 45:3 fine 25:19 first 3:4 8:5,8 9:2 19:9 39:25 39:25 42:17	five 43:8 focus 57:7 focused 50:20 57:6 follow 20:2 47:15 followed 32:13 42:7 following 34:16 41:25 foreclosed 12:9 forego 29:24 foremost 39:25 forfeited 32:12 forget 40:12 forgot 15:1 form 56:11 formalistic 27:13 formulation 54:18 forth 32:25 forward 25:23 found 56:20 57:9 fourth 54:22 56:15 framed 3:11 framework 32:13 fraud 17:24 free 32:3 fulfill 22:3 51:19 fulfilled 34:19 35:2 47:4 fulfillment 34:11 41:5 full 34:16 functioning 31:20 fundamental 3:12 29:20 future 15:23 <hr/> G <hr/> G 3:1 General 1:18	18:15,16 genuine 45:5 getting 28:24 37:12 Ginsburg 3:20 6:25 7:6 9:21 10:3,6,9,14,23 10:25 11:4,12 13:3,8,12 15:9 15:12,14,20 20:13,21 30:19 31:4 50:12,23 52:15 53:1 Ginsburg's 8:19 12:5 give 6:21 7:2,7 8:21 9:17 13:16 18:18 26:6 27:4 28:9 29:25 31:11 33:7 37:22 44:3 52:22 53:25 56:16 given 33:12 34:8 34:9 41:7 48:14 50:9 gives 22:11 giving 20:15 27:25 29:19 34:11 go 4:17,25 6:19 6:22 13:18 17:3 19:14 23:4 25:12 44:1 46:19 48:6 55:17 goes 12:3 17:14 22:4 going 6:14,15 8:21 16:5 20:3 20:19 25:13,15 25:19,20,23 26:5,6,9 27:4,5 29:21 33:3,7 33:17 35:5 36:25 44:9 53:20 58:7,8	good 17:3 24:25 29:2,4,7,15,18 33:13 44:14 gotten 7:14 25:21 35:16,22 43:18 54:15 governed 11:19 12:1 39:20 government 3:14,16 4:6,12 4:17,25 5:3,19 6:2,10,13 7:15 7:25 8:21 9:2,7 9:9,18 10:11 10:15 11:11,15 13:18,25 14:10 15:2,7 16:17 17:18,25 19:16 19:20 20:4,8 21:8 22:3,15 23:4,7,12,15 24:2,17 25:14 25:18 26:7,8 26:11,23 27:11 27:18,23,24 28:20,20 29:12 29:15,19 30:13 31:18 33:1 34:6 35:2,8,14 38:1,9,12,19 39:8 40:19 41:2,22 42:5 42:24 43:2,3 44:8,22 45:10 47:7 48:19 49:10,13,15,19 50:7 51:9,10 51:19 52:17,19 55:5 56:12 57:15,25 58:2 government's 8:24 9:1 10:12 11:21 17:21 18:8 20:5 22:9 22:13 23:5,18 32:10 35:5 40:3 41:11
---	--	--	---	--

48:2 50:4 grant 20:2 38:20 56:18 granted 38:21 great 12:5 greater 13:13 gripe 7:23 guarantees 34:14 guess 9:16 47:24 53:24 guidance 44:3 guideline 8:8 47:8,14 55:10 guidelines 55:10 guilty 3:12 17:6 17:10,14,24 24:15 25:23 55:25	hear 3:3 20:1 heard 20:15 40:22 hears 21:16 heart 12:4 heavier 32:7 help 43:15 helpful 44:4 47:1 high 34:12 36:21 37:2,4 Honor 3:25 4:18 21:24 23:12 24:1 25:10 30:18 31:12 32:23 33:1 37:19 57:4 honored 20:14 Honors 56:22 hope 9:20 hoped 27:6 29:6 hunch 14:25 hypothetical 27:2,3 28:6 29:23 35:10 36:3 hypothetically 32:20 46:15	45:16,21,22 46:6,7,8 implicitly 42:17 implied 5:16,16 5:23 imply 23:3 importance 16:4 36:17 important 9:6 18:7,8 31:20 37:7,13 44:24 imposed 21:18 impossibility 57:25 impossible 57:18 impracticable 4:23 incentive 38:8 incentives 38:4 include 14:23 15:3,9 included 15:8,17 16:12,16 inconsistent 6:13 24:11 increase 18:18 indicate 5:23 indicated 15:8 46:24 49:16 indicates 6:4 47:6 49:13 individual 34:8 36:6 induced 17:1,4 17:10 inference 5:14 informants 41:14 information 53:9 initiated 52:18 insignificant 45:12 instance 35:14 instances 19:3 instigated 56:2	instructive 3:18 integrity 17:14 18:7 intelligent 3:19 intend 47:15 intent 18:4 intention 17:25 interest 25:7,8,9 25:22 36:22 37:2,5,13,17 interests 37:7,19 37:20 interim 20:17 interpreted 21:13,13 interval 7:9 intervening 50:1 invalid 23:14 24:25 invalidated 23:17 investigation 9:14 invocation 34:16 invoke 34:17 involuntarily 12:19 involved 12:6 irrelevant 27:11 Isaacson 1:15 2:3,8 3:6,7,9 3:20,25 5:3,11 5:18 6:6,18 7:5 7:11,16,19,24 8:15,25 9:15 10:1,5,8,13,20 10:24 11:2,8 11:14 12:3,21 13:6,9,14,21 13:24 14:12 15:5,11,13,17 15:24 16:10,15 16:24 17:9,17 18:3,19 19:1,7 19:16 20:6,20 21:1,23 22:19	22:23 23:20,23 24:1,10,13,17 24:21 25:2,10 25:24 26:12,15 26:23 27:9,21 28:12,18 29:11 29:17 30:6,15 30:18 31:2,6 31:12 56:25 57:2,4 issue 11:25 21:19 31:25 32:19 42:4 issues 25:11
<hr/> H <hr/> H 1:17 2:5 31:14 half 50:13 hand 28:6 42:5 42:15 46:7 53:17 hands 18:16 25:12 happened 9:13 14:6 30:20 31:8 41:20,22 46:18 47:11 50:25 happens 24:24 24:24,24 25:7 47:19 happy 43:25 hard 54:25 harmless 30:4,6 30:7,12,13,17 30:17 33:25 34:5,21 35:17 39:10,11 40:4 44:7 58:6 harmlessness 35:6 harsh 24:2,2	<hr/> I <hr/> idea 43:6 57:20 57:23 ignore 4:9,10 29:24 ignored 45:13 ignoring 47:3 illegal 53:18 imagine 15:2 immaterial 18:21 20:5 immediate 31:23 41:1 impermissible 5:14 implicated 56:1 implicit 42:13 42:16,17,21	<hr/> J <hr/> jail 3:24 7:3 35:19 41:7 JAMES 1:3 January 1:9 Jimmy 3:12 Johnson 56:14 Joint 8:15 judge 4:16,18 6:7,25 7:5,6,11 8:20 9:6,8,12 9:17 10:6,8,11 10:18,25 12:5 13:5,17,18 14:9,10 19:5 19:13,19,24 20:14,24 21:3 21:10,21 23:13 23:15 26:4,8 26:25 27:3,11 28:19 29:24 30:21 33:2,4 36:4 39:5 40:10,10 41:5 41:10,15 48:6 48:18 50:17 51:21 52:13,16 52:16,20,21 53:7,9,12 55:4 55:7,16 57:11 57:12,12,17,20 57:24		

judges 7:7	47:2,4,16 48:5	LARS 1:15 2:3	lowered 33:7	minute 10:18
judge's 6:20	48:17 49:8,14	2:8 3:7 57:2	lowest 35:15	51:16
21:14 50:20	49:21 50:12,23	law 4:3,22 11:20	42:7 47:8,14	minutes 31:11
judgment 50:2	51:6 52:8,15	18:10 28:3,9		57:1
56:23	53:1,12 54:3,7	28:11 34:20	M	misrepresenta...
jurisprudence	54:8,19,24	lawful 5:24	Machibroda	17:1,4,22,24
27:9	55:18,22 56:4	lawyer 10:17	17:4,10	missing 17:16
jury 12:9	56:9,24 58:12	23:11	major 3:11	19:1
Justice 1:18 3:3	Justice's 27:2	lawyer's 16:7	majority 22:10	Mobil 22:8
3:9,20 4:2 5:10	35:10 36:3	law-abiding	making 30:22	moment 32:20
5:13,22 6:4,12	K	15:16,22	37:7 58:2	51:23
6:25 7:6,13,17	keep 5:24 16:20	let's 14:4,4 21:8	man 4:18	motion 10:19,20
7:20 8:12,17	keeps 36:4	26:1,3	manger 25:6	15:10,12,18
8:18,18 9:12	Kennedy 5:13	level 3:15 9:3	manipulating	16:1 19:17,20
9:21 10:3,6,9	5:22 18:10,20	11:17 14:15	38:19	50:4
10:14,23,25	19:3,12,23	18:21,22,23	manipulation	mouth 28:16
11:4,12,18	20:10 24:4	19:24 20:23	38:15,18	move 6:3 33:3
12:5,12 13:3,8	32:19,24 33:11	48:3	manual 55:10	multiple 33:17
13:12,15,22	34:3	levels 47:9 50:15	materiality 20:6	muster 58:5
14:3,5,17 15:9	kept 27:18 38:9	Lewisville 1:15	20:9	N
15:12,14,20	kind 16:23	liberty 34:9,11	matter 1:11 9:8	N 2:1,1 3:1
16:5,14,19	27:13 30:2	36:21,22 37:2	34:20 47:25	nature 22:8,12
17:5,13,20	36:25 42:3,3	37:5,13	50:12 55:13,15	need 18:23
18:10,20 19:3	53:13	lies 46:18	58:15	23:21 31:24
19:12,23 20:10	knees 18:17	light 45:23 49:9	ma'am 10:1	38:1 44:18
20:13,21 21:5	knew 9:23 10:11	likelihood 54:1	mean 4:9,11	needs 5:19
22:17,20 23:9	33:19 55:4	54:2	6:14,16 9:22	negative 46:8
23:21,25 24:4	know 4:11,15	LISA 1:17 2:5	12:15,18 17:24	negotiated
24:5,11,14,19	8:5,13 9:3	31:14	27:19 28:2,15	14:20
24:22 25:4,16	11:19 18:6,14	listen 24:8	29:12 30:8	negotiating 15:3
26:1,13,18,19	19:17,18,24	literally 45:25	31:3 41:10	neither 34:18
27:1,12 28:2	23:13 25:18	little 30:8 49:9	43:1 44:13	36:7
28:14,24 29:14	26:24 28:16	logical 30:25	46:23 47:22,22	never 11:11
30:2,10,16,19	31:4 36:4 41:5	long 12:6	47:25 50:6,7	12:15 20:15
31:4,10,13,16	41:10,15 43:10	longer 45:24	51:7,24	23:24 24:5
32:19,24 33:11	46:8 47:13,20	look 26:5 29:2,3	means 35:21	25:15 29:14
34:2,3,23	48:8,18 53:8	32:25 48:7	meant 15:21	30:4,16 38:8
35:20,23,24	53:10 54:12,24	53:13,14 57:21	mentioned	40:22 42:1
36:2,14 37:9	knowing 12:22	looked 18:11	14:18	45:17 48:18
37:22 38:6,11	knowingly 24:6	Looking 41:24	mere 23:18	49:6
38:17,23,24	known 9:13 51:8	looks 6:24 45:3	merging 22:8	nevertheless
39:3,18 40:8	L	lost 43:19	merits 44:23	30:14
40:14,18 41:9	labels 30:11	lot 43:2,4 44:25	metaphysical	new 14:9 25:1
41:24 43:1,13	language 15:1	45:3	27:15 28:10,13	55:9,19
43:18,20,24,25	16:25	low 20:18 30:22	mind 19:22	nonmaterial
44:6,13,21		lower 4:13,19	29:14 50:20	18:12
45:2,9,11,20		8:8 23:13	minimus 21:25	

<p>normal 13:1 14:23 16:8 22:6,7 28:8 normally 16:12 16:12 22:15 Northern 5:5 note 49:4 number 6:19,21 57:19</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">O</p> <p>O 2:1 3:1 obey 5:19 object 10:18 16:7 24:8 32:8 32:16 37:1 38:1,12 49:2 51:16 objected 23:11 32:22 58:4 objection 11:13 23:21 31:19 32:2,7 33:8 35:3,12 36:11 36:12 39:1,5,6 39:12 40:2 48:15 50:23 51:2 52:2,5 58:8 objections 37:8 38:5 obligations 22:9 obviating 31:24 obvious 43:7 obviously 50:1 occur 12:2 25:15 29:11 occurred 28:8 31:22 41:7 45:6 51:14 occurs 38:1 odd 15:20 offense 3:15 48:3 55:9 offhand 8:13 officer 52:24 55:8,8 56:7</p>	<p>officially 19:17 oh 5:10 23:15 25:13 38:22 51:21 Olano 32:13 54:4,4,18 omits 27:18 once 9:1 17:18 open 7:1 15:25 45:10 opponent 39:7 opportunity 44:17,23 opposed 13:1 option 26:16,20 28:1 oral 1:11 2:2 3:7 31:14 order 28:25 44:23 53:10 ordered 20:24 ordinary 40:6 outcome 32:17 43:11,12 49:2 52:1 54:10 56:19,21 overall 31:8 overpinnings 12:25 overtones 12:25</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">P</p> <p>P 3:1 page 2:2 8:15 22:12 55:2 panel 57:5,8 paragraph 32:25 42:13,15 42:22 45:23,25 47:3,3,4,6 49:12,18 50:17 paragraphs 8:16 22:14 23:6 part 4:5,24 8:5,6 8:8 14:7 20:13 23:5 31:1 38:4</p>	<p>42:7 particular 39:4 50:3 parties 12:13,15 14:7 31:22 parts 8:4 21:23 party 4:22 17:22 32:7 pass 58:5 penalty 13:13 people 42:12 46:22 percent 29:20 perfectly 13:23 performance 54:16 permit 31:23 permits 31:21 38:15 permitted 5:15 person 55:2 Petitioner 1:4 1:16 2:4,9 3:8 37:25 48:15 49:6,17 53:3,3 53:7 56:2 57:3 Petitioner's 54:1 phrase 51:14 pick 44:22 place 29:3 36:17 36:21 37:2 placed 34:13 37:5 42:6 47:8 placing 32:7 plain 11:9 21:20 30:11 41:17 42:1,2,4,22 43:21 44:8,16 46:16,21,22 47:2 57:8 plainly 46:13,14 plain-error 11:7 12:1 22:21,22 32:11,14 36:24 40:4 43:14 44:5,20 48:23 51:4 54:21</p>	<p>58:5 play 25:6 38:8 plea 3:18,22 4:1 4:7 5:4,4,6,9 5:12,20,20 7:9 7:24 8:4,10,13 9:2,4,7,9,23 10:3,12,19,21 11:1,1,5,11,16 11:19,22,23 12:7,24 13:1,5 13:10,19,25 14:15,23 15:24 16:22,25 17:7 17:10,14,19 18:8 19:10 21:25 22:1,5 22:10 23:5,14 24:15,18,25 25:23,23 27:7 27:16,19,23,25 28:11,17,21,22 30:4,17,24 31:18 32:4,12 33:13 38:3 39:6,20 42:2 45:16 49:13 50:3,9,18,24 53:5,17 56:1 56:12 pleading 6:17 please 3:10 31:17 pled 3:12 12:4 55:25 plus 20:23 point 6:3 7:13 7:14,18 8:19 9:16,19 11:8 12:5 15:18 20:11 26:16 27:2,8 41:1 42:11 47:10 49:24 50:5 51:7,8,13,19 54:25 58:1 points 6:8,9,11</p>	<p>6:20,21 8:2,3,6 8:11 9:18 19:9 26:6 27:4 29:25 57:11 poor 20:8 posed 22:25 position 7:16 9:19 20:8 21:11,13,15 22:15 24:9 27:13,14,20 37:3 38:12,25 48:1 54:20 56:10 possibility 53:6 54:11 possible 26:21 32:3 35:15 43:11,12 possibly 27:17 29:6,23 posture 6:5 potential 21:22 Potentially 13:14 power 19:19 27:24 practicably 4:25 practice 50:12 50:21 practiced 5:5 precedent 12:22 precedents 9:3 precisely 39:20 49:10 preclude 35:17 56:16 prejudice 8:20 37:1 48:16,21 57:7,11,16,16 58:2 prejudiced 8:23 9:1 40:10 48:10 present 12:10 15:25 34:25 presentence</p>
---	--	--	---	---

9:14 52:16,19 52:21 56:8 preserved 40:2 pretty 41:12,15 previously 46:3 principle 4:21 principles 11:15 28:8 prior 9:3 10:21 private 17:11 pro 10:22 probability 32:17 41:19 probably 6:3 14:22 40:19 probation 52:24 55:7,8 56:7 problem 14:9 34:5 36:6 57:5 57:10 problems 33:17 proceeding 32:18 47:10 49:3 proceedings 32:3 55:21 process 12:25 37:11,11 44:16 prohibits 55:11 promise 3:13,16 5:19,20,23 17:21 31:1 35:2,5,13 41:6 41:23 42:5,8 42:13,16 46:7 promised 23:4,8 23:12 promises 5:23 12:7,8,23 17:2 17:10 22:3,16 23:5 29:18 prong 57:6 proof 46:17 55:1 55:13 proposed 53:6 54:13 proposes 37:25	proposition 36:15,17 prosecution 19:4,11 prosecutor 21:11 33:12 55:3,5 prosecutors 18:5 provides 44:17 provision 5:7 14:23 15:22 16:9 47:11 50:3,24 provisions 14:20 Puckett 1:3 3:4 3:12 6:9 9:19 10:20 12:8 13:9 14:2 25:25 57:5,8 Puckett's 47:7 punctiliously 27:18 purpose 15:22 32:1,4 purposes 4:9 31:20 pursued 31:9 put 15:1,5 26:1 48:5 puts 6:4	39:17 48:14 49:10 55:1 56:10,14 questions 5:22 10:10 14:18 31:8 43:2,4,9 44:14 46:15 quite 5:5	31:11 57:2 receive 6:10 53:11 received 35:15 35:19 41:3 receives 35:12 recision 18:13 recognition 42:14 recognize 6:2 22:1 23:2 24:7 36:25 42:1 recommend 8:7 23:12 26:8,11 40:19 41:2 48:7,7 53:16 recommendat... 7:15,21 18:23 19:5,15 20:2 23:16 33:3,5,6 41:12 53:20 recommended 7:22 record 8:13 14:20 31:7 41:21,21 45:19 47:13 49:7 51:14 52:6 56:20 reduce 18:24 reducing 27:24 reduction 3:15 7:14 48:3 reed 9:20 reflected 56:7 regard 21:25 regarded 34:20 reinforces 32:6 reiterate 55:9 relate 31:20 related 35:4 release 21:3 relevant 8:19 9:11 21:9 57:13 relief 13:3,6 28:3,3,9 32:8	56:16,18 rely 12:8 35:7 remanded 13:17 remarks 21:12 remedies 53:5 remedy 4:10 11:25 13:23 14:8,12 16:23 17:6 52:14 remember 17:8 remorse 4:13,15 6:14,15,16 47:18 remorseful 4:19 26:6 render 5:8 12:24 17:21 rendered 11:22 13:25 renders 11:16 16:22 reneging 52:18 renewed 41:6 repeating 53:21 report 52:17,19 52:21 56:8 represent 51:17 request 13:6 42:6 47:7 require 22:2 32:15 51:18 required 13:18 rescind 18:12 resentencing 52:13 reserve 21:9 resolve 43:16 respect 54:3 respectfully 56:13 respond 40:25 Respondent 1:19 2:6 31:15 response 41:1 43:8 53:25 responsibilities 52:23	
	Q				
	qualification 50:5 qualified 3:14 6:10 48:2 qualifies 49:24 qualify 49:17,19 49:22 quality 27:15 question 6:1 8:19 16:6 21:24 22:18,25 24:5 26:2 30:3 34:4 37:10 38:6 39:10,15	R	R 1:15 2:3,8 3:1 3:7 57:2 raise 21:18 38:2 raised 12:5 31:7 35:3,12 37:8 52:5 raises 11:17 ran 21:3 range 8:8 rare 29:25 40:11 40:13,14,15 rarer 40:19 reaches 14:15 read 30:19 52:20 reading 20:10 readings 42:22 real 39:10 45:5 reality 4:11 realize 16:8 really 4:17,18 22:17 23:3 24:5 30:1 36:16 37:18 38:12,16 39:9 40:20 44:24 45:12 46:20 51:24 reason 27:22 29:2,4,7,9,16 29:18 33:12,14 33:24 44:13 51:3 reasonable 32:17 41:19 54:1 rebuttal 2:7		

<p>responsibility 7:2,8 10:16 15:15 19:8 20:16 41:3 42:9,11 46:1,3 49:18,20 51:11 51:18,22 55:11 result 27:10 28:19 33:8,9 36:7,7,19 49:5 53:23 54:17 57:24 retaining 36:22 retroactively 17:21 return 56:9 reversal 22:2 23:1,8 reverse 58:10 reversed 22:16 40:5 reversible 24:10 review 11:7 31:25 33:25 35:17 40:1 rich 47:20 rid 30:10 ridiculous 51:20 right 3:13 7:23 9:25 10:13 12:8,9,9 13:8 14:14 16:14 18:24 19:12 21:9 23:19,22 26:10 28:22 33:5 37:9,14 40:16 43:20 44:7 46:12 50:14 51:21 55:12,23,24 rights 9:20 12:23 22:11 27:25 29:20 34:17 44:19 49:3 54:5,9,14 56:11 ROBERTS 3:3</p>	<p>6:12 8:18 25:16 26:1,13 26:18 31:10,13 40:8,14,18 41:9 43:18,25 44:6 47:16 48:5,17 53:12 55:18,22 56:4 56:24 58:12 rose 28:16 rosiest 27:5 route 35:25 rule 9:24 12:1 22:21,22 29:1 29:1,2,16 32:2 32:6,7 37:21 37:21,24 40:6 44:24 46:25 rules 40:6 run 30:23</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">S</p> <hr/> <p>S 2:1 3:1 sacrificed 37:17 sandbag 25:14 Sanders 7:11 9:17 10:8 12:6 40:10 41:15 48:18 53:12 Santobello 9:5,7 11:10,12 18:4 20:7,10 33:10 33:12,14,16,18 33:19 34:24,25 35:14,17 36:10 52:13 53:6 57:10 satisfactory 13:23 satisfied 21:17 satisfy 54:17 saying 5:19 8:11 17:18 22:20,23 23:9,17 26:4 27:24 28:15 30:20 37:10 40:24 46:11,11</p>	<p>46:12 55:5 says 5:7 8:20,21 26:4,8,8 27:4 29:25 30:25 32:24 33:1,2,4 36:20 42:19,20 49:15 53:16 54:4 55:8 Scalia 4:2 5:10 6:4 8:12,17 13:15,22 14:3 17:20 23:9,21 23:25 24:11,14 24:19,22 25:4 47:2 scenario 27:5 Schertler 1:17 2:5 31:13,14 31:16 32:23 33:9,15 34:22 35:23 36:1,9 37:4,15,24 38:10,14,22 39:2,14,23 40:13,17,25 41:17 42:24 43:12,24 44:2 44:12 45:2,14 46:23 47:6,24 48:12,23 49:12 49:16,25 50:22 52:3,10,24 53:2,24 54:7 54:19 55:14,20 55:24 56:6 scrivener's 14:22 se 10:22 second 8:6 16:1 secondly 9:5 57:15 secret 10:14 secured 35:13 see 21:17 24:23 25:7,19 43:3 seeing 29:10 seek 33:16</p>	<p>seeking 13:4 seen 53:17 send 14:9 sense 51:4 sensible 36:24 sent 7:3 52:12 52:15 sentence 4:13,19 20:18 21:4,18 21:18 24:8 26:24 28:23 33:7 35:15 42:6 47:8 53:11 sentences 30:23 sentencing 7:10 8:1,7 9:6 10:21 11:2 13:5 19:18 21:10,11 21:12,21 26:25 27:3,10 30:22 47:12 53:10 57:7,17,20 58:5 sentencings 40:4 serious 42:18 seriously 53:20 serve 15:21 served 20:24 32:4 37:7 serves 31:20 set 13:10 39:6 setting 17:6 35:11 48:24 shift 48:25 show 32:16 40:3 41:18 49:2 54:1,9 57:16 57:23 showed 41:21 showing 32:14 48:16,21 54:11 56:19 shown 4:14 45:25 46:4 shows 7:9 14:20 22:13</p>	<p>side 3:23 4:23 10:12 sides 15:6 significant 41:4 silly 52:9,11 similar 56:14 Simms 55:2,9 simply 21:14 27:11,18 28:13 35:6 42:8 57:13 single 23:1 29:12 sit 21:16 24:23 25:12,17 sitting 34:15 54:15 situation 3:18 22:9 26:14 29:23 33:21 36:25 37:5 41:3 45:24 six 50:13 slim 9:20 small 22:14 sole 37:17 solemn 12:11 Solicitor 1:17 18:15 somebody 14:25 20:16 54:14 somebody's 36:18 soon 7:3 sorry 10:1,24 15:7 19:1,7 24:13 34:3 sort 36:4 39:16 sorted 33:22 Souter 7:13,17 7:20 26:19 27:1,12 28:2 28:14,24 29:14 34:2,23 35:20 35:23,24 36:2 36:14 37:9,22 38:6,11 51:6</p>
--	--	--	--	--

52:8 54:3,7,8 54:19 Souter's 56:9 specific 5:15 specifically 9:11 stabs 4:16 stake 50:14 stand 10:17 11:11 16:25 standard 32:11 39:21 40:1 41:18 43:14 44:5,20 49:1 51:4 54:5,6,22 56:16 57:18 standards 58:6 started 34:4 36:18 state 46:24 stated 27:22 31:7 47:12 statement 8:1 35:7 56:1 Statements 17:3 States 1:1,6,12 3:5,16 16:2 18:15 29:24 34:14 stay 36:20 Stevens 14:17 16:5,14,19 17:5,13 30:2 30:10,16 38:17 38:23,24 39:3 39:18 44:21 45:2,9 stood 51:10 strenuously 50:7 strictly 11:19 strong 36:10 strongest 44:23 structural 30:8 30:11 subject 16:22 21:19 submission	32:10 submit 35:9 36:11 48:14 56:13 submitted 58:13 58:15 subsequent 53:8 53:15,18 subsequently 12:18 substantial 44:19 49:3 54:5,9,14 56:11 suffered 28:5 35:3 suffice 13:15 suggest 11:8 12:3,21 16:4 16:11,13,15 18:3 23:24 24:21 25:2 26:15 30:1 suggested 25:14 37:19 56:2 suggesting 25:15 28:12,13 suggestion 23:7 34:6 36:10 43:20 suggests 28:18 supervisory 21:2 supporting 56:1 suppose 4:16 8:18 32:20 51:20 supposed 4:17 8:1 14:11 48:6 51:17 Supreme 1:1,12 sure 19:19 22:17 27:14 37:7 42:4 43:5 50:20 surprising 41:13 suspect 40:18	system 38:15,18 38:19 <hr/> T <hr/> T 2:1,1 take 4:22 13:10 18:22 19:13 21:10 24:4,5 25:12 31:1 33:6 37:10 43:5,6,7 53:20 54:20 56:10,25 57:20 taken 9:25 10:4 45:25 48:1 takes 17:18 talk 20:9 talked 12:7 talking 19:2 27:1 29:3 30:7 38:17 39:18 talks 9:5 18:4 teach 4:2 teaches 27:10 teachings 3:17 technical 22:1 tell 4:3 33:5 45:23 46:17 48:21 52:23 term 16:21 termination 6:23 terms 5:24 20:6 33:19,23 45:16 50:9 terrific 29:5 Tex 1:15 Texas 5:5 Thank 8:17 31:10,12 56:22 56:24 57:4 58:12 theme 34:24 theoretical 27:13 29:8 theoretically 6:13	theory 28:3 thereof 18:9 thing 9:10 16:20 23:13 40:22,23 50:15 54:25 things 22:8,12 25:12 27:16 46:19 55:1,6 57:22 think 15:6 16:17 16:24 17:15,17 21:23 22:7 26:5,9,14 28:14,18,25 30:23 31:2 33:9 35:20 37:12,16 39:7 39:10,19,21,23 40:5 45:9 46:2 46:16,18,21,22 46:25 47:2,16 53:2,7,21,22 54:25 thinking 7:1 third 18:23 19:10,14,23 48:25 50:5 57:6 thought 34:3 40:14 thoughts 36:5 threats 17:11 three 3:21 21:1 26:6 27:4 three-level 3:15 48:3 threshold 22:24 throw 28:17 time 6:15 12:17 17:22 21:21 29:21 47:19 50:18 55:20 58:4 timely 11:13 today 3:4 32:11 told 46:1 totally 30:12	44:25 trial 3:13 12:2,9 13:11 20:22 23:10,13,15 25:1,20 34:9 34:10,16 36:7 36:19 42:10,14 54:17 57:11,12 57:12 tried 44:22 trivial 18:12,13 truth 37:12 try 30:24 trying 9:16 26:17 28:25 30:10 turn 27:16 turned 55:2 turning 39:12 turns 42:21 55:7 55:12 twice 25:20 two 3:11,21 8:4 14:17 18:5 19:9 21:23 22:14 23:6 36:23 42:19,21 46:12 50:15 56:25 type 5:8 43:14 56:14 typical 53:5 <hr/> U <hr/> unclear 21:6 33:18 underlying 11:16 17:15 21:2 understand 4:7 16:19 20:12,17 23:10 43:19 undertaken 14:21 undertaking 50:19 51:19 undertook
---	---	---	--	--

<p>13:19 unfulfillable 12:24 17:2 unfulfilled 12:23 17:1 Unheard 7:1 unimportant 44:25 United 1:1,6,12 3:4,16 16:2 18:15 29:24 34:13 unknown 7:7 40:13,15,15 unlawful 14:24 unremorseful 5:2 unring 51:15 unusual 14:19 15:7 upper 20:23 usually 28:2 29:1 U.S 50:13,16,16 51:20,22 U.S.C 57:19</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">V</p> <p>v 1:5 3:4 valid 3:18 36:19 value 14:1 34:13 36:16,21 37:2 37:4 varying 39:21 vast 22:10 vehicle 44:14 vented 32:21 view 30:3 violate 33:13 violated 49:3 violates 9:2 violation 54:5,9 54:12,14 virtually 5:6 57:18 void 5:8 9:4 11:17,22 12:24</p>	<p>14:1,16 16:21 16:22 17:8,12 17:15 25:3,5,8 25:9,18 voidable 25:3,4 25:6 volume 8:16 voluntarily 11:23 12:16,19 voluntary 3:19 14:6 17:12,19 34:17 36:20</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">W</p> <p>wait 10:18 21:17 24:23 25:7 51:16 waived 3:12 waiver 12:22 walk 27:19 want 5:13 13:7 20:22 42:10 43:4,7,10 50:17 54:24 wanted 16:20 wants 34:17 washed 24:15,19 Washington 1:8 1:18 wasn't 10:7 15:12 38:19 45:12 52:17 55:18 way 9:22 26:2 43:22 45:19 46:18 48:8 51:25 52:4,6,7 52:11 53:13 54:8 Wednesday 1:9 went 47:18 51:11 weren't 20:23 we'll 26:8 we're 27:24 win 32:8 43:20 44:23</p>	<p>withdraw 10:19 10:21 11:1,5 13:4 26:14,20 27:7 28:22 30:24 38:3 withdrawn 19:17 withhold 38:5 witnesses 12:10 wonder 38:18 wonderful 43:5 word 10:18 25:2 38:9 52:20 words 20:8 27:12,15,19 46:5 49:15 wouldn't 9:14 13:15,22 18:17 18:18 20:1,2,2 30:19 33:6,7 37:3 40:20,21 50:15,20 53:23 Wow 23:25 wrong 18:22 27:14 39:9 42:2,23 43:10 46:13,14 50:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">X</p> <p>x 1:2,7</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Y</p> <p>yeah 36:20 41:9 years 11:10 50:13</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">0</p> <p>07-9712 1:5 3:4</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">1</p> <p>1 6:23 8:16 42:13 10:12 1:13 3:2 11 9:24 11:15 58:14 14 1:9 18 57:19</p>	<hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">2</p> <hr/> <p>2009 1:9</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">3</p> <hr/> <p>3 2:4 3E1.1 6:18 31 2:6 35 11:10 355 57:19</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">5</p> <hr/> <p>51a 22:13 52(a) 40:6 52(b) 32:6 46:25 57:6,8,13 54a 8:15 57 2:9</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">8</p> <hr/> <p>8 8:16 32:25 42:15,22 45:23 45:25 49:12,18 50:18</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">9</p> <hr/> <p>9 8:16 47:3,3,4,6 99.9 29:20</p>
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