

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- - - - -
DOUGLAS BROWNBACK, ET AL.,)
 Petitioners,)
 v.) No. 19-546
JAMES KING,)
 Respondent.)
- - - - -

Pages: 1 through 68
Place: Washington, D.C.
Date: November 9, 2020

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION
Official Reporters
1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 206
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 628-4888
www.hrccourtreporters.com

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2 - - - - -

3 DOUGLAS BROWNBACK, ET AL.,)

4 Petitioners,)

5 v.) No. 19-546

6 JAMES KING,)

7 Respondent.)

8 - - - - -

9

10 Washington, D.C.

11 Monday, November 9, 2020

12

13 The above-entitled matter came on for
14 oral argument before the Supreme Court of the
15 United States at 11:13 a.m.

16

17 APPEARANCES:

18 MICHAEL R. HUSTON, Assistant to the Solicitor General,
19 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. ;
20 on behalf of the Petitioners.

21 PATRICK M. JAICOMO, ESQUIRE, Arlington, Virginia ;
22 on behalf of the Respondent.

23

24

25

1	C O N T E N T S	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	PAGE:
3	MICHAEL R. HUSTON, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioners	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	
6	PATRICK M. JAICOMO, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	34
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF:	
9	MICHAEL R. HUSTON, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioners	64
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

P R O C E E D I N G S

(11:13 a.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear argument next in Case 19-546, Brownback versus King.

Mr. Huston.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

MR. HUSTON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

The text of the FTCA judgment bar resolves this case. The district court entered the judgment in an action under Section 1346(b), so that judgment constitutes a complete bar to any action by Respondent against the federal employees involved in his FTCA claim. That broad text unambiguously precludes Respondent's Bivens action here, which asserts the same injuries based on the very same subject matter.

The Sixth Circuit's refusal to apply the judgment bar in this case rested on two propositions: first, that when the United States prevails in an FTCA action, the district court must necessarily dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, second, that

1 such a jurisdictional dismissal does not trigger
2 the judgment bar.

3 Both propositions are wrong. This
4 Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's
5 jurisdictional analysis in *FDIC v. Meyer*, but
6 even more important for present purposes, this
7 Court in *Simmons v. Himmelreich* squarely
8 rejected the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the
9 judgment bar never applies to an FTCA judgment
10 for the government.

11 The Court held instead that the
12 judgment bar does apply where a plaintiff simply
13 fails to prove his claim. And that conclusion
14 follows directly from the text of Section 2676,
15 which makes "the judgment" in an FTCA action
16 preclusive, without drawing any distinction
17 based on which side prevails.

18 Respondent now concedes that the Sixth
19 Circuit's reasoning cannot be reconciled with
20 *Simmons*, so he shifts to an alternative
21 argument. He says he should be able to bring an
22 FTCA action and an individual action together
23 without the judgment bar coming into play.

24 But the statutory text directly
25 refutes that argument too. Whereas common law

1 res judicata made a judgment preclusive "in a
2 subsequent action," Congress in the judgment bar
3 expressly departed from that rule and prohibited
4 any individual action following an FTCA
5 judgment.

6 That's because Congress wrote the
7 judgment bar to prevent duplicative litigation
8 against the government's employees, and that
9 objective does not depend on whether the
10 plaintiff's individual action is brought with
11 the same case number or a different one.

12 The judgment below should be reversed.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Huston, I
14 -- I want to ask you about your -- your last
15 point. As -- as you read this statute, the
16 disposition of an FTCA claim bars Bivens claims
17 against the employee.

18 But, of course, the statute speaks of
19 actions, not -- not claims. And it was -- was
20 and is very well established that there's no bar
21 with respect to claims in the same action.

22 If -- if Congress were going to make
23 such a dramatic departure from that rule, the
24 obvious word to use is right there; it's
25 "claims." And yet, they -- they didn't do that.

1 MR. HUSTON: If I might make two
2 points about that, Your Honor.

3 The first is that, as I just said,
4 you're right that the common law rule was that a
5 judgment in a -- in a subsequent action is
6 preclusive. But I think you can see that
7 Congress made exactly the type of express
8 departure from the common law that Your Honor
9 mentioned, because it deleted the word
10 "subsequent," which you will find in the First
11 Restatement, in this Court's cases. Over and
12 over again, Congress removed the word
13 "subsequent action" and replaced it with a
14 complete bar to any action.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I don't
16 know -- I don't know that that's the clearest
17 way they could go about it. The clearest way to
18 go about it would say "the claim." It would be
19 a -- a complete bar to any claim that is -- is
20 raised, as opposed to, you know, any subsequent
21 action.

22 That's where the real departure is.
23 And it seems to me that that's a much more
24 direct way to eliminate any confusion than
25 simply deleting, you know, the "subsequent" in

1 -- that appeared in some -- some cases.

2 MR. HUSTON: Well, Your Honor, in --
3 in 1946, as we explain in our reply brief at
4 page 8, the definition of the term "action" was
5 a demand for relief in court. And I think you
6 can see that Section 2676 uses the term "action"
7 to be essentially synonymous with "claim"
8 because it refers to an action under
9 Section 1346(b). And so it's clearly tying the
10 -- the word "action" to specific causes of
11 action.

12 But, again, I think, if you put the
13 common law, the classic canonical formulation of
14 res judicata side by side with this statute, the
15 key difference you see is the deletion of the
16 word "subsequent" and the replacement with the
17 word "any."

18 So I think it's not surprising that
19 Congress would refer to preclusion of an action,
20 because that's traditional common law res
21 judicata. What the difference was, was that
22 they eliminated the requirement that preclusion
23 would occur only in a subsequent action and made
24 it a complete bar to any action.

25 And that, of course, accords directly

1 with Congress's purpose because, from the
2 standpoint of preventing duplicative litigation
3 against the federal employees, it makes
4 absolutely no difference whether the duplicative
5 individual action is filed together in the same
6 lawsuit with the FTCA action or separately. And
7 I think it --

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
9 counsel.

10 Justice Thomas.

11 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Chief
12 Justice.

13 Mr. Huston, I'd like to pick up on
14 your last point.

15 Now the -- in this case, Respondent
16 filed the Bivens action together with the FTCA
17 action and -- though the argument seems to have
18 just disappeared and then reappeared here.

19 Petition -- Respondent now argues that
20 if -- if he loses on the -- on the FTCA claim,
21 that he -- that he has the alternative argument
22 that since -- since these were filed together,
23 the outcome should be different from a case in
24 which they were filed separately or
25 sequentially.

1 What would be your argument there?

2 First, can he even make that argument now? And,
3 two, if he can, what -- give -- would you
4 elaborate more on your response to that?

5 MR. HUSTON: Absolutely, Justice
6 Thomas.

7 To your -- to your first question, I
8 think it's clear that Respondent did not develop
9 this argument in anything like the way that he
10 did in his brief below. Now whether -- whether
11 he waived it or not, you know, we haven't taken
12 a position on that. He gestured at the idea
13 that this litigation wasn't duplicative because
14 he only filed one lawsuit. But, certainly, this
15 is largely an argument that's been developed in
16 his brief in this Court.

17 To your -- to your question about why
18 we -- I think the text makes clear that that's
19 not allowed, in addition to the point I was just
20 making to the Chief Justice about the way in
21 which Congress expressly departed from the
22 common law by changing the -- the formulation, I
23 think the -- the implications of Respondent's
24 position are striking. And the reason why every
25 single court of appeals has rejected

1 Respondent's argument in the 70 years since the
2 judgment bar was enacted is that his argument
3 would permit him actually to litigate under the
4 FTCA and prevail, to win a judgment against the
5 United States and then seek additional damages
6 against the government's employees, for example,
7 punitive damages, just because he brought the
8 actions together in the same lawsuit.

9 But we know from this Court's decision
10 in *Gilman* that that result is precisely what
11 Congress created the judgment bar to avoid, and
12 that's because the policy of the judgment bar is
13 one of repose. Congress found that lawsuits
14 against the government's employees are extremely
15 burdensome, and it wanted to limit them without
16 precluding them entirely by saying that, if a
17 plaintiff chooses to take advantage of the FTCA
18 cause of action, then the judgment in that
19 action will bring repose to the entire
20 controversy.

21 JUSTICE THOMAS: On the point of what
22 judgment, what sort of judgment in an action is
23 included, would an appeal -- a -- a judgment
24 that is still appealable also have the same
25 preclusive effect?

1 MR. HUSTON: Yes, Your Honor. I think
2 the definition of "judgment" in Section 26 is
3 the same as the definition of the word
4 "judgment" in the Federal Rules of Civil
5 Procedure. It is the order of a district court
6 that is appealable.

7 Now, of course, that means that if a
8 plaintiff succeeds in appealing an FTCA judgment
9 and gets it vacated by a court of appeals, at
10 that point, there no longer is a judgment in an
11 action under Section 1346(b) and, therefore, the
12 judgment bar would no longer apply.

13 But, while the judgment entered by the
14 district court is in force -- and, of course, in
15 this case, that judgment is final -- that
16 judgment by the plain text is a complete bar to
17 any individual action against the federal
18 employee.

19 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you.

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
21 Breyer.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: Thank you.

23 Can -- can you tell me if I have this
24 basically right? Courts of appeals get lots of
25 appeals from district courts. And I thought a

1 judgment is a piece of paper normally that the
2 district judge files at the end of a lawsuit,
3 and it says "Judgment," and it tells you how the
4 lawsuit turned out, who won, and perhaps on what
5 grounds.

6 And, here, the judgment in an action
7 under 1346(b) shall constitute a complete bar.
8 But, normally, if you have four different claims
9 in the lawsuit, the judgment doesn't come in
10 until the whole thing is over.

11 You might preliminarily decide or you
12 decide the judge says this -- he's going to lose
13 on this claim, he's going to lose on this claim,
14 maybe he'll win on this claim, and, at the very
15 end of the thing, we have a judgment. Isn't
16 that how it works?

17 MR. HUSTON: Yes, Your Honor, I think
18 that description of the word "judgment" is
19 right, but that is exactly the judgment that the
20 district court entered here. And you can see
21 that at Petition Appendix 86A. The district
22 court resolved all of the claims in the case.

23 Now the key to the judgment bar, of
24 course --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, it's the

1 judgment shall constitute a bar to an action of
2 the claimant by reason of the same subject
3 matter, et cetera, but the judgment didn't
4 appear until after he wanted to pursue his
5 Bivens claim.

6 MR. HUSTON: Your Honor, the --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: There was no judgment
8 to bar it because the judgment wasn't entered
9 yet.

10 MR. HUSTON: Respectfully, I disagree,
11 Your Honor. I think the judgment was entered by
12 the district court at the -- when it resolved
13 the dispositive motion, it resolved all of the
14 claims in the case and it entered a judgment.

15 That document, which is at Petition
16 Appendix 86A, that is the thing that triggered
17 the judgment bar. And Respondent left that
18 judgment final -- with respect, he left the
19 judgment in the action under Section 1346(b)
20 final by not appealing it.

21 So the core -- the core rule of the
22 judgment bar, when that judgment was entered, it
23 precludes any further litigation at that point.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: I -- I agree with
25 that. But I -- but I -- I mean, wasn't the

1 judge wrong to enter a judgment before he
2 decided the Bivens claim, or did he decide the
3 Bivens claim in the judgment?

4 MR. HUSTON: He decided the Bivens
5 claim, Your Honor. The district court resolved
6 --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. He
8 decided it. Okay. On what ground did he decide
9 it? He decided it because there was a bar.
10 But, at that moment, there wasn't a bar because,
11 when he decided it, it was before he entered the
12 judgment.

13 MR. HUSTON: No, no --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: And at that point,
15 there was no judgment.

16 MR. HUSTON: No, respectfully, Your
17 Honor, the --

18 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, all right.

19 MR. HUSTON: -- district court's
20 analysis had nothing whatsoever to do with the
21 judgment bar. The district court adjudicated
22 the substance of both the Bivens cause of action
23 and the FTCA cause of action. It never said
24 anything about the judgment bar.

25 The judgment bar was triggered only

1 after the district court entered judgment. And
2 you -- you can see this in the district court's
3 opinion.

4 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. All
5 right. I -- I -- I have enough to see that I
6 have to sit down and figure this out word by
7 word, which I'll do.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: Assuming the principal
10 argument now made by Respondent wasn't
11 forfeited, we have discretion whether to affirm
12 on that alternative ground. And what would you
13 say as to why we should not exercise that
14 discretion?

15 MR. HUSTON: Because, Your Honor, the
16 -- the -- this Court has held repeatedly in
17 interpreting the FTCA that the text means what
18 it says.

19 And, in particular, the word "any"
20 really does mean any. No exceptions. Those are
21 the core lessons of the Court's decisions in
22 Simmons, in Hui, in Millbrook, in Ali, and in
23 Smith. And so I think that all the Court has to
24 do is say that the language of this statute is
25 intentionally and exceptionally broad.

1 Congress imposed a complete bar to any
2 individual action, and that precludes Respondent
3 from bringing a demand for relief under Bivens
4 regardless of whether it's pleaded separately
5 from or together with the individual action.

6 So I think it's just --

7 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that's a -- that
8 is an argument on the merits of that issue,
9 isn't it? I'm -- I'm asking the preliminary
10 question, why should we even get to that here?

11 We granted cert to decide a particular
12 question which has to do with the effect of a
13 final judgment. Why should we not presume most
14 of the time we answer the question on which we
15 -- we granted review and not some other
16 question?

17 So that's my question. That -- that's
18 what I'm asking you. Why should we depart from
19 our normal practice of just deciding the
20 question presented and decide another
21 question --

22 MR. HUSTON: I don't think that --

23 JUSTICE ALITO: -- which has been
24 addressed by -- how many courts of appeals have
25 addressed this issue and what have they decided?

1 MR. HUSTON: Seven courts of appeals
2 have addressed this argument, Your Honor. Every
3 single one of them has rejected the argument
4 that Respondent now makes that he is entitled to
5 litigate under the FTCA, prevail, and then
6 continue suing the government's employees.

7 So I think Your Honor is exactly right
8 that the reason why you should not exercise
9 discretion to consider this argument is because
10 it simply doesn't warrant the Court's review.

11 The only court of appeals that has --
12 has even come close to accepting Respondent's
13 argument is the Ninth Circuit, and the only way
14 that it did that was by building in a rule that
15 the judgment bar depends on which side wins.

16 And that, of course --

17 JUSTICE ALITO: Let me try to -- let
18 me try to ask one question about the question on
19 which we did grant review.

20 In your -- in your view, what is the
21 dividing line between a claim that is not
22 cognizable under 1346(b)(1) and a claim that is
23 cognizable yet fails on the merits?

24 MR. HUSTON: Well, Your Honor, I think
25 the insight of this Court's decision in FDIC v.

1 Meyer is that "cognizable" means the same thing
2 as "actionable," and a claim is actionable so
3 long as the plaintiff alleges the elements, and
4 that -- of Section 1346(b).

5 And that makes sense because the
6 question -- as this Court describes in -- in
7 Meyer, the question whether the United States
8 has waived sovereign immunity for a particular
9 type of legal demand for relief is analytically
10 distinct from the question whether the plaintiff
11 can prevail on the merits or even whether he
12 stated a claim for relief under Federal Rule of
13 Civil Procedure 8.

14 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, is it -- is that
15 the -- is it the same test as it would be under
16 a federal question, in a federal question case?

17 MR. HUSTON: I think that that is a
18 perfectly fine analogy, Your Honor. Of course,
19 if a plaintiff pleaded in diversity that his
20 demand for relief was worth more than \$75,000,
21 and then it turns out later that he actually has
22 no claim at all at summary judgment, everyone
23 understands that that is a dismissal on the
24 merits of the claim that triggers res judicata,
25 even though we now know at that point that the

1 amount in controversy in the case is zero.

2 No one would think that the --

3 JUSTICE ALITO: Thank you.

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
5 counsel.

6 Justice Sotomayor.

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, I -- I am
8 a little confused, and perhaps your adversary
9 will un-confuse me, but I don't think every
10 circuit has held that same suit claims of an
11 FTCA and a Bivens claim means that you can't
12 appeal them.

13 I thought at least the Ninth Circuit
14 has said so. All of the other circuits, I agree
15 with you, have said that, if you lose a FTCA
16 claim, you can't file a separate claim. That's
17 not the issue. It's the same claim. But your
18 adversary can tell me what the circuit split is
19 on that question.

20 However, I am going to go back to what
21 Justice Alito raised. You brought the cert
22 petition. I believe that your adversary in its
23 -- I believe I know in its response, not at
24 length, but it did mention this as an
25 alternative ground not to grant cert, that he

1 could bring the two claims in the same action
2 and not be precluded. And I think the same
3 argument was raised below. Am I correct?

4 MR. HUSTON: Well, I certainly agree
5 with Your Honor that the Respondent raised the
6 argument as an alternative ground in the brief
7 in opposition. The argument -- again, in the
8 lower courts, in the court of appeals, the
9 argument -- the Respondent did not develop this
10 argument with anything like the argumentation
11 that now appears in this Court.

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You know
13 something, counsel, that may or may not be true,
14 but it's fully briefed here. It's an issue of
15 law, isn't it? And you can defend the judgment
16 on any legal ground, correct?

17 MR. HUSTON: Yes, Your Honor. And
18 that's why we have fully briefed the --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. Now,
20 counsel, let me go on to where the Chief
21 started. He said that the FTCA talks about a
22 judgment in an action. In Section 2672 of the
23 FTCA, it says explicitly: Acceptance of an
24 administrative settlement with the U.S. shall
25 constitute a complete release of any claim

1 against the United States and against the
2 employee of the government.

3 It seems to me that Congress knew how
4 to say that -- that there was a big difference
5 between a release of a claim rather than a bar
6 to an action. So why should we accept your
7 argument that they meant the same thing when
8 they used different language in two different
9 sections?

10 MR. HUSTON: Because, Your Honor, the
11 definition of the term "action" in 1946 when
12 Congress wrote the judgment bar is a demand for
13 relief in court. And I think that when -- if
14 you just substitute that for -- that into the
15 text, then the judgment in an action under
16 Section 13 --

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right,
18 counsel, I'm almost out of time, so let me just
19 ask you one last question. As a matter of
20 policy, why would Congress have wanted to go
21 around the common law rule?

22 It seems to me that then happenstance
23 controls. This district court could have ruled
24 the other way, could have said the Bivens claim
25 -- or, I'm sorry, the Bivens claims -- like in

1 Manning, the Bivens claim is good, but the FTCA
2 claim is not.

3 And you're still saying there's a bar,
4 correct?

5 MR. HUSTON: Arguably, Your Honor, I
6 mean, that would be consistent with one of
7 Congress's purpose for the judgment bar to wrap
8 everything up.

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But why does that
10 make --

11 MR. HUSTON: It is that --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- why does that
13 make sense when Congress explicitly, in the FTCA
14 and in the Westfall Act, saved the Bivens
15 claims?

16 MR. HUSTON: Because the purpose of
17 the judgment bar, Your Honor, is repose.
18 Congress wanted the judgment in the FTCA action
19 to bring repose to the entire controversy.

20 To your question specifically about
21 Bivens, I think this Court addressed that issue
22 directly in Hui, and just as it said there, the
23 text of the judgment bar is certainly broad
24 enough to preclude causes of action that are
25 both known and unknown when Congress enacted it.

1 I think the more --

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
3 counsel.

4 Justice Kagan.

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Count -- counsel, just
6 a point of clarification first as to the extent
7 of your argument. There are courts in the
8 Seventh and the Tenth Circuit that have said
9 that the judgment bar can undo even prior final
10 judgments on Bivens claims, so sort of
11 retroactively undo a Bivens judgment.

12 Do you think that that's right?

13 MR. HUSTON: I think it's possible,
14 Your Honor, because it would be consistent with
15 the goal of the judgment bar to wrap the entire
16 resolution of the claim into the judgment on the
17 FTCA action.

18 Now, on -- I would also understand the
19 contrary argument that when the judgment has
20 been entered in the individual action, there is
21 no more individual action for the judgment bar
22 to preclude. It's, of course, not something
23 that this Court has to decide in this case,
24 because this is the quintessential example of an
25 FTCA judgment on the merits and, therefore, it's

1 the judgment in an action under Section 1346(b).

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess I'm wondering
3 whether your understanding of this provision
4 makes it into something that the language
5 suggests it's not.

6 So, if I understand your position
7 correctly, you're really turning this into an
8 election-of-remedies provision; in other words,
9 that once somebody files an FTCA claim, then,
10 really, they -- they can't bring a Bivens claim
11 anymore. And the only way to bring a Bivens
12 claim is just to forego the FTCA claim.

13 And that might make sense, you know,
14 as a policy matter, to turn this statute into
15 such an election-of-remedies provision, but the
16 statute doesn't read like that. It -- I mean,
17 Congress knows how to write a provision like
18 that.

19 Instead, this statute reads like a
20 preclusion statute. And preclusion, as the
21 Chief Justice began the argument by saying,
22 always applies between suits and not within a
23 single suit.

24 MR. HUSTON: Well, Your Honor, I -- I
25 -- I -- I really think that Your Honor has it

1 exactly right, that the purpose of this statute
2 was to offer plaintiffs in Respondent's position
3 a choice. They could either stick with the
4 traditional individual cause of action, they
5 weren't foreclosed from that. But, if they
6 choose to take advantage of the FTCA cause of
7 action, which, of course, opens the opportunity
8 for the plaintiff to recover from the judgment
9 fund -- judgment's fund, then that choice comes
10 with consequences, and the critical consequence
11 --

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: All right. But I
13 think I was suggesting, just to -- just to make
14 myself clear, that's a perfectly sensible
15 statute. I guess my question is, is it the
16 statute that Congress wrote? That Congress
17 wrote a statute -- I mean, election-of-remedy
18 statutes are easy to write. And this is not
19 that. This is a preclusion statute, which has a
20 different set of consequences.

21 MR. HUSTON: Your -- yes, Your Honor,
22 but the -- the text of the judgment bar --
23 there's no -- is unambiguous. The triggering
24 event is the judgment in an action under
25 Section 1346(b), and then what comes next is a

1 extremely broad preclusion provision, a complete
2 bar to any action against the employee.

3 I think the only fair way to read that
4 provision is that Congress told plaintiffs that
5 if they pursue an action under Section 1346(b)
6 and it goes to judgment, then there can be no
7 further litigation against the federal
8 employees. And that's the --

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you.

10 MR. HUSTON: -- same objective --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
12 Gorsuch.

13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you. No
14 questions.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
16 Kavanaugh.

17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Good morning,
18 Mr. Huston. I just want to follow up on
19 something Justice Alito raised and then Justice
20 Sotomayor followed up on, which is this
21 alternative argument being before us.

22 I mean, we -- we could decide it, but,
23 as the Court's often said, we're a court of
24 review, not of first view. And there are
25 obviously important exceptions to that

1 principle, but I'm not sure this case really
2 cries out for us to depart from the general
3 principle.

4 So why don't we resolve the question
5 presented that's presented in the cert petition,
6 I think was Justice Alito's question, and that's
7 sufficient unto the day, and we can worry about
8 the other issue when and if we need to address
9 that?

10 MR. HUSTON: Justice Kavanaugh, I
11 think that is exactly what the Court should do.
12 And the reason why that would be appropriate in
13 this case is that the alternative argument
14 raised by the Respondent would not warrant this
15 Court's review.

16 As I mentioned, every court of appeals
17 has rejected Respondent's position. Now the
18 Ninth Circuit, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out,
19 has adopted a slightly different rule, no -- not
20 shared by any other circuit, that just -- but
21 that really is just a relic of before Simmons,
22 because the Ninth Circuit's rule is that whether
23 or not the judgment bar is triggered depends on
24 who wins in the FTCA action. And Simmons was
25 absolutely clear that that is not how the

1 judgment bar works, which, of course, accords
2 with the statutory text.

3 So I really don't -- I just -- I think
4 the Court should not address the question.
5 There's no need to, because it's not
6 cert-worthy. We addressed it in our brief
7 because it was raised and we wanted the Court to
8 have all the arguments, but I think that's a
9 perfectly sensible way to resolve the case.

10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: If we do resolve
11 that question, I'm going to reiterate questions
12 asked by others now, but the key problem for you
13 is it says "any action," not "any claims."

14 Do you just want to summarize your
15 best arguments in response to that?

16 MR. HUSTON: Thank you, Justice
17 Kavanaugh, yes. Again, the term "action" is
18 defined in legal dictionaries in 1946, at the
19 relevant time, as a demand for relief in court.

20 So I think, if you substitute that
21 phrase into the judgment bar, then the judgment
22 in this FTCA action is a complete bar to any
23 demand for relief by the plaintiff under Bivens.

24 And that is -- just the plain text of
25 that understanding means that there's -- there's

1 no room for an exception for -- that -- that
2 would -- that would make preclusion applicable
3 only in a subsequent action. And I just think
4 it's particularly clear that Congress didn't
5 want that subsequent action limitation because
6 that was in every description of the common law,
7 and Congress changed that formulation expressly.

8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
10 Barrett.

11 JUSTICE BARRETT: Counsel, I want to
12 ask you a question about the question on which
13 we granted cert. Did the government make a
14 mistake in moving -- moving for dismissal under
15 Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, as
16 opposed to for judgment on the pleadings or just
17 -- I -- I know -- I know they also moved for
18 summary judgment, but why even have the motion
19 to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in there?

20 And I'll tell you the reason why I'm
21 asking is it seems to me that 1346(c) gives
22 district courts the jurisdiction to resolve
23 civil actions against the government on the
24 bases that's listed in the statute. And it
25 seems to me that that means that the government

1 is submitting as sovereign to the district
2 court's resolution of those claims either way,
3 whether they win or not, so it's different than,
4 say, in Simmons, where the district court does
5 not have jurisdiction to resolve claims if they
6 involve misconduct in the exercise of a
7 discretionary function.

8 So why did the government even treat
9 this as a jurisdictional issue?

10 MR. HUSTON: Well, Your Honor, there
11 -- at -- at the time in the Sixth Circuit, there
12 was some precedent that suggested that the
13 resolution of an FTCA claim on the merits would
14 also trigger some jurisdictional implications.

15 Now we don't think that that's
16 correct. As we explain in our brief, I think
17 Meyer explains -- and -- and as -- as Your Honor
18 just explained exactly correctly, the text of
19 Section 1346(c) refers to jurisdiction over
20 civil actions on claims alleging the FTCA's
21 element.

22 So -- and -- and as Meyer further
23 explained, that's analytically distinct from the
24 question whether the plaintiff is entitled to
25 prevail.

1 But I think what -- what critically
2 matters for the case in this case is whether
3 there was the judgment in an action under
4 Section 1346(b). And Meyer is perfectly clear
5 that a claim is actionable under Section 1346(b)
6 so long as the plaintiff alleges the elements.
7 And Respondent certainly alleged all the
8 elements of the FTCA claim. You can see that in
9 the complaint at JA 39 and 40.

10 So there's no dispute about what the
11 substance of the judgment was here. And as I
12 think Justice Breyer helpfully explained for the
13 First Circuit in Rowe, what matters to
14 preclusion is not the label that gets -- the
15 jurisdictional label that gets attached to
16 something, it's the substance.

17 And Semtek and many of this Court's
18 other cases are quite clear that where a
19 district court, as here, adjudicated the
20 substance of the FTCA cause of action --

21 JUSTICE BARRETT: So, counsel --

22 MR. HUSTON: -- that is a merits
23 determination that's precluded.

24 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- before my time
25 expires, let me just clarify something. So you

1 agree that if, say, the plaintiff had not
2 alleged all the elements and so the claim was
3 dismissed without prejudice under 12(b)(6), that
4 wouldn't count as a judgment that would trigger
5 the bar?

6 MR. HUSTON: Absolutely, Your Honor.
7 A dismissal is not a judgment. Those things are
8 not synonymous, as Justice Breyer explained.
9 It's -- it is only the entry of judgment that
10 triggers the judgment bar.

11 And that's why the judgment bar was
12 triggered in this case. When the district court
13 entered the final judgment at the end of the
14 case, Respondent simply chose for his own
15 reasons not to appeal that judgment.

16 JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: A minute to
18 wrap up, Mr. Huston.

19 MR. HUSTON: Thank you, Mr. Chief
20 Justice.

21 We've talked already about why our
22 position is compelled by the statutory text and
23 this Court's precedent. I want to emphasize for
24 just a moment why it's fundamentally fair.

25 The decision below would permit a

1 plaintiff to bring a lawsuit against the United
2 States, litigate it all the way through summary
3 judgment, lose on the ground that the
4 government's employees did not do what was
5 alleged of them, and then turn around and pursue
6 claims against the same employees using the same
7 factual allegation.

8 That result makes little sense, and it
9 is directly at odds with Congress's objective
10 for the judgment bar, which was to prevent
11 duplicative litigation against the government's
12 employees after an FTCA judgment.

13 Congress's rule in the judgment bar
14 was straightforward. If a plaintiff chooses to
15 litigate an action under Section 1346(b), then
16 the judgment in that action will bring repose to
17 the entire controversy.

18 Respondent had a fair chance to obtain
19 damages for his alleged injury. He didn't
20 recover for the simple reason that he didn't
21 prove his case. And the judgment bar does not
22 allow him to start the case over again against
23 the officers.

24 Thank you.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr.

1 Huston.

2 Mr. Jaicomo.

3 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PATRICK M. JAICOMO

4 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

5 MR. JAICOMO: Mr. Chief Justice, and
6 may it please the Court.

7 Through the text of the FTCA, Congress
8 provides two independent and easily
9 administrable rules that control the application
10 of the judgment bar.

11 First, the judgment bar does not apply
12 to claims brought together in a single action.
13 As Will and Simmons explained, the text of
14 Section 2676 imports common law res judicata.
15 In the history of American law, res judicata has
16 never been applied to claims brought together in
17 a single action.

18 Section 2676's requirement of the
19 judgment in an action, not a judgment on a
20 claim, demonstrates that Congress did not intend
21 a judgment bar to depart from that common law
22 history.

23 Second, the judgment bar does not
24 apply to claims dismissed for lack of
25 jurisdiction. Because Section 1346 restricts

1 FTCA jurisdiction to actions on claims that
2 satisfy six elements, the dismissal of an FTCA
3 claim under Rule 12(b)(6) does not trigger the
4 judgment bar.

5 As Meyer explained, a claim does not
6 come within the FTCA's jurisdiction unless a
7 plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state
8 a cause of action under the statute. Thus, a
9 court's holding that a plaintiff has failed to
10 state a claim under the FTCA is not the judgment
11 in an action under Section 1346; it is a holding
12 that the court lacks jurisdiction to enter such
13 a judgment.

14 Both the same claims rule and the
15 jurisdictional rule honor the language Congress
16 enacted in the FTCA. Both present simple,
17 predictable standards that courts and parties
18 can follow, and neither results in duplicative
19 litigation. Under either rule, the judgment bar
20 does not apply to this case.

21 This Court should affirm the decision
22 below and allow King to pursue his meritorious
23 constitutional claims in this action, which is
24 the one and only lawsuit King has ever filed.

25 I welcome this Court's questions.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Jaicomo,
2 your theory really would combine the merits and
3 jurisdiction not just in a case like this but in
4 every case.

5 I mean, if you think you have a claim
6 under a federal question statute, if it turns
7 out you don't, then you would say, okay, well,
8 then there wasn't jurisdiction because I didn't
9 satisfy the elements of the statute that gave
10 rise to a federal -- a federal question.

11 We've -- we've, I think, long held
12 that in a case like -- like this one, where, if
13 you make a determination under the merits, there
14 isn't the established jurisdiction against the
15 United States, that they're treated the same.
16 You can't -- in other words, whenever you lose,
17 you don't lose because the court had -- under
18 your theory, would have had no jurisdiction.

19 That doesn't seem to make much sense.

20 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice,
21 that's -- that's not the extent of our position.
22 We actually offer three different ways the Court
23 can view jurisdiction. And -- and I'll first
24 state that the reason that it's so complicated
25 is that through Section 1346, as the government

1 agrees, Congress simultaneously waived its
2 sovereign immunity, sets jurisdiction, and
3 provides the elements for a cause of action.

4 So the -- the most narrow way this
5 Court could look at that is to look at a case
6 like this and simply say the district court
7 itself entered a judgment under 12(b)(1).
8 Therefore, it concluded pursuant to Rule
9 12(h)(3) that it lacked jurisdiction of the
10 subject matter.

11 The -- the -- the middle ground
12 position is the position from Meyer, which is
13 that to trigger the jurisdiction of
14 Section 1346, a claim has to allege a valid
15 cause of action, which is also consistent with
16 this Court's dealing with the sovereign immunity
17 statute in Helmerich and Payne.

18 Only in the very broadest
19 understanding, which is brought in through the
20 Arbaugh decision, do any of the concerns that
21 you have raised come to light.

22 And so this Court could easily dispose
23 of this jurisdictional question without reaching
24 that furthest ruling, but I'm happy to discuss
25 it further if -- if Your Honor would like to do

1 so.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I guess
3 I don't really understand. I think, under your
4 view, a -- a -- a favorable decision for the
5 government would never satisfy the elements of
6 the judgment bar because of the lack of
7 jurisdiction.

8 What -- what am I missing in that?

9 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. No,
10 that's only if this Court adopts the Arbaugh
11 standard. We offer two other more restrictive
12 understandings. So only under Arbaugh would
13 that be the case.

14 If this Court decides that
15 jurisdiction attaches after a claim passes
16 beyond Rule 12(b)(6) or if this Court decides
17 that jurisdiction has to be decided at Rule
18 12(b)(1), either way, a -- a -- a decision
19 favorable or not for the government would
20 trigger the judgment bar.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
22 counsel.

23 Justice Thomas.

24 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Chief
25 Justice.

1 Counsel, why should we even consider
2 your argument that the judgment bar doesn't
3 apply when the claims are brought together?

4 MR. JAICOMO: For several reasons,
5 Your Honor.

6 The first is that that's what the
7 language of the statute requires.

8 But the second is that that question
9 is embedded in the question presented that the
10 government brought to this Court. And I'll
11 quote the relevant language. It says, "the
12 question presented is whether a final judgment
13 in an action bars a claim." And that
14 necessarily requires this Court to consider how
15 that claim is presented.

16 And -- and, finally, this is not an
17 issue that has just come up now. The first
18 argument we made in the Sixth Circuit was that
19 the reason the judgment bar shouldn't be applied
20 to this case is because there's no chance of
21 duplicative litigation when claims are brought
22 together in the same action.

23 And as the government has conceded,
24 this is also a point that we made in our brief
25 in opposition to cert when that was filed.

1 JUSTICE THOMAS: Well, I have one
2 unrelated question, brief question.

3 Should it matter in deciding this case
4 that Bivens was -- didn't exist at the time the
5 judgment bar was enacted?

6 MR. JAICOMO: No, Your Honor, I don't
7 think that -- that that has an impact on the
8 outcome of this case simply because, as we
9 explain in our briefing, since the judgment bar
10 incorporates res judicata, the controlling issue
11 is that claim -- or that King brought all of his
12 claims in a single action.

13 So the subject matter for the action
14 is not at issue here since the Bivens claim and
15 the FTCA claim are brought in the same lawsuit.

16 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
18 Breyer.

19 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, if we did reach
20 this other question, what is your -- what will
21 you say to what your opposing colleague said?
22 Look, he said, if you read 1346(b)(1), if you
23 read -- it says the judgment in any action shall
24 constitute a complete bar.

25 Now, to any government claimant --

1 against the employee of the government, now
2 that's the point of this statute. Go sue the
3 United States; don't sue the employee.

4 But, if you're right, what you could
5 do as a plaintiff is you sue under the statute
6 against the government, you win, and then you go
7 sue against the employee, the very thing that
8 the statute was passed to stop.

9 MR. JAICOMO: No, Your Honor. Our --
10 our position, even under the broadest
11 understanding of jurisdiction, is that if you
12 bring separate actions and one of them is
13 against the United States and that concludes --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: No, you bring the
15 same action. What you do is you have a couple
16 of defendants.

17 MR. JAICOMO: Well, in -- in that
18 case, Your Honor, this would simply be a matter
19 of applying res judicata through the judgment
20 bar, which presents exactly that same scenario
21 where you could sue, for example, an employer
22 and an employee in the same lawsuit. And the
23 disposition of one claim or another wouldn't
24 necessarily foreclose your claim against the
25 other one.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, that's my
2 problem, the disposition of one against the
3 other. So you win against the employer, the
4 government, and then you go sue the employee.

5 Well, I think, if there was one thing
6 this statute was passed to stop, it was that.
7 It was that the United States should take the
8 liability and the employee wouldn't.

9 MR. JAICOMO: Well, Your Honor, that
10 --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Am I wrong about
12 that?

13 MR. JAICOMO: No. But the
14 hypothetical you propose is that the claims are
15 brought together in the same action, so there is
16 no separate going and suing the employee.
17 There's only one lawsuit.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: Look, take my point.
19 I'm not interested in exactly how you do it.

20 MR. JAICOMO: Sure.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: But if you can get --
22 Claim 1, we sue the government, give us some
23 money. Claim 2, employee, you're involved in
24 this lawsuit too, give us some money. Okay?

25 Now that's what I'm worried that your

1 argument here would lead to. And from what you
2 said so far, you say that's just what it would
3 lead to, and that's a good thing.

4 MR. JAICOMO: No, Your Honor. There's
5 no chance, for example, you could get a
6 duplicative recovery where you would --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: No, not duplicative.
8 He said extra damages, for example.

9 MR. JAICOMO: Oh, okay. Yes, so this
10 comes down to the fact that, as the Westfall Act
11 and this Court's decisions in Carlson and Wilkie
12 versus Robbins and Correction Incorporation
13 versus Malesko indicate, that Bivens and the
14 FTCA provide parallel, complementary remedies.

15 So it was exactly what Congress
16 intended for the rest of the courts --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Then your
18 answer is he's right, you could do this, and
19 you're saying Congress did not want to stop all
20 the recoveries against the employee, right?

21 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, absolutely.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.

23 MR. JAICOMO: Absolutely.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: That's your answer.

25 Thank you very much.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito.

2 JUSTICE ALITO: If a district court
3 rejects a claim under the FTCA for failure to
4 proof -- failure of proof, does the judgment bar
5 apply to that, or is that a jurisdictional
6 determination?

7 MR. JAICOMO: It wouldn't apply in any
8 case if the claims are brought together in the
9 same action, but, if they were brought
10 separately --

11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that wasn't my
12 question. How about if you answer the question
13 I actually asked?

14 MR. JAICOMO: If -- if they were
15 brought separately, Your Honor, the case would
16 have to pursue beyond trial, the same -- which
17 is the line that's drawn by Rule 12(h)(2).

18 JUSTICE ALITO: The case would have to
19 proceed beyond trial. What does that mean?

20 MR. JAICOMO: It -- it's the standard
21 where a party can no longer raise a 12(b)(6)
22 defense. Rule 12(h)(2) says you can raise that
23 defense up to and at trial but not beyond it.

24 JUSTICE ALITO: Why is 12(b)(6) the
25 dividing line?

1 MR. JAICOMO: Because the language of
2 Section 1346 confers jurisdiction only when
3 there are claims that satisfy the elements of
4 the FTCA.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: Why are the elements
6 of the FTCA satisfied up to the -- not satisfied
7 up to 12(b)(6) but are satisfied after that
8 point?

9 MR. JAICOMO: Because, as this Court
10 explained in the Meyer decision, Your Honor, the
11 -- the trigger for jurisdiction is whether a
12 plaintiff has pleaded allegations that set forth
13 a cause of action. And so the failure of proof
14 portion of it, as is noted in the footnote of
15 Meyer, doesn't come into play until there's
16 actually fact-finding being done by the court.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: Why was the decision
18 here in essence a 12(b)(6) decision?

19 MR. JAICOMO: Well, for several
20 reasons.

21 First, Your Honor, is that the
22 government itself moved under 12(b)(1) and
23 12(b)(6). And the reason is that the court more
24 specifically held it was dismissing the case
25 under Rule 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, for

1 failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

2 JUSTICE ALITO: What is the breakout
3 of the circuits on the question that you would
4 like us to decide?

5 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. So
6 there -- there is -- only the Ninth Circuit
7 has -- has adopted this same claims argument,
8 but that argument's also consistent with this
9 Court's decisions in Will and Simmons.

10 And, as we point out in the brief,
11 none of the other courts of appeals, which all
12 have somewhat different analyses of how they get
13 there, actually address the common law aspects
14 of Section 2676. And most of them simply rely
15 on the Manning decision from the Seventh
16 Circuit.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: In light of those --
18 what is it -- six circuits that have decided the
19 issue the other way, do you still think the
20 question is so clear that we should decide it
21 even though it was not the question that we were
22 asked to decide in this case?

23 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor, it is
24 that clear. I think the language of
25 Section 2676 and the common law concepts that it

1 incorporates make it very clear. And so the
2 government has essentially come up with its
3 using of the judgment bar in this way in the
4 last couple decades. It's not as if this has
5 been the case since 1946.

6 And so I think this Court's
7 involvement would be very helpful on this issue.

8 JUSTICE ALITO: Thank you.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
10 Sotomayor.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, I want to
12 separate out the two arguments, the
13 jurisdictional argument, which was the
14 government's -- which was the Sixth Circuit's
15 conclusion and the basis of the -- most of the
16 government's argument.

17 Your alternative argument, I call, the
18 same case argument. Can you -- Justice
19 Kavanaugh asked this question earlier, and I
20 posed the same one.

21 Given that it is one circuit against
22 others, has there been sufficient percolation
23 before the court below, the Sixth Circuit, for
24 us to jump in and decide this question now?

25 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As a matter of
2 policy, why should we do that? Meaning it's up
3 to us to decide whether to take a -- to address
4 a ground not decided upon by the court below.

5 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. So,
6 although the Sixth Circuit decision below didn't
7 address this issue, the Sixth Circuit has
8 addressed this issue, and I'll -- I'll concede
9 that it came out on the other side of it.

10 But the reason that this Court should
11 address this issue from a policy standpoint is
12 exactly the reason that this Court explained the
13 judgment bar shouldn't operate in the Simmons
14 decision, which is, if this Court doesn't draw
15 the line on claims in the same action, the
16 result of a favor -- a decision in favor of the
17 government will be an enormous increase in
18 litigation. And because the government has
19 adopted this peculiar election of remedies
20 that's not really an election of remedies, that
21 litigation will be infinitely more complex and
22 plaintiffs will be obligated to make it complex
23 to ensure that the FTCA portion or separate
24 action never gets --

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, I -- I do

1 have some practical difficulties with the
2 government's position on the same action,
3 meaning that what the government is encouraging
4 plaintiffs to do is to file their Bivens claims
5 first, win or lose, then file their FTCA claims,
6 and -- and hope that they've won and that we
7 don't put a bar in like the one that Justice
8 Kagan referred to earlier.

9 That seems somewhat time-confuse --
10 consuming. It also makes a difference whether a
11 district court decides whether it's going to
12 decide the Bivens claims first and just say, I
13 don't need to decide the FTCA claims, or try
14 both claims together, win both, give judgment on
15 both, and then go on appeal.

16 There seems variations that are very
17 inefficient. Am I right about that?

18 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. In
19 fact, every variation is very inefficient
20 because, as Your Honor's question indicates,
21 there's no way from an ex-post position for a
22 plaintiff to know what it should do to ensure
23 that it can litigate these claims in parallel,
24 even though Congress and this Court have both
25 said they can be litigated in parallel.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And that's the
2 answer to Justice Breyer, isn't it, that
3 Congress in both -- in both -- in both the FTCA
4 and in Westfall have agreed that Bivens claims
5 can and should be brought, correct?

6 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor, that's
7 exactly correct.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Unless there's
9 been a bar of a judgment previously?

10 MR. JAICOMO: That's correct.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan.

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, Mr. Jaicomo, just
13 to continue in this same vein, I mean, what the
14 government is saying about this provision, you
15 know, makes sense in a way. I mean, the
16 government is saying this reflects a broad
17 remedial compromise. Plaintiffs can sue the
18 United States, but, in exchange for that, they
19 give up certain remedies against federal
20 employees, and that that's the way we should
21 read the provision.

22 And you can well imagine how Congress
23 might have thought that that would be a good
24 thing to do. So why shouldn't we read the
25 provision that way?

1 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. I
2 don't dispute that you could make a policy
3 argument for why the -- that Congress should
4 create an exclusive -- or an election of
5 remedies, but the reason this Court shouldn't
6 read it that way is because Congress has not
7 done so and has explicitly carved out the
8 ability of plaintiffs to bring, under the
9 Westfall Act, an FTCA claim and a Bivens claim.

10 And even before then, since 1952 in
11 the Brooks case this Court decided, it has said
12 there is not an election of remedies in the FTCA
13 and has continued to say that every time it's
14 had the opportunity over the last 70 years.

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: And if you were just
16 to look at the -- at the language of the
17 provision, what would you say about the language
18 of the provision with respect to this question?

19 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. So
20 this gets us back to the distinction between "an
21 action" and "any action." And it would -- it's
22 simply a situation where someone had the coupon
23 to go to a grocery store that says if you buy a
24 case of pop or soda, as -- as people might call
25 it, you get any case free. Of course, a

1 reasonable person would not understand that
2 coupon to mean the first case was free. You
3 have to buy the first case.

4 The government is, in this case -- in
5 this situation, asking the Court to say that
6 coupon applies to the first case of soda or, in
7 this instance, the first and only action that's
8 ever been brought.

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: If I understood
10 Mr. Huston's argument, it was that, you know,
11 you might think that we're taking the word
12 "action" and making it mean "claim" and, in
13 fact, you might think that the two words are
14 different, but, in fact, they're not, because
15 Mr. Huston said an action is just a demand for
16 relief in court, you know, when this statute was
17 written.

18 So why isn't that true?

19 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor.
20 Because the definition that my friend relies on
21 is -- is definitely well outside the mainstream.
22 In the CalPERS decision, which is actually cited
23 in Public Citizen's textual analysis, amicus
24 brief, they -- this Court clearly delineated
25 between actions and claims, and it did so by

1 citing 1933's Black's Law Dictionary, which says
2 that the concept of an action is, if not
3 entirely, almost entirely synonymous with a
4 suit.

5 And so there's no way to split that
6 hair, especially in light of the fact that, as I
7 believe you pointed out earlier, Your Honor,
8 Section 2672, which is the release bar, refers
9 to complete release of any claim.

10 So Congress knew how to distinguish
11 between these concepts. It chose not to in the
12 judgment bar because it was adopting res
13 judicata.

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you,
15 Mr. Jaicomo.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
17 Gorsuch.

18 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Good morning,
19 counsel. I -- I'd like to just return to the --
20 I guess your alternative argument in the same
21 action simultaneously pending position. What do
22 we do about the fact that your client chose not
23 to pursue his FTCA claim on appeal? And so the
24 judgment there would seem to be in an action and
25 it's final. There doesn't appear to be any

1 simultaneously pending action under the FTCA at
2 this point.

3 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. So the
4 distinction is still the concept of actions
5 versus claims. So even with an action that has
6 multiple claims, the -- the failure of one claim
7 or the waiver of that claim doesn't doom the
8 other claims, as we cite on page 26 of our brief
9 the statement from Wright Miller, which says
10 claim preclusion is not appropriate within a
11 single lawsuit so long as it continues to be
12 managed as a single action.

13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So -- so we go back
14 to the question whether "any" means any, any
15 judgment in an action, which seems to
16 contemplate the possibility of multiple
17 judgments.

18 MR. JAICOMO: No, Your Honor.
19 Actually, the language of Section 2676 says
20 "the" judgment in an action, which is -- the
21 definite article requires that there can only be
22 a single judgment in an action.

23 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah.

24 MR. JAICOMO: And that judgment
25 necessarily must deal with all the claims in the

1 action. So you can't have the judgment in an
2 action and there still be any action left to
3 apply the preclusive bar to.

4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: What -- what about
5 the "any action by the claimant" language?

6 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. This
7 just goes back to the -- the linguistic
8 distinction between "an action" and "any
9 action." And I'll -- I'll also point out that a
10 number of courts before the enactment of the
11 judgment bar had used the phrase "complete bar
12 to any action" to mean res judicata.

13 But, even if that weren't the case, at
14 the time the judgment bar was enacted, Congress
15 understood that, for jurisdictional reasons, a
16 party could not sue the United States as a
17 codefendant with its employees. So the need for
18 something like separate or subsequent --

19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- I guess what
20 I'm trying to get at is we have "the" judgment
21 in an action under the FTCA, and that would seem
22 to bar any other action like Bivens later.

23 MR. JAICOMO: Right.

24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And your way around
25 that is to say that they're simultaneously

1 pending, but "the" judgment under the FTCA seems
2 to be final in this case.

3 MR. JAICOMO: No, Your Honor, the --

4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It ought to be.

5 MR. JAICOMO: The judgment in an
6 action is not final because that action is this
7 case directly on appeal. So --

8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: But you -- you have
9 to -- well, okay. All right. Thank you,
10 counsel.

11 MR. JAICOMO: Thank you.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
13 Kavanaugh.

14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

15 Good afternoon, Mr. Jaicomo. I want
16 to raise the point that's bothering me about
17 what we should decide, and I don't blame you for
18 raising the alternative argument. I understand
19 that. You're trying to win the case. But
20 trying to think about why we should consider it.

21 We obviously discuss very carefully
22 our decisions to grant certiorari on particular
23 cases and particular issues within that case,
24 and we don't usually decide things that weren't
25 decided by the court below.

1 And there are exceptions to that, and
2 no doubt about that, and you -- but I don't
3 think this is embedded within in the way you
4 said. And sometimes we'll do it if it's really
5 -- really simple and it will be helpful just to
6 go ahead and resolve it. But I'm not sure this
7 qualifies as really simple either because, if we
8 get to the merits -- at least not very simple in
9 your direction because, if we get to the merits
10 of that alternative argument, every court of
11 appeals, save one, has ruled against you, and
12 the text says "any action," not any subsequent
13 action.

14 You have forceful arguments in
15 response to that, but I guess I'm just back at
16 why should we consider that issue at this time
17 in this case, given the way it was developed in
18 the Sixth Circuit?

19 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. So,
20 like -- as I mentioned earlier, there's no
21 question that the Sixth Circuit didn't predicate
22 its decision on this point. But it was raised
23 in the Sixth Circuit. And in the Simmons case,
24 this Court actually decided the FTCA decision on
25 a separate ground than the one that the Sixth

1 Circuit had used below.

2 And so, here, I think the -- the
3 existence of the other circuit court
4 decisions -- which, as I mentioned, although
5 they somehow agree on this same claims point,
6 they do so in very different ways -- illustrates
7 that there's an enormous amount of confusion
8 that this Court could very simply clear up and
9 do so consistent with its decision in Simmons
10 and Will, which is focused on stating that the
11 purpose of the judgment bar is to prevent
12 duplicative litigation, as this Court said in
13 Will, multiple suits on identical matters.

14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, can I just
15 stop you there? You said the other courts of
16 appeals have ruled against your position on this
17 issue in many different ways, and I don't see
18 how that makes it easier to clear that up. That
19 just means there are lots of routes that courts
20 of appeals have thought that lead to the
21 opposite result from what you're suggesting
22 here. That would seem to make it harder, not
23 easier, for us to just, in your words -- well, I
24 don't know if you used this phrase, but to clean
25 it up or clear it up, as you said.

1 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. I -- I
2 do think the -- the one thing that animates all
3 of those decisions is why this Court should
4 weigh in, which is that all of those decisions
5 repudiate or simply ignore the fact that
6 Section 2676 incorporates res judicata, which
7 has as its central premise the concept that you
8 can't be barring claims brought together in one
9 lawsuit.

10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, that just
11 goes back to the "any action" versus "any
12 subsequent action" argument of the government,
13 which I -- I understand your point on that.

14 My time's up. Thank you very much.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
16 Barrett.

17 JUSTICE BARRETT: Counsel, I want to
18 make sure that I understand your position on the
19 nature of this judgment and whether it's on the
20 merits or can be a bar.

21 Is it your position -- I thought I
22 heard you say this earlier; maybe it was in
23 response to the Chief Justice -- that a judgment
24 is only -- functions as a bar if it's entered
25 after trial?

1 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor, that's
2 one of the lines that we draw. There are three.
3 Simply put, in this case, because the government
4 requested and received a 12(b)(1) dismissal, the
5 Court doesn't even need to reach that second --

6 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. But -- but
7 what about if it's a summary judgment? Didn't
8 the government also in this case request summary
9 judgment in the alternative? I thought they had
10 said 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), or summary judgment.

11 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor, they
12 did request it in the alternative, but the
13 district court didn't grant that. And all
14 through the Sixth Circuit, the government
15 continuously said it only moved under Rule 12,
16 and only then at the merits stage did they
17 announce that it was actually a Rule 56 summary
18 judgment decision.

19 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. So what if
20 they had won summary judgment? In your view
21 then, is that a judgement that, even if the
22 United States wins, can then be a bar?

23 MR. JAICOMO: I -- I think it depends,
24 Your Honor. I think, because a court is
25 required to assess its own jurisdiction, that a

1 court necessarily has to decide. Certainly, in
2 a -- in a situation where a party has raised
3 these alternative avenues for relief, that --

4 JUSTICE BARRETT: No, no, no, just
5 answer as to the question. So it's summary
6 judgment and the United States -- I just don't
7 understand how that's not done on the merits.

8 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor. It --
9 it simply depends on whether there has been
10 actual fact-finding or not. And the reason that
11 the on-the-merits portion is a little obscure is
12 because, as I mentioned, and the government
13 agrees, the language of Section 1346(b)
14 intertwines merits, jurisdiction, and sovereign
15 immunity.

16 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Let me ask
17 you a question about the second alternative
18 argument that you've made. Let's say that
19 you're -- you bring a Bivens claim first and you
20 lose, and then you bring an FTCA claim against
21 the United States.

22 Can the United States then just under
23 regular common law preclusion assert defensive
24 issue preclusion against you?

25 MR. JAICOMO: No, Your Honor, I don't

1 think that it can because, as the professors'
2 amicus brief points out, there's a different
3 primary right at stake. And so, if -- if simple
4 preclusion was being applied, a Bivens claim
5 before an FTCA claim would not have a preclusive
6 bar.

7 JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, but issue
8 preclusion just requires identity of issues,
9 right?

10 MR. JAICOMO: Yes. Of course, we're
11 talking about claim preclusion, but, if we were
12 talking about issue --

13 JUSTICE BARRETT: I know, but I asked
14 about issue.

15 MR. JAICOMO: If we were talking about
16 issue preclusion, Your Honor, yes, there would
17 be certain issues that could be carried over
18 from the Bivens claim to the FTCA claim. But,
19 if you look at a case like this, the FTCA claim
20 was decided on grounds of government immunity
21 that wouldn't apply to a Bivens claim.

22 So it depends on how the Bivens claim
23 is decided, if you're -- if you're looking at
24 issue preclusion.

25 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Thank you.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Jaicomo,
2 you can take a couple of minutes to wrap up.

3 MR. JAICOMO: Yes, Your Honor.

4 Embedded in Congress's enactment of
5 the FTCA and its judgment bar, it is a very
6 simple common law doctrine that has been with
7 litigants since the beginning of this country,
8 which is the concept of res judicata.

9 The primary basis for res judicata is
10 that it only applies to separate lawsuits. This
11 Court has said so on many occasions. And that
12 it only applies once a judgment has been entered
13 on the merits by a court with jurisdiction.

14 So, as I mentioned, we raised this
15 issue of duplicative litigation in the Sixth
16 Circuit. The government has addressed it in its
17 brief. It's fully briefed. There's no reason
18 that this Court shouldn't honor the language
19 that Congress enacted by addressing this claim
20 at issue.

21 And even if -- even in the
22 alternative, the independent ground here also
23 justifies this Court affirming the Sixth Circuit
24 because the government moved for and received a
25 dismissal on the basis of jurisdiction.

1 It should not now be allowed to come
2 to this Court and say: Jurisdiction and merits
3 are the same and -- and merits should,
4 therefore, prevail because, as Wright and Miller
5 in the First Restatement and many other places
6 have said, anytime jurisdiction's entwined with
7 merits, jurisdiction controls, not merits.

8 And if it were the other way around,
9 the Court would be able to reach beyond its
10 actual authority granted by Congress.

11 So, for these reasons, this Court
12 should affirm the Sixth Circuit and allow James
13 King to continue taking his first and only bite
14 at the apple in this lawsuit.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
16 counsel.

17 Mr. Huston, three minutes for
18 rebuttal.

19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON

20 ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT

21 MR. HUSTON: Thank you, Mr. Chief
22 Justice.

23 Regarding the question presented, the
24 judgment bar is triggered by the judgment in an
25 action under Section 1346(b). Respondent

1 created just such an action by pleading a demand
2 for relief alleging the elements of Section
3 1346(b), and the district court indisputably
4 entered judgment.

5 The Sixth Circuit explained at
6 Petition Appendix 1A, Note 1, why the district
7 court's judgment is best understood as a summary
8 judgment in favor of the government, because
9 both parties submitted a body of extensive
10 evidentiary exhibits in support of the motion.

11 But even if the Court concluded that
12 the judgment was best understood as a dismissal
13 for failure to state a claim, it makes no
14 difference because it's still the judgment in an
15 action under Section 1346(b), as Meyer
16 explained, and this Court's canonical decision
17 in *Bell v. Hood* makes clear that a dismissal for
18 failure to state a claim for relief is a
19 decision on the merits and, therefore,
20 preclusive.

21 The surest way to know Respondent's
22 main argument on the question presented is
23 incorrect is that it forces my friend into the
24 extraordinary conclusion that the judgment bar
25 is not triggered by a judgment in favor of the

1 United States on the FTCA action. Simmons
2 squarely foreclosed that, and the plain text
3 refutes it.

4 Now, regarding my friend's fallback
5 argument, I think, as the Court has recognized
6 this morning, it certainly has discretion not to
7 consider that argument in this case, and that's
8 the most appropriate disposition because the
9 alternative question simply isn't cert-worthy.

10 There's no significant disagreement
11 about the circuits on it. The only circuit that
12 has even come close to saying something like
13 that argument is the Ninth, and that's -- the
14 basis of its -- of its reasoning was abrogated
15 by Simmons.

16 The Court should not leave in place
17 the Sixth Circuit's rather obvious mistaken
18 interpretation of the judgment bar and, instead,
19 decide the case in favor of Respondent on an
20 alternative ground that no other court has
21 accepted.

22 And -- and even if -- if the Court
23 were inclined to reach the alternative question,
24 we think the text is unambiguous in our favor.
25 Congress would have looked at a lawsuit like

1 this one and said Respondent has an action under
2 Section 1346(b) and an action under Bivens, and
3 he has joined them together in a single lawsuit,
4 but there's simply no way to read the phrase
5 "complete bar to any action" to actually mean
6 that Respondent is precluded only from bringing
7 a subsequent action when that is exactly the
8 common law rule that Congress expressly changed.

9 In the 70 years since the judgment bar
10 was enacted, the courts of appeals have
11 overwhelmingly rejected this argument, and
12 that's because, as Justice Breyer recognized, it
13 directly conflicts with Congress's purpose.

14 Congress's -- the rule that Respondent
15 advocates would permit a plaintiff to sue the
16 United States and win and then continue pursuing
17 individual government employees for additional
18 relief just because he brought his two actions
19 together in the same lawsuit. That is exactly
20 the result that Congress created the judgment
21 bar to prevent, as this Court explained in
22 Gilman.

23 For all those reasons, the judgment
24 should be reversed.

25 Thank you.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
2 counsel. The case is submitted.
3 (Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the case
4 was submitted.)

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Official - Subject to Final Review

\$	abrogated ^[1] 66:14	alleged ^[5] 31:7 32:2 33:5,19 35:7	around ^[4] 21:21 33:5 55:24 64:8
\$75,000 ^[1] 18:20	absolutely ^[6] 8:4 9:5 27:25 32:6 43:21,23	alleges ^[2] 18:3 31:6	article ^[1] 54:21
1	accept ^[1] 21:6	alleging ^[2] 30:20 65:2	aspects ^[1] 46:13
1 ^[2] 42:22 65:6	Acceptance ^[1] 20:23	allow ^[3] 33:22 35:22 64:12	assert ^[1] 61:23
11:13 ^[2] 1:15 3:2	accepted ^[1] 66:21	allowed ^[2] 9:19 64:1	asserts ^[1] 3:18
12 ^[1] 60:15	accepting ^[1] 17:12	almost ^[2] 21:18 53:3	assess ^[1] 60:25
12(b)(1) ^[7] 29:15 37:7 38:18 45:22, 25 60:4,10	accords ^[2] 7:25 28:1	already ^[1] 32:21	Assistant ^[1] 1:18
12(b)(6) ^[10] 32:3 35:3 38:16 44:21, 24 45:7,18,23 46:1 60:10	Act ^[3] 22:14 43:10 51:9	alternative ^[19] 4:20 8:21 15:12 19:25 20:6 26:21 27:13 47:17 53: 20 56:18 57:10 60:9,12 61:3,17 63:22 66:9,20,23	Assuming ^[1] 15:9
12(h)(2) ^[2] 44:17,22	action ^[122] 3:13,15,18,23 4:15,22, 22 5:2,4,10,21 6:5,13,14,21 7:4,6, 8,10,11,19,23,24 8:5,6,16,17 10: 18,19,22 11:11,17 12:6 13:1,19 14:22,23 16:2,5 20:1,22 21:6,11, 15 22:18,24 23:17,20,21 24:1 25: 4,7,24 26:2,5 27:24 28:13,17,22 29:3,5 31:3,20 33:15,16 34:12,17, 19 35:8,11,23 37:3,15 39:13,22 40:12,13,23 41:15 42:15 44:9 45: 13 48:15,24 49:2 51:21,21 52:7, 12,15 53:2,21,24 54:1,5,12,15,20, 22 55:1,2,2,5,8,9,12,21,22 56:6,6 57:12,13 59:11,12 64:25 65:1,15 66:1 67:1,2,5,7	alternatively ^[1] 45:25	attached ^[1] 31:15
12(h)(3) ^[1] 37:9	actionable ^[3] 18:2,2 31:5	although ^[2] 48:6 58:4	attaches ^[1] 38:15
12:16 ^[1] 68:3	actions ^[9] 5:19 10:8 29:23 30:20 35:1 41:12 52:25 54:4 67:18	American ^[1] 34:15	authority ^[1] 64:10
13 ^[1] 21:16	actual ^[2] 61:10 64:10	amicus ^[2] 52:23 62:2	avenues ^[1] 61:3
1346 ^[5] 34:25 35:11 36:25 37:14 45:2	actually ^[11] 10:3 18:21 36:22 44: 13 45:16 46:13 52:22 54:19 57:24 60:17 67:5	amount ^[2] 19:1 58:7	avoid ^[1] 10:11
1346(b) ^[17] 3:13 7:9 11:11 12:7 13: 19 18:4 24:1 25:25 26:5 31:4,5 33: 15 61:13 64:25 65:3,15 67:2	addition ^[1] 9:19	analogy ^[1] 18:18	B
1346(b)(1) ^[2] 17:22 40:22	additional ^[2] 10:5 67:17	analyses ^[1] 46:12	back ^[6] 19:20 51:20 54:13 55:7 57:15 59:11
1346(c) ^[2] 29:21 30:19	address ^[6] 27:8 28:4 46:13 48:3, 7,11	analysis ^[3] 4:5 14:20 52:23	bar ^[90] 3:11,14,21 4:2,9,12,23 5:2, 7,20 6:14,19 7:24 10:2,11,12 11: 12,16 12:7,23 13:1,8,17,22 14:9, 10,21,24,25 16:1 17:15 21:5,12 22:3,7,17,23 23:9,15,21 25:22 26: 2 27:23 28:1,21,22 32:5,10,11 33: 10,13,21 34:10,11,21,23 35:4,19 38:6,20 39:2,19 40:5,9,24 41:20 44:4 47:3 48:13 49:7 50:9 53:8,12 55:3,11,11,14,22 58:11 59:20,24 60:22 62:6 63:5 64:24 65:24 66: 18 67:5,9,21
19-546 ^[1] 3:4	addressed ^[7] 16:24,25 17:2 22: 21 28:6 48:8 63:16	analytically ^[2] 18:9 30:23	Barrett ^[14] 29:10,11 31:21,24 32: 16 59:16,17 60:6,19 61:4,16 62:7, 13,25
1933's ^[1] 53:1	addressing ^[1] 63:19	animates ^[1] 59:2	barring ^[1] 59:8
1946 ^[4] 7:3 21:11 28:18 47:5	adjudicated ^[2] 14:21 31:19	announce ^[1] 60:17	bars ^[2] 5:16 39:13
1952 ^[1] 51:10	administrable ^[1] 34:9	another ^[2] 16:20 41:23	based ^[2] 3:19 4:17
1A ^[1] 65:6	administrative ^[1] 20:24	answer ^[6] 16:14 43:18,24 44:12 50:2 61:5	bases ^[1] 29:24
2	adopted ^[3] 27:19 46:7 48:19	anytime ^[1] 64:6	basically ^[1] 11:24
2 ^[1] 42:23	adopting ^[1] 53:12	appeal ^[6] 10:23 19:12 32:15 49: 15 53:23 56:7	basis ^[4] 47:15 63:9,25 66:14
2020 ^[1] 1:11	adopts ^[1] 38:10	appealable ^[2] 10:24 11:6	began ^[1] 24:21
26 ^[2] 11:2 54:8	advantage ^[2] 10:17 25:6	appealing ^[2] 11:8 13:20	beginning ^[1] 63:7
2672 ^[2] 20:22 53:8	adversary ^[3] 19:8,18,22	appeals ^[14] 9:25 11:9,24,25 16: 24 17:1,11 20:8 27:16 46:11 57: 11 58:16,20 67:10	behalf ^[8] 1:20,22 2:4,7,10 3:8 34: 4 64:20
2676 ^[7] 4:14 7:6 34:14 46:14,25 54:19 59:6	advocates ^[1] 67:15	appear ^[2] 13:4 53:25	believe ^[3] 19:22,23 53:7
2676's ^[1] 34:18	affirm ^[3] 15:11 35:21 64:12	APPEARANCES ^[1] 1:17	Bell ^[1] 65:17
3	affirming ^[1] 63:23	appeared ^[1] 7:1	below ^[10] 5:12 9:10 20:3 32:25 35:22 47:23 48:4,6 56:25 58:1
3 ^[1] 2:4	afternoon ^[1] 56:15	appears ^[1] 20:11	best ^[3] 28:15 65:7,12
34 ^[1] 2:7	agree ^[5] 13:24 19:14 20:4 32:1 58: 5	Appendix ^[3] 12:21 13:16 65:6	between ^[7] 17:21 21:5 24:22 51: 20 52:25 53:11 55:8
39 ^[1] 31:9	agreed ^[1] 50:4	apple ^[1] 64:14	beyond ^[5] 38:16 44:16,19,23 64:9
4	agrees ^[2] 37:1 61:13	appeared ^[1] 7:1	big ^[1] 21:4
40 ^[1] 31:9	ahead ^[1] 57:6	appears ^[1] 20:11	bite ^[1] 64:13
5	AL ^[1] 1:3	appeals ^[14] 9:25 11:9,24,25 16: 24 17:1,11 20:8 27:16 46:11 57: 11 58:16,20 67:10	Bivens ^[34] 3:18 5:16 8:16 13:5 14: 2,3,4,22 16:3 19:11 21:24,25 22:1, 14,21 23:10,11 24:10,11 28:23 40: 4,14 43:13 49:4,12 50:4 51:9 55: 22 61:19 62:4,18,21,22 67:2
56 ^[1] 60:17	Ali ^[1] 15:22	appeals ^[14] 9:25 11:9,24,25 16: 24 17:1,11 20:8 27:16 46:11 57: 11 58:16,20 67:10	Black's ^[1] 53:1
6	Alito ^[19] 15:8,9 16:7,23 17:17 18: 14 19:3,21 26:19 44:1,2,11,18,24 45:5,17 46:2,17 47:8	applies ^[5] 4:9 24:22 52:6 63:10, 12	blame ^[1] 56:17
64 ^[1] 2:10	Alito's ^[1] 27:6	apply ^[11] 3:20 4:12 11:12 34:11, 24 35:20 39:3 44:5,7 55:3 62:21	body ^[1] 65:9
7	allegation ^[1] 33:7	applying ^[1] 41:19	Both ^[13] 4:3 14:22 22:25 35:14,16 49:14,14,15,24 50:3,3,3 65:9
70 ^[3] 10:1 51:14 67:9	allegations ^[1] 45:12	appropriate ^[3] 27:12 54:10 66:8	bothering ^[1] 56:16
8	allege ^[1] 37:14	Arbaugh ^[3] 37:20 38:10,12	breakout ^[1] 46:2
8 ^[2] 7:4 18:13		Arguably ^[1] 22:5	
86A ^[2] 12:21 13:16		argues ^[1] 8:19	
9		argument ^[55] 1:14 2:2,5,8 3:4,7 4: 21,25 8:17,21 9:1,2,9,15 10:1,2 15:10 16:8 17:2,3,9,13 20:3,6,7,9, 10 21:7 23:7,19 24:21 26:21 27: 13 34:3 39:2,18 43:1 46:7 47:13, 16,17,18 51:3 52:10 53:20 56:18 57:10 59:12 61:18 64:19 65:22 66: 5,7,13 67:11	
9 ^[1] 1:11		argument's ^[1] 46:8	
A		argumentation ^[1] 20:10	
a.m ^[2] 1:15 3:2		arguments ^[4] 28:8,15 47:12 57: 14	
ability ^[1] 51:8		Arlington ^[1] 1:21	
able ^[2] 4:21 64:9			
above-entitled ^[1] 1:13			

Official - Subject to Final Review

<p>Breyer [24] 11:21,22 12:25 13:7,24 14:7,14,18 15:4 31:12 32:8 40:18, 19 41:14 42:1,11,18,21 43:7,17,22, 24 50:2 67:12</p> <p>brief [13] 7:3 9:10,16 20:6 28:6 30: 16 39:24 40:2 46:10 52:24 54:8 62:2 63:17</p> <p>briefed [3] 20:14,18 63:17</p> <p>briefing [1] 40:9</p> <p>bring [13] 4:21 10:19 20:1 22:19 24:10,11 33:1,16 41:12,14 51:8 61:19,20</p> <p>bringing [2] 16:3 67:6</p> <p>broad [5] 3:17 15:25 22:23 26:1 50:16</p> <p>broadest [2] 37:18 41:10</p> <p>Brooks [1] 51:11</p> <p>brought [19] 5:10 10:7 19:21 34: 12,16 37:19 39:3,10,21 40:11,15 42:15 44:8,9,15 50:5 52:8 59:8 67: 18</p> <p>BROWNBACK [2] 1:3 3:4</p> <p>building [1] 17:14</p> <p>burdensome [1] 10:15</p> <p>buy [2] 51:23 52:3</p>	<p>44:1 47:9 50:11 53:16 56:12 59: 15,23 63:1 64:15,21 68:1</p> <p>choice [2] 25:3,9</p> <p>choose [1] 25:6</p> <p>chooses [2] 10:17 33:14</p> <p>chose [3] 32:14 53:11,22</p> <p>Circuit [27] 17:13 19:10,13,18 23:8 27:18,20 30:11 31:13 39:18 46:6, 16 47:21,23 48:6,7 57:18,21,23 58:1,3 60:14 63:16,23 64:12 65:5 66:11</p> <p>Circuit's [7] 3:20 4:4,8,19 27:22 47:14 66:17</p> <p>circuits [4] 19:14 46:3,18 66:11</p> <p>cite [1] 54:8</p> <p>cited [1] 52:22</p> <p>citing [1] 53:1</p> <p>Citizen's [1] 52:23</p> <p>Civil [4] 11:4 18:13 29:23 30:20</p> <p>claim [77] 3:16 4:13 5:16 6:18,19 7: 7 8:20 12:13,13,14 13:5 14:2,3,5 17:21,22 18:2,12,22,24 19:11,16, 16,17 20:25 21:5,24 22:1,2 23:16 24:9,10,12,12 30:13 31:5,8 32:2 34:20 35:3,5,10 36:5 37:14 38:15 39:13,15 40:11,14,15 41:23,24 42: 22,23 44:3 46:1 51:9,9 52:12 53:9, 23 54:6,7,10 61:19,20 62:4,5,11, 18,18,19,21,22 63:19 65:13,18</p> <p>claimant [3] 13:2 40:25 55:5</p> <p>claims [45] 5:16,19,21,25 12:8,22 13:14 19:10 20:1 21:25 22:15 23: 10 28:13 30:2,5,20 33:6 34:12,16, 24 35:1,14,23 39:3,21 40:12 42: 14 44:8 45:3 46:7 48:15 49:4,5,12, 13,14,23 50:4 52:25 54:5,6,8,25 58:5 59:8</p> <p>clarification [1] 23:6</p> <p>clarify [1] 31:25</p> <p>classic [1] 7:13</p> <p>clean [1] 58:24</p> <p>clear [14] 9:8,18 25:14 27:25 29:4 31:4,18 46:20,24 47:1 58:8,18,25 65:17</p> <p>clearest [2] 6:16,17</p> <p>clearly [2] 7:9 52:24</p> <p>client [1] 53:22</p> <p>close [2] 17:12 66:12</p> <p>codefendant [1] 55:17</p> <p>cognizable [3] 17:22,23 18:1</p> <p>colleague [1] 40:21</p> <p>combine [1] 36:2</p> <p>come [9] 12:9 17:12 35:6 37:21 39: 17 45:15 47:2 64:1 66:12</p> <p>comes [3] 25:9,25 43:10</p> <p>coming [1] 4:23</p> <p>common [15] 4:25 6:4,8 7:13,20 9: 22 21:21 29:6 34:14,21 46:13,25 61:23 63:6 67:8</p> <p>compelled [1] 32:22</p> <p>COMPLAINANT [1] 64:20</p> <p>complaint [1] 31:9</p> <p>complementary [1] 43:14</p> <p>complete [14] 3:14 6:14,19 7:24</p>	<p>11:16 12:7 16:1 20:25 26:1 28:22 40:24 53:9 55:11 67:5</p> <p>complex [2] 48:21,22</p> <p>complicated [1] 36:24</p> <p>compromise [1] 50:17</p> <p>concede [1] 48:8</p> <p>conceded [1] 39:23</p> <p>concedes [1] 4:18</p> <p>concept [4] 53:2 54:4 59:7 63:8</p> <p>concepts [2] 46:25 53:11</p> <p>concerns [1] 37:20</p> <p>concluded [2] 37:8 65:11</p> <p>concludes [1] 41:13</p> <p>conclusion [4] 4:8,13 47:15 65:24</p> <p>confers [1] 45:2</p> <p>conflicts [1] 67:13</p> <p>confused [1] 19:8</p> <p>confusion [2] 6:24 58:7</p> <p>Congress [40] 5:2,6,22 6:7,12 7: 19 9:21 10:11,13 16:1 21:3,12,20 22:13,18,25 24:17 25:16,16 26:4 29:4,7 34:7,20 35:15 37:1 43:15, 19 49:24 50:3,22 51:3,6 53:10 55: 14 63:19 64:10 66:25 67:8,20</p> <p>Congress's [7] 8:1 22:7 33:9,13 63:4 67:13,14</p> <p>consequence [1] 25:10</p> <p>consequences [2] 25:10,20</p> <p>consider [6] 17:9 39:1,14 56:20 57:16 66:7</p> <p>consistent [5] 22:6 23:14 37:15 46:8 58:9</p> <p>constitute [4] 12:7 13:1 20:25 40: 24</p> <p>constitutes [1] 3:14</p> <p>constitutional [1] 35:23</p> <p>consuming [1] 49:10</p> <p>contemplate [1] 54:16</p> <p>continue [4] 17:6 50:13 64:13 67: 16</p> <p>continued [1] 51:13</p> <p>continues [1] 54:11</p> <p>continuously [1] 60:15</p> <p>contrary [1] 23:19</p> <p>control [1] 34:9</p> <p>controlling [1] 40:10</p> <p>controls [2] 21:23 64:7</p> <p>controversy [4] 10:20 19:1 22:19 33:17</p> <p>core [3] 13:21,21 15:21</p> <p>correct [7] 20:3,16 22:4 30:16 50: 5,7,10</p> <p>Correction [1] 43:12</p> <p>correctly [2] 24:7 30:18</p> <p>counsel [19] 8:9 19:5,7 20:13,20 21:18 23:3,5 29:11 31:21 38:22 39:1 47:11 48:25 53:19 56:10 59: 17 64:16 68:2</p> <p>Count [2] 23:5 32:4</p> <p>country [1] 63:7</p> <p>couple [3] 41:15 47:4 63:2</p> <p>coupon [3] 51:22 52:2,6</p> <p>course [12] 5:18 7:25 11:7,14 12: 24 17:16 18:18 23:22 25:7 28:1</p>	<p>51:25 62:10</p> <p>COURT [93] 1:1,14 3:10,12,24 4:4, 7,11 7:5 9:16,25 11:5,9,14 12:20, 22 13:12 14:5,21 15:1,16,23 17: 11 18:6 20:8,11 21:13,23 22:21 23:23 26:23 27:11,16 28:4,7,19 30:4 31:19 32:12 34:6 35:12,21 36:17,22 37:5,6,22 38:10,14,16 39:10,14 44:2 45:9,16,23 47:23 48:4,10,12,14 49:11,24 51:5,11 52:5,16,24 56:25 57:10,24 58:3,8, 12 59:3 60:5,13,24 61:1 63:11,13, 18,23 64:2,9,11 65:3,11 66:5,16, 20,22 67:21</p> <p>Court's [20] 6:11 10:9 14:19 15:2, 21 17:10,25 26:23 27:15 30:2 31: 17 32:23 35:9,25 37:16 43:11 46: 9 47:6 65:7,16</p> <p>Courts [14] 11:24,25 16:24 17:1 20:8 23:7 29:22 35:17 43:16 46: 11 55:10 58:15,19 67:10</p> <p>create [1] 51:4</p> <p>created [3] 10:11 65:1 67:20</p> <p>cries [1] 27:2</p> <p>critical [1] 25:10</p> <p>critically [1] 31:1</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">C</p> <p>call [2] 47:17 51:24</p> <p>CalPERS [1] 52:22</p> <p>came [2] 1:13 48:9</p> <p>cannot [1] 4:19</p> <p>canonical [2] 7:13 65:16</p> <p>carefully [1] 56:21</p> <p>Carlson [1] 43:11</p> <p>carried [1] 62:17</p> <p>carved [1] 51:7</p> <p>Case [59] 3:4,12,21 5:11 8:15,23 11:15 12:22 13:14 18:16 19:1 23: 23 27:1,13 28:9 31:2,2 32:12,14 33:21,22 35:20 36:3,4,12 37:5 38: 13 39:20 40:3,8 41:18 44:8,15,18 45:24 46:22 47:5,18 51:11,24,25 52:2,3,4,6 55:13 56:2,7,19,23 57: 17,23 60:3,8 62:19 66:7,19 68:2,3</p> <p>cases [4] 6:11 7:1 31:18 56:23</p> <p>cause [10] 10:18 14:22,23 25:4,6 31:20 35:8 37:3,15 45:13</p> <p>causes [2] 7:10 22:24</p> <p>central [1] 59:7</p> <p>cert [6] 16:11 19:21,25 27:5 29:13 39:25</p> <p>cert-worthy [2] 28:6 66:9</p> <p>certain [2] 50:19 62:17</p> <p>certainly [6] 9:14 20:4 22:23 31:7 61:1 66:6</p> <p>certiorari [1] 56:22</p> <p>cetera [1] 13:3</p> <p>chance [3] 33:18 39:20 43:5</p> <p>changed [2] 29:7 67:8</p> <p>changing [1] 9:22</p> <p>CHIEF [37] 3:3,9 5:13 6:15 8:8,11 9:20 11:20 15:8 19:4 20:20 23:2 24:21 26:11,15 29:9 32:17,19 33: 25 34:5 36:1,20 38:2,21,24 40:17</p>			<p style="text-align: center;">D</p> <p>D.C [2] 1:10,19</p> <p>damages [4] 10:5,7 33:19 43:8</p> <p>day [1] 27:7</p> <p>deal [1] 54:25</p> <p>dealing [1] 37:16</p> <p>decades [1] 47:4</p> <p>decide [19] 12:11,12 14:2,8 16:11, 20 23:23 26:22 46:4,20,22 47:24 48:3 49:12,13 56:17,24 61:1 66: 19</p> <p>decided [14] 14:2,4,8,9,11 16:25 38:17 46:18 48:4 51:11 56:25 57: 24 62:20,23</p> <p>decides [3] 38:14,16 49:11</p> <p>deciding [2] 16:19 40:3</p> <p>decision [21] 10:9 17:25 32:25 35: 21 37:20 38:4,18 45:10,17,18 46: 15 48:6,14,16 52:22 57:22,24 58: 9 60:18 65:16,19</p> <p>decisions [7] 15:21 43:11 46:9 56: 22 58:4 59:3,4</p> <p>defend [1] 20:15</p> <p>defendants [1] 41:16</p> <p>defense [2] 44:22,23</p> <p>defensive [1] 61:23</p> <p>defined [1] 28:18</p> <p>definite [1] 54:21</p> <p>definitely [1] 52:21</p> <p>definition [5] 7:4 11:2,3 21:11 52: 20</p> <p>deleted [1] 6:9</p> <p>deleting [1] 6:25</p> <p>deletion [1] 7:15</p> <p>delineated [1] 52:24</p> <p>demand [9] 7:5 16:3 18:9,20 21: 12 28:19,23 52:15 65:1</p>

Official - Subject to Final Review

<p>demonstrates ^[1] 34:20 depart ^[3] 16:18 27:2 34:21 departed ^[2] 5:3 9:21 Department ^[1] 1:19 departure ^[3] 5:23 6:8,22 depend ^[1] 5:9 depends ^[5] 17:15 27:23 60:23 61:9 62:22 describes ^[1] 18:6 description ^[2] 12:18 29:6 determination ^[3] 31:23 36:13 44:6 develop ^[2] 9:8 20:9 developed ^[2] 9:15 57:17 dictionaries ^[1] 28:18 Dictionary ^[1] 53:1 difference ^[6] 7:15,21 8:4 21:4 49:10 65:14 different ^[14] 5:11 8:23 12:8 21:8, 8 25:20 27:19 30:3 36:22 46:12 52:14 58:6,17 62:2 difficulties ^[1] 49:1 direct ^[1] 6:24 direction ^[1] 57:9 directly ^[7] 4:14,24 7:25 22:22 33:9 56:7 67:13 disagree ^[1] 13:10 disagreement ^[1] 66:10 disappeared ^[1] 8:18 discretion ^[4] 15:11,14 17:9 66:6 discretionary ^[1] 30:7 dismiss ^[2] 37:24 56:21 dismissal ^[9] 4:1 18:23 29:14 32:7 35:2 60:4 63:25 65:12,17 dismissed ^[2] 32:3 34:24 dismissing ^[1] 45:24 dispose ^[1] 37:22 disposition ^[4] 5:16 41:23 42:2 66:8 dispositive ^[1] 13:13 dispute ^[2] 31:10 51:2 distinct ^[2] 18:10 30:23 distinction ^[4] 4:16 51:20 54:4 55:8 distinguish ^[1] 53:10 district ^[26] 3:12,23 11:5,14,25 12:2,20,21 13:12 14:5,19,21 15:1,2 21:23 29:22 30:1,4 31:19 32:12 37:6 44:2 49:11 60:13 65:3,6 diversity ^[1] 18:19 dividing ^[2] 17:21 44:25 doctrine ^[1] 63:6 document ^[1] 13:15 done ^[3] 45:16 51:7 61:7 doom ^[1] 54:7 doubt ^[1] 57:2 DOUGLAS ^[1] 1:3 down ^[2] 15:6 43:10 dramatic ^[1] 5:23 draw ^[2] 48:14 60:2 drawing ^[1] 4:16 drawn ^[1] 44:17 duplicative ^[11] 5:7 8:2,4 9:13 33:</p>	<p>11 35:18 39:21 43:6,7 58:12 63:15 <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">E</p> <hr/> earlier ^[5] 47:19 49:8 53:7 57:20 59:22 easier ^[2] 58:18,23 easily ^[2] 34:8 37:22 easy ^[1] 25:18 effect ^[2] 10:25 16:12 either ^[5] 25:3 30:2 35:19 38:18 57:7 elaborate ^[1] 9:4 election ^[4] 48:19,20 51:4,12 election-of-remedies ^[2] 24:8,15 election-of-remedy ^[1] 25:17 element ^[1] 30:21 elements ^[11] 18:3 31:6,8 32:2 35:2 36:9 37:3 38:5 45:3,5 65:2 eliminate ^[1] 6:24 eliminated ^[1] 7:22 embedded ^[3] 39:9 57:3 63:4 emphasize ^[1] 32:23 employee ^[13] 5:17 11:18 21:2 26:2 41:1,3,7,22 42:4,8,16,23 43:20 employees ^[13] 3:16 5:8 8:3 10:6,14 17:6 26:8 33:4,6,12 50:20 55:17 67:17 employer ^[2] 41:21 42:3 enacted ^[7] 10:2 22:25 35:16 40:5 55:14 63:19 67:10 enactment ^[2] 55:10 63:4 encouraging ^[1] 49:3 end ^[3] 12:2,15 32:13 enormous ^[2] 48:17 58:7 enough ^[2] 15:5 22:24 ensure ^[2] 48:23 49:22 enter ^[2] 14:1 35:12 entered ^[15] 3:12 11:13 12:20 13:8,11,14,22 14:11 15:1 23:20 32:13 37:7 59:24 63:12 65:4 entire ^[4] 10:19 22:19 23:15 33:17 entirely ^[3] 10:16 53:3,3 entitled ^[2] 17:4 30:24 entry ^[1] 32:9 entwined ^[1] 64:6 especially ^[1] 53:6 ESQ ^[3] 2:3,6,9 ESQUIRE ^[1] 1:21 essence ^[1] 45:18 essentially ^[2] 7:7 47:2 established ^[2] 5:20 36:14 ET ^[2] 1:3 13:3 even ^[23] 4:6 9:2 16:10 17:12 18:11,25 23:9 29:18 30:8 39:1 41:10 46:21 49:24 51:10 54:5 55:13 60:5,21 63:21,21 65:11 66:12,22 event ^[1] 25:24 everyone ^[1] 18:22 everything ^[1] 22:8 evidentiary ^[1] 65:10 ex-post ^[1] 49:21 exactly ^[13] 6:7 12:19 17:7 25:1 27:11 30:18 41:20 42:19 43:15 48:</p>	<p>12 50:7 67:7,19 example ^[5] 10:6 23:24 41:21 43:5,8 exception ^[1] 29:1 exceptionally ^[1] 15:25 exceptions ^[3] 15:20 26:25 57:1 exchange ^[1] 50:18 exclusive ^[1] 51:4 exercise ^[3] 15:13 17:8 30:6 exhibits ^[1] 65:10 exist ^[1] 40:4 existence ^[1] 58:3 expires ^[1] 31:25 explain ^[3] 7:3 30:16 40:9 explained ^[11] 30:18,23 31:12 32:8 34:13 35:5 45:10 48:12 65:5,16 67:21 explains ^[1] 30:17 explicitly ^[3] 20:23 22:13 51:7 express ^[1] 6:7 expressly ^[4] 5:3 9:21 29:7 67:8 extensive ^[1] 65:9 extent ^[2] 23:6 36:21 extra ^[1] 43:8 extraordinary ^[1] 65:24 extremely ^[2] 10:14 26:1 <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">F</p> <hr/> fact ^[7] 43:10 49:19 52:13,14 53:6,22 59:5 fact-finding ^[2] 45:16 61:10 facts ^[1] 35:7 factual ^[1] 33:7 failed ^[1] 35:9 fails ^[2] 4:13 17:23 failure ^[7] 44:3,4 45:13 46:1 54:6 65:13,18 fair ^[3] 26:3 32:24 33:18 fallback ^[1] 66:4 far ^[1] 43:2 favor ^[6] 48:16,16 65:8,25 66:19,24 favorable ^[2] 38:4,19 FDIC ^[2] 4:5 17:25 federal ^[12] 3:15 8:3 11:4,17 18:12,16,16 26:7 36:6,10,10 50:19 figure ^[1] 15:6 file ^[9] 19:16 49:4,5 filed ^[7] 8:5,16,22,24 9:14 35:24 39:25 files ^[2] 12:2 24:9 final ^[10] 11:15 13:18,20 16:13 23:9 32:13 39:12 53:25 56:2,6 finally ^[1] 39:16 find ^[1] 6:10 fine ^[1] 18:18 first ^[22] 3:22 6:3,10 9:2,7 23:6 26:24 31:13 34:11 36:23 39:6,17 45:21 49:5,12 52:2,3,6,7 61:19 64:5,13 focused ^[1] 58:10 follow ^[2] 26:18 35:18 followed ^[1] 26:20 following ^[1] 5:4</p>	<p>follows ^[1] 4:14 footnote ^[1] 45:14 force ^[1] 11:14 forceful ^[1] 57:14 forces ^[1] 65:23 foreclose ^[1] 41:24 foreclosed ^[2] 25:5 66:2 forego ^[1] 24:12 forfeited ^[1] 15:11 formulation ^[3] 7:13 9:22 29:7 forth ^[1] 45:12 found ^[1] 10:13 four ^[1] 12:8 free ^[2] 51:25 52:2 friend ^[2] 52:20 65:23 friend's ^[1] 66:4 FTCA ^[62] 3:11,16,23 4:9,15,22 5:4,16 8:6,16,20 10:4,17 11:8 14:23 15:17 17:5 19:11,15 20:21,23 22:1,13,18 23:17,25 24:9,12 25:6 27:24 28:22 30:13 31:8,20 33:12 34:7 35:1,2,10,16 40:15 43:14 44:3 45:4,6 48:23 49:5,13 50:3 51:9,12 53:23 54:1 55:21 56:1 57:24 61:20 62:5,18,19 63:5 66:1 FTCA's ^[2] 30:20 35:6 fully ^[3] 20:14,18 63:17 function ^[1] 30:7 functions ^[1] 59:24 fund ^[2] 25:9,9 fundamentally ^[1] 32:24 further ^[4] 13:23 26:7 30:22 37:25 furthest ^[1] 37:24 <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <hr/> gave ^[1] 36:9 General ^[2] 1:18 27:2 gestured ^[1] 9:12 gets ^[11] 9:31,14,15 48:24 51:20 Gilman ^[2] 10:10 67:22 give ^[5] 9:3 42:22,24 49:14 50:19 Given ^[2] 47:21 57:17 gives ^[1] 29:21 goal ^[1] 23:15 Gorsuch ^[11] 26:12,13 53:17,18 54:13,23 55:4,19,24 56:4,8 government ^[34] 4:10 21:2 29:13,23,25 30:8 36:25 38:5,19 39:10,23 40:25 41:1,6 42:4,22 45:22 47:2 48:17,18 49:3 50:14,16 52:4 59:12 60:3,8,14 61:12 62:20 63:16,24 65:8 67:17 government's ^[9] 5:8 10:6,14 17:6 33:4,11 47:14,16 49:2 grant ^[4] 17:19 19:25 56:22 60:13 granted ^[4] 16:11,15 29:13 64:10 grocery ^[1] 51:23 ground ^[11] 14:8 15:12 19:25 20:6,16 33:3 37:11 48:4 57:25 63:22 66:20 grounds ^[2] 12:5 62:20 guess ^[6] 24:2 25:15 38:2 53:20 55:19 57:15</p>
---	--	---	--

Official - Subject to Final Review

<p style="text-align: center;">H</p> <p>hair ^[1] 53:6 happenstance ^[1] 21:22 happy ^[1] 37:24 harder ^[1] 58:22 he'll ^[1] 12:14 hear ^[1] 3:3 heard ^[1] 59:22 held ^[5] 4:11 15:16 19:10 36:11 45:24 Helmerich ^[1] 37:17 helpful ^[2] 47:7 57:5 helpfully ^[1] 31:12 Himmelreich ^[1] 4:7 history ^[2] 34:15,22 holding ^[2] 35:9,11 Honor ^[62] 6:2,8 7:2 11:1 12:17 13:6,11 14:5,17 15:15 17:2,7,24 18:18 20:5,17 21:10 22:5,17 23:14 24:24,25 25:21 30:10,17 32:6 35:15 37:25 38:9 39:5 40:6 41:9,18 42:9 43:4 44:15 45:10,21 46:5,23 47:25 48:5 49:18 50:6 51:1,19 52:19 53:7 54:3,18 55:6 56:3 57:19 59:1 60:1,11,24 61:8,25 62:16 63:3,18 Honor's ^[1] 49:20 Hood ^[1] 65:17 hope ^[1] 49:6 However ^[1] 19:20 Hui ^[2] 15:22 22:22 HUSTON ^[47] 1:18 2:3,9 3:6,7,9 5:13 6:1 7:2 8:13 9:5 11:1 12:17 13:6,10 14:4,13,16,19 15:15 16:22 17:1,24 18:17 20:4,17 21:10 22:5,11,16 23:13 24:24 25:21 26:10,18 27:10 28:16 30:10 31:22 32:6,18,19 34:1 52:15 64:17,19,21 Huston's ^[1] 52:10 hypothetical ^[1] 42:14</p>	<p>indicates ^[1] 49:20 indisputably ^[1] 65:3 individual ^[11] 4:22 5:4,10 8:5 11:17 16:2,5 23:20,21 25:4 67:17 inefficient ^[2] 49:17,19 infinitely ^[1] 48:21 injuries ^[1] 3:19 injury ^[1] 33:19 insight ^[1] 17:25 instance ^[1] 52:7 instead ^[3] 4:11 24:19 66:18 intend ^[1] 34:20 intended ^[1] 43:16 intentionally ^[1] 15:25 interested ^[1] 42:19 interpretation ^[1] 66:18 interpreting ^[1] 15:17 intertwines ^[1] 61:14 involve ^[1] 30:6 involved ^[2] 3:16 42:23 involvement ^[1] 47:7 Isn't ^[7] 12:15 16:9 20:15 36:14 50:2 52:18 66:9 issue ^[25] 16:8,25 19:17 20:14 22:21 27:8 30:9 39:17 40:10,14 46:19 47:7 48:7,8,11 57:16 58:17 61:24 62:7,12,14,16,24 63:15,20 issues ^[3] 56:23 62:8,17 itself ^[2] 37:7 45:22</p>	<p>judgments ^[2] 23:10 54:17 judicata ^[13] 5:1 7:14,21 18:24 34:14,15 40:10 41:19 53:13 55:12 59:6 63:8,9 jump ^[1] 47:24 jurisdiction ^[30] 3:25 29:15,19,22 30:5,19 34:25 35:1,6,12 36:3,8,14,18,23 37:2,9,13 38:7,15,17 41:11 45:2,11 60:25 61:14 63:13,25 64:2,7 jurisdiction's ^[1] 64:6 jurisdictional ^[10] 4:1,5 30:9,14 31:15 35:15 37:23 44:5 47:13 55:15 Justice ^[152] 1:19 3:3,9 5:13 6:15 8:8,10,11,12 9:5,20 10:21 11:19,20,20,22 12:25 13:7,24 14:7,14,18 15:4,8,8,9 16:7,23 17:17 18:14 19:3,4,6,7,21 20:12,19 21:17 22:9,12 23:2,4,5 24:2,21 25:12 26:9,11,11,13,15,15,17,19,19 27:6,10,18 28:10,16 29:8,9,9,11 31:12,21,24 32:8,16,17,20 33:25 34:5 36:1,20 38:2,21,23,24,25 40:1,16,17,17,19 41:14 42:1,11,18,21 43:7,17,22,24 44:1,1,2,11,18,24 45:5,17 46:2,17 47:8,9,9,11,18 48:1,25 49:7 50:1,2,8,11,11,12 51:15 52:9 53:14,16,16,18 54:13,23 55:4,19,24 56:4,8,12,12,14 58:14 59:10,15,15,17,23 60:6,19 61:4,16 62:7,13,25 63:1 64:15,22 67:12 68:1 justifies ^[1] 63:23</p>	<p>lead ^[3] 43:1,3 58:20 least ^[2] 19:13 57:8 leave ^[1] 66:16 left ^[3] 13:17,18 55:2 legal ^[3] 18:9 20:16 28:18 length ^[1] 19:24 lessons ^[1] 15:21 liability ^[1] 42:8 light ^[3] 37:21 46:17 53:6 limit ^[1] 10:15 limitation ^[1] 29:5 line ^[4] 17:21 44:17,25 48:15 lines ^[1] 60:2 linguistic ^[1] 55:7 listed ^[1] 29:24 litigants ^[1] 63:7 litigate ^[5] 10:3 17:5 33:2,15 49:23 litigated ^[1] 49:25 litigation ^[12] 5:7 8:2 9:13 13:23 26:7 33:11 35:19 39:21 48:18,21 58:12 63:15 little ^[3] 19:8 33:8 61:11 long ^[4] 18:3 31:6 36:11 54:11 longer ^[3] 11:10,12 44:21 look ^[6] 37:5,5 40:22 42:18 51:16 62:19 looked ^[1] 66:25 looking ^[1] 62:23 lose ^[8] 12:12,13 19:15 33:3 36:16,17 49:5 61:20 loses ^[1] 8:20 lots ^[2] 11:24 58:19 lower ^[1] 20:8</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">I</p> <p>idea ^[1] 9:12 identical ^[1] 58:13 identity ^[1] 62:8 ignore ^[1] 59:5 illustrates ^[1] 58:6 imagine ^[1] 50:22 immunity ^[5] 18:8 37:2,16 61:15 62:20 impact ^[1] 40:7 implications ^[2] 9:23 30:14 important ^[2] 4:6 26:25 imports ^[1] 34:14 imposed ^[1] 16:1 inclined ^[1] 66:23 included ^[1] 10:23 incorporates ^[3] 40:10 47:1 59:6 Incorporation ^[1] 43:12 incorrect ^[1] 65:23 increase ^[1] 48:17 independent ^[2] 34:8 63:22 indicate ^[1] 43:13</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">J</p> <p>JA ^[1] 31:9 JAICOMO ^[57] 1:21 2:6 34:2,3,5 36:1,20 38:9 39:4 40:6 41:9,17 42:9,13,20 43:4,9,21,23 44:7,14,20 45:1,9,19 46:5,23 47:25 48:5 49:18 50:6,10,12 51:1,19 52:19 53:15 54:3,18,24 55:6,23 56:3,5,11,15 57:19 59:1 60:1,11,23 61:8,25 62:10,15 63:1,3 JAMES ^[2] 1:6 64:12 joined ^[1] 67:3 judge ^[3] 12:2,12 14:1 judgement ^[1] 60:21 judgment ^[164] 3:11,13,14,21 4:2,9,9,12,15,23 5:1,2,5,7,12 6:5 10:2,4,11,12,18,22,22,23 11:2,4,8,10,12,13,15,16 12:1,3,6,9,15,18,19,23 13:1,3,7,8,11,14,17,18,19,22,22 14:1,3,12,15,21,24,25 15:1 16:13 17:15 18:22 20:15,22 21:12,15 22:7,17,18,23 23:9,11,15,16,19,21,25 24:1 25:8,22,24 26:6 27:23 28:1,21,21 29:16,18 31:3,11 32:4,7,9,10,11,13,15 33:3,10,12,13,16,21 34:10,11,19,19,21,23 35:4,10,13,19 37:7 38:6,20 39:2,12,19 40:5,9,23 41:19 44:4 47:3 48:13 49:14 50:9 53:12,24 54:15,20,22,24 55:1,11,14,20 56:1,5 58:11 59:19,23 60:7,9,10,18,20 61:6 63:5,12 64:24,24 65:4,7,8,12,14,24,25 66:18 67:9,20,23 judgment's ^[1] 25:9</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">K</p> <p>Kagan ^[11] 23:4,5 24:2 25:12 26:9 49:8 50:11,12 51:15 52:9 53:14 Kavanaugh ^[11] 26:16,17 27:10 28:10 17 29:8 47:19 56:13,14 58:14 59:10 key ^[3] 7:15 12:23 28:12 KING ^[6] 1:6 3:5 35:22,24 40:11 64:13 known ^[1] 22:25 knows ^[1] 24:17</p> <p style="text-align: center;">L</p> <p>label ^[2] 31:14,15 lack ^[5] 3:24 29:15,19 34:24 38:6 lacked ^[1] 37:9 lacks ^[1] 35:12 language ^[14] 15:24 21:8 24:4 35:15 39:7,11 45:1 46:24 51:16,17 54:19 55:5 61:13 63:18 largely ^[1] 9:15 last ^[5] 5:14 8:14 21:19 47:4 51:14 later ^[2] 18:21 55:22 law ^[18] 4:25 6:4,8 7:13,20 9:22 20:15 21:21 29:6 34:14,15,21 46:13,25 53:1 61:23 63:6 67:8 lawsuit ^[18] 8:6 9:14 10:8 12:2,4,9 33:1 35:24 40:15 41:22 42:17,24 54:11 59:9 64:14 66:25 67:3,19 lawsuits ^[2] 10:13 63:10</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">M</p> <p>made ^[7] 5:1 6:7 7:23 15:10 39:18,24 61:18 main ^[1] 65:22 mainstream ^[1] 52:21 Malesko ^[1] 43:13 managed ^[1] 54:12 Manning ^[2] 22:1 46:15 many ^[5] 16:24 31:17 58:17 63:11 64:5 matter ^[11] 1:13 3:19,25 13:3 21:19 24:14 37:10 40:3,13 41:18 48:1 matters ^[3] 31:2,13 58:13 mean ^[14] 13:25 15:20 22:6 24:16 25:17 26:22 36:5 44:19 50:13,15 52:2,12 55:12 67:5 Meaning ^[2] 48:2 49:3 means ^[8] 11:7 15:17 18:1 19:11 28:25 29:25 54:14 58:19 meant ^[1] 21:7 mention ^[1] 19:24 mentioned ^[6] 6:9 27:16 57:20 58:4 61:12 63:14 meritorious ^[1] 35:22 merits ^[21] 16:8 17:23 18:11,24 23:25 30:13 31:22 36:2,13 57:8,9 59:20 60:16 61:7,14 63:13 64:2,3,7,7 65:19 Meyer ^[11] 4:5 18:1,7 30:17,22 31:</p>

Official - Subject to Final Review

<p>4 35:5 37:12 45:10,15 65:15 MICHAEL [5] 1:18 2:3,9 3:7 64:19 middle [1] 37:11 might [7] 6:1 12:11 24:13 50:23 51:24 52:11,13 Millbrook [1] 15:22 Miller [2] 54:9 64:4 minute [1] 32:17 minutes [2] 63:2 64:17 misconduct [1] 30:6 missing [1] 38:8 mistake [1] 29:14 mistaken [1] 66:17 moment [2] 14:10 32:24 Monday [1] 1:11 money [2] 42:23,24 morning [3] 26:17 53:18 66:6 most [5] 16:13 37:4 46:14 47:15 66:8 motion [3] 13:13 29:18 65:10 moved [4] 29:17 45:22 60:15 63:24 moving [2] 29:14,14 much [4] 6:23 36:19 43:25 59:14 multiple [3] 54:6,16 58:13 must [2] 3:24 54:25 myself [1] 25:14</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">N</p> <p>narrow [1] 37:4 nature [1] 59:19 necessarily [5] 3:24 39:14 41:24 54:25 61:1 need [5] 27:8 28:5 49:13 55:17 60:5 neither [1] 35:18 never [5] 4:9 14:23 34:16 38:5 48:24 next [2] 3:4 25:25 Ninth [6] 17:13 19:13 27:18,22 46:6 66:13 none [1] 46:11 normal [1] 16:19 normally [2] 12:1,8 Note [1] 65:6 noted [1] 45:14 nothing [1] 14:20 November [1] 1:11 number [2] 5:11 55:10</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">O</p> <p>objective [3] 5:9 26:10 33:9 obligated [1] 48:22 obscure [1] 61:11 obtain [1] 33:18 obvious [2] 5:24 66:17 obviously [2] 26:25 56:21 occasions [1] 63:11 occur [1] 7:23 odds [1] 33:9 offer [3] 25:2 36:22 38:11 officers [1] 33:23 often [1] 26:23 Okay [11] 14:8 36:7 42:24 43:9,17,</p>	<p>22 56:9 60:6,19 61:16 62:25 on-the-merits [1] 61:11 once [2] 24:9 63:12 one [27] 5:11 9:14 10:13 17:3,18 19:2 21:19 22:6 35:24 36:12 40:1 41:12,23,25 42:2,5,17 47:20,21 49:7 54:6 57:11,25 59:2,8 60:2 67:1 only [26] 7:23 9:14 14:25 17:11,13 24:11 26:3 29:3 32:9 35:24 37:18 38:10,12 42:17 45:2 46:6 52:7 54:21 59:24 60:15,16 63:10,12 64:13 66:11 67:6 opens [1] 25:7 operate [1] 48:13 opinion [1] 15:3 opportunity [2] 25:7 51:14 opposed [2] 6:20 29:16 opposing [1] 40:21 opposite [1] 58:21 opposition [2] 20:7 39:25 oral [5] 1:14 2:2,5 3:7 34:3 order [1] 11:5 other [22] 16:15 19:14 21:24 24:8 27:8,20 31:18 36:16 38:11 40:20 41:25 42:3 46:11,19 48:9 54:8 55:22 58:3,15 64:5,8 66:20 others [2] 28:12 47:22 ought [1] 56:4 out [14] 12:4 15:6 18:21 21:18 27:2,18 36:7 46:10 47:12 48:9 51:7 53:7 55:9 62:2 outcome [2] 8:23 40:8 outside [1] 52:21 Over [7] 6:11,12 12:10 30:19 33:22 51:14 62:17 overwhelmingly [1] 67:11 own [2] 32:14 60:25</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">P</p> <p>p.m [1] 68:3 PAGE [3] 2:2 7:4 54:8 paper [1] 12:1 parallel [3] 43:14 49:23,25 particular [5] 15:19 16:11 18:8 56:22,23 particularly [1] 29:4 parties [2] 35:17 65:9 party [3] 44:21 55:16 61:2 passed [2] 41:8 42:6 passes [1] 38:15 PATRICK [3] 1:21 2:6 34:3 Payne [1] 37:17 peculiar [1] 48:19 pending [3] 53:21 54:1 56:1 people [1] 51:24 percolation [1] 47:22 perfectly [4] 18:18 25:14 28:9 31:4 perhaps [2] 12:4 19:8 permit [3] 10:3 32:25 67:15 person [1] 52:1 Petition [6] 8:19 12:21 13:15 19:22 27:5 65:6</p>	<p>Petitioners [5] 1:4,20 2:4,10 3:8 phrase [4] 28:21 55:11 58:24 67:4 pick [1] 8:13 piece [1] 12:1 place [1] 66:16 places [1] 64:5 plain [3] 11:16 28:24 66:2 plaintiff [19] 4:12 10:17 11:8 18:3,10,19 25:8 28:23 30:24 31:6 32:1 33:1,14 35:7,9 41:5 45:12 49:22 67:15 plaintiff's [1] 5:10 plaintiffs [6] 25:2 26:4 48:22 49:4 50:17 51:8 play [2] 4:23 45:15 pleaded [3] 16:4 18:19 45:12 pleading [1] 65:1 pleadings [1] 29:16 please [2] 3:10 34:6 point [20] 5:15 8:14 9:19 10:21 11:10 13:23 14:14 18:25 23:6 39:24 41:2 42:18 45:8 46:10 54:2 55:9 56:16 57:22 58:5 59:13 pointed [2] 27:18 53:7 points [2] 6:2 62:2 policy [6] 10:12 21:20 24:14 48:2,11 51:2 pop [1] 51:24 portion [3] 45:14 48:23 61:11 posed [1] 47:20 position [16] 9:12,24 24:6 25:2 27:17 32:22 36:21 37:12,12 41:10 49:2,21 53:21 58:16 59:18,21 possibility [1] 54:16 possible [1] 23:13 practical [1] 49:1 practice [1] 16:19 precedent [2] 30:12 32:23 precisely [1] 10:10 preclude [2] 22:24 23:22 precluded [3] 20:2 31:23 67:6 precludes [3] 3:17 13:23 16:2 precluding [1] 10:16 preclusion [16] 7:19,22 24:20,20 25:19 26:1 29:2 31:14 54:10 61:23,24 62:4,8,11,16,24 preclusive [7] 4:16 5:1 6:6 10:25 55:3 62:5 65:20 predicate [1] 57:21 predictable [1] 35:17 prejudice [1] 32:3 preliminarily [1] 12:11 preliminary [1] 16:9 premise [1] 59:7 present [2] 4:6 35:16 presented [8] 16:20 27:5,5 39:9,12,15 64:23 65:22 presents [1] 41:20 presume [1] 16:13 prevail [5] 10:4 17:5 18:11 30:25 64:4 prevails [2] 3:23 4:17 prevent [4] 5:7 33:10 58:11 67:21 preventing [1] 8:2</p>	<p>previously [1] 50:9 primary [2] 62:3 63:9 principal [1] 15:9 principle [2] 27:1,3 prior [1] 23:9 problem [2] 28:12 42:2 Procedure [2] 11:5 18:13 proceed [1] 44:19 professors' [1] 62:1 prohibited [1] 5:3 proof [3] 44:4,4 45:13 propose [1] 42:14 propositions [2] 3:22 4:3 prove [2] 4:13 33:21 provide [1] 43:14 provides [2] 34:8 37:3 provision [11] 24:3,8,15,17 26:1,4 50:14,21,25 51:17,18 Public [1] 52:23 punitive [1] 10:7 purpose [6] 8:1 22:7,16 25:1 58:11 67:13 purposes [1] 4:6 pursuant [1] 37:8 pursue [6] 13:4 26:5 33:5 35:22 44:16 53:23 pursuing [1] 67:16 put [3] 7:12 49:7 60:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Q</p> <p>qualifies [1] 57:7 question [53] 9:7,17 16:10,12,14,16,17,20,21 17:18,18 18:6,7,10,16,16 19:19 21:19 22:20 25:15 27:4,6 28:4,11 29:12,12 30:24 36:6,10 37:23 39:8,9,12 40:2,2,20 44:12,12 46:3,20,21 47:19,24 49:20 51:18 54:14 57:21 61:5,17 64:23 65:22 66:9,23 questions [3] 26:14 28:11 35:25 quintessential [1] 23:24 quite [1] 31:18 quote [1] 39:11</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">R</p> <p>raise [3] 44:21,22 56:16 raised [11] 6:20 19:21 20:3,5 26:19 27:14 28:7 37:21 57:22 61:2 63:14 raising [1] 56:18 rather [2] 21:5 66:17 reach [4] 40:19 60:5 64:9 66:23 reaching [1] 37:23 read [9] 5:15 24:16 26:3 40:22,23 50:21,24 51:6 67:4 reads [1] 24:19 real [1] 6:22 really [13] 15:20 24:7,10,25 27:1,21 28:3 36:2 38:3 48:20 57:4,5,7 reappeared [1] 8:18 reason [14] 9:24 13:2 17:8 27:12 29:20 33:20 36:24 39:19 45:23 48:10,12 51:5 61:10 63:17 reasonable [1] 52:1</p>
---	---	---	--

Official - Subject to Final Review

<p>reasoning ^[2] 4:19 66:14 reasons ^[6] 32:15 39:4 45:20 55:15 64:11 67:23 REBUTTAL ^[3] 2:8 64:18,19 received ^[2] 60:4 63:24 recognized ^[2] 66:5 67:12 reconciled ^[1] 4:19 recover ^[2] 25:8 33:20 recovers ^[1] 43:20 recovery ^[1] 43:6 refer ^[1] 7:19 referred ^[1] 49:8 refers ^[3] 7:8 30:19 53:8 reflects ^[1] 50:16 refusal ^[1] 3:20 refutes ^[2] 4:25 66:3 Regarding ^[2] 64:23 66:4 regardless ^[1] 16:4 regular ^[1] 61:23 reiterate ^[1] 28:11 rejected ^[6] 4:4,8 9:25 17:3 27:17 67:11 rejects ^[1] 44:3 release ^[4] 20:25 21:5 53:8,9 relevant ^[2] 28:19 39:11 relic ^[1] 27:21 relief ^[13] 7:5 16:3 18:9,12,20 21:13 28:19,23 52:16 61:3 65:2,18 67:18 relies ^[1] 52:20 rely ^[1] 46:14 remedial ^[1] 50:17 remedies ^[6] 43:14 48:19,20 50:19 51:5,12 removed ^[1] 6:12 repeatedly ^[1] 15:16 replaced ^[1] 6:13 replacement ^[1] 7:16 reply ^[1] 7:3 repose ^[5] 10:13,19 22:17,19 33:16 repudiate ^[1] 59:5 request ^[2] 60:8,12 requested ^[1] 60:4 required ^[1] 60:25 requirement ^[2] 7:22 34:18 requires ^[4] 39:7,14 54:21 62:8 res ^[13] 5:1 7:14,20 18:24 34:14,15 40:10 41:19 53:12 55:12 59:6 63:8,9 resolution ^[3] 23:16 30:2,13 resolve ^[6] 27:4 28:9,10 29:22 30:5 57:6 resolved ^[4] 12:22 13:12,13 14:5 resolves ^[1] 3:12 respect ^[3] 5:21 13:18 51:18 Respectfully ^[2] 13:10 14:16 Respondent ^[24] 1:7,22 2:7 3:15 4:18 8:15,19 9:8 13:17 15:10 16:2 17:4 20:5,9 27:14 31:7 32:14 33:18 34:4 64:25 66:19 67:1,6,14 Respondent's ^[7] 3:17 9:23 10:1 17:12 25:2 27:17 65:21 response ^[5] 9:4 19:23 28:15 57:</p>	<p>15 59:23 rest ^[1] 43:16 Restatement ^[2] 6:11 64:5 rested ^[1] 3:21 restrictive ^[1] 38:11 restricts ^[1] 34:25 result ^[5] 10:10 33:8 48:16 58:21 67:20 results ^[1] 35:18 retroactively ^[1] 23:11 return ^[1] 53:19 reversed ^[2] 5:12 67:24 review ^[5] 16:15 17:10,19 26:24 27:15 rise ^[1] 36:10 Robbins ^[1] 43:12 ROBERTS ^[26] 3:3 5:13 6:15 8:8 11:20 15:8 19:4 23:2 26:11,15 29:9 32:17 33:25 36:1 38:2,21 40:17 44:1 47:9 50:11 53:16 56:12 59:15 63:1 64:15 68:1 room ^[1] 29:1 routes ^[1] 58:19 Rowe ^[1] 31:13 rule ^[26] 5:3,23 6:4 13:21 17:14 18:12 21:21 27:19,22 29:15 33:13 35:3,14,15,19 37:8 38:16,17 44:17,22 45:25 46:1 60:15,17 67:8,14 ruled ^[3] 21:23 57:11 58:16 Rules ^[2] 11:4 34:9 ruling ^[1] 37:24</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">S</p> <hr/> <p>same ^[39] 3:18,19 5:11,21 8:5 10:8,24 11:3 13:2 18:1,15 19:10,17 20:1,2 21:7 26:10 33:6,6 35:14 36:15 39:22 40:15 41:15,20,22 42:15 44:9,16 46:7 47:18,20 48:15 49:2 50:13 53:20 58:5 64:3 67:19 satisfied ^[3] 45:6,6,7 satisfy ^[4] 35:2 36:9 38:5 45:3 save ^[1] 57:11 saved ^[1] 22:14 saying ^[7] 10:16 22:3 24:21 43:19 50:14,16 66:12 says ^[14] 4:21 12:3,12 15:18 20:23 28:13 39:11 40:23 44:22 51:23 53:1 54:9,19 57:12 scenario ^[1] 41:20 second ^[5] 3:25 34:23 39:8 60:5 61:17 Section ^[34] 3:13 4:14 7:6,9 11:2,11 13:19 18:4 20:22 21:16 24:1 25:25 26:5 30:19 31:4,5 33:15 34:14,18,25 35:11 36:25 37:14 45:2 46:14,25 53:8 54:19 59:6 61:13 64:25 65:2,15 67:2 sections ^[1] 21:9 see ^[8] 6:6 7:6,15 12:20 15:2,5 31:8 58:17 seek ^[1] 10:5 seem ^[4] 36:19 53:24 55:21 58:22 seems ^[10] 6:23 8:17 21:3,22 29:21,25 49:9,16 54:15 56:1</p>	<p>Semtek ^[1] 31:17 sense ^[6] 18:5 22:13 24:13 33:8 36:19 50:15 sensible ^[2] 25:14 28:9 separate ^[8] 19:16 41:12 42:16 47:12 48:23 55:18 57:25 63:10 separately ^[5] 8:6,24 16:4 44:10,15 sequentially ^[1] 8:25 set ^[2] 25:20 45:12 sets ^[1] 37:2 settlement ^[1] 20:24 Seven ^[1] 17:1 Seventh ^[2] 23:8 46:15 several ^[2] 39:4 45:19 shall ^[4] 12:7 13:1 20:24 40:23 shared ^[1] 27:20 shifts ^[1] 4:20 shouldn't ^[5] 39:19 48:13 50:24 51:5 63:18 side ^[5] 4:17 7:14,14 17:15 48:9 significant ^[1] 66:10 Simmons ^[13] 4:7,20 15:22 27:21,24 30:4 34:13 46:9 48:13 57:23 58:9 66:1,15 simple ^[7] 33:20 35:16 57:5,7,8 62:3 63:6 simply ^[15] 4:12 6:25 17:10 32:14 37:6 40:8 41:18 46:14 51:22 58:8 59:5 60:3 61:9 66:9 67:4 simultaneously ^[4] 37:1 53:21 54:1 55:25 since ^[9] 8:22,22 10:1 40:9,14 47:5 51:10 63:7 67:9 single ^[10] 9:25 17:3 24:23 34:12,17 40:12 54:11,12,22 67:3 sit ^[1] 15:6 situation ^[3] 51:22 52:5 61:2 six ^[2] 35:2 46:18 Sixth ^[20] 3:20 4:4,8,18 30:11 39:18 47:14,23 48:6,7 57:18,21,23,25 60:14 63:15,23 64:12 65:5 66:17 slightly ^[1] 27:19 Smith ^[1] 15:23 soda ^[2] 51:24 52:6 Solicitor ^[1] 1:18 somebody ^[1] 24:9 somehow ^[1] 58:5 someone ^[1] 51:22 sometimes ^[1] 57:4 somewhat ^[2] 46:12 49:9 sorry ^[1] 21:25 sort ^[2] 10:22 23:10 Sotomayor ^[15] 19:6,7 20:12,19 21:17 22:9,12 26:20 27:18 47:10,11 48:1,25 50:1,8 sovereign ^[5] 18:8 30:1 37:2,16 61:14 speaks ^[1] 5:18 specific ^[1] 7:10 specifically ^[2] 22:20 45:24 split ^[2] 19:18 53:5 squarely ^[2] 4:7 66:2 stage ^[1] 60:16</p>	<p>stake ^[1] 62:3 standard ^[2] 38:11 44:20 standards ^[1] 35:17 standpoint ^[2] 8:2 48:11 start ^[1] 33:22 started ^[1] 20:21 state ^[6] 35:7,10 36:24 46:1 65:13,18 stated ^[1] 18:12 statement ^[1] 54:9 STATES ^[19] 1:1,15 3:23 10:5 18:7 21:1 33:2 36:15 41:3,13 42:7 50:18 55:16 60:22 61:6,21,22 66:1 67:16 stating ^[1] 58:10 statute ^[24] 5:15,18 7:14 15:24 24:14,16,19,20 25:1,15,16,17,19 29:24 35:8 36:6,9 37:17 39:7 41:2,5,8 42:6 52:16 statutes ^[1] 25:18 statutory ^[3] 4:24 28:2 32:22 stick ^[1] 25:3 still ^[6] 10:24 22:3 46:19 54:4 55:2 65:14 stop ^[4] 41:8 42:6 43:19 58:15 store ^[1] 51:23 straightforward ^[1] 33:14 striking ^[1] 9:24 subject ^[5] 3:19,25 13:2 37:10 40:13 submitted ^[3] 65:9 68:2,4 submitting ^[1] 30:1 subsequent ^[14] 5:2 6:5,10,13,20,25 7:16,23 29:3,5 55:18 57:12 59:12 67:7 substance ^[4] 14:22 31:11,16,20 substitute ^[2] 21:14 28:20 succeeds ^[1] 11:8 sue ^[10] 41:2,3,5,7,21 42:4,22 50:17 55:16 67:15 sufficient ^[3] 27:7 35:7 47:22 suggested ^[1] 30:12 suggesting ^[2] 25:13 58:21 suggests ^[1] 24:5 suing ^[2] 17:6 42:16 suit ^[3] 19:10 24:23 53:4 suits ^[2] 24:22 58:13 summarize ^[1] 28:14 summary ^[10] 18:22 29:18 33:2 60:7,8,10,17,20 61:5 65:7 support ^[1] 65:10 SUPREME ^[2] 1:1,14 surest ^[1] 65:21 surprising ^[1] 7:18 synonymous ^[3] 7:7 32:8 53:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">T</p> <hr/> <p>talked ^[1] 32:21 talks ^[1] 20:21 tells ^[1] 12:3 Tenth ^[1] 23:8 term ^[4] 7:4,6 21:11 28:17 test ^[1] 18:15 text ^[19] 3:11,17 4:14,24 9:18 11:</p>
---	---	--	--

Official - Subject to Final Review

<p>16 15:17 21:15 22:23 25:22 28:2, 24 30:18 32:22 34:7,13 57:12 66:2,24</p> <p>textual ^[1] 52:23</p> <p>theory ^[2] 36:2,18</p> <p>there's ^[20] 5:20 22:3 25:23 28:5, 25,25 31:10 39:20 42:17 43:4 45:15 49:21 50:8 53:5 57:20 58:7 62:2 63:17 66:10 67:4</p> <p>therefore ^[5] 11:11 23:25 37:8 64:4 65:19</p> <p>they've ^[1] 49:6</p> <p>Thomas ^[9] 8:10,11 9:6 10:21 11:19 38:23,24 40:1,16</p> <p>though ^[4] 8:17 18:25 46:21 49:24</p> <p>three ^[3] 36:22 60:2 64:17</p> <p>time's ^[1] 59:14</p> <p>time-confuse ^[1] 49:9</p> <p>together ^[16] 4:22 8:5,16,22 10:8 16:5 34:12,16 39:3,22 42:15 44:8 49:14 59:8 67:3,19</p> <p>traditional ^[2] 7:20 25:4</p> <p>treat ^[1] 30:8</p> <p>treated ^[1] 36:15</p> <p>trial ^[4] 44:16,19,23 59:25</p> <p>trigger ^[7] 4:1 30:14 32:4 35:3 37:13 38:20 45:11</p> <p>triggered ^[6] 13:16 14:25 27:23 32:12 64:24 65:25</p> <p>triggering ^[1] 25:23</p> <p>triggers ^[2] 18:24 32:10</p> <p>true ^[2] 20:13 52:18</p> <p>try ^[3] 17:17,18 49:13</p> <p>trying ^[3] 55:20 56:19,20</p> <p>turn ^[2] 24:14 33:5</p> <p>turned ^[1] 12:4</p> <p>turning ^[1] 24:7</p> <p>turns ^[2] 18:21 36:6</p> <p>two ^[10] 3:21 6:1 9:3 20:1 21:8 34:8 38:11 47:12 52:13 67:18</p> <p>tying ^[1] 7:9</p> <p>type ^[2] 6:7 18:9</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">U</p> <hr/> <p>U.S ^[1] 20:24</p> <p>un-confuse ^[1] 19:9</p> <p>unambiguous ^[2] 25:23 66:24</p> <p>unambiguously ^[1] 3:17</p> <p>under ^[48] 3:13 7:8 10:3 11:11 12:7 13:19 16:3 17:5,22 18:12,15 21:15 24:1 25:24 26:5 28:23 29:14 31:3,5 32:3 33:15 35:3,8,10,11,19 36:6,13,17 37:7 38:3,12 41:5,10 44:3 45:22,25 46:1 51:8 54:1 55:21 56:1 60:15 61:22 64:25 65:15 67:1,2</p> <p>understand ^[8] 23:18 24:6 38:3 52:1 56:18 59:13,18 61:7</p> <p>understanding ^[4] 24:3 28:25 37:19 41:11</p> <p>understandings ^[1] 38:12</p> <p>understands ^[1] 18:23</p> <p>understood ^[4] 52:9 55:15 65:7,12</p>	<p>undo ^[2] 23:9,11</p> <p>UNITED ^[19] 1:1,15 3:22 10:5 18:7 21:1 33:1 36:15 41:3,13 42:7 50:18 55:16 60:22 61:6,21,22 66:1 67:16</p> <p>unknown ^[1] 22:25</p> <p>unless ^[2] 35:6 50:8</p> <p>unrelated ^[1] 40:2</p> <p>until ^[3] 12:10 13:4 45:15</p> <p>unto ^[1] 27:7</p> <p>up ^[18] 8:13 22:8 26:18,20 32:18 39:17 44:23 45:6,7 47:2 48:2 50:19 58:8,18,25,25 59:14 63:2</p> <p>uses ^[1] 7:6</p> <p>using ^[2] 33:6 47:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">V</p> <hr/> <p>vacated ^[1] 11:9</p> <p>valid ^[1] 37:14</p> <p>variation ^[1] 49:19</p> <p>variations ^[1] 49:16</p> <p>vein ^[1] 50:13</p> <p>versus ^[5] 3:4 43:12,13 54:5 59:11</p> <p>view ^[5] 17:20 26:24 36:23 38:4 60:20</p> <p>Virginia ^[1] 1:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">W</p> <hr/> <p>waived ^[3] 9:11 18:8 37:1</p> <p>waiver ^[1] 54:7</p> <p>wanted ^[5] 10:15 13:4 21:20 22:18 28:7</p> <p>warrant ^[2] 17:10 27:14</p> <p>Washington ^[2] 1:10,19</p> <p>way ^[28] 6:17,17,24 9:9,20 17:13 21:24 24:11 26:3 28:9 30:2 33:2 37:4 38:18 46:19 47:3 49:21 50:15,20,25 51:6 53:5 55:24 57:3,17 64:8 65:21 67:4</p> <p>ways ^[3] 36:22 58:6,17</p> <p>weigh ^[1] 59:4</p> <p>welcome ^[1] 35:25</p> <p>Westfall ^[4] 22:14 43:10 50:4 51:9</p> <p>whatsoever ^[1] 14:20</p> <p>whenever ^[1] 36:16</p> <p>Whereas ^[1] 4:25</p> <p>Whereupon ^[1] 68:3</p> <p>whether ^[22] 5:9 8:4 9:10,10 15:11 16:4 18:7,10,11 24:3 27:22 30:3, 24 31:2 39:12 45:11 48:3 49:10, 11 54:14 59:19 61:9</p> <p>whole ^[1] 12:10</p> <p>Wilkie ^[1] 43:11</p> <p>will ^[14] 3:3 6:10 10:19 19:9 33:16 34:13 40:20 46:9 48:17,21,22 57:5 58:10,13</p> <p>win ^[9] 10:4 12:14 30:3 41:6 42:3 49:5,14 56:19 67:16</p> <p>wins ^[3] 17:15 27:24 60:22</p> <p>within ^[5] 24:22 35:6 54:10 56:23 57:3</p> <p>without ^[5] 4:16,23 10:15 32:3 37:23</p> <p>won ^[3] 12:4 49:6 60:20</p>	<p>wondering ^[1] 24:2</p> <p>word ^[12] 5:24 6:9,12 7:10,16,17 11:3 12:18 15:6,7,19 52:11</p> <p>words ^[4] 24:8 36:16 52:13 58:23</p> <p>works ^[2] 12:16 28:1</p> <p>worried ^[1] 42:25</p> <p>worry ^[1] 27:7</p> <p>worth ^[1] 18:20</p> <p>wrap ^[4] 22:7 23:15 32:18 63:2</p> <p>Wright ^[2] 54:9 64:4</p> <p>write ^[2] 24:17 25:18</p> <p>written ^[1] 52:17</p> <p>wrote ^[4] 5:6 21:12 25:16,17</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Y</p> <hr/> <p>years ^[3] 10:1 51:14 67:9</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Z</p> <hr/> <p>zero ^[1] 19:1</p>
--	--	--