

(ORDER LIST: 562 U.S.)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2010

**CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITION**

10-5464 PERKINS, SHERWIN V. AMMONS, WARDEN

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2010).

**ORDERS IN PENDING CASES**

10M44 MOSELEY, K. F. V. USDC D HI, ET AL.

10M45 ELDAGHAR, ASEM V. CITY OF NY DEPT. OF CITYWIDE

The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time are denied.

09-10876 BULLCOMING, DONALD V. NEW MEXICO

The motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel is granted. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Esquire, of Stanford, California, is appointed to serve as counsel for the petitioner in this case.

09-10896 CHRISTIAN, FRED E. V. FRANK BOMMARITO OLDSMOBILE, INC.

10-5586 JOHNSON, FRANK C. V. WILBUR, JOHN H., ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for reconsideration of orders denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied.

10-6283 ADAMS, BARRY V. HIGH PURITY SYSTEMS, ET AL.

10-6701 WIDEMAN, EUGENE V. COLORADO

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma*

*pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until November 29, 2010, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

**CERTIORARI DENIED**

09-1380 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, ET AL. V. WILLIAMS, KEVIN, ET AL.  
09-1490 GARCIA, GEORGE L. V. FLORIDA BAR  
09-1578 ALTUS FINANCE S.A., ET AL. V. SAFG RETIREMENT SERVICES, INC.  
09-10938 VOYLES, JOHN MARTIN V. HILL, SUPT., POWDER RIVER  
10-61 DWORKIN, STEVEN, ET AL. V. TAMBURO, JOHN F., ET AL.  
10-177 MILLER, LISA V. JENKINS, JANET  
10-317 MAWULAWDE, KWABENA V. BD. OF REGENTS UNIVERSITY OF GA  
10-319 HANKEY, JESSICA V. WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL.  
10-325 DUTTON, EDWARD L. V. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD, ET AL.  
10-350 DOE #11, JOHN, ET AL. V. SEBELIUS, SEC. OF H&HS  
10-358 ALLAN R. DUNN, M.D., ET AL. V. SZIRANYI, EVA G.  
10-359 PABLO-SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, ET AL. V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.  
10-361 ZHENG, XIUYING V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.  
10-370 STEWART, KATHLEEN V. AT&T, ET AL.  
10-391 LI, XIU FENG V. HOCK, DOUGLAS  
10-393 BAIRD, DANIEL R. V. BURLINGTON NO. & SANTE FE R. CO.  
10-407 GOULD, ANTHONY V. UNITED STATES  
10-465 SCOTT, WILLIAM S. V. FLORIDA BAR  
10-472 ALEMAN CARDENAL, ARNOLDO, ET AL. V. UNITED STATES  
10-480 KROCKA, VINCENT J. V. UNITED STATES  
10-488 ZAJANCAUSKAS, VLADAS V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.  
10-5113 WALKER, RONNIE D. V. THOMSEN, SCOTT E., ET AL.  
10-5195 GAGLIANO, TOMMY J. V. MAZUR-HART, STANLEY

10-5232 BOND, AQUIL V. PENNSYLVANIA  
10-5247 HUDGINS, WILLIAM V. UNITED STATES  
10-6253 WALKER, WALTER V. CATES, MATTHEWS  
10-6254 VINES, MONTRELL V. KANE, WARDEN  
10-6255 WASHINGTON, CHRISTOPHER E. V. EXPERIAN INC., ET AL.  
10-6263 NOONER, TERRICK T., ET AL. V. HOBBS, DIR., AR DOC  
10-6266 JONES, BRETT D. V. NEVADA  
10-6267 MARSHALL, CONNIE V. BOWLES, JERRY, ET AL.  
10-6273 WOOLRIDGE, JOSHUA T. V. GONZALES, WARDEN  
10-6274 BRADFIELD, MAX C. V. CORR. MEDICAL SERVICES, ET AL.  
10-6277 PEARSON, BILLY T. V. HERRON, CORR. ADM'R, SCOTLAND  
10-6280 MILLER, MAUREEN V. NEW YORK, NY  
10-6281 OSTOPOSIDES, RENNA V. BUNTING, DONALD, ET AL.  
10-6286 LAWLER, GREGORY P. V. HALL, WARDEN  
10-6292 LUA, JESUS V. MARTEL, WARDEN  
10-6293 McCASLIN, LATANYA V. BIRMINGHAM MUSEUM OF ART, ET AL.  
10-6298 SCHWIETERMAN, NICHOLAS V. OHIO  
10-6305 WATKINS, JOVAN V. MD DOC, ET AL.  
10-6306 LaBOY, PLACIDO V. ILLINOIS  
10-6307 LEWIS, BRANDON L. V. JOHNSON, DIR., VA DOC  
10-6308 VILLA, JORGE E. V. ARIZONA  
10-6309 WASHINGTON, DAVID J. V. HARRELSON, LOUIS, ET AL.  
10-6310 WEBB, DAVID V. KERN, JUDGE, ETC., ET AL.  
10-6312 LIGHTFOOT, PHILIP V. BURT, WARDEN  
10-6313 KAO, CHUNG V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.  
10-6317 MARSHALL, GREGORY V. FRIEND, ROBERT, ET AL.  
10-6359 WYNTER, ORVILLE V. NEW YORK  
10-6382 TURNER, COREY V. DZURENDA, WARDEN

10-6439 WASHINGTON, DAVID J. V. PROPES, LARRY W.  
10-6451 TOWERS, LUCRECIOUS V. ILLINOIS  
10-6473 PRICE, OLIVER V. SHEWALTER, WARDEN  
10-6477 CHAVEZ, BARBARA L. V. HENRY, WARDEN  
10-6479 WITHEROW, JOHN V. FARWELL, WARDEN, ET AL.  
10-6490 GREENE, CEDRIC V. KELLY SERVICES, INC.  
10-6518 HITCHCOCK, ALLEN V. JACKSON, WARDEN  
10-6523 FAIRLEY, OTIS V. PUCKETT, STEVE W.  
10-6524 GIBSON, DIMITRA A. V. CULLIVER, WARDEN, ET AL.  
10-6530 HUDSON, JOHNNY R. V. MICHIGAN  
10-6542 MARSHALL, CONNIE V. STAFFIERI, VIC, ET AL.  
10-6572 MONTERROSA, ROBERT V. PREMO, SUPT., OR  
10-6574 WILSON, RONNIE D. V. HURLEY, WARDEN  
10-6592 NUNNERY, MARTISE V. ILLINOIS  
10-6608 MISENHELTER, PAUL V. COLORADO  
10-6615 SALAMEH, MOHAMMAD V. CARLSON, PETER, ET AL.  
10-6651 HERNANDEZ, RAUL A. V. DUNCAN, WARDEN, ET AL.  
10-6665 CHAVEZ, CHARLES K. V. SKOLNIK, DIR., NV DOC, ET AL.  
10-6671 JACKSON, CLIFTON V. BOISE LOCOMOTIVE  
10-6705 TOWNSEND, OTHA E. V. KING, WARDEN, ET AL.  
10-6717 EBERT, JOHN V. GAETZ, WARDEN  
10-6718 CZARKOWSKI, KRYZSTOF B. V. MILLS, SUPT., TWO RIVERS  
10-6723 LINEBAUGH, HENRY C. V. PREMO, SUPT., OR  
10-6724 MANDARELLI, JOHN F. V. BARNHART, WARDEN  
10-6725 NORTON, MARK V. COLEMAN, SUPT., FAYETTE, ET AL.  
10-6737 JONES, MICHAEL L. V. LAFLER, WARDEN  
10-6752 SMITH, DARRELL E. V. WEST VIRGINIA  
10-6759 FERGUSSON, THOMAS J. V. COURSEY, SUPT., EASTERN OREGON

10-6769 TOWNSEL, ERIC V. QUINN, KEN, ET AL.  
10-6795 AMADOR-BELTRAN, ISMAEL V. UNITED STATES  
10-6823 ESTRADA-ELIVERIO, LUIS V. UNITED STATES  
10-6826 PARISH, EARL V. UNITED STATES  
10-6827 RIVERA-MORENO, RICARDO V. UNITED STATES  
10-6831 STITT, OTIS L. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6834 BEILHARZ, JOSEPH R. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6836 MONTGOMERY, ANTONIO M. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6838 LAWSON, ATHENS J. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6840 SNEED, LAMONT D. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6848 BELL, ERNESTO V. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6852 COX, EDDIE D. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6853 REED, WILLIE B. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6854 REID, HENRY L. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6856 ECCLESTON, SEBASTIAN L. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6858 TREVINO, JUAN A. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6860 BIRTHA, ANTHONY A. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6862 MULLINS, LaDONNA V. UNITED STATES  
10-6868 MAZZA-ALALUF, MAURICIO A. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6875 GRAJEDA, GERARDO V. UNITED STATES  
10-6876 ROSS, BILLY R. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6877 SANCHEZ-REBOLLAR, JOSE V. UNITED STATES  
10-6882 SHEPPARD, BRADLEY S. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6884 SANCHEZ, RUBEN O. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6896 RICHARDSON, KAREEM V. UNITED STATES  
10-6898 SALAZAR-AGUNDES, RAYMOND V. UNITED STATES  
10-6899 BELL, HAROLD E. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6901 STEPHENS, DAMON L. V. UNITED STATES

10-6904 HALL-DITCHFIELD, KATHLEEN E. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6906 GINGLEN, WILLIAM V. UNITED STATES  
10-6909 GUTIERREZ, RUBEN M. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6910 FARROW, MICHAEL V. JOHNS, WARDEN  
10-6917 HUGHES, DENYS R. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6922 YOUNG, LARRY A. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6925 WHISNANT, DOUGLAS V. UNITED STATES  
10-6926 AVILA-ANGUIANO, MARCIAL V. UNITED STATES  
10-6930 MEJIA, ALVARO A. V. UNITED STATES  
10-6943 BEY, JAMES H. V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

10-34 RYAN, DIR., AZ DOC V. ROBINSON, FRED L.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

10-318 MCKENNA, KEVIN H. V. NESTLE PURINA PETCARE CO.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

10-369 BALDWIN, STEVE, ET AL. V. SEBELIUS, SEC. OF H&HS, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment is denied.

10-6315 BERRYHILL, LaVERN V. HENRY, GOV. OF OK, ET AL.

10-6564 CORBIN, BILL A. V. FLORIDA, ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied, and the petitions for writs of certiorari are dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

10-6635 BROWN, TROY V. McDANIEL, WARDEN, ET AL.

10-6814 JORDAN, MARK V. UNITED STATES

10-6850 REED, BRYANT W. V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

10-6887 MERCADO, ISAIAH V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

#### **HABEAS CORPUS DENIED**

10-6937 IN RE JASON E. JONES

10-7026 IN RE WILLIAM R. JOHNSON

The petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.

10-6950 IN RE MICHAEL S. GORBIEY

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

#### **REHEARINGS DENIED**

09-11233 COULOMBE, JACKIE L. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.

09-11424 DAVIS, SABRINA D. V. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., ET AL.

09-11481 CRAIN, STEVEN V. HEIFNER, MATTHEW

10-5013 BROOKS, JOHN W. V. LUBBOCK CTY. HOSPITAL DIST.

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

#### **ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE**

D-2563 IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH COSMAS STEINKRAUSS

Joseph Cosmas Steinkrauss, of Medford, Massachusetts, having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys

permitted to the practice of law before this Court. The Rule to Show Cause, issued on October 4, 2010, is discharged.



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**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

**BILL K. WILSON, SUPERINTENDANT, INDIANA  
STATE PRISON v. JOSEPH E. CORCORAN**

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED  
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–91. Decided November 8, 2010

PER CURIAM.

Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law. Because the Court of Appeals granted the writ to respondent without finding such a violation, we vacate its judgment and remand.

\* \* \*

In 1997, respondent Joseph Corcoran shot and killed four men, including his brother and his sister’s fiancé. An Indiana jury found him guilty of four counts of murder, found the statutory aggravating circumstance of multiple murders, and unanimously recommended capital punishment. The trial judge agreed and sentenced respondent to death.

But on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana vacated the sentence out of concern that the trial judge might have violated Indiana law by relying partly on nonstatutory aggravating factors when imposing the death penalty. *Corcoran v. State*, 739 N. E. 2d 649, 657–658 (2000). When addressing respondent at sentencing, the trial court had remarked:

“[T]he knowing and intentional murders of four innocent people is an extremely heinous and aggravated crime. . . . I don’t think in the history of this county we’ve had a mass murderer such as yourself. It makes you, Mr. Corcoran, a very dangerous, evil mass murderer. And I am convinced in my heart of hearts,

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... if given the opportunity, you will murder again.”  
*Id.*, at 657 (quoting transcript).

According to the Indiana Supreme Court, the trial judge’s reference to the innocence of respondent’s victims, the heinousness of his offense, and his future dangerousness was not necessarily improper; it is permissible to provide “an appropriate context for consideration of the alleged aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted). But because the trial court might have meant that it weighed these factors as aggravating circumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court remanded for resentencing. See *ibid.*

On remand, the trial court issued a revised sentencing order. It wrote:

“The trial Court, in balancing the proved aggravators and mitigators, emphasizes to the Supreme Court that it only relied upon those proven statutory aggravators. The trial Court’s remarks at the sentencing hearing, and the language in the original sentencing order explain why such high weight was given to the statutory aggravator of multiple murder, and further support the trial Court’s personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and these crimes.” *Corcoran v. State*, 774 N. E. 2d 495, 498 (Ind. 2002) (quoting order).

On appeal, over respondent’s objection, the Supreme Court accepted this explanation and affirmed the sentence. *Id.*, at 498–499, 502. It explained that it was “now satisfied that the trial court has relied on only aggravators listed in Indiana Code §35–50–2–9(b). . . . There is no lack of clarity in [the trial court’s] statement and no plausible reason to believe it untrue.” *Id.*, at 499.

Respondent later applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus. His habeas petition asserted a number of

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grounds for relief, including a renewed claim that, notwithstanding its assurances to the contrary, the trial court improperly relied on nonstatutory aggravating factors when it resentenced him. Respondent also asserted that this reliance violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Record, Doc. 13, p. 11. In its response to the petition, the State specifically disputed that contention. *Id.*, Doc. 33, p. 16 (“[Respondent] fails to establish any constitutional deficiency in [the] Indiana Supreme Court’s review of the trial court’s treatment of Corcoran’s sentence on remand, let alone does it show that the state supreme court’s judgment is in any way inconsistent with applicable United States Supreme Court precedent”).

The District Court, however, had no need to resolve this dispute because it granted habeas relief on a wholly different ground: that an offer by the prosecutor to take the death penalty off the table in exchange for a waiver of a jury trial had violated the Sixth Amendment. *Corcoran v. Buss*, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 725–726 (2007). It did not address the sentencing challenge because that was “rendered moot” by the grant of habeas relief. *Id.*, at 734.

The State appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s Sixth Amendment ruling. *Corcoran v. Buss*, 551 F. 3d 703, 712, 714 (2008). Then, evidently overlooking respondent’s remaining sentencing claims, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the District Court “with instructions to deny the writ.” *Id.*, at 714. To correct this oversight, we granted certiorari and vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment. *Corcoran v. Levenhagen*, 558 U. S. 1 (2009) (*per curiam*). We explained that the Court of Appeals “should have permitted the District Court to consider Corcoran’s unresolved challenges to his death sentence on remand, or should have itself explained why such consideration was unnecessary.” *Id.*, at \_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 2).

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On remand—and without any opportunity for briefing by the parties—the Court of Appeals changed course and *granted* habeas relief. *Corcoran v. Levenhagen*, 593 F. 3d 547, 555 (2010). After determining that respondent’s sentencing challenge had been waived by his failure to include it in his original cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the claim satisfied plain-error review. *Id.*, at 551. The panel explained that, “unlike the Indiana Supreme Court,” it was unsatisfied with the trial court’s representation that it relied only on aggravating factors authorized by Indiana law. *Ibid.* Because the trial court’s revised sentencing order said that it used the nonstatutory factors of heinousness, victims’ innocence, and future dangerousness to determine the weight given to the aggravator of multiple murders, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Indiana Supreme Court had made an “unreasonable determination of the facts” when it accepted the trial court’s representation that it did not rely on those factors as aggravating circumstances. *Ibid.* (quoting 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2)). The panel therefore required the Indiana trial court to reconsider its sentencing determination in order to “prevent non-compliance with Indiana law.” 593 F. 3d, at 552–553.

But it is only noncompliance with *federal* law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(a). And we have repeatedly held that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting *Lewis v. Jeffers*, 497 U. S. 764, 780 (1990)). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” 502 U. S., at 67–68. But here, the panel’s

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opinion contained no hint that it thought the violation of Indiana law it had unearthed also entailed the infringement of any federal right. Not only did the court frame respondent's claim as whether "the Indiana trial court considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances . . . in contravention of *state law*," 593 F. 3d, at 551 (emphasis added), it also explicitly acknowledged that "[n]othing in [its] opinion prevents Indiana from adopting a rule permitting the use of non-statutory aggravators in the death sentence selection process. *See Zant v. Stephens*, 462 U. S. 862, 878 (1983) (permitting their use under federal law)," *id.*, at 551–552 (citations omitted).

Nor did it suffice for the Court of Appeals to find an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). That provision allows habeas petitioners to avoid the bar to habeas relief imposed with respect to federal claims adjudicated on the merits in state court by showing that the state court's decision was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." It does not repeal the command of §2254(a) that habeas relief may be afforded to a state prisoner "only on the ground" that his custody violates federal law.

In response to the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the State filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The State's petition argued that the Seventh Circuit had erred by granting relief in the absence of a federal violation. It also contended, on the authority of our opinion in *Wainwright v. Goode*, 464 U. S. 78 (1983) (*per curiam*), that the Court of Appeals erred by second-guessing the Indiana Supreme Court's factual determination that its own trial court complied with Indiana law.

The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing, but amended its opinion to include this language:

"This [remand for resentencing] will cure the state trial court's 'unreasonable determination of the facts.'

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28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) [*sic*]. (It will also prevent non-compliance with Indiana law. [Corcoran] contended that, under the circumstances of this case, noncompliance with state law also violates the federal Constitution and thus warrants him relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). [The State] has not advanced any contrary argument based on *Wainwright v. Goode*, 464 U. S. 78 (1983), or any similar decision.)” App. to Pet. for Cert. 144a–145a.

The amendment did not cure the defect. It is not enough to note that a habeas petitioner *asserts* the existence of a constitutional violation; unless the federal court agrees with that assertion, it may not grant relief. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion reflects no such agreement, nor does it even articulate what federal right was allegedly infringed. In fact, as to one possible federal claim, the court maintains that it would *not* violate federal law for Indiana to adopt a rule authorizing what the trial court did. 593 F. 3d, at 551–552.

In lieu of finding or even describing a constitutional error, the amended opinion says only that the State had not “advanced any contrary argument based on *Wainwright v. Goode* . . . or any similar decision.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 145a. It is not clear what this language was meant to convey. It cannot have meant that the State forfeited the position that respondent’s allegations do not state a constitutional violation, since (as we observed) the State explicitly disputed that point before the District Court—the last forum in which the subject had been raised, leading the Court of Appeals to conclude that *respondent* had waived the claim entirely. 593 F. 3d, at 551. And there is no suggestion that the State has ever *conceded* the existence of a federal right to be sentenced in accordance with Indiana law. Under those circumstances, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ

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without first concluding that a violation of federal law had been established.

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no view about the merits of the habeas petition.

*It is so ordered.*